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This thesis deals with the ethical questions surrounding the development of new 
technology from the perspective of Christian theology. It is comprised of two parts. 
Part I establishes that contemporary attempts to direct the development of new 
technology rely on ethical theories which systematically exclude relevant considerations. 
It traces Martin Heidegger's critique of such thought, which is then examined and 
elaborated by two of his interpreters, George Grant and Michel Foucault. 
Heidegger speculates that the failings of modern ethical deliberation about 
technology reflect a deficit in conventional assumptions about the practical and social 
nature of all human action and knowing. Grant illustrates how this conceptual deficit 
leads to a univocity of practice which impoverishes social, political and technical 
practice. Foucault illustrates similar points by noting how technological practice 
undermines the human capacity for moral deliberation. 
Part II attempts to develop a Christian description of the social and embedded 
nature of all human action which is rich enough to guide deliberation about new 
technology and is grounded in the reconciling and transforming work of God. It 
elaborates themes in Part I via the work of Bernd Wannenwetsch, Karl Barth and 
Augustine of Hippo. 
Wannenwetsch argues that in worship we take part in a practice of praise and 
reconciliation which has a range of practical implications, including the transformation of 
several aspects of political life described in Part I. Barth meets the search of Part I for 
materiality itself to claim and shape our working by contending that in understanding how 
Sabbath specifies the doctrine of creation we may properly integrate our engagement with 
the material world (creation), our life with God, and human society. In a final chapter 
Augustine's doctrine of the two cities provides the framework for understanding 
technology as guise of pride. In addition, this genealogy is reformulated via Barth's 
Trinitarian ontology to indicate how technologies may also be understood as part of 
God's work of redemption. 
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Introduction: Deciding to Make the World New 
Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing 
when we unchained this earth from its sun? Where is it moving to now? Where 
are we moving to? ... 
God is dead! 
... 
And we have killed him! ... who will wipe 
this blood from us?... What festivals of atonement, what holy games will we 
have to invent for ourselves? ... Do we not ourselves have to become gods 
merely to appear worthy of it? 
Friedrich Nietzsche' 
It was perfectly clear to Friedrich Nietzsche that humans are not static entities but 
are beings on the way, beings shaped by perceptions and beliefs about their present and 
future relations. This thesis will not attempt to reestablish the psychological security 
Nietzsche tore away by asking about the death of God, but inquires with Nietzsche into 
the trajectory of human movement. This thesis asks the questions: To where are we 
moving? And, How do we dwell in our present? with a particular emphasis on decision- 
making about new technologies. The answers we find through this type of inquiry, 
Nietzsche believes, will shape and reshape our present behavior as we come to more fully 
know ourselves. The way these questions are asked and answered in contemporary moral 
deliberation about new technology will be outlined in this first chapter and will serve to 
focus the examination of contemporary life in the ensuing study. 
In the course of that study we will often return to another aspect of Nietzsche's 
question: Who are the humans who dwell with [or are] gods, and what are they making? 
An initial image, found in first century Ephesus, serves to focus our imagination. We see 
a man, alone in a rather dark space, patiently toiling over a tool to shape a small piece of 
glittering metal. Through his patient scraping and burnishing an object is drawn forth 
from mind and hand. His happy concentration on the intricately engraved silver is broken 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, ed. 
Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff, poems trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), bk. 3.125: 120. 
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by the interruption of the local gossip. Returning with a grimace to his work as the 
annoying chatter begins, Demetrius' disengagement turns to anger upon hearing that, 
"Paul was speaking out again today against Artemis. " After another meandering few 
minutes of conversation, Demetrius dismisses the gossip and with a troubled brow returns 
to the fine and satisfying work of engraving. But a rising tide of irritation spoils his usual 
enjoyment of craftsmanship. Demetrius asks himself, "Do not we bring good to the 
people by constructing Artemis shrines? If Paul opposes our shrines, will he next oppose 
our engraved silver plate? " Yet the present impact on business of Paul's agitation is all 
too clear. At length Demetrius' angry perplexity gives way to resolution: "This 
questioning of our livelihood must stop, even if I myself must call a meeting to decide 
how us silversmiths will deal with this threat to our livelihoods. "2 
This ancient image might be paired with a contemporary analogue. Instead of a 
dark workroom, the scene is now a bright, window-encircled boardroom overlooking a 
sprawling city, where ten men in suits are seated around a long table deliberating about 
business strategy. Unlike Demetrius, their hands are not blackened by the manufacture 
process, because their words alone set to work the hands and machinery of a vast 
enterprise. We might find such groups in any number of similar buildings, and their remit 
is largely the same across the industrialized world: to produce computers, credit cards, 
petroleum, biotech products, national security, the whole panoply of manufactured goods, 
services and government. They steer a course for the future, shifting in the arrangements 
of funds, infrastructure and labor under their control, with the intent to rearrange the 
internal organization of their concerns and the products these concerns release into wider 
society. Within the limits of their resources, legal, and market constraints, such boards are 
free to act as they see fit to produce what they consider to be the most beneficial state of 
affairs for the entity they govern. 
With such important decisions at stake, each board member naturally intends to 
pursue his work with conscientious meticulousness, thinking to himself he will do 
nothing rashly, confident in his own "prudence and considerateness whenever the safety 
of others is committed to my care. " If at times the task demands exploratory or sweeping 
2 Acts 19: 23-27. 
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rearrangement of the social or material arrangements of society they must not risk the 
welfare of their corporations with practical paralysis, but must at all times be sure of their 
own commitment to benevolence. Thus each man must be able to say to himself with a 
clear conscience, "[I] will not rashly encounter danger. I will be cool, persevering, and 
prudent. ,3 
Demetrius the silversmith and our ten managers bear a clear awareness of their 
duties as part of the decision-making organ of a manufacturing concern. Among the many 
differences between the two forms of manufacture are their modes of deliberation about 
how to direct these concerns. Modern corporate and state managers have developed a 
highly formal method of moral deliberation in the hopes of maximizing the possible 
welfare they may produce by their decisions. Yet we cannot help but wonder: Does the 
presence of Christ, which caused Paul to so disturb the silversmiths of Ephesus, also 
break into and claim our ten men's deliberation? 
New Technology, the Manager and the Language of Technology Assessment 
In order to ask whether contemporary deliberation about new technology might be 
interrupted and claimed by the creating and redeeming God, close attention must be paid 
to the lineaments of that deliberation. In our age the process of deliberating about and 
implementing new technologies has become a science in itself. 
According to Ernest Braun4 this science, known as technology assessment (TA), 
was coalesced at the request of the United States Congress, who systematized the diverse 
3 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein: Or, The Modern Prometheus (London: David Campbell Publishers Ltd., 
1992), 9,11. Lest it appear to be a gratuitous slur to place the portentous words of Shelley's scientist on the 
lips of corporate and government managers, we might note that the "Bill Gates of Biotech" made the claim 
himself by referring to his work creating artificial life in these terms: "Shelley would have loved this! " 
Quoted in Kevin Davies, The Sequence: Inside the Race for the Human Genome (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 2001), 110. 
4 "Despite the fact that [technology assessment and environmental impact assessment are] widely practiced 
throughout the globe, there is no generally accepted approach to which the terms `technology assessment' 
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methods of making investment decisions of private firms. In the 1950 sand 1960, s; 
Congress faced increasing pressure to coordinate national policy on technology. In 1972 it 
set up the Office of Technology Assessment to provide objective reports about the 
potential impacts of new technologies, so that development options could be prioritized to 
maximize investment and return. So conceived, TA served strategic planning on the 
assumption that technology is one of if not the principle weapon for both strategic and 
tactical maneuvering among competing entities. 5 An important linkage comes into view 
with this assumption: deeper tactical connections between the seemingly disparate 
projects of scientific exploration and technological "application", both of which are a 
function of policy objectives formulated and funded by managers. Many historical studies 
have traced the subsumption of science and invention conceived as free academic or 
entrepreneurial pursuits into managerial culture of industry and government. A watershed 
in this shift was the rise of the large techno-scientific projects of the second World War. 
Understanding this, we can see development of TA in 1972 as the maturation and 
rationalization of this shift in the culture of invention. 6 
Stated formally, TA is "a systematic attempt to foresee the consequences of 
introducing a particular technology in all spheres it is likely to interact with. "7 Therefore, 
and `environmental impact analysis' refer. " K. S. Shrader-Frechette, Science Policy, Ethics, and Economic 
Methodology: Some Problems of Technology Assessment and Environmental-Impact Analysis (Dordrecht, 
Holland: D. Reidel Company, 1985), 12. In a field in which no clear spokesperson represents a consensus 
view, Braun's study (Ernest Braun, Technology in Context: Technology Assessment for Managers (London: 
Routledge, 1998) ) is a lucid and representative treatment of the central currents of a mature but not 
solidified discourse. Several journals are devoted to debating the details of the method, including 
Technology Assessment and The International Journal of Technology Assessment in Healthcare. The moral 
framework grounding the method is utilitarian consequentialism, which assumes the idealist maxim that the 
good can be impartially or "rationally" defined (either procedurally or by content) and thus costs and 
benefits can be balanced to reach an expedient political decision. See Shrader-Frechette, Science Policy, 
chapter two. 
5 Braun, Technology in Context, 26-30,55-57. 
6 Mary Jo Nye, Before Big Science: The Pursuit of Modern Chemistry and Physics, 1800-1940 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
7 Braun, Technology in Context, 28. 
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continues Braun, TA is concerned with "what effect different present actions and 
decisions might have upon the future. "8 The task it sets itself is to understand the 
differing effects of incremental and radical innovations, to anticipate and plan for wide- 
ranging systematic changes in specific technology systems, and to foresee large-scale 
shifts in the general technological paradigm of society. 9 
Conceived as a social science, TA aims to be as objective as possible in 
presenting a balanced view of the possible futures a nation or company faces. Those who 
assess technology, Braun claims, "do not offer advice of the kind `this ought to be done', 
but only of the kind `if you wish to achieve this and that, the following instruments are at 
your disposal and may prove effective. "'10 Whether in this specific case in this specific 
society we choose to inhabit or forego the future latent in a particular technology can only 
be a decision we make as part of the political process, claims Braun. "Technology 
assessment and democratic politics is as near as we can get to the ideal. "11 
In practical terms TA bears a close relation to dominant forms of economic 
science, attempting to produce a set of mathematical cost-benefit curves which have 
meaningful purchase on actual human behavior in the future. The methods of 
extrapolation, expert opinion, mathematical modeling, cost-benefit analysis, and cross- 
impact or environmental impact analysis are combined to create the most accurate picture 
possible of the future impacts of technology. Risk-cost-benefit analysis is the preeminent 
technique in this battery of conceptual and empirical tools, because it can deal with the 
widest number of variables and is favored by private industry because it emphasizes 
profit as a prime determinant in decision-making. 12 Such a method intends not only to 
rule out investments in new technologies which will not produce a dividend, but to 
indicate opportunities when the introduction of a new technology may be especially 
8 Braun, Technology in Context, 109. 
9 Braun, Technology in Context, 14-15. 
10 Braun, Technolog y in Context, 38. 
11 Braun, Technolog y in Context, 157. 
12 Shrader-Frechette, Science Policy, 14-15. 
12 
profitable. 13 However, because TA deals with inherently unpredictable human social 
behaviors, in the end, Braun concludes, "Perhaps TA is more an attitude than a method- 
the attitude of attempting to take a holistic view of technology within its broad social 
setting. " 14 
The Conceptual and Moral Commitments of Technology Assessment 
It is important to outline the basic commitments of TA as these will indicate a 
form of social grammar which will receive critical analysis in the course of this study. 
TA's subject is technology, understood as both a mode of production and the thing 
produced and used. As a thing produced, the focus of TA is technology defined as a 
combination of material artifacts (hardware) and the codified knowledge (software) which 
is immediately associated with it, the classic example being a railway system. Braun 
includes in his definition of technology those rules and procedures which are directly 
related to the operation of the technical system such as train scheduling, and maintenance 
procedures, but not those which are more peripheral, such as financial management, ticket 
sales or catering. '5 
Because technologies by definition intertwine with social systems, "We do know 
that technology will change and develop, " Braun says, "but we do not know either the 
pace or the details of such developments. "16 Two major forces are accountable for this 
development. The first is the internal logic of science and technology-there is always 
more for science to discover, and technology to improve. The second force is economic. 
"Technology and its efficient use have come to take pride of place among the ingredients 
that determine competitive advantage and economic success of nations and enterprises. " 17 
13 Ernest Braun, "Methods Useful in Technology Assessment, " chapter five in Technology in Context. 
14 Braun, Technology in Context, 108. 
15 Braun, Technology in Context, 8-9,12. 
16 Braun, Technology in Context, 109. 
17 Braun, Technology in Context, 13. 
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The manager's task is to foresee the shape of future developments in order to assure the 
competitive success of nations and corporations by knowing which technologies should 
be the subject of investment. Technology itself is understood to be neutral, capable of 
being used for good or ill, Braun says, and "How it is used depends largely on how it is 
managed, and to manage it well we need to look upon it with as broad and far-reaching a 
perspective as possible. " 18 For the technology assessor the world is full of tangible but 
abstract social forces, amidst which strategic planning "is an attempt to steer a large 
organization toward a desired goal, instead of allowing it to be buffeted hither and thither 
by external forces. The steering can have only limited success, as external forces can 
neither be eliminated nor entirely predicted. Yet some success is attainable, and worth the 
effort. "19 
Braun warns that in the titanic struggle to steer a large organization in a complex 
social arena, managers must understand that the uncompetitive will suffer extinction. 
Thus their first priority must be the maintenance of a minimal level of profit, or capital 
improvement. Yet maintaining this minimum is complicated because there are limits to 
how this may be accomplished. For instance, a polluting corporation, or a nation who is 
seen to trade unfairly will lose trading power in the marketplace. Thus as a modification 
of the basic priority of survival managers must maintain their company's or nation's 
reputation for valuing those who cannot be protected, which includes the poor but means 
primarily a valuation of the truly voiceless, the environment. 20 
Not only is there a question of reputation at stake, Braun continues. Corporate or 
national managers are also the guardians of the public interest, and their aim must be to 
foster and control technology so as to maximize benefit and minimize harm to all who are 
impacted by their decisions. Again, the definition of benefits and harms are questions 
which can be resolved only by political agreement. Developed Western nations currently 
agree on basic minimum standards of harm: light, noise, smell, heat pollution, and the 
degradation of the environment are all of sufficient public concern to warrant their 
18 Braun, Technology in Context, 1. 
19 Braun, Technology in Context, 55. 
20 Braun, Technology in Context, 83-84,90. 
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inclusion as a significant cost of any new technology which exacerbates them. 21 Yet 
Braun articulates the consensus in the field of TA, arguing that the horizon is limitless in 
solving these social problems: "Problems are here to be solved, not to defeat us. But to 
solve them, some cherished old patterns of thought and habit may have to be 
discarded. , 22 
The change in labor practices entailed in the introduction of a new technology also 
modifies the central focus on corporate survival, for policy makers have a responsibility 
to mitigate as much as possible the problems of deskilling and unemployment that 
technological change may create. Such responsibility is limited, indicates Braun, by the 
awareness that whole economic systems, which are the responsibility of the government 
policy makers, lie outside the scope of corporate managers, limiting their ability to protect 
labor. 23 Globalization creates a host of problems for the manager trying to steer a 
corporate entity, and thus a practical realism is in order. "Not only can advanced 
economies not hope to compete with developing countries in the production of 
undifferentiated staple products, they are powerless to protect the most oppressed workers 
and the most abused environments ... 
This is not to say that employment in developing 
countries should be put in jeopardy-they need it badly-but that action against abuse of 
workers and against environmental degradation should be taken wherever possible. , 24 
While it is important for legislators to address the basic social and environmental 
problems which we all face, the best that corporate or government managers can hope for 
is a rational and politically acceptable balance of benefit and harm when implementing a 
new technology. 
Braun indicates that the final consideration which the manager must take into 
account is the importance of optimizing the pace of technological change. Mangers must 
on one hand stay sufficiently abreast of new developments, but more importantly must 
also limit the rate of technological change, because when it proceeds too quickly 
21 Braun, Technology in Context, 77-78. Cf. chapter four, "Contemporary Problems in Technology. " 
22 Braun, Technology in Context, 93. 
23 Braun, Technology in Context, 102. 
24 Braun, Technology in Context, 104. 
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investment in production technologies is not recouped. Research and development costs 
jump to keep up with increasing innovation, waste increases with the necessary disposal 
of obsolete goods, and workers and consumers become disoriented by excess novelty. 
Each effect is counter-productive in the struggle for corporate survival. 25 
TA presumes that negative effects of too rapid deployment of new technologies 
are minimized by making sure that a given new technology is needed. A portion of this 
need is in the consumer sector, but the problem here, Braun admits, is that much 
consumer demand is manufactured by marketing and advertising. Thus much consumer 
demand could be said to more directly serve the "need" of the producer than the 
consumer. More obviously concrete need is represented by the common good, or interests 
such as the underprivileged or the environment which do not have direct representation in 
the decision-making of the market. 26 
In summary, Braun understands TA to be a political tool based on a form of moral 
deliberation designed for the managers of business and the policy formers of nations. It 
coordinates the actions of the firm or nation so as to serve the tactical interests of that 
entity. Managing the technical change the entity undergoes is only part of this task, but an 
integral and critical part of its long-term health. Managers must also consider objective 
criteriof real need and social utility in order to value those public goods not protected 
by market forces, rather than just making a strictly profit-based calculation. 27 
Braun's presentation of the conceptual framework of TA is by no means unique, 
and therefore represents well the way contemporary managers conceive their attempts to 
think the future. The form their deliberation takes is a response to the questions put to 
them by TA, and thus they might be said to be "being together in what is understood. " 28 
The question of this thesis is whether TA is encouraging our ten men to ask the right 
questions. 
25 Braun, Technology in Context, 105. 
26 Braun, Technology in Context, 105-107. 
27 Braun, Technology in Context, 5,106-107. 
28 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: 
State University of New York Press, 1996), 153-154. 
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Christian Perspectives on Technology Assessment 
Imagining that one of our ten men were to search for literature analyzing and 
critiquing these presuppositions from a Christian perspective or giving practical guidance 
about making such decisions in a Christian way, what might he find? If he were involved 
in making decisions about a narrow range of high profile, media-worthy topics such as 
biomedicine, ecology, animal welfare, information technology or weapons, he would find 
a wealth of studies suggesting the desirability of one or another course of action, in some 
cases utilizing theological reasoning and others recounting technical details and 
indicating "ethical issues" that might arise. 29 He might also turn to the literature on 
Christian business ethics, but would find that it is focused on questions of truth telling 
and deception, employee/employer relations, environmental impacts and property 
ownership policies. 30 While these particular discussions of individual questions would 
undoubtedly help to frame a limited range of TA inquiries, they vary widely in their 
theological method and do not directly question the ethical system which TA assumes, 
nor would they provide a framework for dealing with questions outside the narrow scope 
of their particular questions. 
In searching for more general treatments he might find approaches which agree 
that technology must progress and which argue, on more or less Christian grounds, that 
only theology can posit the values toward which it is directed. This position will be 
29 Compare as an example of these two forms of study Oliver O'Donovan, Begotten or Made? (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984) with Thomas A. Shannon, Made in Whose Image: Genetic En ineering and 
Christian Ethics (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 1999). 
30 Alexander Hill, Just Business: Christian Ethics for the Marketplace (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster Press, 
1998). Richard Chewning et al., Business Through yes of Faith (Leicester: Apollos, 1992) These 
Christian treatments vary little in material focus from secular treatments such as Elaine Sternberg, Just 
Business: Business Ethics in Action, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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referred to in the next chapter as the humanist understanding of technology. 31 Of studies 
which directly address procedures for making decisions about any new technology, he 
would find a wealth of sympathetic and sophisticated practical and theoretical 
philosophical discussion. 32 He might also discover the less sophisticated analysis and 
theology of Ian Barbour's thinly Christianized TA. 33 While these two projects aim to 
validate the status quo, Responsible Technology emerges from the Dutch Calvinist 
tradition and makes an eloquent protest against the narrowness of the decision-making 
frameworks of TA by attempting to develop a set of wider considerations which should 
influence good, Christian design. 34 This project most resembles Responsible Technology, 
despite my attempt to make explicit theological reasoning play a more prominent role 
than is apparent in this Herman Dooyeweerd-influenced account. 
The Plan of the Project 
This chapter looked briefly at two examples of moral deliberation about the 
practice of manufacture, an ancient silversmith and a modern boardroom, to expose the 
presuppositions guiding modern deliberation about the implementation of new 
technologies. In Part II of this study we will look in depth at another set of practices, the 
worship of the Christian church, and try to link those practices with the form of moral 
deliberation it calls forth. The contrast which the study will establish and examine is the 
comparison of the logics of the boardroom and the worship service, and the extent to 
31 For a Christian version see C. A. Coulson, Science, Technology and the Christian (London: Epworth 
Press, 1960). For a pragmatist/Rawlsian liberal version see Paul A. Alcorn, Practical Ethics for a 
Technological World (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001). These will be referred to as 
humanist because they assume that technology is simply a tool needing well-defined objectives for their use 
which humans must conscientiously supply. 
32 See Shrader-Frechette, Science Policy. 
33 See Ian G. Barbour, Ethics in an Age of Technology (The Gifford Lectures 1989-1991, Vol. 2) (London: 
SCM Press Ltd., 1992), especially chapters eight and nine. 
34 Stephen V. Monsma et al., Responsible Technology: A Christian Perspective (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
William B. Eerdmans, 1986). 
18 
which they are mutually reinforcing or call one another into question. I will argue that in 
talking about these narrower social spheres (the activities of boardroom and worship 
service) we are in fact discussing the logic of our action as a whole. My contention is that 
our whole form of life can be made explicit in relation to technology by asking how it 
meshes or clashes with the logic of these two settings. 
It is important to emphasize the presupposition of this study that the service of 
worship and the practices of the boardroom meeting are both contexts in which our form 
of life as human beings rises before us as explicit questions: Who are we and where are 
we going? How will we dwell on this earth? These questions encompass both theory and 
practice. Decisions about technology are not only "theory" but also practice, as the 
Christian life is not simply assent to dogmas. By pointing to the practices of the 
boardroom and the worship service I emphasize that decisions about how we will live 
cannot only make reference to theory. In worship we make explicit in a moment of our 
living the meaning and context of theology as part of life which takes refuge under God's 
wings. 35 We are questioned and our action gives answers, or, we might also say, here we 
see the ways our lives enflesh a vision of humanity. 
One type of answer to this questioning is examined in Part I, the outlines of which 
have begun to emerge in our examination of the logic of the corporate boardroom. Here 
humanity questions its surroundings to discern possibilities for action, conceiving its 
context to be a chaotic one upon which it acts in order to bring about a secure future. Here 
moral being and moral deliberation assume a specific and describable shape in which 
technology plays a central role and from which issue technological artifacts coherent with 
its logic. 
The primary task of Part I will be to trace Martin Heidegger's response to such 
thought along with two of his many interpreters, George Grant and Michel Foucault. All 
share the common desire to elucidate how human beings ought to live in the world, and 
the presupposition that good living in the world is superior to the denuding, exploitative, 
corrupting way of dwelling. They establish that the dilemmas of TA are false dilemmas 
which cause us to lose sight of wider and more destructive rifts in the contemporary way 
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of life by bringing clarity to the claim that we do not simply make technology: it is the 
Western way of living in the world. 
Part I establishes that technology has this much wider range of implications than 
contemporary moral deliberation about new technologies typically recognizes. Thus any 
moral theory which hopes to adequately analyze new technology must also address these 
wider frames of reference. Part II sets out how worship is a practice in this "thick" sense, 
making it a rival to the technological way of being in every sphere of human action. The 
task of Part II is to describe this second form of human action which begins with the 
transformation of humanity represented by and sustained in the gathering and 
worshipping of the Christian community. This community gathers together because it 
believes it has been gathered, and in this gathering it perceives itself as questioned and 
reformed as it seeks to actively participate in this reformation. Here God's transformation 
of humanity is celebrated, and a renewal of life issues in a growing appreciation of a new 
way of relating to other people and to creation. This reconciled and reconciling logic of 
life shapes the worshipping community's understandings and practical relations to 
technological artifacts, inevitably conflicting with the way of being laid out in Part I. 
The argument of Part II begins by defending the assertion that Christian moral 
theology cannot serve any ethical methodology, but can only point to its authority, the 
person of Jesus Christ. This means that the critical analysis of Part I will be understood as 
an anticipatory exploration whose insights are taken up in dialogue by the theological 
discussion of Part II. There is no strict correlation of content between Parts I and H. 
Part II begins from the practice of worship explicated by Bernd Wannenwetsch. 
This practice is the central practice of human redemption, the impact of which on human 
political relations is outlined in chapter four. In chapter five worship is re-examined 
through the work of Karl Barth as the practice of Sabbath, and the ethical implications for 
our relations with ontological order are set out. Chapters four and five develop a material 
description of the ethical contours of redeemed life, illustrated by outlining the ways the 
two approaches differ in their response to particular social practices. Finally, Augustine 
35 Psalm 91: 4. 
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and Barth are paired to set up a genealogy of technology, re-narrating technology as good 
and evil for the purpose of situating contemporary deliberation about new technology. 
It is also important to note that the subject of this study is human action: the 
development of a diagnosis of its present shape and the construction of the basic outlines 
of a normative, Christian description of what it is called to be. Such an attempt is based 
on the claim of faith that only through the worship of the living Trinitarian God are we 
questioned in a way which leads to salvation. Here alone may we discover our true being, 
ceasing our wandering to be given wholeness. This means that the house of God is the 
true home of humanity, because here alone are we definitely taught what it means to live 
within the other moments of God's action. Here we may understand that God has 
revealed His being first in His dealings with Israel and then in Christ, precisely in order 
that we may rightly live within the cosmos of His creation. 
To grasp that right living in the house of creation is known most definitively in 
the house of worship is the work of divine grace. The content of this work is both the 
shattering blow of the cross and the renewal of life which is resurrection and Sabbath. In 
this Word to humanity we may learn that technology cannot displace reliance on God's 
grace, meaning it must not become itself a false home. In the house of worship God tells 
humanity that it does not need to frantically create a home because it has already been 
housed by a gracious Creator. The fear of having to create meaning and shelter is already 
to wander the path of darkness. 
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PART I: NEGATIVE THEOLOGY 
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Chapter One: Martin Heidegger on Technology as a Way of Life 
Human territory is defined least of all by physical frontiers. 
John Fowles36 
The technology assessor's analysis of technology is typical in understanding the 
problem of technology (insofar as problems arise) to be the problem of optimal control. 
Such a position might be called an instrumentalist view. This view is characterized by the 
resolution to make technology more faithfully serve the ends it has been designated to 
serve by reconfiguring its properties in order to curb the problem of "autonomous" or 
uncontrolled technologies. This might include such attempts as prioritizing the use of 
hand tools over power tools, 37 or engineering for the prevention of accidents rather than 
the traditional focus on mechanical efficiency. 38 
A contrasting position regards the problem of technology to be the clarification of 
the proper ends it should serve, protesting that the tools of technology have not been 
directed by humans toward good ends. We might label this position humanist, which 
resolves to put the human will in order by positing good ends, vowing, for instance, to 
focus technological development on service to the marginalized, or by stressing that its 39 
36 John Fowles, The Magus, quoted in Gregory J. E. Rawlins, Slaves of the Machine: The Ouickening of 
Computer Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997), 63. 
37 Ivan Illich, Tools For Conviviality (New York: Harper & Row, 1973). Cf. also Langdon Winner, 
Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: 
The MIT Press, 1977). 
38 See Robert Pool, Beyond Engineering: How Society Shapes Technology (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), chapter nine. 
39 Karl Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age, trans. [from German] Eden and Cedar Paul (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul Ltd., 1966). 
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windfall be equitably distributed, 40 more ecologically sensitive, 41 or more highly valuing 
of individual difference and therefore less coercive. 42 
For Heidegger, both solutions are not only dead ends but also make the 
technological predicament deeper because they leave untouched an essential examination 
of more basic assumptions out of which our technological predicament has grown. The 
purpose of this chapter will be not to develop a full exposition or critical analysis of 
Heidegger's work, but to allow his thought on the topic of technology to shed light on the 
modern way of being. In the context of this study, he anchors the redescription of the 
practices of our ten men which is the purpose of Part I. I trace Heidegger's nuanced 
definition of technology which exposes the way our usual thought about technology is 
reductive and therefore short-sighted. Heidegger argues that technology is not "things we 
make" but is "the way we live", and if ignorant of this our technological rationality will 
come increasingly to characterize our relations with all things culminating in 
understanding humanity itself as a raw material. 
In arguing this case Heidegger traces several moments in the rise of the 
technological way of being embodied in the instrumentalist and humanist positions. He 
shows that the groundwork for the modern way of being was laid in ancient history, but 
that the flowering of these early cultural innovations went through successive stages to 
produce the highly technologized practices of our age. His criticism of the instrumentalist 
and humanist positions also entails a critique of the thought structure of Enlightenment 
rationality which both take for granted. Having traced this background development of 
Heidegger's explicit thinking about technology, I explore how Heidegger's late view of 
technology avoids what he claims are the oversimplifications of the instrumentalist and 
40 Cf. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes, intro. Ernest Mandel 
(London: Penguin Books, 1976). 
41 Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, trans. 
Hans Jonas with David Herr (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984). 
42 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, intro. 
Douglas Kellner (London: Routledge, 1964). 
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humanist solutions, while maintaining that his solution has both internal problems and 
theological mistakes which our remaining chapters will attempt to rectify. 
I take from Heidegger's analysis a critique of the usual modes of talking about 
how technology should be "guided". I further indicate that his "metaphysic", which sees 
thought, action, and making as an indissoluble unity in order to grasp technological 
activity in a "thick" way, might prove, on further thought, to be indispensable to a 
properly theological account. 
The Encompassing Reality of World: Beyond Idealism and Empiricism 
Heidegger's philosophy, upon which his criticism of the instrumentalist and 
humanist solutions to the problem of technology are built, grows out of a critique of 
German Idealism. Heidegger censures Descartes, whose "I think therefore I am" 
represents for him the pure idealist position in which true knowledge is graspable by the 
solitary subject without reference to phenomenological investigation. This neo-Platonism 
claims that we can only know things we encounter because they conform to a concept 
43 which deductive logic has provided for the rational agent. 
But, Heidegger counters, in order to apply any ideal description of a thing to an 
object in lived existence we must first assume that we do receive some information about 
the substance of that thing which enables us to connect it to the ideal logical schema from 
which Descartes claims to know the world. The fact that Descartes cannot but rely on the 
receipt of phenomenological data provided by things themselves which is not contained 
in logical ideas reveals the insufficiency of idealism as an explanation of cognition. 44 
Heidegger's counter-proposal is that true cognition is built up in the moments 
when the properties of things themselves disrupt our regular patterns of cognition. Instead 
of understanding the disclosure of things to be a purely top-down project of inference, 
Heidegger holds that not only must we have ideas to guide our exploration of the world, 
43 Heidegger, Being and Time, 8-9. 
44 Heidegger, Being and Time, 92. 
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but that these ideas are formed and reformed by the process of things in themselves 
emerging and revealing themselves not to be in conformity with our thought schemas. It 
is the unforeseen emergence of that which is hidden in our normal ways of looking at 
things which is the possibility of knowing things in themselves, and the memory of such 
disturbances establishes our cognitive frameworks. 45 So all things, we can assume, must 
have both a part of their being which we recognize because they conform to our 
expectations of how things are, and an unrecognizable part, which is invisible as a part of 
being which is outside of the categories whereby we might know it. 
Because it disavows this unrecognized aspect of the ontological, pure idealism 
must be repudiated, and this means that we must revise Descartes' cogito ergo sum. 
Heidegger begins his philosophy not with the thinking being, but with the sheltering, 
eating, communicating being embedded in activity and learning. Rather than begin our 
search for truth in the rarefied air of solitary contemplation, we must begin by 
understanding that for things to appear to us at all, they must have been discovered as 
things which are relevant to our own lived existence. Things become relevant to us 
through a web of interconnected human communication and our individual need for food 
and shelter. The totality of the web of thoughts, communications and habitual behaviors 
within which we receive the frameworks of thought through which we explore things, 
Heidegger calls world. 46 
The term `world' makes explicit the myriad of ways our practical behavior and 
our theoretical behavior are inextricably intertwined. Many if not most of our daily 
practices proceed without any reference to theory. Yet we are able to abstractly theorize 
about objects and our practices, and thus arises the possibility of explicit knowledge. 
Heidegger insists, however, that the basic level of our encounter with all things is within 
the categories of usability and from this the possibility of theoretical thought arises. We 
' Heidegger, Being and Time, 70. This might also be understood as a reformulation of idealism. Cf. 
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, paragraph 109. 
46 Heidegger, Being and Time, 78-81. 
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discover the forest because it is timber, the wind because it is in our sails, but these things 
only appear to us at all because we have learned to use them in these ways. 47 
According to Heidegger, the signings of language are the conduit for the exchange 
of this knowledge of things and their usefulness. We gesture in our communication to 
regions of being which may be useful to others or, more basically, we discover the world 
because others have gestured to us and we have come to understand regions of being as 
useful to us. Communication is not really comprehended until it draws us into its world, 
orienting us to our environment, helping us to understand what is useful for our 
sustenance. Human communication brings us to share in the totality of useful things so 
that the being which is nearest us becomes visible to us in its beneficiality to us. Signs 
explicitly indicate the relevance of the things we encounter, and implicitly inculcate the 
habits and practices of our contemporaries in which we participate, so mediating world to 
us. 48 
If world is the semiotic and praxological context in which we learn to relate 
ourselves to things and people, Heidegger continues, then care is the self-interested 
concern which draws us into relations with things and people. We are always with others, 
and the other can only be encountered as part of world. The other is not first encountered 
because I already have a prior self-understanding from which I posit other beings in 
differentiation from myself. Only gradually does the child become aware that it is an I, 
and that the other is a you because the I and the you care for different sets of things. Even 
farther from us is the he, who is "over there" and thus even less related to the set of things 
that I care about. In this way Heidegger constructs an understanding of existential 
spatiality. The I is the being whose concerns are closest to me, the you with his or her 
concerns are understandable to me, and within the range of my ongoing attention, and the 
47 Heidegger, Being and Time, 65-66. This thought produces problems for his understanding of technology, 
to which we will return. 
48 Heidegger, Being and Time, 74. As one commentator notes, cultural practices are an "... implicit 
pedagogy, capable of instilling a whole cosmology, an ethic, a metaphysic, a political philosophy, through 
injunctions as insignificant as `stand up straight' or `don't hold your knife in your left hand. "' Paul 
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they stand at the periphery of my attention; their cares and my cares are distinct, and their 
being occupies my attention only rarely. Yet whether recognized or not, this existential 
spatiality allows me to recognize that the they is present with me in the artifacts that their 
hands have produced which I live in, put on, and eat. In turn my action affects their life 
because it alters the world they and I share. I am always present to the other via my action 
and words as the other is present with me, yet it is essential to our taking this interaction 
seriously that we bring to explicit awareness the many levels of this interaction. 49 
Heidegger agrees with Descartes that philosophy cannot avoid beginning with an 
I, and this I is the being toward whom I gesture when I mean myself. Yet, unlike the 
Cartesian self-reference, this gesture does not yet define others but simply notes the place 
from which all examination within world must begin, the durative locus for this 
exploration. This self is always concerned with its own possibilities, and thus is wrapped 
up in its own cares. In this sense, "care of the self' is a tautological phrase. 
5° We both 
care to be engaged in knowing things because we care for the self, and yet all that we 
know about this care is given to us by others. 
Death and the Possibility of Transcendent Thought 
Having leveled such a critique of Descartes, has Heidegger locked himself in a 
tautologous cycle of endless immanence without the possibility of transformative 
transcendence? Heidegger is well aware of Descartes' quest for a transcendent foundation 
for truth, but insists that by making transcendent ideals the beginning and end of truth the 
real world is disallowed a role in human cognition. How then does Heidegger escape 
from the implication that we can never think anything other than what other people think? 
Matthews, The Revelation of Nature (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2001), 110, quoting 
Pierre 
Adieu. 
a9 Heidegger, Being and Time, 112-13. 
so Heidegger, Being and Time, 293. This phrase comes to anchor the phase of Foucault's work examining 
how we shape ourselves which is examined in chapter three. 
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He does so by examining the phenomenon of death, the inherent temporal aspect of the 
limit of the self. 
Because knowledge arises in the context of world, Heidegger believes that the 
basic human problem is proper individuation. Philosophy can reveal when an over- 
identification with the other leads to acting and seeing in ways prescribed by the masses. 
This unwarranted solidarity with contemporary thought and practice means that public 
opinion is granted a solidity which refuses any investigation of the reality of being itself. 
Thus world is allowed to establish our identity and choose for us the possibilities of our 
own being. In each present moment our understanding of truth is grounded not in things 
as they are but in the public view of things because we are closed to the truth of things 
themselves. 5' 
Heidegger refers to this being defined by the masses as averageness or 
inauthenticity-for it systematically repudiates the being's ability to care for its own 
interests as an individual rather than being told what to care for in ways which may 
ultimately obscure the truth. The only way to break out of the sway of averageness is to 
transcend our enmeshment in the other to establish a self. This may be accomplished by 
coming to understand our true otherness from world by contemplating the death which is 
irrevocably unique, ours. By grasping the individuating import of our own death we are 
enabled to perceive world anew, and the possibility arises that we may allow other beings 
to exist for their own potential being, rather than simply for our own ends. 52 Michael 
Gelven situates this attempt to ground transcendence in finitude within the tradition of 
idealism, which Heidegger modifies by following Nietzsche's radically immanent 
grounding of epistemology. 53 
Dying alone, Heidegger says, helps us to see that we exist in our own particular 
place, not the generic nowhere which the public view pushes upon us. Yet we have been 
enabled to transcend this particular place not by taking an eternal viewpoint, but by 
51 Heidegger, Being and Time, 119,182. 
52 Heidegger, Being and Time, 274. 
53 Michael Gelven, A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 203 
204. 
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allowing our finitude, with its past, present, and future to really affect us, urging on us a 
different view of the possibilities of the present. Having come to know that we must be 
born in a single setting (past) and proceed to an utterly unique end (death) we are able, 
Heidegger contends, to resolutely insist on our individuality against the public view 
which is always enmeshed in the present. This enmeshment in the present is characterized 
by fear and anxiousness as the inauthentic feel themselves being carried into an unknown 
future, or a pallid lack of emotion as the individual gives him or herself over to world 
without any resistance. While seeing our individual death clearly may lead to angst about 
being so deeply shaped by the many, tempting us to simply relax into its oblivion, this 
angst may also be put to good use in leading us to the hope that we may successfully 
achieve a state of self-possession of our being. 54 
Heidegger later critiques this focus on the individual as too strong, arguing that 
the individual's freedom to imagine other possibilities for existence must be limited by 
tradition and the material world. In chapter four I will maintain that theologically we must 
say that we are saved through a movement toward proper communion rather than out of 
an improper communion into individuation. Yet Heidegger correctly emphasizes the 
importance of finitude, context, and communal speech for human knowledge, indicating 
also the importance of eschatological vision as transformative, a framework which will 
have important implications for his (and my) understanding of technology. But before we 
examine Heidegger's response to the problem of technology, we must examine what he 
thinks technology is. 
The Birth and Ascent of the Modern Technological Way of Being 
Technology is not an object or set of objects, nor a way of handling objects with 
tools, but a way of being with all things, Heidegger contends. This way of being, he says, 
has roots in humble practices like the measurement of time. From the beginning of human 
history human events were regulated according to the movements of the greater and lesser 
54 Heidegger, Being and Time, 311-312,317. 
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lights of the heavens. Time was public in this way, forming the substrate of any given 
individual's perception of all things. 55 
This public time could be referenced by simple measurements such as the place of 
the sun in the sky or the length of shadows. Yet time measured by the rhythms of the day 
and the heavens gave way to a measure which does not depend on these rhythms, and thus 
directed humans to new understandings of time understood as abstract and 
interchangeable units. The way moderns experience the present has come to be located 
within world in a new way which is as "obvious" to us as was the casual glance at the sky 
was for primitive humanity. For Heidegger's purposes the essential difference between the 
two was that while both situate our experience of the present in the time of the public 
realm, abstract time sets up a global and simultaneous grid over human action which 
devalues to the point of obliteration the time-measuring aspect of the previous 
coordinates. 56 
The sun dial was a manufactured artifact which assumed the time-measuring 
technique of glancing at the sky by making this glance more accurate. But mechanical 
clocks severed time measurement from any direct reference to the diurnal cycle because 
they assumed a public view of time as a standardized unit. With the clock time is made 
public in such a way that the profile of time as a sequence of identical "vows" is given 
precedence over time as a unique part of a unique day of the year. The point of this 
observation is not that the latter is an illegitimate way of measuring time, but that each 
means of measuring time shifts the experience of world and thus perception of all 
reality. 57 
The effect on perception of this abstraction of time lies behind formal discussions 
of epistemology because they shape our practical activity. For the first time, time can be 
55 Heidegger, Being and Time, 380-381. 
56 Heidegger, Being and Time, 381-382. 
57 Heidegger, Being and Time, 382-385. This makes eastern (Chinese) and western (monastic) attempts to 
make clocks which measure the days according to the seasonally variable hours of daylight and darkness 
particularly interesting in that they modified the machines of time keeping rather than foregoing the 
connection with the "natural" arbiters of time. 
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"objectively understood" as a sequence of vows passing away and arriving in a 
continuous flow, creating the popular understanding of time as a "flux" of nows, or as a 
"course of time. " Heidegger has been striving to displace this undifferentiated measure of 
time by arguing that if time is existentially conceived as the succession of our caring for 
things in which one thing must follow another, then at a basic level each thing has unique 
temporal significance. The abstraction of clock time is fruitful for certain ways of 
thinking even as it strips lived time of both datability and significance. But this common 
modern understanding of time, which takes abstract time to be "real" and the existential 
reality of human communion to be less real, cannot make sense of the relation of time to 
world and human significance. These relationships have been covered over by the 
abstract conception of time. Being covered over, the real significance of time as the 
sequence of human beings caring for things is obscured in favor of an understanding of 
time as that arena in which humans enter life and grasp possibilities before their 
expiration. So clocks are both emblematic of and necessary to modern technology, which, 
Lorenzo Simpson comments, both depends on and is spurred by the clock. Thus, "... we 
can begin to see how the clock as a representation of time as linear, as irreversible, as the 
bearer of the irretrievable, is a key to the technological phenomenon. "58 The clock is the 
machine which embodies and sustains the abstract form of public time which obscures 
the temporal significance of our being-together. 59 
Heidegger uses this example of the clock to point to something profound 
happening in human thought. His basic observation is that "modern science is 
mathematical. From Kant comes the oft-quoted but still little understood sentence, 
`However, I maintain that in any particular doctrine of nature only so much genuine 
science can be found as there is mathematics to be found in it. "'60 Mathematics proper 
(geometry, etc. ) relies on a deeper experience of reality, an experience which can be 
58 Lorenzo C. Simpson, Technology, Time and the Conversations of Modernity (New York: Routledge, 
1995), 23. 
59 Heidegger, Being and Time, 386-387. 
60 Heidegger, "Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics, " in Basic Writings: From Being and Time 
(1927) to the Task of Thinkin (1964), 1964), ed. and trans. David F. Krell (London: Routledge, 1993), 273. 
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learned, a way of experiencing, which can be expressed in mathematics proper. So 
`mathematics' can have two meanings: what we learn through this manner of inquiry and 
the manner in which we learn it. The Greeks grasped the essence of this learning, and the 
construction of the mechanical clock marked the point in human history when this 
esoteric learning became public for the first time, so hastening its application to regions 
of human experience hitherto regulated and marked by other measures. 61 
Having traced the earliest stages of the rise of the mathematical, Heidegger 
contends that the most systematic and creative culmination of the mathematical 
metaphysic was Isaac Newton's Phil osophia Naturalis Principia Mathematica of 1686-87. 
This text inaugurated the age of modem science, as Newton brings to explicit statement a 
philosophical presupposition which had been hovering in the tradition, most obviously in 
the work of Galileo. This first principle, the principle of inertia, states, "Every body 
continues in its state of rest, or uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to 
change that state by force impressed upon it. " Now accepted as self-evident truth, this law 
was until Galileo's time not only unknown, but, Heidegger contends, most regions of 
nature and being were experienced in such a way that the axiom would have appeared 
senseless. 62 
In the west to this point, Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy had been ascendant, 
in which, a moving body was considered to be seeking its rightful place amidst a layered 
universe in which the earth stood at the center, water upon it, air around the whole, and 
fire in the heavens. Thus all things could be observed to move regularly toward their 
natural resting point, either in straight or, in the case of stars, circular lines. Circular 
movement was considered the perfect movement because it exhibited a change which 
returns to its beginning and is its own place, while linear movement was a deviation from 
61 Heidegger, "Modern Science, " 273-278. Heidegger's understanding of the roots of technology does, in 
fact, square with the historical evidence. Cf. Marshall Clagett, Greek Science in Antiquity (London: 
Abelard-Schuman Ltd., 1957), 3-3 1. 
62 Heidegger, "Modern Science, " 279-280. 
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this perfect movement. In addition, bodies which moved in straight lines were 
ontologically inferior to bodies that moved in circles. 63 
But, Heidegger argues, Newton reversed this whole cosmology. 64 Within this 
radical shift in metaphysical perspective are eight novel assertions. First, all being is 
asserted to be homogenous, discarding the division of the universe into earthly and 
celestial bodies. Second, the priority of circular heavenly motion over linear motion 
disappears, and though straight lines become decisive Newton refuses to divide bodies on 
the basis of their kinds of motion. Third, the notion of "proper place" disappears. Place is 
no longer where a thing belongs, but a position related to other positions. For the first 
time we may investigate why things do not travel in a straight line, making circular 
motion the anomaly to be explained. Fourth, motion is no longer a characteristic of the 
composition of a substance but is determined by an extrinsic variable related to the law of 
linear motion. Thus force goes from being understood as originating from within a thing 
to an energy which impacts a thing from outside, causing linear progress to deviate. Fifth, 
motion is no longer investigated as a displacement from position but becomes generic and 
measurable, a change paralleled by the transformation of nomenclature from the term 
weight to mass. Sixth, this change means that the difference between natural and violent 
motion against nature are eliminated, making all motion measurable in generic units. 65 
The seventh and eighth novelties are critical. 
7. Therefore, the concept of nature in general changes. Nature is no longer the inner principle out 
of which the motion of the body follows; rather, nature is the mode of the variety of the changing 
relative positions of bodies, the manner in which they are present in space and time, which 
themselves are domains of possible positional orders and determinations of order and have no 
special traits anywhere. 
63 Heidegger, "Modern Science, " 284-286. 
64 For what follows, see "Modern Science, " 274-294. 
65 Heidegger, "Modern Science, " 286-287. 
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8. Thereby the manner of questioning nature also changes and, in a certain respect, becomes the 
reverse. 
66 
The popular belief that modem science is based on solidly testable experience is 
here exposed to be covering a highly interpretative activity. Having disavowed the more 
poetic science of medieval Scholasticism, with its roots firmly in the integrated moral and 
natural knowledge of Greek philosophy, modem science has at its center a law describing 
the motion of a body which does not exist. 67 "It demands a fundamental representation of 
things that contradict the ordinary, " notes Oliva Blanchette, who continues, "Ancient 
metaphysics started from being in its concrete actuality, not from an abstract name for 
some objectified real essence. It considered being as a subject of consideration in 
experience, not as a formal object separated from experience or what Kant would later 
refer to as an unknowable noumenal object. "68 Because it was so extraordinary, this 
newly explicit metaphysic required long controversy to bring it to power. Galileo dropped 
differently weighted balls in Pisa and attempted to explain the difference in their fall 
(even though the experimental evidence contradicted his theory) not by making reference 
to the nature of the falling objects but by reference to the resistance of the medium 
through which they fell. This theory was the antecedent to Newton's, Heidegger points 
out, and already contains the idealistic heart of modem science. "In his Discorsi, which 
appeared in 1638, Galileo said: `I think of a body thrown in a horizontal plane and every 
obstacle excluded... the motion of the body over this plane would be uniform and 
perpetual if the place were extended infinitely. , 69 The most important move in this 
formulation is the "to think in the mind" in which all bodies are alike, no motion is 
66 Heidegger, "Modern Science, " 288. Point seven is particularly laden with implications when we 
understand that the Aristotelian definition of motion also grounds Aristotle's moral philosophy on which the 
Christian tradition based its most influential account of virtue ethics. Cf. Aquinas Summa Theologiae, Part 
I, Q5 A8. 
67 Heidegger, "Modern Science, " 289. 
68 Oliva Blanchette, "Suarez and the Essentialism of Heidegger, " in The Review of Metaphysics 53 
(September 1999): 1: 209,11. 
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special, and thus all change in motion is a deviation from a basic blueprint of the motion 
of a point of mass. 
Now Heidegger can outline the essence of the mathematical, the way of being in 
the world from which modern technology springs: 
1) It is a mental projection which skips over certain perceptions in order to open another 
domain from the obvious one in which things generally show themselves. 
2) This projection posits beforehand what things are to be understood as, and how they 
are to be evaluated, setting up axiomatic propositions about the way things are. 
3) These axioms anticipate in advance the structure of everything and its relation to 
every other thing. 
4) The nature of a thing is laid out for the future to encompass all knowable objects. 
Bodies are now things existing in the context of uniform space-time context of 
motion. 
5) Now nature so described requires a mode of access appropriate to these axiomatically 
predetermined objects. Preconditions are proposed by which things are said to show 
themselves and the inquiry is predetermined by the outline of this project. This 
determines the shape of the modem experiment. "Upon the basis of the mathematical, 
the experientia becomes the modem experiment. Modem science is experimental 
because of the mathematical project. 1170 
6) Because this project establishes the uniformity of all beings, it requires a universal 
and uniform measure. 
The new form of modem science did not arise because mathematics became an essential 
determinant. Rather, that mathematics, and a particular kind of mathematics, could come into 
play and had to come into play is a consequence of the mathematical project. The founding of 
analytical geometry by Descartes, the founding of the infinitesimal calculus by Newton, the 
simultaneous founding of the differential calculus by Leibniz-all these novelties, this 
70 Heidegger, "Modern Science, " 292. 
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mathematical in a narrower sense, first became possible and above all necessary on the grounds 
of the basically mathematical character of thinking. 71 
This new view of the world, with its reversed mode of perception, is not yet a description 
of science, but is an outline of a fundamental change in the way that questions were 
posed, laws established, and new regions of beings disclosed, Heidegger concludes. 
Because it is such a way of perceiving all things, it now becomes possible for the first 
time to act out the absurdity of applying the mathematical to solve the problems caused 
by seeing all things mathematically. 
The Rise of Mathematical Thinking as a World View 
According to Heidegger this absurdity becomes possible with the total dominance 
of the mathematical which results from the collapse of other orienting schemas. Prior to 
the early modern emergence of the mathematical, authoritative truth was grounded in the 
church and faith and was conceived as a relation between symbols and values, with 
natural knowledge having no independent intelligibility or grounds outside of this 
framework. In one historian's words, 
The highest object in the city was the church spire which pointed toward heaven and dominated 
all the lesser buildings, as the church dominated their hopes and fears. Space was divided 
arbitrarily to represent the seven virtues or the twelve apostles or the ten commandments or the 
trinity. Without constant symbolic reference to the fables and myths of Christianity the rationale 
of medieval space would collapse. 72 
But mathematics provided the negative condition for the severing of thinking from this 
symbolic world. In the mathematical project truth is grounded by reference to internally 
coherent principles. It is no coincidence that a generation after Galileo Descartes 
71 Heidegger, "Modern Science, " 293. 
72 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilisation (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1947), 18. 
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developed a philosophy which, by contemplating the essence of the mathematical, came 
to understand the self-grounding axioms of mathematics to be the warrant for all true 
knowledge. 73 Heidegger notes that Descartes' "simultaneous advance in the direction of a 
foundation of mathematics and of a reflection on metaphysics above all characterizes his 
fundamental philosophical position. "74 
In Regulae ad directionem ingenii Descartes explicitly enunciates the basic 
mathematical/metaphysical character of all modem knowing. Here we do not intuit or 
directly perceive knowledge, but extract it by deploying a rational method. Method is not 
one component, but the primary component which establishes what beings may emerge. 
And method, Descartes tells us, must begin not with stories or images but with the 
simplest propositions, making the axiom the basic foundation upon which everything else 
is based in insightful order. Because mathematical knowledge has been set up as the 
principle of all knowledge, all knowledge is now questioned, whether previously tenable 
or not. 
Descartes does not doubt because he is a skeptic; rather, he must become a doubter because he 
posits the mathematical as the absolute ground and seeks for all knowledge on a foundation that 
will be in accord with it. It is a question not only of finding a fundamental law for the realm of 
nature, but finding the very first and highest basic principle for the Being of beings in general. 
This absolutely mathematical principLC cannot have anything in front of it and cannot allow what 
might be given to it beforehand. 75 
With this formulation Descartes solidifies the inversion of the knower and the 
known. 
Until Descartes, every thing at hand for itself was a "subject"; but now the "I" becomes the 
special subject, that with regard to which all the remaining things first determine themselves as 
73 Heidegger, "Modern Science, " 295-297. Thus Descartes re-integrated moral and natural knowledge to 
create a unified philosophy of all things to complete the replacement of the Greek view. 
74 Heidegger, "Modern Science, " 299. 
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such. Because-mathematically-they first receive their thingness only through the founding 
relation to the highest principle and its "subject" (I), they are essentially such as stand as 
something else in relation to the "subject, " which lie over against it as objectum. The things 
themselves become "objects. "76 
Heidegger levels the obvious accusation: this is a new and radical non-openness to 
beings. What is posited and spoken cannot speak against what posits and speaks it. 
Michael Inwood summarizes this non-openness: 
The modern experiment essentially involves `exact' measurement. Objects are shorn of their 
essences and regarded as mere individuals conforming to mathematical regularities. These 
regularities determine in advance what counts as objective. Scientists do not conduct exact 
experiments to discover whether nature conforms to mathematical regularities; they do so 
because they presuppose a projection of nature as mathematical. Experimental in this sense is 
quite different from 'experience': `science becomes rational-mathematical, i. e. in the highest 
sense not experimental'. `Experiment' and `experience' were once contrasted with the medieval 
practice of examining authorities and previous opinions. Now they are contrasted with mere 
observation and description, guided by no mathematical anticipation. 77 
Heidegger's hope is that the hegemony of this "mathematical anticipation" of all 
things may be reversed so that a true openness to other humans and material otherness 
can be recovered. But if modern science has been such a boon to humanity, bringing new 
health and prosperity the globe over, then what objections can he have to the reversal in 
human self-perception which grounds it? Part of the task of substantiating Heidegger's 
claims will be to indicate the encroachment of the mathematical way of being into realms 
where it impoverishes our relations with one another and creation. The following two 
chapters will examine examples of the totalizing tendency of the mathematical in its 
76 Heidegger, "Modern Science, " 303. 
77 Michael Inwood, "Experience, " from A Heidegger Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1999), 
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connection with the dilemmas of technological life. We return now, however, to consider 
Heidegger's solution to such dilemmas of the mathematical way of being. 
Can We "Tame" Technology? Technology as a Way of Being in the World 
This chapter began by pointing out that technology has usually been understood in 
one of two ways. Instrumentalists resolve to make technology serve the ends humans 
have chosen for it, and humanists resolve to posit good ends. 78 But if technology is 
understood in the broad sense that Heidegger has outlined, then we can no more legislate 
against its misuse than we can "get it intelligently in hand. " The problem lies in both 
positions' assumption that technology is simply a "tool. " How then does Heidegger 
intend to resolve the practical questions which first led us to examine our deliberation 
about new technologies? 
Having stressed the situatedness and communal texture of all knowledge, 
Heidegger returns to reformulate the question of technology. He uses the example of a 
hammer which is said to be "too light" to show the tendency of certain types of 
knowledge to hide the communal and ontological context of knowing. Such a statement 
may point to the consideration that too much force is required to drive in a nail, and thus 
the hammer is functionally inadequate. But it may also imply that the hammer always has 
the property of weight, exerting a pressure upon what lies beneath it. Speaking about the 
hammer in this generic sense of weight, however, severs it from its context of meaning to 
which the "too" of "too light" refers. These two ways of interpreting our statement are 
thus seen as entirely different but intimately related ways of conceiving the being of the 
hammer. The statement that the hammer is attracted by gravity abstracts the hammer from 
its position in a world of useful things for human sustenance in favor of a relative 
measurement of position, time and mass, giving it a designation as a generic point 
distinguishable only mathematically from any other. Here a hammer may only be heavier 
than a feather and lighter than a planet. What is decisive about the mathematical view of 
78 Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology, " in Basic Writings, 312-313. 
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nature is again not primarily the mathematical element as such, but the fact that the 
project discloses a priori and in its own way. 79 
But, Heidegger protests, the understanding of the hammer as mass cannot become 
the public definition of the term weight because it both obscures the hammer as a 
constructed object and as an object which we comment upon because it is relevant for our 
life projects. While the transcendence and abstraction afforded by the concept of mass 
may be useful and legitimate, for this reason it cannot become our basic category for 
exploring our surroundings. This observation, one commentator explains, does not mean 
Heidegger has the intention of "lower[ing] the status of science, as some might feel, for 
science belongs to the general range of authentic understanding. What Heidegger does 
wish to lower, however, are mistaken views as to what constitutes the methodology of 
science (the positivists), and those who take technique as a mode of life. "80 The abstract 
framework of the mathematical is only possible because there is a way of being with 
things which is stable and "practical, " our everyday being with things in the world of their 
use. Within the lived experience of practical life, things before us always take on a 
hierarchy of importance, and only because this primal level exists may we pursue the 
abstractions of science. 81 
Heidegger explains then, that such an existential concept of science tries to 
explain the origins of the theoretical mode of human behavior. This is distinct from the 
"logical" understanding of science which defines it in terms of its predictive capability. 
Saying that scientific behavior is a way of being-in-the-world makes it clear that science 
cannot be purely descriptive and theoretical, but is a set of human practices where 
theoretical and practical behaviors are connected in definable ways. 82 
The point of this distinction is that when we see things "as" something, this seeing 
already carries within it a projected world and implies a teleology. We must say then, that 
if the existing subject is the ground of our investigation, then the subject's world is the 
79 Heidegger, Being and Time, 330-331. 
80 Gelven, A Commentary, 200-201. 
81 Heidegger, Being and Time, 332-334. 
82 Heidegger, Beingrand Time, 327. 
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context in which meaning arises, making it "more objective" than any possible "object. , 83 
But, if Heidegger has said that lived existence is the basic locus of all knowledge, how 
can he then say that human world is "more objective" than any possible "object", and 
furthermore, how can he avoid saying that technology is simply the projection of human 
self-interest? 
Hubert Dreyfus argues that Heidegger came to realize that this way of defining 
knowledge left him unable to comprehend any limits to the remaking of all things through 
human efforts. Having successfully interrelated existential significance, the totality of 
involvements, and the importance of world to arrive at a deepened possibility of 
encountering beings not possible to traditional idealism, Heidegger seems again to have 
resorted to its methods in giving the individual's death "in the future" a central role and 
thereby rendering the particularities of time and place irrelevant. Furthermore, he soon 
came to see that he had given no place to an openness to nature's own self-revealing as a 
guide for human making. 84 These problems drove Heidegger to his mature position on 
technology which assumes the continuing validity and importance of his critique of 
Idealism, but takes even more seriously the practical implications of the complex, 
particular, and praxological location of all human knowing. 85 
Heidegger's Mature Understanding of the Question of Technology 
Technology Within the Law of Material Being 
Crediting the problems in his early formulation to being too deeply influenced by 
Nietzsche, Heidegger increasingly focused his thought on the problem of modem 
83 Heidegger, Being and Time, 335. 
84 Hubert Dreyfus, "Heidegger's History of the Being of Equipment, " in Heidegger: A Critical Reader, ed. 
Hubert Dreyfuss and Harrison Hall (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1992), 173-185. 
85 On the development of Heidegger's position and his critique of Idealism see Dorothea Frede, "The 
Question of Being: Heidegger's Project, " in Charles B. Guignon, ed., The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chapter one. 
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technology as a way of rectifying the deficits of his basic insights. One of the first fruits 
of this focus was his realization of the importance of the material order of the cosmos 
claiming human making and the impossibility of doing so via appeals to either 
metaphysics or science if it is not to be the expression of raw human will. 86 
Heidegger's first problem with the formulation of Being and Time was its inability 
to sustain a reason why human making, which he had tied simply to self-interest, would 
not in time turn upon itself to totally remake itself. As a way of containing this tendency 
he saw that he had to give a greater place to the self-revealing of the material cosmos in 
directing the course of human making. Whereas his earlier thought seemed to center a 
conception of good human making upon empathetic respect for the otherness of Dasein, 
in his later work the place of otherness was expanded to include the material. This he 
referred to as earth which he came to consider the moral wellspring of all human culture. 
Heidegger's most explicit outline of this new conceptual category is found in a late 
essay, "The Origin of the Work of Art, " in which he clarified his understanding of 
equipment, work, and world, and the relations between them. 87 Here he makes two 
critical moves, first critiquing the abstraction of form from matter and then the separation 
of material and social aspects of reality. We begin with his first critique. 
Traditionally understood, metaphysics has tended to operate utilizing a distinction 
between matter, or content, considered formless and alogical, and form, considered 
rational. This conceptual machinery has been applied within many disciplines. Such a 
schema assumes the possibility of such an entity as `formless matter' or `mere' thing-ness 
without any form. Heidegger points out that the impossibility of conceiving a formless 
object reveals that matter always has a form, and that this natural form often determines 
its use by humans, rather than the other way around. When we choose hard leather to 
make the sole of a shoe, and soft leather for its upper, we do not search for formless 
matter to mold into a shoe, but are forced by our project to certain materials with the 
sufficient qualities whose given form best serves our purposes. We have both perceived 
86 Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, and Art 
(Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1990), 226-227. 
87 Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art, " in Basic Writings, 143-203. 
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and utilized the material of the universe based on our prior desire to accomplish a certain 
self-interested purpose. What is a helpful abstraction of form from matter easily becomes 
the illusion that the given form of matter is non-existent, while our design for it is 
obvious and the central factor determining the way in which matter comes to have 
meaningful form. Under the sway of this illusion all things appear to us as either that 
which we can use or things whose form has not yet been conceived in use-value terms. 88 
How then are we to escape from this tendency to judge all things in usefulness 
categories? This is Heidegger's second critical move. Rather than utilizing a form/matter 
distinction, Heidegger distinguishes between the ontological material of the universe, and 
human social self-perception. Building on his concept of world, he adds that world stands 
in tension with earth, which is the source of world because in earth all things known or 
unknown to human world exist. Thus it is the horizon and source of human world. 89 
This new polarity, earth and world, frames Heidegger's mature thought on 
technology, and between the two stands human work. World comes into being through 
human work. The intelligibility structures of a historical world frame the forms of earth 
within a context of intelligibility, yet earth, because it has the unknown quality which is 
the nature of all materiality, stands against work as the fertile and mysterious ground 
which shelters world. Heidegger pictures this symbiotic relationship in mythic terms, 
earth pressing in on world attempting to reclaim it for the wild, while world strives to 
keep earth at bay, even as it is enriched by its mysterious multiplicity of forms. Human 
work does not resolve this struggle between world and earth, but is this struggle. The 
earth needs world to appear from its seclusion, and world cannot soar away from its 
ground-thus the wrestling of work makes both world and earth what they are. 90 
In this we see why the mature Heidegger considered the primal symbol of the 
human not to be the eye, nor rationality, but the hand, for humans are the shaping beings. 
Held in that human hand is equipment. Equipment is matter formed according to the 
design of a human task, and equipment is truly itself when grasped by man, in motion as a 
88 Heidegger, "The Origin, " 152-156. 
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transparent extension of his work. At the interface between the world and earth we find 
both work and its reliable and transparent companion, equipment. 
So far Heidegger has not explained how human world can be changed except from 
the outside. He now goes on to explain that art is a type of work in that it physically 
reshapes earth, but unlike normal work it also explicitly re-shapes world. It does not 
simply project the new world created as in Idealism, but reveals a new world already 
resting within earth. The artwork links earth and world taking both into account by 
defining or re-defining their boundary. Art, then, is not simply an aesthetic pursuit as in 
common parlance, but is a self-revealing of, or a self-creating of truth by being itself, in 
which humans participate. 
As an example of such art Heidegger examines a Greek temple. It does not portray 
the gods, but lets the gods be present, creating a holy space in and around itself. This holy 
space is structured in a way which holds in place9specific socialized interpretation of birth 
and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline. As such it 
defines a human universe, the self-perception which is human world. In resting on the 
earth, the temple reminds those who participate in it that human world is sheltered in the 
arms of the earth, from whose bottomless multiplicity of forms culture is drawn. The 
temple is Being itself revealing one of its facets, through the work of human hands, at a 
specific point in history. 91 
As the temple performs this social function it is an artwork which is true-uniting 
around itself a cultural network of behavior and significations which articulate its space 
and give a meaning to the space in which people dwell. "The temple, in its standing there, 
first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves. This view remains 
open as long as the work is a work, as long as the god has not fled from it. "92 To be a true 
piece of art, an object or thought must set up and keep open a world, sustaining it by 
creating participants in its truth, opening up a space in human perception with the aid of a 
thing which clarifies world and anchors its present relation to earth. 
9' Heidegger, The Origin, " 168. 
92 Heidegger, "The Origin, " 168. 
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This is not to say that when such a truth is set up, it is necessarily beneficial to 
humanity, Heidegger warns. Ge-stell, or enframing, is the modern version of the space 
cleared by the Greek temple, and is characterized by the linked procedure of knowing and 
making which is modern technology. This mathematical knowing/making accounts the 
whole earth as standing reserve, obliterating otherness as a conceptual category. This is 
the problem of the instrumental and humanist views of technology: they overlook a prior 
and fundamental western legitimization of this clearing. Humanity becomes a victim of 
false consciousness about its way of revealing. We believe we can get technology 
`intelligently in hand' when in reality it is just this mass illusion which appears to exalt 
human subjectivity while offering up humanity itself as a natural resource. To posit `good 
ends' or get technology `in hand' is to augment the technological illusion, exacerbating 
our enmeshment in the technological way of being. Conceiving technology in this way, 
we see that enframing was well underway long before it was embodied in modern 
technology. Human work has finally become efficient at what the human mind thought in 
the seventeenth century, and now we believe it obvious that whatever problems the 
control of matter might present, more control is the obvious solution-even when it 
means engineering ourselves. 93 
Heidegger is not a radical foe of such enframing, because, pointing out the 
obvious, we can hardly escape the clearing in which we exist. But, he proposes, while 
standing in this clearing we may strive to take account once again of material being which 
stands against us with its own form rightly resisting total disassembly. Humanity's 
destiny is to enframe things, but not only to enframe. If man simply enframes then he 
loses sight of the multifaceted mystery which is earth. The danger of enframing is that it 
will not evolve in attentiveness to the evolution of Being, allowing humanity to be 
estranged from the truth which emanates from Being. Humanity must become more self- 
conscious about its revealing, in order to sense its enmeshment in technological revealing 
which is only enframing, a denial of Being. Heidegger's hope is that human work will 
become true, by which he means attentive to the prevailing self-revealing of earth. 
93 Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology, " in Basic Writings, 326-328. 
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Outside of the clearing made by the prevailing shape of world a remnant of being 
is and will always remain concealed, for all intelligibility rests on the concealment of 
`extraneous' sense data. Yet these hidden facets of the bounteous earth are available for 
future art to draw out, setting up a new world which takes them into account. Truth then, 
is that which conforms with the prevailing balance of unconcealment and denial of earth 
by the current configuration of world and work. Clearly Heidegger is using a peculiar 
definition of the wor&truth'here in his definition of truth as the anchor of our cultural 
clearing. Heidegger puts it this way: 
We believe that we are at home in the immediate circle of beings. Beings are familiar, reliable, 
ordinary. Nevertheless, the clearing is pervaded by a constant concealment in the double form of 
refusal and dissembling. At bottom, the ordinary is not ordinary; it is extraordinary. The essence 
of truth, that is, of unconcealment, is dominated throughout by denial. Yet this denial is not a 
defect or a fault, as though truth were an unalloyed unconcealment that has rid itself of 
everything concealed. If truth could accomplish this, it would no longer be itself. This denial, in 
the form of a double concealment, belongs to the essence of truth as unconcealment. Truth, in its 
essence, is un-truth. 94 
This insight will resonate throughout this study: that creation is erasure, or to express one 
order is to submerge another. This remaking may bring about a confusion or disarray 
from different levels of pre-existing order, or may bring to harmonious expression a pre- 
existing but not dominant level of order. We will see in more detail in the next two 
chapters how to establish new social and material orders is to subsume or reconfigure old 
orders. 
That which we call human work then, is a historically contextualized action which 
reshapes the ontological by concealing certain facets of the form of that ontological 
reality in order to make others more pronounced. Effectual work functions to unconceal 
by concealing alternatives. Human work simply maintains the current boundary between 
earth and world, but art is creation, a midwifery, remaking world in a new configuration 
94 Heidegger, "The Origin, " 179. 
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by letting "something emerge as a thing that has been brought forth. , 95 What Heidegger is 
struggling to express with the rather inadequate image of the work of art is that the 
everyday questions of our work must be re-oriented. If the contemporary shape of world 
is characterized by unfettered human willing it can only be questioned if the orders of the 
material universe are taken as important in themselves, to be listened to and received as 
ever new and enriching. 96 Heidegger looks longingly to ancient Greece when human 
revealing was at its height and was such an artistic revealing, poesis, a revealing which 
brought forth that which lay hidden within earth. Having observed that such a balance 
between listening to and transforming being was possible in the art of Greece, Heidegger 
asks us to heed their example, thereby reinfusing our technological revealing with the 
qualities of art, allowing ourselves to be part of earth's self-revelation. Our dignity "lies 
in keeping watch over the unconcealment-and with it, from the first, the concealment- 
of all essential unfolding on this earth. "97 
In the course of the discussion it becomes clear that Nietzsche and his espousal of 
the naked freedom of the will to power is Heidegger's constant dialogue partner. 
Heidegger views modem technology as a species of Nietzschean willing, a dangerously 
human-centered abstraction from earth. For Heidegger good technology is human work 
(and equipment) which does not force its designs upon matter but is attentive to matter, 
thus maintaining its primal power as the living force of culture. The anthropomorphic and 
humanist solutions to the problem of technology (and with them most contemporary 
discussions of the topic) do not account for the modem denial of the form of matter, and 
thus they strengthen the assumption of our cultural clearing that instead of working with 
the material of the universe, work must be conceived as the project of gaining ever firmer 
control over matter. In such thinking, Heidegger says, 
Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there 
just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. . . The word "standing-reserve" assumes the 
95 Heidegger, "The Origin, " 185. 
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rank of an inclusive rubric. It designates nothing less than the way in which everything presences 
that is wrought upon by the revealing that challenges. Whatever stands by in the sense of 
standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object. 98 
Heidegger agrees with Nietzsche that human work is best defined as the "hands" 
of human willing, and that truth can only be defined in relation to culture. But Heidegger 
wants to set human willing within the context of past revealing, and curb its expansion 
into an "inclusive rubric" by grounding it in the self-revealing of Being itself, or earth. He 
will not permit Nietzsche's definition of willing as a self-posited goal to remain 
unchallenged. Though both agree that we cannot step outside the relative intelligibility 
structures of human world, Heidegger insists that revealing must be set under the law of 
beings. He believes that work as the preserving of a world established by art, or work as 
creation, the hearing of being, gives human willing a context by referring it in a 
controlled way to being itself. In this way Heidegger makes clear that even though we still 
know the world out of our basic self-interest, our work becomes destructive if we sever it 
from the normative claim of both ontological and cultural order. To live authentically 
then, the individual must resolve to stand within a culturally defined world with its 
peculiar and (ontologically) limited configuration of earth and world, whose boundary art 
defines and shows how to preserve. "In this way, standing-within is brought under law. "99 
If technology is made to serve the law of beings instead of being harnessed to a 
human will-centered way of conceiving the universe, Heidegger speculates that it might 
become what it was meant to be; part of the self-revealing of things. Only what is primal 
will endure, and technology, as a form of revealing, must be directed to serving that 
which is primal and thus enduring rather than the passing and solely human. Human 
dignity is found in serving as a midwife in the ongoing coming to birth of the primal. We 
share in revealing the truth of Being, but our freedom and dignity are not found by doing 
so according to mere arbitrary will nor abstract laws, but in finding a way to cooperate 
98 Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology, " 322. 
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with Being. Heidegger's conclusion: technology as a way of work lies at the heart of the 
very same locus of revealing things in which lies the saving power of the primal. 100 
To summarize Heidegger's mature view, enframing is human working at an 
important and uniquely human task of revealing truth. Yet as conceived in the 
contemporary world, we are imprinted with a tendency to see the material simply as a 
resource, having no inherent form of its own. In succumbing to such an enframing we 
systematically close ourselves to the self-revealing of being which we might hear if we 
listened to Being itself, as we do in art. The dangers of technological enframing are: 1) 
The illusion prevails that everything humans encounter exists only as a human construct. 
2) Yet nowhere does humanity actually encounter itself or the other in their essence-this 
difference has been elided. 3) Truth is foreclosed. It can only be reached through attention 
to Being and a revealing which seeks not to erase, but to allow the mysteries of Being to 
rejuvenate human culture. Succumbing to enframing means our own dissolution as raw 
material in the acid of our own technological will. '01 
Heidegger's Strengths and Weaknesses 
The remainder of the first part of this study will be devoted to critiquing and 
expanding Heidegger's description of technology. The next two chapters will suggest the 
adequacy of his account by elaborating it from two quite different perspectives. It will 
become clear that Heidegger has pinpointed a major problem of the technological way of 
being, that it blinds us to the importance of otherness by defining all things as standing 
reserve. Much of the remainder of the study will be devoted to thinking through how the 
possibility of otherness might be re-established in order that it might again claim and 
orient our living, including our making of technological artifacts. We agree, then, in an as 
yet unspecified way, that Heidegger is correct in saying, "Man is not the lord of beings. 
Man is the shepherd of Being. Man loses nothing in this `less'; rather.. . 
he gains the 
100 Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology, " 330. 
101 Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology, " 332,333. 
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essential poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself 
into the preservation of Being's truth.. . Man is the neighbor of Being. " 
102 
The attempt to speak in terms of neighborliness entails going behind concrete 
ethical questions to examine the technological ethos. Such an inquiry is "neither ethics 
nor ontology.... Nonetheless [the] question, though in a more original way, retains a 
meaning and an essential importance... can we obtain from such knowledge directives 
that can be readily applied to our active lives? " Heidegger answers that, "The answer is 
that such thinking is neither theoretical nor practical. It comes to pass before this 
distinction... Thus language is at once the house of Being and the home of human 
beings. "103 Part II will explain how such a statement might not only be taken seriously, 
but explicitly affirmed by Christians. 
Clearly the strengths of such an account make it especially important that we 
provisionally set out its theological deficits. Let us recount Heidegger's salvation history. 
His Fall occurs when humans forget that they are part of a larger universe which is a gift 
sustaining their existence. Human redemption is the restoration of the integration of the 
human way of being with its human context and material substrate. Our theological 
treatment will firmly support this story as having significant parallels with the Christian 
story. It will, however, question Heidegger's redeeming agent, which is humanity itself, 
or the primal earth. In his early thought the formal concept of death functions as 
revelation, through which the individual learns who they are and where they are going. 
But Christian faith affirms the centrality of the divine Word in establishing this new 
orientation. Likewise, in his mature thought humanity is again alone in the house of being 
with creation, or with the cosmos which has no Creator, and hence he cannot lay bare the 
heart of the Christian understanding of being alienated from creation: that it is grounded 
in a more primal alienation from God. In chapter six, Augustine will argue that we can 
never truly be open to love and be restored to unity with creation unless we are reconciled 
with the God who gave it as a good gift of His love. 
102 Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism, " in Basic Writings, 245. 
103 Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism, " 259-262. 
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Despite creation or earth functioning for Heidegger as a surrogate deity, the late 
Heidegger did not give earth enough solidity to support any concrete ethical claims. He 
ended not as an anthropological relativist like Nietzsche, but became an earth-centered 
relativist. Because his priority is to preserve the fluidity of culture, morality, and ontology 
from any solidification by a transcendent order which might lay claim to our making in a 
permanent way, he was simply unable to make more than the most basic ethical claim 
which amounts to a religious call for reverence for the earth. 
This lack warrants the project of Part II to define how the material creation might 
be taken seriously in an ethically relevant manner. I will, however, attempt to uphold and 
elucidate the importance of maintaining the conceptual unity of our active life (ethics), 
with our practical need as beings (shelter, etc. ), and our capacities as transcendent beings 
whose ideas are conveyed in language and whose survival depends on that language being 
grounded in the conditions that making speech possible: material life. We must live in the 
house of Being, but we do not do so by attempting to draw ethical rules directly from 
materiality, but by allowing it a systematic place in shaping the transcendent space in 
which our dreams dwell. Those dreams, Heidegger is right to say, guide our work, which 
is the interface between cultural world, its changes, and the way it takes up the material. 
This work is accompanied by material shaped to aid it, which is equipment, and is 
oriented by objects which anchor its current configuration, as depicted in the Greek 
temple. 
There is then a connection between ontology and ethics, but if we set upon 
materiality to find moral rules for action, we uphold the very technological activism 
which is the source of our problem. The alternative to this activism is not passivity but 
openness, an attitude of waiting for "nothing" as it were-a waiting that recognizes that 
the cosmos is a gift. I will argue in Part II that this gift attitude is the only antidote to the 
traditional calculative conception of the standing reserve. Our" ... releasement 
lies-if we 
may use the word lie-beyond the distinction between activity and passivity. " 
04 Ingrid 
Scheibler summarizes the two-fold potential of Heidegger°s claim: 
104 Heidegger, quoted in Ingrid Scheibler, "Heidegger and the Rhetoric of Submission, " in Rethinking 
Technologies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 131. 
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First, one rebuts the assumptions of positivism and the philosophy of consciousness concerning 
the issue of our embeddedness in a social-historical life world. Forces such as language and 
tradition precede us and limit our complete autonomy. That we are in this sense "dependent" can 
no longer be conceived as a failing. Second, Heidegger's elaboration of the relation of mutuality 
and dependence between human beings and nature displaces the dominant calculative- 
representational model that conceives of man as "lord over the earth. " Heidegger calls for a 
recognition and awakening of the "gift" element expressed in the idea of "waiting upon"; the 
awareness that our field of vision is open but that its openness is not because of our looking... 
Wonder and curiosity are valuable precisely because they contribute to the recognition that, 
despite the expansion of modem science and technology into the cosmos at the levels of macro 
and micro, infinite and infinitesimal, there are some things that are not subject to calculation. '°5 
Wonder and a certain respectful curiosity, identification with the creation and its limits, 
relinquishment of the will. . . 
George Grant expands on these fertile beginnings in the next 
chapter, and in chapter five I return to further clarify theologically what it means to be 
open to and grateful for creation. 
In conclusion, we must say that Heidegger has provided a powerful but as yet 
untested description of the connection of the lived life to the theoretical and practical 
behavior of humanity, and has indicated how these behaviors might be understood to 
intertwine with our making. In doing so he has made it possible to grasp some of the 
unique facets of modern technological making. The next two chapters will break apart the 
two facets of human action that Heidegger has so skillfully interwoven in order to test his 
theories about technological life by reference to contemporary examples. This is done, 
however, only in agreement with Heidegger's claim that "`theory' and `praxis' are 
possibilities of being for a being whose being must be defined as care. "106 Our analysis 
will proceed to examine the habits of technological society from the theoretical and 
praxological aspects in turn, on the understanding that they are only facets of the being 
which cares, existing within a lived activity in which the two are always united. In chapter 
105 Scheibler, "Rhetoric of Submission, " 132-133. 
106 Heidegger, Being and Time, 180. 
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three I trace the thought of Michel Foucault, who combines the insights of Marx and 
Heidegger to establish the veracity of Heidegger's insights regarding the relation between 
technology and the inexplicit knowledge of praxis. But first we turn to the Platonic 
Heideggerian George Grant, who clarifies the accuracy of Heidegger's insights regarding 
the relationship between technology and explicit theoretical thought. 
54 
Chapter Two: George Grant and the Technological Hermeneutic 
Imagine a garden with a hundred kinds of trees, a thousand kinds of flowers, a 
hundred kinds of fruit and vegetables. Suppose, then, that the gardener of this 
garden knew no other distinction than between edible and inedible, nine-tenths 
of this garden would be useless to him. He would pull up the most enchanting 
flowers and hew down the noblest trees and even regard them with a loathing 
and envious eye. 
Hermann Hesse 107 
Grant, Heidegger, and Technology as Idea 
The aim of chapters two and three is to examine and develop aspects of 
Heidegger's theories about the technological way of being by situating them within 
analysis of contemporary social trends. George Grant and Michel Foucault each take up 
specific concepts from Heidegger's thinking about technology within a broader agreement 
with his questioning of modern deliberation about new technology. In this chapter Grant 
indicates how Heidegger may be understood as having correctly perceived that 
contemporary modes of thinking, which can be described as technological, frame the way 
we perceive all things. Grant suggests that contemporary thinking works within set 
parameters which make certain categories of being visible while rendering others 
invisible (for example, it can see that I am six feet tall, but not that I have moral 
character). He gives examples of how technology sets out to find things which fit its 
version of reality (conforming to mathematical reason), and in doing so devalues and 
destroys everything which cannot be quantified with this mode of reason. By examining 
Heidegger's thought from a top-down or ideal perspective Grant proves the accuracy and 
illuminative power of Heidegger's analytical framework in relation to contemporary 
107 Hermann Hesse, Steppenwolf, trans. Basil Creighton, rev. Walter Sorell (London: Penguin Books, 
1965), 79. 
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modes of thinking and therefore acting. I will contend that Grant's corroboration and 
extension of Heidegger's thought validates Heidegger's call for the order of material 
ontology to be given a substantial place in our thinking if we are to live as beings who do 
not see, and therefore remake, all things in a unifaceted and thus destructive manner. 
During the years 1959-1969 Grant formulated a tight complex of thought about 
the relation of time, ontology and technology. This decade is marked by a deep 
engagement with Heidegger and Nietzsche. Grant found in Heidegger the expression of 
several themes which had already developed important roles in his perception of 
contemporary society. ' 08 He concurred with Heidegger that, "Technology is the 
metaphysics of our age... it is the way being appears to us, and certainly we're rushing 
into the future with no categories by which we can judge it. "109 
For Grant, the actual machines of science and technology are the signs of specific 
ways of thinking which need analysis, the surface manifestations by which we grasp the 
uniqueness of our age, in the hope of understanding its worldwide appeal. I10 Grant 
examines the modem inability to think of any boundaries to technology and flags up the 
importance of the contemporary crisis about what should be made and unmade. The fact 
that in our material making we find it impossible to think clearly about technological 
frontiers leads us into a much wider examination of what we understand ourselves to be 
doing with our making and unmaking. III 
Grant's analysis aims to provide an opening into how this lack might be 
addressed. He utilizes Heidegger's conceptual tools to illustrate in detail that once we 
have decided upon the machines and ideals which govern our life together, the moral 
shape of our society has already been cast. He does this in order to draw out the points at 
108 Joan E. O'Donovan, George Grant and the Twilight of Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1984), 107,117. O'Donovan's thorough exposition and critique of Grant's thought is marred by an 
insufficient reading of Heidegger which overlooks his search to limit Nietzsche's unfettered willing via an 
ontological and cultural reference for human making (cf. 167). 
109 Frank K. Flinn, "George Grant's Three Languages, " in Chesterton Review 11: 2 (May 1985): 155. 
"o George Grant, Technology and Justice (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 14. 
"' George Grant, "Technology as Warning, " in William Christian and Sheila Grant, eds., The Georeg Grant 
Reader, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 410-415. 
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which we can and must change our thinking if we are to truly wrestle with rather than 
simply enact our technological fate. His quest is to come to a clearer understanding of the 
modern failure of imagination-and to understand how this failure relates to our habitual 
grasping for new technology. Based on the questions Grant raises here, Part II of this 
thesis will return to develop a more positive technological ethic, with many of Grant's 
most important themes coming into that discussion in chapter five (but not exclusively 
there). 
Judging the Present 
Before we look at Grant's diagnosis of modernity, we must note his method of 
diagnosis. Grant believes that it is possible to read back from what we do, say, and make 
to our fundamental commitments, and thus his project assumes there is a central core of 
ideas out of which the modern technological age flows. His attempt to grasp this core he 
calls `enucleation' or observant participation in the age. "In another age, it would have 
been proper to say that I am attempting to partake in the soul of modernity. " This 
contrasts with the mode of modernity itself, Grant claims, which is to study things by 
objectifying and analyzing them in order to predict their future behavior. So Grant's 
methodology is an attempt to take Heidegger's observations about technological method 
seriously by replacing the project of prediction and control with an examination based on 
participation with, because "All descriptions or definitions of technique which place it 
outside ourselves hide from us what it is. "112 To externalize technique in order to study it 
is to hide the reality that technique is ourselves, that technology is ourselves in action. 
Clearly this project assumes what Heidegger has called ekstasis-to admit that we reside 
in a specific, all-encompassing horizon of knowledge, but still to believe we can imagine 
ourselves into another horizon in order to gauge our current position. 
Grant's search is for the novelty of our age, and as a diagnostic tool in finding this 
novelty he looks at words we use and things we create for clues about our view of human 
112 George Grant, Technology and Empire (Concord, Ontario: Anansi, 1969), 137. 
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nature and destiny. A society's rites of passage, its sacred times and spaces, its 
iconographic representations, and its places of pilgrimage help us see the locuses which 
claim its devotion. ' 13 Grant implicitly utilizes the thought analysis laid out with 
Heidegger's temple analogy which illustrated that by studying the art of the Greeks we 
have some access to their thought world. Similarly, by studying our most important 
symbols and artifacts and political goals, our conceptual cosmos may be likewise made 
more explicit. 
In his later work Grant sharpens this procedure by adding that not only do our rites 
and shrines provide a diagnostic tool, but they also demand a certain way of life from us. 
In agreeing together to construct a certain society a fate is cast. Historical necessity is thus 
the material embodiment of society's considered judgments about the good. 114 The world 
we create is marked by what we love, whether it be procedure or result, corporate or 
individual, local or global. Here again Heidegger's thought is influential as Grant utilizes 
his axiom about the transmission of ideas to great effect: ideas must be transmitted by 
creating adherents-and all social action, all work, is moved by adherence to ideas. I take 
Grant's thought to be concerned with understanding the role technology plays in relation 
to the teaching "There is nothing outside of a man which by going into him can defile 
him, but the things which come out of a man are what defile him" (Mark 7: 15). Foucault 
reverses the route of examination of the impact of technology, being concerned with 
illustrating the role technology plays in clouding our eyes as in the teaching, "If your eye 
is not sound, your whole body will be full of darkness (Matthew 6: 23). 
Axioms of our Age (or Modernity: What is that? ) 
Our reading of Grant will trace that nucleus of four interconnected ideas which he 
understands to uniquely characterize our age. The first is that history is a human creation. 
This belief about history rests on a second affirmation-that history is a theater for will. 
113 George P. Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age (New York: Hill and Wang, Inc., 1960), 29. 
114 George Grant, Lament for a Nation (Ottowa: Carleton University Press, 1995), 104. 
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This assumes in turn a third thesis about human freedom-that it is the basic attribute of 
humanity. Finally, the evidence provided by examination of our artifacts is that we 
understand this will to be actualized through the agency of mathematecized reason. 
Time as History 
Grant's most helpful addition to our discussion of technology is to make explicit 
Nietzsche's role in shaping the modern mind. He, more than any other philosopher, made 
explicit the Western belief that humans must make meaning by making history. Our age 
is novel in many ways, but the novelty that most directly urges a limitless technological 
remaking is our belief in time as history. The Guinness Book of World Records, for 
instance, is systematically structured by the concept of time as history. It records the leaps 
of "progress" in any given human performance judged in terms of duration or distance or 
time or number on the assumption that these acts are the milestones of human history. We 
might compare such a project, and its contemporary popularity, with the very different 
medieval method of cataloging, which was pursued as a classification and ordering of 
things which were assumed to have eternal and unchanging material structures. 
Grant draws an extended contrast between the view of time as history and the 
ancient Greek understanding of time. For the Greeks truth was eternal, and good human 
willing sought the temporal embodiment of this eternal truth. For them, time itself was 
meaningless, being simply the medium in which humans attempted to reflect and realize 
the eternal. 115 Modern thought immanentizes this distinction, making judgments of the 
good dependent upon events in history. This revision brings the human shaping of history 
to prominence by emphasizing the moments of its triumphant "progress. " Our lack of 
115 Colin Gunton and others rightly warn of oversimplifications about antique views of time. While agreeing 
with Grant that contemporary thought reverses the pervasive bias of the antique view of time he sharpens 
Grant's reading by saying that for the Greeks, "The logic of eternity-the justice of Zeus-embraces that of 
time, not denying it, but shaping and controlling it. " Colin Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many: God, 
Creation and the Culture of Modernity. The Bampton Lectures 1992 (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 79. 
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surprise at phrases like "the end of history" reveals the centrality and importance of our 
root belief that history is a human project. The ancient Greeks would simply have been 
unable to think this thought. ' 16 Through the history-centered thought of Marx and other 
western thinkers this modern focus on the making of history has also come to deeply 
mark the thinking of eastern cultures. Thus, in an important sense, the culture of the 
modern west has become global. In the technological age, the eternal is not that which is 
immutable and overarching all time, but the limitless possibilities of human activity in 
space and time for making a future. ' 17 
Christianity, Grant contends, first made time as history thinkable. With the 
introduction of the idea of the incarnation, the immutable God of the Greeks was 
permanently transformed by being pictured as entering history to save men, making 
events in time necessary precursors to the final redemption of humanity. Before 
Christianity entered the scene, the thought of the Jews had already made Israel and its 
historical narrative meaningful as an agent of redemption. The doctrine of the incarnation 
takes this historical redemption up into God Himself. Thus it was uniquely the doctrine of 
the incarnation which raised the status of the overcoming of evil in time to prominence in 
western thought. l l8 
A critical conclusion for Grant is that the modern idea of progress is the Christian 
view of salvation in history shorn of its transcendent, eternal term by a misunderstanding 
of the nature of human freedom. With the death of belief in God, modem humanism was 
born with its pseudo-Christian morality and Christian view of history-reinterpreted as an 
optimistic view of progress toward a future golden age. Such optimism turns to reject the 
God who limits the action of humanity in the historical project of alleviating evil within 
history. This is a profoundly different humanism from that of the ancients, whose more 
melancholy and resigned form of humanism consisted of wisdom designed to make the 
best of the unmanageable vicissitudes of life. ' 19 
116 Grant, Philosophy, 32-35. 
117 Grant, Philosophy, 37. 
118 Grant, Philosophy, 56-60. 
119 Grant, Philosophy, 61-63. 
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As indicated, Grant understands Marxism to have provided the most transparent 
vehicle for this post-Christian humanism, and, not coincidentally, the most transparent 
justification for technological humanism. It boldly asserts the moral claim which grounds 
the extensive modern investment in science and technology: salvation from evil is 
possible for all through the practical work of creating and correctly using technology. 
Marx distilled the essence of the moral humanism which sustains the work of modem 
scientists and engineers: their work was the material medium for the alleviation of human 
misery in history. 120 
Marx's articulation of this secular salvation raised temporality to a role of 
prominence by discarding the notion of eternal truth, as Kant's attempt to preserve it had 
also previously done. Kant attempted to situate human history-making within the ambit of 
JN5 
eternal truth by conceiving rationality*ternal and thus above human history. In this way 
the static eternal of Platonism was maintained in Idealism as human eternal reason. 
Because rational statements (like 2+2 =4) appear to be eternally true, Kant asserted them 
to claim and guide humanity's history-making work. Only in this Kantian form does any 
concept of eternal truth enter the modern public sphere, Grant argues. Modern liberal 
political theory is the most important heir to the Kantian philosophical framework in 
understanding justice to be grounded in the rationally informed consent which may be 
given or withheld by every rational agent. 121 
Grant's late work Time as History brings this line of reasoning to a crescendo. He 
has already indicated ways in which the ersatz eternal of the idealists (typified in Kant) 
placed the historical subject as knower in a central position. Thus even appeals to 
unchanging truth have an admixture of temporal reference not present in Greek thought. 
The predominance of popular modes of thought, however, speak much more bluntly of 
"making" history, or in other contexts speak as if history demands, commands, requires, 
teaches, etc. This use of the word history is peculiar to modernity-and is thus useful in 
knowing ourselves as moderns. Modern humanity easily and most readily defines itself as 
a being whose access to knowledge is through the historical, as indicated by the huge 
120 Grant, Philosophy, 76-78. 
121 George P. Grant, English sh Speaking (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 26. 
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conceptual influence of thinkers like Darwin, Freud, Marx and Nietzsche. Here an 
unprecedented weight is placed on the importance of the coming-to-be of knowledge, its 
genealogy. "[T]he greatest difference between the ancient and modern accounts of 
knowledge is this modern concentration on the genesis of something in order to know 
it.,, 122 History, the human context in which we are not only made but actively make, is 
sharply distinguished from natural causality. In modern thought human history rather than 
the natural given is the essential ingredient in true knowledge. 
What does Grant understand to be the implications of this shift in the grounding 
of knowledge? On one hand technology is seen as the participation of man with the 
upward ascent of nature as evolution ever elaborates our movement from the primordial 
sea. On the other hand technology is also viewed as the method by which humanity 
overcomes unordered nature. It is natural that the two languages should coalesce in 
praising such technological feats as setting foot on the moon. Man is seen not only as the 
finest product of evolution, but as its spearhead who can consciously direct the very 
process from which it came forth. 123 
Modern political philosophies have taken the historical basis of knowledge to be 
axiomatic. Marxism, democratic liberalism, and national socialism have each called 
individuals to be resolute in their actions so that the future may be mastered, and a just 
society constructed. At the heart of the view of time as history is a combination of future- 
orientation with the will to mastery. "The more we are concentrated on the future as the 
most fascinating reality, the more we become concentrated on that side of our existence 
that is concerned with making things happen. "124 The modern, and especially the modern 
American self-perception, from whence the technological empire arises, is thought almost 
122 George Grant, Time as History, ed. William Christian (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 11. 
123 Grant, Time as History, 12. If the open-ended metaphor of evolution is to be squared with God's sabbath 
declaration that creation is good and complete (chapter five), then serious conceptual work remains to be 
done in explanation of how we might affirm our material being as a good and complete gift while 
simultaneously affirming that biological order is provisional because it is moving toward a higher 
ontological perfection. Anthony Baker touches on this issue in "Theology and the Crisis in Darwinism, " 
Modern Theology 18.2 (April 2002), 183-216. 
124 Grant, Time as History, 19-20. 
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exclusively in terms of time as progress, and calls for human action to festoon history 
with ever greater crowning achievements. It is in this light, says O'Donovan, that "Grant 
views `history' as the central religious and moral idea of our age. "125 
Grant believes that this observation forces on us the following question: Is human 
action judged in terms of how well it has shaped history, or as it conforms to some more 
stable order within or outside of the universe? If the latter, then an account of natural or 
divine order must renounce history-making as an animating concept, seeking instead to 
live wisely within the created order in the present. When viewing time as history the 
priority is reversed: today serves only tomorrow, for our today is judged by the tomorrow 
it shapes. 126 "Ours has been a dynamic civilization and that dynamism has related to the 
fact that our apprehension of temporality was concentrated on the future. `Has been' and 
`is now' weakened in our consciousness compared with `will be. 127 Both this focus on 
the future and the centrality of the will are necessary to understand the seductiveness of 
technological progress. 
The Good as Activity 
We have already uncovered the second central affirmation of modern thought 
which is contained within the first: that will is the central feature of modern anthropology. 
... one is forced to touch... upon the most 
difficult matter which faces anybody who wishes to 
understand technology. This is the attempt to articulate that primal western affirmation which 
stands shaping our whole civilization, before modern science and technology, before liberalism 
and capitalism, before our philosophies and theologies. It is present in all of us, and yet hidden to 
all of us... In all its unfathomedness, the closest I can come to it is the affirmation of human 
beings as `will' ... 
128 
125 O'Donovan, Twilight of Justice, 155. 
126 Grant, Philosophy, 51. Here Grant uncovers the fatal conceptual flaw of technology assessment. 
127 Grant, Time as History, 20. 
128 Grant, English Speaking Justice, 63-64. 
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To substantiate this observation Grant again turns to examine the power of Marxism in 
the modern world. Why has it exerted such great influence? First, it is a humanism of 
universal salvation, and second, it proposes concrete and practical guidelines for that 
salvation. Its power lies in its story of evil being overcome in this world, and here its 
dependence on Judeo-Christian ideas about history is patent. This hope is not for a future 
whose arrival is unpredictable, but is a salvation to be created by contemporary human 
beings, acting within and upon the forces already existing in our societies. Thus Marx 
was able to speak about human action in fluid terms, describing moral behavior as the 
correct practical alleviation of the world's evils. This explains his high estimation of 
technology, which he married in the modern fashion to scientific endeavor, as the means 
whereby humanity would be freed from the evils of pain, want, and work. Marx offered 
scientists and technologists (no longer conceivable as separate groups) the ultimate moral 
high-ground, conceiving the scientist as ethical precisely in the function of her work 
because the work itself serves the alleviation of suffering as long as its products are 
equitably distributed. ' 29 
Grant points out that the caption on Marx's Highgate tombstone crystallizes this 
modern quest: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways. The 
point however is to change it. "130 Here only the manipulation of material reality is 
conceived as producing human meaning and good. This language of will which is so 
highly valued in our culture is found in many civilizations, but its centrality in western 
thought is unique. Grant concludes, "To enucleate the conception of time as history must 
then be to think the orientation to the future together with the will to mastery. " 
131 On this 
view, reflection, worship, and tradition are considered meaningless activities unless 
harnessed to action in which we do violence to the world, closing down an option which 
was formerly open, asserting that, as far as we are concerned, this rather than that will 
come to be. To will announces that we are serious, choosing to actualize ourselves and 
129 Grant, Philosophy, 76-78. 
130 Grant, Time as History, 23. 
131 Grant, Time as History, 17. 
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our view of the world against the one who simply thinks, or impotently desires without 
acting. Grant notes that in Greek thought willing was intended to bring into immediate 
being the beauty of the eternally noble and beautiful. But modern willing has a much 
larger task-it must bring into being a good future, by conquering an indifferent nature 
and making it good for us. 132 
According to Grant, realizing this helps us to see our age's science and technology 
more accurately. Scientists do not "discover" and technologists "put science to use. " This 
is a false description of science. Because willing or technology is the means of bringing 
the good life to all, science becomes in all but the rarest cases an early stage of the 
technological project. 133 Grant is not alone in making this observation. Historians of 
technology also note that what is novel about modem science is the subsuming of the 
wonder-driven exploration commonly thought of as science within the application of 
scientific knowledge we call technology. Science has become an arm of production. 134 
The English term "technology" is symptomatic of this novelty with its confusing 
admixture of the root words for making (techne) and study (logos), Grant contends. 
"[M]odern technology is not simply an extension of human making through the power of 
a perfected science, but is a new account of what it is to know and to make in which both 
activities are changed by their co-penetration, " says Grant. "We hide the difficulty of 
thinking that novelty, because in our implied `histories' it is assumed that we can 
understand the novelty only from within its own account of knowing, which has itself 
become a kind of making. "135 To the Greeks, art was considered a species of knowing the 
contingent, the accidental and historical rather than the eternal. Science, by contrast, was 
necessarily knowledge of what must be. This conceptuality established a firm separation 
in the types of knowledge and activity of the two disciplines. In contrast, modern 
132 Grant, Time as History, 23-25. 
'33 Grant, Time as History, 25-27. 
134 James E. McClellan III and Harold Dorn, Science and Technology in World History (Baltimore, Md.: 
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scientific knowing is entwined with intent to use. '36 This co-penetration of knowing and 
willing means that reason which is not addressed to willing is considered superfluous or 
inefficient. Reason itself is thus annexed not to control power, but as the mode of the 
extension of power. 137 It is this interpenetration of knowing and willing which is the most 
appropriate descriptor of modern society-the technological society. "I mean by 
[technology] the endeavor which summons forth everything (both human and non- 
human) to give its reason, and through the summoning forth of those reasons turns the 
world into potential raw material, at the disposal of our `creative' wills. The definition is 
circular in the sense that what is `creatively' willed is further expansion of that union of 
knowing and making given in the linguistic union of `techne' and 'logos . 
"'138 
Grant is not suggesting that there have not been significant and laudable outcomes 
of the technological project, nor denigrating that desire to build a world-wide society of 
free and equal people. The desire to alleviate human suffering is itself noble, and 
technology has served well in this pursuit. But as we shall see, a technological habit was 
formed in this period in which a linkage of justice with technological progress was so 
tightly formed that when modem humanity hopes to promote justice, the modality for its 
imagination is technological. 
Freedom Unfettered 
The novelties of modern thought Grant has traced have profoundly shaped the 
modern conception of freedom. To make history and will basic categories of thinking is 
to posit a definition of human freedom in which freedom is conceived as having no 
enduring limit. Grant thought Kant first made the autonomy of the will explicit to western 
136 Grant, Technology and Justice, 14. 
137 Grant, Philosophy, 21. 
138 Grant, "Justice and the Right to Life, " in The George Grant Reader, 117. 
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moral philosophy in making subjectivity central to true knowledge. 139 In Kant's work the 
reasoning subject holds the world before itself, representing it to itself as an object out of 
which truth is extracted by the activity of the knower. 
But then at the height of that new system of representation, namely in the question of justice, he 
does not cross the Rubicon to the new account of justice that is required by the new account of 
truth, proceeding from the new account of reason. He offers the categorical imperative, that 
morality is the one fact of reason. He offers a fundamental equality of persons, that is an account 
of justice that comes out from the older account of truth, which was based not on the first 
principle of subjectivity, but on the eternal order. 140 
Yet Kant's attempt to interject this principle of equality was bound to be undermined by 
his assertion of the centrality of the subject in defining the content of this equality. 
Two biographical experiences came, for Grant, to expose this contradiction. The 
first was the specter of Vietnam, which brought into focus the inner necessity of the 
technological empire to be violently expansionist and therefore unjustly imperialist. But a 
second experience, the legalization of abortion, convinced him that modern technological 
society could not accept any truth but historical truth, and therefore could not be just. 
Joan O'Donovan comments, "If the Vietnam war revealed the shadowy contours of liberal 
justice at the outposts of the American empire, then abortion reveals these same contours 
in its heartland. "141 Grant argues that with the Roe v. Wade decision of the American 
Supreme Court the unhitching of human freedom from the guiding lights of respect for 
ontological order reached a critical point in western society. With this decision American 
society began to roll back a conception of justice based on an account of what 
ontologically is in favor of a conception grounded on the autonomous individual and the 
priority of historical possibility. Here blooms the ontology of the age, which, looking at 
the ontological claim of the other, sees not an other but simply a standing reserve. Such 
139 The George Grant Reader, 222. We might also credit this revolution to Descartes as Heidegger does, 
while agreeing with Grant that the shift truly becomes a mass phenomenon through the work of Kant. 
140 The George Grant Reader, 225. 
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thinking is systematized by philosophical pragmatism, which understands the good as the 
emancipation of the passions in order to free humanity to pursue its desires, bounded only 
by others' freedom to do the same. 142 
Such legal establishment of the freedom to pursue our desires makes plain the 
modern view of human nature, yet it does not complete this thought by allowing all 
desires to be considered of equal value. Here again, action alone is understood to be a 
creator of moral good, meaning that the only proper use of freedom is active willing. 
History and meaning must be pulled from the chaos of the universe by the grasp of the 
willing individual. O'Donovan summarizes, 
Thus, the language of `willing, ' like that of `history, ' has three levels of reference for Grant. It 
refers to a universal aspect of human action, to a specifically modern interpretation of human 
action, and to a peculiar reality of modern action. These strands of meaning are correlative or 
interdependent: each must be thought along with and in terms of the others. This is so because 
the word `willing, ' like the word `history, ' makes present a historical and experiential totality 
proceeding from `some central source, ' from an animating principle, which, however, is not 
distinct from the manifold aspects or `expressions' of the totality. It follows that thinking this 
animating principle should be a movement among its manifold expressions that grasps their 
interpenetration, the refraction of each on the others. This movement is what Grant means by 
`enucleation. ' He has, therefore, tried to enucleate the modern conception of `history' by 
enucleating the modern language of `willing' through which this single totality expresses 
itself. 143 
Nietzsche predicted the incoherence of attempts to ground universal equality in an 
affirmation of the primal will. His solution was the consistent one-to embrace an 
unfettered willing. The overman is the solution to this incoherence, the one who gladly 
takes up the empty mantle of the moral-creating God. But Nietzsche believed that unlike 
141 O'Donovan, Twilight of Justice, 149, cf. 49. 
142 Grant, Lament for a Nation, 71-80; Grant, "Justice and the Right to Life, " in The George Grant Reader, 
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the nihilist who wills out of a desire for revenge, the overman will joy in willing, refusing 
vengeful willing. Grant notes that this new anthropology has permeated the modem world 
through Freud, Weber, and many other disciples of Nietzsche. This anthropology posits 
that, 
The elemental in man is an `it, ' that is, an impersonal chaos of instincts out of which comes forth 
as epiphenomena, reason and morality. It was once believed that the irrational in man existed to 
be subordinated to the rational. In Nietzsche this is denied. This does not, however, free us from 
thinking. It simply means that thinking is carried on over an abyss that it can never fathom. 
Philosophy is simply the highest form of `the will to power. "44 
In being the first to think this thought in its entirety, Nietzsche did not create the 
modern fate but unfolded it by explicitly revealing it for those who are its inheritors. He 
thought time as history comprehensively and urged the relinquishing of our attempts to 
define ourselves with static ideas instead of releasing ourselves into becoming. Humanity 
is simply a bridge from the animals to something more-or at least can be this something 
more if only we could let go of being `humans'. This is the yawning abyss into which we 
gaze and with which we must learn to live. Truth, science, morality and the soul: all are 
attempts to mitigate the pain of this vision of becoming which cramp the willing of free 
creation and the self-transcending of humanity. To be great is to create new horizons from 
which humans can orient themselves. Since what we are is becoming and history, and 
nothing is defined by nature, we ourselves cannot be finally defined except against a 
horizon of our own making. Not being defined, we can have no purpose, save the creation 
of our own striving and the positing of ever more far-reaching horizons. 
This view of time, human action and freedom thrives on an absolute denial of the 
moral value of the ontologically given, or eternal truth, and brings out the tragic paradox 
of the modern conception of freedom. This absolute freedom as a practical and theoretical 
ideal is the modern tradition, and "... is the dissolvent of all traditions outside itself and 
144 Grant, Time as History, 51. 
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the negation of tradition as such. " 145 This negation, Grant contends, gives us our first 
glimpse of the modem tyranny. 
[W]hen we use this language of `freedom' and `values' to ask seriously what substantive `values' 
our freedom should create, it is clear that such values cannot be discovered in `nature' because in 
the light of modern science nature is objectively conceived as indifferent to values. (Every 
sophomore who studies philosophy in the English-speaking world is able to disprove the 
`naturalistic fallacy, ' namely that statements about what ought to be cannot be inferred solely 
from statements about what is. ) Where, then, does our freedom to create values find its content? 
When that belief in freedom expresses itself seriously (that is, politically and not simply as a 
doctrine of individual fulfillment), the content of man's freedom becomes the actualizing of 
freedom for all men. The purpose of action becomes the building of the universal and 
homogenous state-the society in which all men are free and equal and increasingly able to 
realize their concrete individuality. 
But in order for all to be free, the aberrant in human relationships must be rigorously 
suppressed. 
As we push toward the goal we envisage, our need of technology for its realization becomes ever 
more pressing. If all men are to become free and equal within the enormous institutions 
necessary to technology, then the overcoming of chance must be more and more rigorously 
pursued and applied-particularly that overcoming of chance among human beings which we 
expect through the development of the modern sciences. 146 
The renunciation of limits to willing leads, paradoxically, either to chaos or a 
homogenizing politic, a politic of mathematical equality. 
145 O'Donovan, Twilight of Justice, 60. 
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Mathematecized Reason 
According to Grant, human thought in the age of progress is characterized by its 
mathematical roots and its focus on efficiency. Taking up Heidegger's thesis that the 
modem age was inaugurated with the invention of modem physics, Grant takes pains to 
point out the many practical ways that mathematecized reason has and is penetrating 
every arena of contemporary action. Grant notes that it is difficult to compare ancient and 
modem accounts of physics, but we can assert with confidence that Greek physics did 
not, like modem physics, produce knowledge of the kind which put the energies of nature 
at their disposal. Our physics lays a perceptual grid over all things which assumes that all 
energy and motion are convertible and interchangeable. To possess such knowledge is to 
grasp by definition the steps needed to effect this conversion. That Einstein felt 
compelled to advise Roosevelt that modern discoveries in physics would make it possible 
for an atom bomb to be built makes the modern novelty more obvious-because no such 
communication was conceivable within the ambit of ancient science. 147 
Computers are emblematic of modern science with its grounding in mathematics, 
Grant argues. If the steam steel press is the image of Newtonian physics and mathematics, 
the computer is its contemporary counterpart. The computer is born out of a paradigm of 
knowledge in which truth is reducible to a numerical value, and its existence has required 
in turn a fuller realization of the western paradigm of knowledge. The computer makes a 
subtle but far reaching distinction between knowledge and information which accelerates 
the tendency of modern thought to examine all things for the production of "objective" 
knowledge. 148 This mathematicized gaze is not confined to the study of the natural world, 
but has become the method of choice for studying (with an eye to controlling or at least 
predicting) human behavior. Modern technology begins with the defining of knowledge 
using a mathematical paradigm and becomes a behaviorism explained in terms of 
147 Grant, Technology and Justice, 13-14. 
148 Grant, Technology and Justice, 21-23. 
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algebra, 149 as summed up in Freud's contention that, "in reality, psychoanalysis is a 
method of investigation, an impartial instrument like, say, the infinitesimal calculus. , 150 
Modern maths and physics thus necessarily become the foundation-stock of all 
university disciplines committed to "truth", leading, for instance, to the development of 
"value free" social sciences, Grant continues. Business, industry, and government 
increasingly need information about the individuals who are within their scope of 
influence, and sociologists carry out the production of this information. Such information 
is only usable, however, in a "value free" format. The social sciences so developed cannot 
simply provide information, but are part of a system which increasingly closely monitors 
and manipulates the inhabitants of the technological society. 
Thus the fact-value distinction, which was intended to provide "value free" 
information rather than simply providing "facts" to corporations and government 
agencies, actually works to establish a monism of technical values, Grant argues. By 
describing human society through a paradigm which excluded the non-numerical, it 
undermined the validity of the type of non-empirical thinking which might be able to 
brake the "triumphant chariot of technology. " The fact-value distinction upon which 
computers and mathematecized science depend must assume that morality itself is a 
collection of posited values rather than a knowledge-set based on the truth of the cosmos 
itself. The possibility or at least relevance of such moral knowledge has been 
systematically undermined by questioning whether there is knowledge without 
experimental method, skepticism about whether it is possible to speak of better or worse 
human purposes, and the affirmation that humans must will meaning amid a primal 
chaos. Having sundered facts from values, Grant claims, the sciences looked to the 
humanities for the "values" with which society might be guided. Unfortunately the 
philosophers too had taken the presuppositions of modernity to heart, retreating into 
analytical and historicist research which was unable to say anything beyond "this is how 
people once thought. " "The public hope that the humanities would fulfill a positive moral 
149 Grant, Technology and Justice, 9,13,99. 
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role was, therefore, vitiated by the fact that the best professionals of these disciplines did 
not see their activity in this way. " 151 
Grant concludes that the hegemony of mathematical reason has undermined any 
real pluralism about the good end of humanity in favor of technological moral monism. 152 
[P]luralism has not been the result in those societies where modern liberalism has prevailed. 
Western men live in a society the public realm of which is dominated by a monolithic certainty 
about excellence-namely that the pursuit of technological efficiency is the chief purpose for 
which the community exists. When modem liberals... have criticized the idea of human 
excellence, they may have thought they were clearing the ground of religious and metaphysical 
superstitions which stood in the way of the liberty of the individual. Rather they were serving the 
social purpose of legitimizing the totally technological society by destroying anything from 
before the age of progress which might inhibit its victory. Modern liberalism has been a superb 
legitimizing instrument for the technological society, because at one and the same time it has 
been able to criticize out of the popular mind the general idea of human excellence, and yet put 
no barrier in the way of that particular idea of excellence which in fact determines the actions of 
the most powerful in our society. 153 
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The Natural Outcome of Modern Thought 
We turn now to examine two broad categories of estrangement Grant believes 
have resulted from understanding the contemporary ideal of human excellence in this 
way. First, technology increasingly turns from being used to alleviate human suffering to 
controlling society. Second, our moral reasoning is progressively enfeebled by our 
rejection of the categories of thought which make moral deliberation possible. 
1) Technologies of the Helmsman 
Grant contends that the outcome of this constellation of thought is a widespread 
view that humanity itself can be understood as a standing reserve. He explores 
Heidegger's description of the birth of our age's tyranny under the heading of 
technologies of the helmsman. '54 While the ancient Greeks understood political tyranny 
as the despotic rule of one man over many, Grant points out that, 
[W]hat distinguishes modem tyranny from ancient tyranny is the presence in the modern world 
of a science that issues in the conquest of nature and the belief in the possibility of the 
popularization of philosophy and science. Both the possibilities were known to the ancient 
philosophers. "But the classics rejected them as `unnatural, ' i. e., as destructive of humanity. 
They did not dream of present day tyranny because they regarded its basic presuppositions as so 
preposterous that they turned their imaginations in entirely different directions. " 
55 
Modem tyranny, by contrast, is the homogenization of society and its control by the 
sciences which were first developed to conquer the forces of nature. Grant argues that, 
once again, Christianity played a role in the genesis of modern tyranny by smoothing the 
transition from applying science to the natural world to applying it to human society. St. 
154 Grant, English Speaking JL ustice, 9. 
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Paul first thought the possibility of the homogenous state in that he saw all individual and 
national difference radically relativised and replaced by a new identity in Christ. The 
Greeks could never reach this place because of the ineradicable, ontological divide 
between the slave and master. Christian thought erased this divide, an erasure that, with 
the demise of God, has made thinkable the project of remaking any aspect across the 
breadth of human society. '56 
It is the possibility of the alleviation of human suffering which validates modern 
attempts to set up such a state. But this justification seems to have lost its grounding in 
the relief of suffering, Grant contends. "[T]echnological progress is now being pursued 
not first and foremost to free all men from work and disease, but for the investigation and 
conquest of the infinite spaces around us. The vastness of such a task suggests that 
modern society is committed to unlimited technological progress for its own sake. " 157 Yet 
this desire for progress and conquest does not fully eclipse its original focus on making 
the world good for humans, and so turns its gaze to the ever more intimate conquest of 
chance (now understood as the root of suffering) in human affairs. The scientific 
overcoming of nature, once harnessed for our use, now becomes the empowering of select 
individuals to shape society in unprecedented ways. ' 58 In this way "... absolute freedom 
and absolute determinism call forth each other. " 159 
That liberalism is technological in its essence is revealed, Grant contends, in 
noting that beneath the rhetoric of democratic difference and the importance of the relief 
of suffering through material progress is a demand for a high level of social conformity. 
[D]ifferences in the technological state are able to exist only in private activities: how we eat; 
how we mate; how we practice ceremonies. Some like pizza, some like steaks, some like girls, 
156 Grant, Technology and Empire, 87. Grant is correct in pointing out the centrality of the remaking of 
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some like boys; some like synagogue, some like the mass. But we all do it in churches, motels, 
restaurants indistinguishable from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 160 
Why is this a tyranny? Because having defined justice as what we agree on, then we must 
relegate to the private sphere anything which might threaten this homogeneity. This 
bifurcation muzzles dissent against the continual homogenizing revolutions which sweep 
our culture, making us ever less able to maintain a publicly acceptable distinction 
between what we can do (technically) and what we should do, morally. By definition, it is 
the separation of the public from the private which the technological world demands, and 
this separation creates tyranny. '61 
The Implications of this Homogenizing Tyranny 
a) The Undermining of True Democracy and Political Theory 
At the level of practice, when the masses are manipulated then democracy 
becomes a farce. But conceptually, "... political reflection today is bound to a body of 
political doctrine ('the religion of democracy, ' `the religion of progress, mastery and 
power') which has abandoned the principles and distinctions without which no public, 
including the modern public, can be understood. "162 According to Grant, this means that 
the most pressing question of our political life, how to regulate technological change, is 
problematized by the rooting of political thought in self-interest as defined in the terms of 
progress itself. When both conservatives and liberals espouse a technological vision of 
progress, then mathematecized technological rationality has become hegemonic, and 
political choice against its power non-existent. By defining humans as holders of one 
rational share in the social contract the citizen's body is opened up for social 
manipulation which disregards any possible claims of material order. The technology of 
human control comes to be part of our social fabric, with its apparatus of artisans 
160 Grant, Technology and Empire, 26. 
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remaking humanity in extreme ways such as behavior modification, genetic engineering, 
and population control by abortion, and in a myriad of not so extreme ways, such as the 
swaying of opinion by psychological research and media manipulation. 163 
b) Education Must Become Technique-Centered 
If nations wish to maintain their technological advantage they must structure their 
educational systems so that the necessary technicians will be available to support this 
endeavor, Grant contends. This technization of education undermines cultural 
distinctiveness because the needs of industry mitigate against non-technical ways of 
educating youth. Nations are thus faced with the either/or of maintaining their cultural 
heritage through non-technical emphases in their educational curriculum, or becoming 
non-technically-educated laborers in their own industrialization. 164 
At another level, mathematecized reason infects all levels of scholarship in the 
university. In "The University Curriculum, " Grant notes the wide ranging impact of fact- 
value thinking on views of the good. 165 Growing from his lifelong acrimonious struggles 
over university curricula, Grant developed a fine tuned and oft elucidated distinction 
between researchers, who reveled in their systems of schematization, and scholars, who 
combed historical traditions for wisdom in living today. 166 Grant argues that 
technologized views of knowledge systematically skew education by devaluing the 
inculcation of wonder in favor of the skills of mastery. 167 What modern society believes 
itself to need are competent technicians, and the universities are coming to see their sole 
task as cultivating those sciences which issue in the mastery of human and non-human 
nature. "It is this growing victory of power over wonder which is the basis of the 
163 Grant, English Speaking Justice, 9,44. 
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proposition that the modern sciences can best be understood as a unity around the idea of 
mastery. "168 
c) Religious Communities Must Opt Out of "Progress" or Liberalize Their View 
of Human Nature 
Grant takes the example of the pressures of homogenization upon French- 
speaking Quebec to illustrate the dilemma which homogenization forces on religion. 
Grant believes that the intellectual core of French Canada, and the anchor of its cultural 
distinctiveness amid the technological dynamo which is North America, is its old-world 
Catholicism. What will happen to Catholic anthropology when Catholics are asked to 
shape society through the new sciences? Will Quebecois abstain from all behavior 
control, genetic manipulation, and similar social trends? Will the Catholic church of 
Quebec become like the Protestant church in America which has no conflict with the 
premises of the technological empire? If it gives up its distinctive anthropology, its moral 
heart will be removed, and Quebec will blend into industrialized America with only 
residual patterns of language and personal habit to show for its distinctive history. '69 
Where churches have liberalized to accept the dominant mode of reasoning, "public 
religion has become an unimportant litany of objectified self-righteousness necessary for 
the more anal of our managers. " 70 
d) Justice is Defined as the Extension of Technical Progress to All 
Grant contends that when justice is severed from ontology and becomes simply a 
value posited by subjective agents, it becomes impossible to define. This allows him to 
put a bracing question to contemporary contractarian liberalism: Can a substantive 
definition of social justice be derived from a political procedure which claims to be 
168 Grant, "The University Curriculum, " in Technology and Empire, 116. 
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morally neutral because based on contracts between self-interested individuals? What will 
be the content of such justice severed from an eternal or created referent? Without this 
referent justice is simply a construct for happy social living, a product of our willing. 171 
This will-to-will reading of justice is the polar opposite to the ancient reading of justice as 
something given, and makes justice a matter of empirical calculation, a justice which 
cannot, therefore, be worthy of our love. 172 Grant is unsurprised that the society which 
understands justice in this way has fallen prey to an insatiable will for technological 
expansion. Having defined the structural form of justice in this creative mode, only 
narrow possibilities are left for the material content of justice: equal goods or equal 
procedure. Such a view of justice cannot function without annihilating traditional moral 
qualms about protecting the weak in the pursuit of the "needs" of the masses, despite the 
tendency of the exploited majority to get together and insist on justice against the 
"creative" strong. Liberal contractarian thinkers believe themselves to be facing a 
technical problem about how to control technology, not realizing that contractarianism 
and technology come from the same root, and neither have the intellectual resources to 
say how any vision of the good or natural essence may count as an objection to a 
technological change. They are incapable of establishing what is not to be violated, or 
why people might be uniquely suited for equality, 173 and thus pave the way for justice as 
willing in which justice is building a better race, a race not fettered by hatred of the past 
but, as Nietzsche prefigured, transcending static morality which assumes that justice is 
due to all humans. '74 
At the culmination of this trend, Grant continues, the overcoming of chance 
through technology and the exploring of the unexplored replace the drive for freedom for 
all because the overcoming of chance has come to be equated with freedom for all. 175 
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e) A Vast and Violent Ideological Empire is Created 
In this new world the nation which dissents from the technological imperative 
comes under sustained attack. Grant's Canadian nationalism caused him to develop a 
hypersensitivity to the role of technology in modem imperialism, particularly the 
American technological empire which is the most powerful the world has ever known. '76 
He battled those Canadians who hoped for stronger political ties with the United States 
based on a faith that superior technological power makes one a player in history, thus 
lending life meaning and purpose. '77 He contends that the American empire expands in 
part by spreading the faith that technology is power, and thrives on its reputation as the 
most effective purveyor of that power. 178 Imperialism, Grant notes, is as old as humanity 
itself, but what is masked in modem imperialism is its violence because technological 
progress is equated with justice. As we have seen, for Grant Vietnam made this injustice 
and violence blatantly apparent. 179 Liberation theologians have pointed out in their lands 
what Grant has argued from his Canadian perspective: that the technological vision of 
knowledge has masked the violence of the West's view of justice and equality. ' 80 The 
West has lost a view of justice, love and beauty with the advent of the technological way 
of knowing, yet because of their material want, the dispossessed believe the modern myth 
that their needs will be met by including them in the technological empire. '81 
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We might summarize Grant's understanding of the implications of the 
homogenizing tyranny by saying that technology grew from a desire to overcome nature 
in hopes of relief from poverty and ignorance, but ends up desiring to homogenize 
humanity so that it is happy and well-controlled. 182 
2) "Scientific Neutrality" Hides the Meaning of our Decisions 
Technological society, Grant contends, is not only homogenizing and thus 
subversive of good government, but also progressively enfeebles our capacity for moral 
deliberation. Popular rhetoric insists that the novelty of the technological era is that it 
places ever more powerful tools at our disposal. But this instrumental view of technology 
masks the true depth of our predicament, thereby increasing our confusion. It is the 
language of instrumentality which causes us to make statements like, "The computer does 
not impose on us the ways it should be used. " Such a statement is pernicious for three 
reasons. First, the construction of computers is based on modern mathematecized science 
which grounds (infects) all modern disciplines, creating a pressure that all knowledge be 
"objective" and therefore manipulable by mathematical machines. Second, as part of the 
mathematecized destiny of modern man, computers do impose in that their very use 
demands the spread of homogenizing ways of dealing with knowledge so that it is 
manipulable by such machines. Third, computers impose because they demand societies 
with large corporations and highly efficient infrastructures for their manufacture and use. 
The problem of conceiving technology as neutral is that the true magnitude of the 
decision to build or use individual technologies, such as computers, is hidden. Grant 
comments, "Seventy five years ago somebody might have said "The automobile does not 
impose on us the ways it should be used", and who would have quarreled with that? Yet 
this would have been a deluded representation of the automobile. , 
183 This delusion is 
especially pernicious when the construction and use of computers accelerates 
182 Grant, "Thinking About Technology, " in Technology and Justice, 16-17. 
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homogenization within the ambit of a society already shot through with mathematecized 
accounts of reasoning. 184 Thus, conceiving technology in neutral terms reveals a problem 
at the heart of the modern way of thinking. Grant concludes, 
"The computer does not impose on us the ways it should be used" asserts the essence of the 
modern view, which is that human ability freely determines what happens. It then puts that 
freedom in the service of the very `should' which that same modern novelty has made 
provisional. The resolute mastery to which we are summoned in `does not impose' is the very 
source of difficulty in apprehending goodness as `should'. Therefore, the `should' in the 
statement has only a masquerading resonance in the actions we are summoned to concerning 
computers... The statement therefore cushions us from the full impact of the novelties it asks us 
to consider... The coming to be of technology has required changes in what we think is good, 
what we think good is, how we conceive sanity and madness, justice and injustice, rationality and 
irrationality, beauty and ugliness... The result of this is that when we are deliberating in any 
practical situation our judgment acts rather like a mirror, which throws back the very metaphysic 
of the technology which we are supposed to be deliberating about in detail. The outcome is 
inevitably a decision for further technological development. '85 
Grant argues that the practical outcome of this deficiency in moral deliberation is seen 
when the only protest against technology that can be offered from within modern 
accounts of rationality is an empirical argument concerning projected harms of specific 
proposed technological developments. Implicit in this logic is a faith that in the long term 
technology will lead humanity to justice and equality. To have any hope of establishing 
that the justice or injustice of actions may be known in advance of empirical evidence, 
Grant contends, necessitates a stepping outside of the voluntarist technological rationality 
which grounds modernity. 
According to Grant, to stay within voluntarist technological assumptions is to 
embrace a future without truly considering the impact of our actions. Technology 
overmasters us because we invest our energies in it without understanding the nature of 
184 Grant, "Thinking About Technology, " in Technology and Justice, 30. 
185 Grant, "Thinking About Technology, " in Technology and Justice, 31-33. 
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our investment. ' 86 Yet an opportunity has been given to us, Grant believes, to look more 
closely at our investments in the technological society because the vast institutions 
needed for more powerful technologies force us to look again at the unfreedom within 
them, noting the various ways in which natural necessities have given way to man-made 
necessity. 187 Not only does technology define the ways that we do individual things, but it 
deeply shapes the distribution of our society's expenditure of resources and talent, by 
default using resources which might have been used to build a more truly just society. '88 
Grant contends that our only tool of justice, technology, by tempting us to mechanized 
conceptions of justice, has sapped our creativity in reaching for a truly just society. 
Because technology is the ontology of the age, we are not as free as we claim to be to 
create any society we wish, but conceive and enact our communal choices from within 
our technological view of justice with its non-appreciation of ontological being. 
Grant points out that by claiming that "technology is neutral in itself' we refuse 
deliberation about the future demands of technology and the present moral claim of 
technology upon us, marginalizing moral deliberation by limiting it to the evaluation of 
technology after we have already created it. 189 One either enacts the maxim, "Just 
because something could be, it does not follow that it should be, " or, more likely in the 
age of progress, follows the maxim of atomic bomb pioneer Robert Oppenheimer, "... if 
something is technically sweet, go ahead and do it. "190 However much we might at points 
wish (and need) to revisit the empirical details of Grant's argument, I believe he has 
established a point essential to exposing the form of contemporary deliberation about new 
technology: that our usual forms of moral deliberation about new technology forego 
entirely any serious deliberation by conceiving such deliberation as grappling only with 
the use of objects and procedures which have been implemented on grounds prior to 
186 Grant, The Good or Values, " in The George Grant Reader, 393. 
187 Grant, "America: A New World, " in The George Grant Reader, 405-406. 
188 Grant, "Technology as Ontology, " in The George Grant Reader, 421-422. 
189 Grant, "Technology as Ontology, " in The George Grant Reader, 430-31; Grant, Technology and Justice, 
24-26,31-32. 
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explicit moral deliberation. To recover the possibility of moral deliberation, Grant says, 
we must seek to reopen questions which technological logic has prematurely closed. 
Grant's Proposed Antidote: Sanity is Not Statistical 
Though Grant himself did not undertake the task, it is possible to summarize the 
considerations he developed which any successful counter to the technological way of 
thinking must take into account. The considerations highlighted by Grant's account will 
frame the development of the theological project of Part II. 
1) Begin by attempting to see technology as it really is. 
This may seem a trivial task, Grant points out, but because technology grows out 
of deeply held commitments we must not presume it to be simple. In one sense, seeing 
technology truly comprises a complete solution to the technological predicament. ' 91 
Following Heidegger, Grant claims that our predicament will only appear in its full 
magnitude as we attentively examine cultures of other ages. '92 "Only in listening for the 
intimations of deprival can we live critically in the dynamo. " 193 Putting a Christian turn 
on Heidegger's notion, he says that the first step is to "bring the darkness to light as 
darkness. "194 
2) After our attempt to see technology for what it is, the most obvious locus for counter 
action is to undermine the fact-value distinction of mathematecized reason. 
How do we escape the fate imposed by our embrace of mathematecized reason? 
Grant notes that an obvious beginning point is to battle the fact-value distinction, 
rejuvenating the "common sense, reverence, communities and art (perhaps even finally 
191 Grant, "Technology and Faith, " in The George Grant Reader, 443. 
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sexuality)" which have been driven into near non-existence by mathematical 
homogenization. 195 
To illustrate... when I state that Bessie Touzel weighs 135 pounds I am stating a fact; but when I 
state that she is a noble human being I am simply expressing my value preferences... Value is 
seen as something external to the facts. . . This is to deny that the world apart from us is valuable, 
and to deny that the world is in itself good is the heart of blasphemy. In this sense the crisis of 
value in technology is nowhere better seen than in the social sciences which make the fact-value 
distinction. For in that very distinction is the denial that the world is in itself valuable. This is to 
leave the individual naked and alone in the dreadful pressure of time. 196 
3) One way to combat the fact-value distinction is to find a place for diversity, in nations 
and individuals. 
Grant contends that the age of progress demands homogeneity of material 
existence-which can only be sustained by enforcing conformity in thought, from which 
the shape of our material existence emerges. Thus, to recover an appreciation of diversity 
is to combat the technological monism of modern society. 
4) An antidote to the technological society must recognize its lack of an account of the 
good ordering of inner life by providing such an account. 
As justice comes to be defined in terms of outer goods, Grant contends that an 
effective response must emphasize the good ordering of the inner life, including giving a 
place to what it is good to love. '97 
5) Any antidote to the technological constellation of thought must make a concerted effort 
to develop a richer anthropology than the anthropology of will. 
According to Grant, such an anthropology must also have room for reverence, 
receptivity, and remembrance. In our society the non-manipulated has ceased to be valued 
195 Grant, Technology and Empire, 133. 
196 Grant, "The Good or Values? " in The George Grant Reader, 392. 
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as good, and thus practices such as prayer and adoration seem meaningless while 
manipulation and material results are defined as meaningful. Modern rationalized 
pragmatism is based on this extensive account of freedom and withered account of law. 
What must be sought is the proper relation between spiritual freedom and boundaries 
which can give it form. If the intellect's only job is to secure the desires of the will, 
intellectual structure becomes meaningless, and a vacuousness about the lived life sets in. 
Grant turns to myth to reconnect meaning with limit. 
The heart of any myth is to tell us of that which our freedom does not create but by which it is 
judged... As modem people come to believe themselves to be the absolute source of themselves, 
all systems of order and meaning which appear to human beings as myth become other to them, 
and so in the very act of their sovereignty they experience the world as empty of meaning. 198 
Greek philosophy and Christian theology share a feature which combats the primacy of 
willing: reverence, a receptivity which must inform action. Reverence, which we learn 
from a tradition which is `surrendered' to us, is the counterpoint to the hegemony of 
willing. But reverence, Grant concludes, cannot be a substitute for willing, lest we end up 
in complacency, so reverence must be a contextualization of willing. 
6) A counter-case must explain how ontological order might be understood as beautiful 
and worthy of love, thus shaping our moral practice. 
It is easily observable, Grant says, that technological practice has brought about 
both good and evil, 199 but this level of analysis distracts us from the reality that the 
modem world, in creating these technologies, has done so using a logic which denies 
ontological being its own uniqueness by leveling all things into generic quanta of energy. 
This leveling precludes our loving it as it presents itself but only as it becomes a useful 
extension of our will. Modern humanity therefore has no reason to respect the given (such 
197 Grant, English Speaking Justice, 84. 
198 Grant, "The Good or Values? " in The George Grant Reader, 389. 
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as protecting endangered species) other than that it suits our desires, which might be 
renounced in favor of other interests at another time. This is a disjunction between truth 
and beauty at the heart of the modern project. Only when truth and beauty are seen 
together are we able to see the reality of the other, whether speaking in terms of material 
or social ontology. When truth and beauty are disjoined, the other inevitably collapses 
into projections of ourselves. What blocks our perception of the beauty of the other is not 
primarily an epistemic deficiency but a conceptual problem. We cannot `experience' the 
primal truth and beauty of creation if we are not open to it, and our instrumental view of 
ontology systematically repudiates this openness . 
200 
Our task then, Grant contends, is to reconnect the affirmation of creation as good 
with ontological order. 201 If we refuse to affirm that there is moral value in the structure 
of creation we deny its goodness, opening the door to the account of nature as indifferent 
and indeterminate "stuff". 
7) Closedness to the other, born of our instrumental reason, must be renounced in favor of 
an understanding of ontology which relates it to justice. The search for a right 
understanding of ontology must not become abstract or disconnectedly metaphysical, but 
must be linked to questions about the meaning of justice. 
Grant admits that his own view is heavily indebted to Plato's Republic, which 
strives to explain what is morally due to things and people. To know is to love, and 
therefore to give each thing its due. Christianity extends this account of justice by 
including what is due to individuals-forgiveness. If we understand justice in the Greek 
sense as rendering to things that which they are due, then decisions about concrete 
technologies are linked into a web of moral claims. 202 
Another way to say this is to point again to Heidegger's claim that we do not 
recover a right appreciation of material ontology without reference to social ontology. 
Grant holds that Heidegger was right-the solution to our technologically induced 
200 Grant, "Faith and the Multiversity, " in Technology and Justice, 51-52,64-66. 
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blindness is to return to a vision of reason which appreciates and listens to the 
ontologically given. Grant, however, thinks that Heidegger is wrong to say that we have 
lost touch with ontology, and contends that by speaking this way Heidegger masks the 
injustice of his own ontology. Heidegger renews our appreciation of the ontological, but 
loses Plato's sense that ontology must be one part of the search for social justice or proper 
social relations. 203 
Another way of saying that ontology must be the search for justice, Grant 
contends, is to say that we must have an account of otherness which can provide a 
boundary to our habit of using the other as a standing reserve. With abortion most 
obviously, but in many other facets of our social interaction, the ontological difference of 
the other is flattened out because their value is understood to reside in their fitting into my 
designs. Without a vision of true, ontological otherness as boundary we cannot love other 
humans or creation; we cannot even have "beauty in the eye of the beholder, " for even a 
beholder must behold an other to be classed as a beholder. Neither the other in the present 
nor the other who speaks from the past through literature and religious tradition is 
available to scientific minds which stand above being and thought, objectifying it. 204 Our 
thought must continually return to concrete situations in which we wrestle through the 
practical implications of the desire to respect the inviolable claim of the other on our 
205 
action. 
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8) Given this linkage of ontology and justice, a counter proposal must be set within an 
understanding of freedom which contends that the only unfettered freedom we have is to 
reject the beautiful and the good. 
Grant denies the modern claim that to be human is to be the holder of the freedom 
to make ourselves and our world. Freedom is the possibility of loving the good which is 
given to us by God-and thus our only unbounded freedom is the freedom to turn away 
from this beauty. 206 
9) We must be careful to avoid imbalances of past Christian ethics which have made it 
impossible to construct the above counter position. 
Grant points out first that to construct such a counter position demands that 
Christian moral theory not become static, complacent, or conservative due to an over 
focusing on the eternal or created component of moral truth. Such forms of moral theory 
tend to be too dismissive of the possibility of the amelioration of evil within history. On 
the other side, Christian moral theory must not allow human willing in abstraction from 
the created order. The goal is to think order and the attempt at progressive elimination of 
evil together. Christian moral deliberation which hopes to respond to the question of new 
technology cannot focus too heavily on law so that it kills human freedom and ingenuity, 
nor can it focus on freedom so that human ingenuity becomes unharnessed from the good 
order of creation. This means we must eschew the oft-caricatured polarities of an activist, 
will-based Protestant ethic or a law-based, non-eschatological Catholic morality. 207 
As can be expected, Grant was most worried about the dangers of Protestant 
voluntarism having taken up Max Weber's reading of technology as the product of 
Puritan piety. Specifically, he agrees with Weber's argument that medieval Catholic 
liturgy maintained a sense of rhythm and structure which worked with the rhythms of the 
body, while Calvinism in practice tended to espouse the teaching that men were 
responsible for reforming their bodies as they must subdue the natural world. Even more 
scathingly, he argues that Protestantism concentrated its focus when speaking of the 
206 Grant, "Faith and the Multiversity, " in Technology and Justice, 74-75. 
207 Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age, 96-100,117. 
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control of the passions on sexual lust and laziness, while emancipating the church from 
the traditional restraints on greed and the lust for mastery. The challenge of the North 
American untamed wilds further hardened this religiously-fueled vision to crystallize the 
core of modern technological man, which had no pre-modern traditions on which to look 
back to temper this willing. 208 Because North America remains largely Protestant in 
sensibility, Grant's analysis indicates that contemporary political theology must face a 
powerful current of activist thought and habit, which tends to swallow any more careful 
thinking as soon as a particular case of human suffering presents itself to be "solved", 
thus opening the floodgates of technology once again. 
Conclusion: Limits, Creation and Hubris 
In searching for the conceptual heart of modernity Grant has gone some way in 
establishing the veracity of Heidegger's account of modern technology. He has 
demonstrated practical ways in which the core ideas of modernity make certain facets of 
material and social reality visible as they devalue others, and by reference to ancient 
thought has illustrated what is lost to moderns in the process. 
Grant has also corroborated and substantially sharpened Heidegger's assertion that 
material ontology must guide human making in order to be good. They agree that our 
proper home is discovered not created. But he also shows how without this search being 
guided by a definition of justice, or fitting human action, attention to material ontology 
cannot satisfactorily guide human making because it claims attention to material order is 
justice. This insight is at times vitiated by Grant's use of the problematic formulation 
which asserts the "necessity of limits to man's making. "209 The search for "limits" fits 
well within the framework of an activist project, and if we are to develop a more central 
role for reverence it is important to stress its ability to develop sensitivities to once- 
hidden facets of the material order within which we exist. More importantly, as will be 
208 Grant, "America: A New World, " in The George Grant Reader, 401-404. 
209 Grant, Philosophy, 78. 
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argued in detail in chapter six, to search for "limits" is already to have turned away from 
moral deliberation as contemplation of the supreme good, God. I will argue that any 
theologically proper sense of moral boundaries is fundamentally focused on the giver and 
sustainer of all order. 
Grant gets close to the meaning of this criticism in arguing that the problem of 
technology is that in living by its dictates we live without attention to the context of all 
human action, and this context is properly known only through the doctrine of creation. In 
his early work he weakens this insight by collapsing creation into eschatology with talk of 
continuous creation, but in his later work he gives us room to reverse this imbalance by 
asserting that the work of Christ is the criterion of all truth . 
210 
In the final analysis, Grant is unable to construct a positive theological framework 
because he has pitted temporality and atemporality too firmly against one another. Grant 
applauds Aquinas' attempt to hold in tension the Greek view of an atemporal natural law 
with the biblical, Jewish God of history. In chapter six I contend that such attempts are 
pre-Christian in logic and thus theologically self-defeating. If Heidegger's God was 
entirely immanent (being equated with earth) then Grant's God is too alienated from time 
(being grounded in atemporality). Heidegger sets up a false redemption (as unity with the 
revealing of earth). Grant knows the right redeemer (the Christian God) but in the wrong 
form (complete transcendence). 
What his discussion has drawn out is that creation is a given-the order of 
materiality does come to us as benefit to which all our action and making are beholden. 
He shows how this realization is related to theological beliefs, and how its rejection is 
both widespread and can be understood in terms of sin. He has indicated how this hubris 
of modernity might be questioned in order to begin to work through how it might be 
renounced. While Grant can tend to ontologize this hubris as the fate of the age, 
211 the 
theological account of chapter six will indicate why we need not assume this. 
In sum, Grant has supplied a promising but incomplete account of how 
Heidegger's thought might be shown to illumine the technological thinking and thus 
210 O'Donovan, Twilight, 17,42,44. 
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practice of modernity. Because Michel Foucault is more skeptical about the relation of 
thought to practice, he contends that to understand the modern way of life we must look 
beyond our explicit thoughts to the unthought logic of our practices. 
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Chapter Three: Michel Foucault and the Practices of Technology 
He was useful because he had been instructed... 
Joseph Conrade''` 
The Turn from the Ideal to the Empirical Perspective 
If Grant's study of Heidegger's thought has developed a clearer picture of the 
importance of explicit knowledge frameworks for all our action and perceiving, Foucault 
pursues a similar course to establish that human knowing and acting is also deeply shaped 
in less explicit and therefore less accessible ways by our practical life. He gives added 
depth to Heidegger's explication of the way of being of our ten men by illustrating how 
deeply their explicit language and thought are bound up with wider logics of practice to 
which each actor has little or no direct access. In the last chapter we were concerned with 
the distribution of ideas in conceptual space, and attempted to link changes in the 
distribution of ideas with changes in the behaviors of bodies in real space. Now we 
reverse this procedure, concerning ourselves with the activity of bodies in real space, 
working backward to make explicit the hidden patterns imbedded in their movements. 
Such embedded bodily knowledge has come to play an important part in modern 
political life. "For Heidegger, the technological understanding of beings attempts to make 
entities wholly present as standing reserve, " whereas one commentator notes, "For 
Foucault, the technological system attempts to make humans wholly present as bio- 
power. "213 Grant's analysis, with its idealist cast, assumed but did not analyze this 
inexplicit level of human practical and physical knowledge. Foucault exposes the central 
role such knowledge plays in sustaining political life. Modern political power is novel, he 
says, in its explicitly technological method of training physical habits to expedite social 
212 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness (London: David Campbell Publishers Ltd., 1993), 51. 
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functioning. The upshot is that we moderns willingly, but without explicitly realizing it, 
participate in regimens which treat us and others as raw material to be reformed by 
political technique. Arnold Pacey and David Nye contend that this point can be sharpened 
in relation to manufacture by establishing that technological practice (the making of 
artifacts) relies on a whole range of subconscious aesthetic senses, which, again, are 
easily manipulated by political techniques to make the implementation of new 
technologies "feel"-subjectively-good, therefore undermining any serious impulse to 
moral examination of the propriety of new technologies. This chapter concludes that on a 
"bottom-up" examination, Heidegger's theory is again vindicated. Analysis of our 
practices makes it clear that no matter what we explicitly claim and affirm, our practices 
uphold and augment a political mechanism which has all the hallmarks of treating 
humanity as standing reserve which must be rationally developed and deployed in the 
struggle of nation against nation and corporation against corporation. It is my contention 
that the habits of Western citizenship have a direct bearing on how we approach a wide 
range of practical problems, especially problems of interpersonal and political relations. 
Before moving to the body of the chapter, three preliminary remarks are in order. 
Situating Foucault's Analysis 
Diagnosing the Present: The Methods of Grant and Foucault 
Like Grant, Foucault attempts to read the present with the help of several 
Heideggerian tools. What Foucault learned from Heidegger is best summarized by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's comment that, "Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say 
that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing 
that things which look the same are really different. "214 If Grant's project is to trace a 
214 Quoted in David J. Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 18. Gouwens notes Wittgenstein's profound respect for Kierkegaard, and the similarity of 
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continuity in the penetration of technological thinking into every facet of human thought, 
Foucault focuses on differences in historical practice, providing a necessary hedge against 
constructing an "ascent" genealogy of technology: "I think we should have the modesty to 
say to ourselves that, on the one hand, the time we live in is not the unique or 
fundamental or irruptive point in history... It is a time like any other, or rather, a time that 
is never quite like any other. , 215 Foucault's warning is a reminder that we need not rest an 
analysis of the current hegemony of the technological on a projection about whether the 
past expansion of the technological mindset will continue or decline. I agree that 
Heidegger and Grant have rightly traced a historical expansion of mathematical logic to 
create the world we know, but the important point is to trace how historical trends have 
brought us to the present, and to establish that this present may indeed be described as 
one in which the predominant mode of behavior augments human power by way of 
technological logic. 
Foucault's focus on the logic of present practices means he does not analyze ideas 
or language games. Comparisons of present practices to those of the past reveal the 
peculiarity of contemporary social embedding. Such an inquiry, he hastens to add, is not 
deconstruction, but "a movement of critical analysis in which one tries to see how the 
different solutions to a problem have been constructed; but also how these different 
solutions result from a specific form of problematization. "216 
From Foucault's perspective, Grant's methodical attempt to "enucleate" the 
thought of the present is of limited value, for our thought is molded more completely than 
we mold the thought of our age. Both Grant and Foucault would repudiate the critical 
method of the other, each claiming that one cannot take up both perspectives 
215 Michel Foucault, "Structuralism and Post-structuralism, " in Michel Foucault, The Essential Works of 
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simultaneously. 217 Yet both build on the thought of Heidegger in which the two 
perspectives stand unified. Given the merits of Heidegger's interweaving of the two 
perspectives, it seems fair to temper the counter-polemics of Grant and Foucault, while 
admitting their claims to absolute exclusivity are correct to the extent that one cannot 
"mix" the two levels of analysis into a composite view which denies each analysis its 
warranted uniqueness. Having affirmed the Heideggerian symbiotic dialectic of thought 
and practice, I also contend that there is a heuristic value in Grant's attempt to trace how 
explicit thought maintains and marks our action, while agreeing with Foucault that the 
logic of our practices is indeed a more basic form of knowledge, yet not one which 
invalidates all transcendent thinking. In practice the two levels are constantly in interplay. 
But the radically different starting points of Grant and Foucault allow a sharpening of this 
study by providing distinct angles from which to study contemporary technological 
society. 
Problematization 
Foucault's term `problematization' lies at the heart of our interest in his project of 
describing, identifying, and explaining the thought forms and practices which cause 
certain problems to appear as problems. Ethics, for Foucault, (insofar as there is an ethical 
task) begins with a decision about present dangers, and may be followed by a speech act 
which reveals that the "problems" which constrain our choices into dangerous channels 
may be illusory. Perceived obstacles, Foucault claims, are not necessarily to be taken at 
face value, but rather present the opportunity to examine the broad trajectories of thought 
and action which have "produced" the obstacle as obstacle. Such examination wrests 
from the experience of dilemma greater knowledge of our present beliefs. 
218 The ethical 
task then is "to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is 
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accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such. Practicing criticism is a 
matter of making facile gestures difficult. , 219 
Technology is never the central focus of Foucault's analysis, but his notion of 
problematization explains why study of the social perplexity surrounding moral 
deliberation about new technologies may be uniquely productive, because representing a 
rare opportunity for free thought. 220 "[F]or a domain of action, a behavior, to enter the 
field of thought, it is necessary for a certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, 
to have made it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of difficulties 
around it. "221 Once thought has detached from practice we are freed to reflect on how a 
paired set of problems and solutions given to us in our social context are incomplete or 
contradictory and in need of reformulation. This focus on problems constitutes a central 
orienting framework for the ethical method of Part II. 
We can summarize Foucault's method by saying that he is attempting to make our 
`world' (in Heideggerian terms) appear visibly before us. Foucault's thought regularly 
returns to examine `constructed' worlds, those politically and ideologically saturated 
spaces, such as the American Puritan city or, 
... those extraordinary colonies of 
Jesuits that were founded in south America: marvelous, 
absolutely regulated colonies in which human perfection was effectively achieved. The Jesuits of 
Paraguay established colonies in which existence was regulated in every particular. The village 
was laid out according to a strict arrangement around a rectangular plaza with a church at the far 
end; on one side the secondary school, on the other the cemetery, and then opposite the church, 
219 Quoted in John Caputo and Mark Yount, eds., "Institutions, Normalization, and Power, " in Foucault and 
the Critique of Institutions (University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1993), 9. Whether 
Foucault's descriptive project can sustain the ethical claims made here will be the subject of this chapter's 
concluding analysis of his thought. 
220 Here Foucault explicitly follows Heidegger. Commenting on paragraph 69 of Being and Time, Michael 
Gelven notes that this is why Heidegger focuses on the question of damaged equipment, which is no longer 
transparent in its functioning. We can use a hammer, or reflect on its purpose, but the reflective mode is 
derivative of the mode of using. See Gelven, A Commentary, 198,199. 
221 Foucault, "Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations, " in Ethics, 117. 
97 
there began an avenue that a second avenue intersected at a right angle. The families each had 
their little hut along these two axes, and in this way the sign of Christ was exactly 
reproduced... The daily life of individuals was regulated not with the whistle, but with the bell. 
Reveille was set for everybody at the same hour and work began for everybody at the same hour; 
meals were at noon and five o'clock then one went to bed, and at midnight there was something 
called the conjugal wakeup, meaning that when the convent bell rang, everybody did his duty. "' 
The Jesuit colony and the ship (a space organized for empire building and commercial 
gain) are pure types which help us to understand that the organization of the space we 
inhabit is patterned, quite often to some purpose. By analyzing the practical obstacles 
thrown up for us by life in our historically particular environment, the priorities we too 
have been born into can slowly come into focus. 
Punishment and the Disciplinary Society: From Drama to Docility 
Discipline and Punish presents the results of some of Foucault's closest 
archeological investigation, in which he is specifically trying to understand how power 
relations manipulate knowledge to create certain types of agents. 223 For our purposes it 
will be important to draw out the development of logic grounding the multitude of 
discontinuities which Foucault will examine in his quest to understand the modern 
technology of power. Foucault will show that this logic is focused on efficiency and 
rationalized control, the hallmarks of the technological method. More importantly, he also 
shows how these technological priorities are not simply the priorities of political 
governors, but are our priorities as well. 
222 Foucault, "Different Spaces, " in Aesthetics, 184. 
`23 Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow thoroughly examine the phases of Foucault's thought and indicate the 
importance of this mature synthesis in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, with an afterward by Michel Foucault (New York: Harvester Press, Ltd., 
1982). 
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Foucault's examination of modern political practice begins with an observation 
about a great shift in western penal practice, and goes on to show how this change in the 
practice of punishment marked a change in the practices of society as a whole, as 
indicated by the growth of specific new modes of social and political practice. Foucault 
brings before us a nearly-forgotten world with this startling quotation from a French court 
judgment: 
On 2 March 1757 Damiens the regicide was condemned to `make the amende honorable before 
the main door of the Church of Paris', where he was to be `taken and conveyed in a cart, wearing 
nothing but a shirt, holding a torch of burning wax weighing two pounds'; then, `in the said cart, 
to the Place de Greve, where, on a scaffold that will be erected there, the flesh will be torn from 
his breasts, arms, thighs and calves with red-hot pincers, his right hand, holding the knife with 
which he committed the said parricide, burnt with sulphur, and, on those places where the flesh 
will be torn away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, burning resin, wax and sulphur melted 
together and then his body drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs consumed by fire, 
reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the winds'. 224 
In this not-so-distant European world, political power is sustained by rituals which are 
public and visual, based on the codified violence of punishment. 
Only fifty years later, and in stark contrast, would-be penal reformer Jeremy 
Bentham expressed the essence of the modern punishment regime. Gone was the 
destruction of the criminal, and in its place Bentham called for a "mill for grinding rogues 
honest, and idle men industrious. "225 Such a prison would operate with clockwork 
224 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1995), 3. 
225 Janet Semple, Bentham's Prison: A Study of the Panopticon Penitentiary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993), 107. Semple's excellent examination of Bentham's life and the intellectual history of the Panopticon 
on the whole confirms Foucault's reading of Bentham's Panopticon. She emphasizes more strongly than 
does Foucault that the Panopticon ought to be understood as the hermeneutic key linking Bentham's 
biography and philosophy, but dislikes (for no given reason) "revisionist historian" Foucault implying that 
the Panopticon exemplifies important facets of modern political practice (152). 
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regularity through ingenious systems of observation and communication (hence pan 
opticon) designed to keep prisoners separate from warders while maintaining visual 
contact so that "a keeper never need see a prisoner without either a wall, or a grating, or a 
space of seven feet between them. "226 The emblem Bentham chose to represent such a 
prison was the ever open eye, ringed by the words "Mercy, Justice, Vigilance. "227 Such a 
machine had potential not only for the reform of prisoners, the aged Bentham recalled, 
but was "a magnificent instrument with which I then dreamed of revolutionizing the 
world. , 228 The Panopticon was "A new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a 
quantity hitherto without example. , 229 Though Bentham was never to build his beloved 
Panoptical prison, Foucault argues that in it he laid bare the essence of modern political 
technique. 
The Sword, the Pageant and Premodern Political Technique 
To grasp the novelty of modern forms of political practice requires a close 
examination of premodern forms as exemplified in the torture and execution of Damiens 
the regicide. What political techniques are at work here? In the premodern era, Foucault 
contends, torture and public punishment were intended to reveal truth while 
simultaneously serving as a public ritual maintaining the fabric of the political economy. 
Torture was part of a legal method which did not follow the binary guilty/innocent 
scheme with which we are familiar, but an admixture method which assumed that there 
were degrees of guilt, and thus degrees of punishment. Thus torture was simultaneously a 
method of investigation and a punishment. Even the execution itself was part of the 
226 Semple, Bentham's Prison, 119. 
227 Semple, Bentham's Prison, 143 
228 Semple, Bentham's Prison, 288. 
229 Semple, Bentham's Prison, 301. 
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investigation as the crowds who watched tried to ascertain in the manner of the 
condemned's death whether they were guilty or innocent . 
230 
It was this final public moment of punishment which constituted the chief 
political inefficiency of the old political technique, susceptible as it was to a reversal 
which exposed the government as having condemned an innocent person. If the 
condemned did not recant, this undermined the state's authority in the eyes of the 
populace. More efficient penal practices were needed which were not susceptible to this 
reversal, yet any reform would attack a whole environment of social beliefs and 
institutions. Public punishment fits within a system of production in which labor power, 
and thus the human body, had neither utility nor commercial value conferred upon it by 
an industrial economy. Centuries of the practice of Christianity had tended to create a 
widespread sense that the body was instrumental for the health of the soul, to be mortified 
for the soul's good. Thus the extravagance of the destruction of the body of the criminal 
was comprehensible in several frameworks as the proper means of upholding social order 
in pre-modern society. Torture was a similarly coherent legal practice in that the power of 
the sovereign was imbedded in bodies to reveal truth and uphold the right of the 
sovereign over bodies. The horror of the sovereign's violent punishment annulled the 
horror of the crime, the body of the accused being the site of the rightful vengeance of the 
sovereign upon wrongdoing. 231 
Thus did crime and punishment fit together in a coherent whole, Foucault 
continues. The violence of execution negated a crime against the people, a cauterization 
undertaken by the sovereign responsible for protecting the body politic. In turn, the 
sovereign maintained by punishment an expectation in the populace of a certain wrathful 
vengeance upon any violator of the social union. Governmental power was charged with 
pursuing war and maintaining social order; it was a power based on personal bonds, 
whose breaches called for a wrathful vengeance; a power in which crime was rebellion, 
230 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 34,42,46. 
231 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 54-55,61-63. 
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potentially the first act of civil war against rightful sovereignty; in sum, this was the 
power of the sword recharged and maintained in ritualized, public shows of violence. 232 
Discipline, Training and Modern Political Technique 
The advent of the Enlightenment heralded a new vision of humanity, Foucault 
notes. A limit was proclaimed to punishment; the reformers wanted a correlation of the 
measure of punishment with a heretofore unknown quality, a prisoner's "humanity, " 
which came in time to be seen as a resource to be corrected and transformed and returned 
again to circulation. Historical records show that this conceptual shift was preceded by 
much more mundane adjustments to penal policy. The end of the eighteenth century, 
parallel to the rise of industrial production, saw the emergence of a more finely tuned 
penal practice with a greater intolerance for economic offenses but a higher threshold of 
punishment for violent crime. At the same time smaller penal interventions appeared 
more quickly, more regularly and for more petty offenses. Thus it appears that the prison 
reformers' criticism had at least two motives: the protection of the prisoner against the 
cruelty of those wielding political power, and a critique of a poor economy of political 
power which was ineffective at stopping the types of crimes that were important to curtail 
in an early industrial society. Behind calls for reform lay a political need to punish more 
universally and more deeply within the social body. Calls for "humanity" on the practice 
of punishment, Foucault notes, retooled the way power interacted with the social body, 
limiting a wasteful form of punishment by reformulating it in a configuration more 
efficient at controlling the movements of bodies. 233 
Observing the intermediate stages of early modern punishment also helps to 
clarify the current shape of modern punishment. While Enlightenment penal reformers 
fully accepted the maxim of pre-modern punishment, that punishment should fit as 
closely as possible to the crime, they rejected its premodern interpretation; the removal of 
232 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 57. 
233 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 74-75,78-82,92. 
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the liar's tongue, the sluggard being put to labor, the poisoner being boiled alive; the 
whole educative theater of punishment. They likewise reversed the presumption of pre- 
modern political economy that the prison was an arbitrary and therefore disreputable tool 
of the king or prince who could imprison without trial and for any duration he chose. 234 
Foucault asks, "How then could detention, so evidently bound up with an illegality that 
was denounced even in the power of the prince, become in so short a time one of the most 
general forms of legal punishment? "235 
Foucault detects several strands of theory coalescing in the newly solidified 
preference for penitentiary punishment. In premodern punishment, the act of punishment 
was conceived in metaphysical terms, as a destruction of evil, a purging, which was 
intended to educate the political body, and as also having a pedagogical function, to 
uphold the political economy. With the birth of the great colonial experiments came 
deportation, which combined an economic rationale with the metaphysical expungment of 
evil. But as the industrial age came to full force the new logic of industrial power pressed 
in on punishment, in which maximizing the trained work force is all important. These 
shifting pressures on the political task of punishment help to begin to explain how the 
mode of western penality has been effected by larger trends in political economy. 
By the late eighteenth century these wider social dynamics had come to be 
expressed in the form of the modern penitentiary, which focused on the prevention of 
future crime and thus the project of retraining the criminal, Foucault observes. Penalty 
had been detached from the crime and reattached to the factors considered to indicate 
threat of recidivism in the criminal. From punishment as a public sign of the cleansing of 
the social body comes the repeated reforming exercises of the prisoner, made up of time 
tables, compulsory movements, regular activities, solitary meditation. This regimen 
sought to restore the obedient subject who accepts the habits, rules and orders of the 
power exercised continually around him and in him. 236 The old form of power, Foucault 
notes, uses, "the ritual marks of the vengeance that it applies to the body of the 
234 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 116-119. 
235 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 120. 
236 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 126. 
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condemned man; and it deploys before the eyes of the spectators an effect of terror as 
intense as it is discontinuous, irregular and always above its own laws, the physical 
presence of the sovereign and of his power. The reforming jurists, on the other hand saw 
punishment as a procedure for requalifying individuals as subjects, as juridical 
subjects. . . it operated methods of training the body-not signs-by the traces it leaves, in 
the form of habits, in behavior. "237 
Foucault sees Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon as the perfect architectural 
embodiment of modern methods of disciplining order. The Panopticon is a circular 
building, comprised in its outer wall by vertical rows of cells, each back lit, containing an 
occupant, and open to the center where an unobservable observer oversees all. Such a 
system reverses the principle of the dungeon confinement, using light instead of darkness 
and substituting visibility for hiddenness. The observed become invisible to one another 
but visible to their supervisors. The effect of such an enclosure is immediate and 
profound: those watched over feel the effects of power etched into their consciousness as 
long as they are within its gaze, whether this power is actually exercised or not. To make 
this internalization of the gaze of power most effective, Bentham laid down the principle 
that power should be visible at all times, but unverifiable. In the Panopticon, the central 
observation tower must always be visible, but those watched over must never know if the 
observation tower is occupied. 238 The architecture is a technology for imprinting power 
into the subconscious. "It is an important mechanism, for it automatizes and 
disindividualizes power, " Foucault comments. "Power has its principle not so much in a 
person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an 
arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are 
caught up. "239 Such an efficient tool for the control of bodies creates a homogenous field 
of supervision which is silent and permanent, making physical restraint unnecessary as 
237 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 130-13 1. 
238 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 200. 
239 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 202. Foucault's conceptual point is also intended as a jab at ongoing 
Communist political repression. 
104 
light and openness become the tools of restraint. Overseers can calmly undertake the task 
of classification and examination of progress, or calculating wages, or assessing health. 
Here, Foucault notes, is a secularized parody of the Christian insight that God sees 
all things, which has long attuned the Christian conscience to the importance of detail. 
Modem political economics seized on and applied this emphasis as a technical program: 
all details can be understood, tapped, and used to mold the whole. Napoleon understood 
this principle with striking clarity, wishing "to arrange around him a mechanism of power 
that would enable him to see the smallest event that occurred in the state he governed; he 
intended, by means of the rigorous discipline that he imposed, `to embrace the whole of 
this vast machine without the slightest detail escaping his attention. ", 240 
Napoleon was well aware that this new technology of political power was 
applicable right across society. Any increase in the ability to oversee could be teamed 
with a disciplinary regime which aimed to homogenize and thus more efficiently order 
those overseen. Foucault understands the peculiarly modern form of this visual and 
normalizing political economy to have five distinctive marks. First, its penal mechanism 
is one of small disincentives which are established in connection with innumerable minor 
infractions, and aims to make all deviations subject to a web of minor repercussions. 
Second, a focus on non-observance is characteristic of this new disciplinary penality. 
Offenses are no longer only rule breaking behaviors, but also, and more often, offenses 
are committed by not reaching a required level of proficiency or production. Third, 
punishments are corrective exercises making punishments isomorphic with obligations. 
Punishment for poor writing or shooting will be more writing and shooting exercises. 
Fourth, the disciplinary stick operates in tandem with the carrot, transposing the medieval 
concept of the indulgence to allow rewards for good behavior to cancel out penal micro- 
debts. Finally, rank becomes a simple mechanism of reward or punishment by which 
"good" subjects are rewarded and "bad" assessed with precision and punished by 
successive micro-demotions . 
24 1 Thus, Foucault says, "The perpetual penality that 
traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, 
240 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 141. 
241 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 177-181. 
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differentiates, hiearchicalizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes. "242 Such a 
radically normalizing procedure is perfectly compatible with a high formal valuation of 
both equality and difference, "since within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm 
introduces, as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the shading of 
individual differences. "243 
The heart of this visibility-penality structure is the examination, the point at which 
normalizing judgment and observing hierarchy are united. In the course of the eighteenth 
century we see the hospital and school, for instance, transformed by ever more regular 
and codified systems of examinations. Tracking and supervision of patients and students 
is greatly enhanced by formalized charting and grading methods. The repetition of 
physician examination sees a sharp rise in this period. In 1681, in Paris, doctors made 
single daily visits only to seriously sick patients, but by the eighteenth century regulations 
stipulated a minimum of two hours of examination a day, "even Easter Sunday. " By 1771 
a resident physician was appointed to be on hand day and night, and to make regular 
rounds. In this way, 
The old form of inspection, irregular and rapid, was transformed into a regular observation that 
placed the patient in a situation of almost perpetual examination. This had two consequences: in 
the internal hierarchy, the physician, hitherto an external element, begins to gain over the 
religious staff and to regulate them to a clearly specified, but subordinate role in the technique of 
the examination; the category of the `nurse' then appears; while the hospital itself, which was 
once little more than a poorhouse, was to become a place of training and of the correlation of 
knowledge; it represented a reversal therefore of the power relations and the constitution of a 
corpus of knowledge. The `well-disciplined' hospital became the physical counterpart of the 
medical 'discipline'; this discipline could now abandon its textual character and take its 
references not so much from the tradition of author-authorities as from a domain of objects 
perpetually offered for examination. 2' 
242 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 183. 
243 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 184. 
244 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 186. 
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Whereas once the political economy was grounded in the power to expose 
subjects, either to public punishment or public honor, with the examination power is 
exercised behind the scenes, in an invisible selection process which at the same time 
imposes on all its subjects an intimate and compulsory visibility. Thus the examination 
for the first time introduces individuality into the field of surveillance: an archive is 
constructed by using a network of documents to capture and fix the individual. It answers 
the problem of armies, where deserters had to be tracked, dead noted, and the services 
and values of individuals known; of hospitals, where patients must be recognized, the 
evolution of their diseases and effectiveness of their treatments marked, and epidemics 
noted; and of schools, where aptitudes had to be defined, and progress tracked. 
A third change created by the addition of the examination to the regular operation 
of power is made visible by a change in nomenclature. The "case" is no longer, as in law, 
the circumstances defining an act and capable of modifying the application of a rule, but 
is a single individual conceived as the referent of a physical archive of knowledge. This is 
a stark change with broad import. Politically, the examination is the creation of the 
individual, a project of power to develop a catalog of the individual's salient features to 
constitute them as a "case". This is a portentous reversal of individualization. In the past, 
The more one possesses power or privilege, the more one is marked as an individual, by rituals, 
written accounts or visual reproductions. The `name' and the genealogy that situate one within a 
kinship group, the performance of deeds that demonstrate superior strength and which are 
immortalized in literary accounts, the ceremonies that mark the power relations in their very 
ordering, the monuments or donations that bring survival after death, the ostentation and excess 
of expenditure, the multiple, intersecting links of suzerainty, all these are procedures of an 
`ascending' individualization. In a disciplinary regime, on the other hand, individualization is 
'descending': as power becomes more anonymous and more functional, those on whom it is 
exercised tend to be more strongly individualized; it is exercised by surveillance rather than 
ceremonies, by observation rather than commemorative accounts, by comparative measures that 
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have the `norm' as a reference rather than genealogies giving ancestors as points of reference; by 
`gaps' rather than by deeds. 245 
This great reversal has profound implications for how we describe the action of political 
power upon the masses. 
We must cease once and for all to describe the efforts of power in negative terms: it `excludes', it 
`represses', it `censors', it `abstracts', it `masks', it `conceals'. In fact, power produces; it 
produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the 
knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production. 246 
According to Foucault, the shift in punishment technique from visual ritual to 
systematic retraining assumed a general shift in how bodies themselves were conceived. 
Take the soldier: until the early seventeenth century it was thought that one could 
recognize a bodily rhetoric of honor in the soldier before he joined the army. Born 
soldiers were those who exhibited natural strength, courage and an honorable bearing. 
But by the late eighteenth century, military training treated the soldier as built up from 
formless clay. The "machine required can be constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a 
calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, mastering it, making it 
pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of habit; in short, one has 
`got rid of the peasant' and given him `the air of a soldier'. "247 
This great shift to man-as-machine was constructed simultaneously on two 
registers, Foucault argues. On the anatomico-metaphysical register, the level of 
intelligibility, Descartes described the individual as a machine-like being whose true 
reality was the thinking mind. On the technico-political register, which is concerned with 
the politically useful body, we see the proliferation of codified regulations and methods 
for building up a disciplined army, school, and hospital, each designed to control and 
245 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 192-193. 
246 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 194. Heidegger's definition of truth as a balance of revealing and 
concealing is evident here. 
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correct the operations of the bodies so segmented from minds. Where once the body was 
assumed to be most useful to power by drawing out its own character, now power works 
by assuming that its preferred subject has first to be made physically blank and docile, in 
order to be re-formed with efficient and scientific methods. 248 The task of government has 
always been to control and oblige individual bodies in order to govern the body politic, 
but in the eighteenth century this control assumes a new form, no longer commanding a 
whole entity but breaking it down to reform it. It focuses less on the symbolic, or the 
retraining of thought, and more on the efficiency of their movements. And in doing so it 
becomes more persistent, more constant and measured, making ever more spatial, 
temporal and dynamic demands on the subject. "These methods, which make possible the 
meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of 
its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called 
'disciplines'. "249 
The effect of these new disciplines was to increase the force of individual bodies 
by training them to work in groups to accomplish specific tasks. Through such training 
the force developed in each body becomes of diminished use to the individual but of 
heightened use to power because the skills by which power is increased are riddled with 
necessary interpenetration by command and information-gathering structures. This, 
Foucault argues, is the paradox of modern power: more of it is harnessed by a deeper 
penetration and tapping of human energies, but at the cost of these new powers being 
unavailable to the individual. Updating Marx's comment that economic exploitation 
separates labor from its product, Foucault argues that modern political economy provides 
new aptitudes while exacting new dominations. 250 
247 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 135. 
248 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 136. 
249 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 136-137. Foucault does not explicitly make the important implied point 
that the Enlightenment's construction of humanity as the thinking being cleared the way for this remaking of 
bodies by severing cognitive from bodily definitions of freedom. 
250 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 138. 
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Bentham's Panopticon, the architecture of perfect surveillance, may have been 
built only a few times, 251 but it is hardly a footnote in the genesis of modern political life 
as it perfectly represents the logic of modem political life embodied in a pure 
architectural and optical system. 
It's a case of `it's easy once you've thought of it' in the political sphere. It can in fact be 
integrated into any function (education, medical treatment, production, punishment); it can 
increase the effect of this function, by being linked closely with it; it can constitute a mixed 
mechanism in which relations of power (and of knowledge) may be precisely adjusted, in the 
smallest detail, to the processes that are to be supervised; it can establish a direct proportion 
between `surplus power' and `surplus production'. In short, it arranges things in such a way that 
the exercise of power is not added on from the outside, like a rigid, heavy constraint, to the 
functions it invests, but is so subtly present in them as to increase their efficiency by itself 
increasing its own points of contact. 252 
The Training of all Society 
Foucault contends that the modern, moldable human sprang to life in the areas 
where human government was taxed the greatest, in waging war or fighting epidemic. 253 
But the simple techniques developed in these theaters came to be applied to the 
governance of all society, within the space of a century and a half growing from 
extraordinary measures for the combat of deadly disease and war into a regular feature of 
the everyday life of modern humanity. The shift in political model, from one in which 
exclusion or excision of the contagion was the basic political conceptuality to another in 
251 At least one stands in London, the Cruciform Hospital in Gower Street, designed by Bentham himself, 
but the panoptical prison is alive and well as evidenced by a newly built plexiglass and steel example in the 
industrial backwater of my home town, Baytown, Texas. 
252 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 206. 
253 These are extreme social situations in which the use of extreme methods of political organization might 
conceivably be defended. What is essential is recognizing when and how the extraordinary becomes a norm. 
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which the disordered is organized in order to strengthen the social forces, parallels a shift 
in the practices of governing now understood to serve the increasing of production, "to 
develop the economy, spread education, raise the level of public morality; to increase and 
multiply. "254 Foucault thus supplies the historical connection necessary to make sense of 
the rapid application of the disciplines to many social spheres from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century: asylum, penitentiary, reformatory, school, and hospital. 255 In this way 
the panoptic arrangement provided the formula for a more general aim: the society 
"penetrated through and through with disciplinary mechanisms. "256 
Foucault understands this disciplining of society to have been built on four simple 
innovations. First, space was enclosed within a physical partition to increase the ability of 
one person to take responsibility for the goings on within it. The barracks, hospital, and 
factory were explicitly compared to the monastery where gates control access to 
concentrate work forces on a single task. Second, this space was divided analytically, so 
that the bodies and elements within it could be distributed in a logical way, curtailing 
uncontrolled circulation and conglomeration of bodies, and tying them to spots so that 
they can be watched, known and trained. Third, this divided space is organized according 
to a functional schema, so that each person has a task (as in a factory) or a screen can be 
set up to divide different categories of people (as in a hospital where contagion must be 
isolated). Finally, within this horizontal and spatial organization, a vertical and ideal scale 
is set up of rank, a system of hierarchical command relations. This hierarchical system 
begins at school with grades and examinations which sort students by aptitude and 
success, setting them in a competition with their peers which produces maximum effort 
from each student. A perpetual movement up and down the grade hierarchy functions 
both to motivate students and to give the teacher information on how to intervene most 
257 effectively to guide the whole and the individual. In sum, 
25' Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 207-208. 
255 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 198-199. 
256 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 209. 
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In organizing `cells', `places', and `ranks', the disciplines create complex spaces that are at once 
architectural, functional and hierarchical.. . They are mixed spaces: real because they govern the 
disposition of buildings, rooms, furniture, but also ideal, because they are projected over this 
arrangement of characterizations, assessments, hierarchies. The first of the great operations of 
discipline is, therefore, the constitution of `tableaux vivants', which transform the confused, 
useless or dangerous multitudes into ordered multiplicities. 258 
Once bodies are thus organized in space, Foucault points to five further 
mechanisms which remake the functioning of the individual body. First, time is 
subdivided into quarter hours, minutes, then seconds. Movements within armies, schools, 
and factory became amenable to greater intervention by this compartmentalization of 
time, and now performances during this time can be expected to be free of defects-time 
measured and paid must not be spent frivolously, but must be used precisely and 
diligently. 
Second, each body's responsibilities are elaborated within this subdivided time. 
Whereas soldiers once had to walk in step, now the disciplines divide this 
undifferentiated step to institute the one-second length regular step, and the half-second 
double time. During this time each body part will be stringently accounted for by 
temporal imperatives. Acts are broken into elements, and each element, or body part, is 
assigned a task whose order of succession is prescribed. 
Third, the body is correlated to a certain productive gesture. In the correct use of 
the body, which makes possible the correct use of time, nothing must remain idle or 
useless, and a well disciplined body is focused on the slightest gesture. Good 
handwriting, for example, depends on the erect body, slightly turned seating, elbow on 
the table, each finger the correct distance from the table, etc. 
Fourth, the body and the object of production are synchronized. Foucault relates a 
1766 description of the training of the soldier to hold a rifle; right hand grasping butt, 
trigger guard resting on first finger, left hand at notch with thumb back against molding; 
an almost endless litany of precise commands. A coding is created as individual body 
258 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 148. 
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parts are carefully keyed to the parts of the object to be manipulated. These static 
instructions are then woven into a maneuver by a precise sequencing of each body-object 
connection into another succession of explicit and obligatory dynamic prescriptions. In 
this way a body-machine complex is created, a politically efficient synthesis of body and 
machine. 
Fifth, the principle of exhaustive use is developed. The time table no longer 
simply assures the worker's presence at work, but is now used to set up a positive 
economy. Tables are used to ensure more operations are completed in the same time, and 
thus more power is extracted from the body. The more time is divided and the body's 
operations broken down, the greater the possibility for the manager to control exhaustion 
in relation to the goal of maximum speed and efficiency. 259 
Over the course of the eighteenth century, Foucault observes, the techniques of 
arranging such trained bodies in relation to one another were again sharpened, emerging 
first in the military but also in schools. These methods were based on the discovery that 
these new humans were most powerfully combined when thought of as interchangeable 
units as regards their spatial, temporal and force characteristics. Maximization of 
collective output depends on a homogenous workforce in which generic rather than 
individual qualities are the unit of measure. In this way the individual can be fitted within 
a multi-segmentary, machine-like organization. Here individual particularity is valued 
only in relation to skill levels which can be arranged in chronological series. Finally, 
these carefully measured combinations of individual generic bodies must be precisely 
attuned to simple commands and must respond immediately when these commands are 
given. These simple but profound organizational reconceptualizations make it possible to 
place bodies within a coded web of simple signals to which they have single, obligatory 
responses . 
260 
It has been said, notes Foucault, that war is a continuation of politics by other 
means. But it is also true that politics, as a technique of internal peace and order, 
259 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 149-155. 
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... sought to 
implement the mechanism of the perfect army, of the disciplined mass, of the docile, 
useful troop, of the regiment in camp and in the field, on maneuvers and on exercises... The 
classical age saw the birth of the great political and military strategy by which nations confronted 
each other's economic and demographic forces; but it also saw the birth of meticulous military 
and political tactics by which the control of bodies and individual forces was exercised within 
states... Historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a perfect society to the philosophers 
and jurists of the eighteenth century; but there was also a military dream of society; its 
fundamental reference was not to the state of nature, but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of 
a machine, not to the primal social contract, but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental 
rights, but to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to automatic 
211 docility. 
Having outlined the mechanisms of disciplinary society, Foucault goes on to 
attempt to explain the historical factors fanning these isolated disciplinary systems into a 
larger complex encompassing all of society. Historical documents show that these 
methods for the increasing of human output naturally became attached to the great 
essential functions of the eighteenth century, "factory production, the transmission of 
knowledge, the diffusion of aptitudes and skills, the war machine. , 262 This proliferation 
led to a simple numerical increase in the number of disciplinary institutions. In addition, 
these internal apparatuses came in time to seek knowledge and power over factors 
originating outside the institution but impacting performance inside. Schools, for instance 
sought to know the situation of the child's parenting, hospitals sought information about 
epidemics in the surrounding city, and charity organizations sought to know and eradicate 
261 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 168-169. Foucault is not alone in making this observation. Max Weber 
also understood war as the basic force in the development of bureaucratic modernity, asserting, "The 
discipline of the army gives birth to all discipline. " Quoted in Roger Cooter, Mark Harrison, and Steve 
Sturdy, eds., War, Medicine and Modernity (England: Sutton Publishing Limited, 1999), 3. This volume of 
essays corroborates Foucault's general claims about the birth of modernity by detailed examination of 
"... the processes by which some of the most pervasive institutions of modernity, from the vast machinery of 
medical industry and administration to the most intimate of bodily and mental experiences, were shaped by 
the imperative to regiment and regulate human life for the purpose of conflict between nations, " 17. 
262 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 211. 
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the sources of social disorder, both in society and the lives of their recipients. Finally, the 
state began to take over these mechanisms of social discipline. In England this function 
was filled by charity organizations, but in France it was the police who became the source 
of information for governance of cities. This web of extra-institutional inspection quite 
quickly interlaced to complete a new political economy. With this interlacing it became 
clear that discipline need not be confined to private or circumscribed organizational tasks 
because, 
Discipline may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of 
power, a modality for its exercise... a technology. And it may be taken over either by 
`specialized' institutions (the penitentiaries or `houses of correction' of the nineteenth century), 
or by institutions that use it as an essential instrument for a particular end (schools, hospitals), or 
by pre-existing authorities that find in it a means of reinforcing or reorganizing their internal 
mechanisms of power (one day we should show how intra-familial relations, essentially in the 
parents-children cell, have become `disciplined', absorbing since the classical age external 
schemata, first educational, and military, then medical, psychiatric, psychological, which have 
made the family the privileged locus of emergence for the disciplinary question of the normal 
and the abnormal); or by apparatuses that have made discipline their principle of internal 
functioning (the disciplining of the administrative apparatus from the Napoleonic period), or 
finally by state apparatuses whose major, if not exclusive, function is to assure that discipline 
reigns over a whole society (police). 263 
Foucault notes three historical pressures that called for the resources supplied by 
the disciplinary society. First, the steady and rapid spread of mechanized production 
corresponded with the aptitude of the new political economy of the disciplines, which had 
already reached a state of relative perfection. Combined with the confluence of the aims 
and methods of production and discipline, the eighteenth century saw an increase in 
floating population, a growth which called for a wider power to supervise, and the 
extension of the modern apparatus of production, which was becoming more costly and 
required an increase in profitability. The disciplines make it possible to attack the deficits 
263 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 215-216. 
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of a multiplicity of men by increasing not only material production but expanding the 
production of knowledge in schools, health in hospitals, and destructive violence in the 
army. In sum, the political techniques of display were simply unable to tame and feed this 
mass of disordered humanity, without cheaper and more effective methods of social 
control. Clearly, Foucault contends, "the two processes-the accumulation of men and 
the accumulation of capital-cannot be separated; it would not have been possible to 
solve the problem of the accumulation of men without the growth of an apparatus of 
production capable of both sustaining them and using them; conversely, the techniques 
that make the cumulative multiplicity of men useful accelerated the accumulation of 
capital... Each makes the other possible and necessary; each provides a model for the 
other. , 264 
A second historical trend facilitating the spread of the disciplines was the 
interpenetration of the legal and disciplinary structures of society. Legal structures, which 
appear today to limit the grasp of political power, came to be smoothly integrated with the 
infra-law of the power producing disciplines. Law governs the contractual and thus 
visible interactions of people, but the disciplines create between people "private" but 
highly ordered relations based on inequalities of position which make it possible for the 
legal equality of the contractual partners to be distorted in practice. Panopticism operates 
on the underside of the law, supporting, reinforcing, and multiplying the asymmetries of 
power limited by the law. The disciplines in fact work in tandem with law to stabilize 
power and give it a respectable and moral face at its most intimate interface with 
individuals. Whereas in the political economy of the public punishment the great masses 
were never touched by the practical intervention of the law, and were thus hard to reach 
by power, now the masses are also rarely penalized by the law, but are much more 
available to movement by political power. 
The third social trend which fostered the growth of the discipline society was that 
the conceptualization of the purpose of law and governance becomes positive rather than 
negative. "The transition from the public execution, with its spectacular rituals, its art 
mingled with the ceremony of pain, to the penalties of prisons buried in architectural 
264 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 220-221. 
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masses and guarded by the secrecy of administrations, is... the transition from one art of 
punishing to another, no less skillful one. It is a technical mutation. , 265 What this 
technical mutation assumes as its background is that the ancient negative right of 
government to take life or let live has been replaced by a new political technology which 
deploys positive but no less coercive sanctions in rigorously fostering life. 266 It is a 
"biopolitics of population... a power whose highest function was perhaps no longer to 
kill, but to invest life through and through .,, 
267 
Foucault speculates that this shift was only possible because throughout human 
history human life had not been predictably healthy enough to consider a resource to be 
cultivated. Whether true or not, it is easy to agree with his observation that this shift in 
practice has occurred in the history of the West. We can therefore understand the force of 
his claim that in searching for ever more power to be extracted from society, modern 
political organs function by searching out the dense transfer points in human relations for 
the application of knowledge so that the force of social interaction can be augmented and 
controlled. Again, while we may allow that this search is most often undertaken in good 
faith, it is nevertheless a real penetration of the hidden recesses of social and private life 
by knowledge, the contact point of power. 268 Premodern society used spectacle to create 
social unity while the modern age produces it by the opposite procedure: a small but 
dispersed number who oversee and guide the whole multitude. Political relations between 
individuals and the state, in a society without a communal public life, can only be 
regulated by the reverse of the spectacle. "We are", Foucault concludes, 
... much less Greek than we believe. We are neither 
in the amphitheater, nor on the stage, but in 
the panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves since we are 
part of its mechanism... Our society is not one of spectacle, but of surveillance. . . the play of 
signs defines the anchorages of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is 
265 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 257 (italics mine). 
266 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (London: 
Penguin Books, 1990), 135-138. 
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amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully 
fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies. 269 
Modern methods of incarceration are the most simple expression of the political 
mechanisms which govern all of society; thus in Foucault's view the problem of prisons 
is the problem of society at large: the combination of the rituals of industrial life with the 
rituals of coercive supervision. The problem is "... in the steep rise in the use of these 
mechanisms of normalization and the wide-ranging powers which, through the 
proliferation of new disciplines, they bring with them. , 270 The practical problem of 
modern society is that its political techniques cannot be restrained nor their aim of the 
incessant leveling of difference removed. A threshold has been crossed with this explicit 
embrace by political power of the techniques of the "production" of life: life in its given 
facticity is no longer seen to be an asset in its peculiarities but rather a "resource" to be 
systematically cultivated. Modern man has thus become "... an animal whose politics 
places his existence as a living being in question. "271 
Biopower and the Spectacle: Arnold Pacey and Technology as Experienced Meaning 
It is important not to begin ethics prematurely by confusing the descriptive and 
normative tasks. Therefore we stress again, as does Foucault, that the prece ding analysis 
is not concerned primarily with condemning the sciences in general, nor any specific 
natural or human sciences, exams, armies, punishment, criminology, etc. These methods 
have, as Foucault notes, maintained a growing modern population in a state of physical 
health unsurpassed in previous generations. Yet it must also be admitted that with the 
increase in power to feed came the increased capacity to annihilate life through war, or to 
more quickly erase the vestiges of past cultural configurations. The preceding description 
268 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 103,142. 
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of the operation of modern political technique is meant by neither Foucault nor myself to 
be a blanket condemnation or espousal of this historical shift. 
The reasons for the development of these techniques (alternately to feed and save 
from epidemic, and to destroy life in war) do not in themselves constitute an argument for 
or against future attempts to expand or thwart that power, but are the invaluable data for 
our constructive evaluation. But Foucault's account, considered as a descriptive project, 
has an important deficit which it will be the pupose of the remainder of this chapter to 
remedy. This deficit is not what he affirms but what he denies. While it is true that "Our 
society is not one of spectacle, but of surveillance, "272 I contend that it is just as certainly 
one of spectacle, upheld by modern technological equivalents of ancient gladiatorial 
entertainment. In his discussion of punishment Foucault outlines the ways in which the 
visibility economy has shifted so that the powerful operate as part of the penitentiary and 
surveillance society from a position of invisibility, rather than the high visibility of "the 
educative theater of punishment. " Yet in his eagerness to establish this thesis Foucault 
wrongly marginalizes the role of visibility in orienting and uniting the masses. On the 
contrary, modern political power which does operate from a region of invisibility also 
perfectly comprehends the political capital which may be generated by the technological 
spectacle; the domes, great wheels, or space flights which strengthen the perception of the 
political and technical power and benevolence of the ruling regime. Such spectacles play 
a central social role in augmenting and maintaining the priorities of the technological 
society by maintaining a particular imaginative horizon for consuming at the same time as 
creating goodwill for its creators. Yet the spectacle will always share an Achilles heel 
with the public execution, a susceptibility to symbolic reversal. 273 
This deficit in Foucault's analysis requires a detailed response, in order to show 
that the inexplicit "natural" knowledge of constructed humanity can also be tapped by 
political power through visible methods. The remainder of the chapter will follow out the 
work of Arnold Pacey and David Nye in turn, each of whom is concerned to show that 
how we feel about technology is both based in the practices built up by technological 
272 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 217. 
273 Naomi Klein, No Logo (London: Flamingo, 2000), chapter 12. 
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society as Foucault describes it, and explains that society's widespread attraction to 
ceaseless technological remaking. Arnold Pacey's Meaning in Technology argues that 
technical practice flows from decisions based on frameworks of felt meaning. In diagram 
form he illustrates the relationships which will serve as the framework for the remainder 








Dimensions of technology practice and experience 274 
In the following subsections we will look in turn at each corner of the pyramid, 
which is built on the insight that many of the things we do, flow not out of rational 
deliberation but are based on a pre-reflective sense that a given course of action feels 
meaningful to us. He illustrates the web of referents which guide our making with the 
example of the fabrication of a sword. The construction of a tempered steel sword rests 
on a long and complex tradition of knowledge and highly-developed aesthetic skill. The 
masterful deployment of such skills by the sword-smith makes the physical fabrication 
process pleasurable and meaningful (technical experience). In addition, if the sword- 
smith is making a sword for a particular noble, "he would probably picture the fine- 
looking object he aimed to create rather than the scene of a battle with mutilated bodies. 
And he would plan a decorative finish for the sword to celebrate his own skill and the 
owner's status-also, probably, to symbolize the `heroism' and `glory' of war. "275 This 
274 Arnold Pacey, Meaning in Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1999), S. 
275 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 175. 
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personal social enjoyment (social experience) is paralleled with patriotic feelings 
(political experience). Thus the shape the sword takes would be almost wholly referenced 
to these three frames of meaning. Furthermore, and most importantly, those meanings 
most likely would not have been explicitly chosen, but were part of the fabric of intuitive 
and aesthetic judgments about what was good and proper in the technical, social, and 
political arenas-in short, the sword-smith makes what "feels good" from each 
perspective. The role of this "feel", says Pacey, is pervasive and ineradicable. 
A cook experiences the textures and aromas of foodstuffs being mixed or heated, and 
that is the individual experience that he or she uses to make judgments, again as an individual, 
about how the cooking process is going. But the cook is also aware of the shared, social meaning 
of the meal for the people who will eat it. The designer of a locomotive or an airplane may 
personally experience considerable satisfaction as the concept takes shape on the drawing board 
or computer screen, and his or her visual responses may inform some technical judgments. But 
the designer must also consider whether the finished machine will have an appropriate social 
meaning for the passengers it will serve-whether it will look safe and reliable, for example. 
It is possible to think of these various meanings of technology in terms of a hierarchy of 
levels, with individual experience on the most private level and the experience of the consumers 
of cooked food, the train passengers, and other groups as a more public, social level. Beyond 
that, the political meanings of technology... are on the level with the widest ramifications of 
all. 
276 
To properly analyze the genesis of contemporary technological practice we simply 
cannot ignore the relation between felt meaning and practical ends in each of these 
complex arenas. In speaking about meaning in this way we must point out that conflicting 
meanings can and do exist simultaneously because meanings and purposes are almost 
inexhaustibly complex, shading off into generalized yearnings and undefined 
aspirations. 277 But despite this fluidity, Pacey argues that the "feel" of meaning is best 
encapsulated using the following schema: 1) the technical feel of the process, 2) the feel 
276 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 89-90. 
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of how the artifact will affect others with whom we are personally involved, 3) and the 
feel of how the artifact will change the wider political landscape. 278 We will draw out in 
turn the importance of each for modern technological practice. 
Technical Experience and the Perception of Meaning 
Recalling a Heideggerian theme, `equipment' will help us to grasp Pacey's 
argument that all technical experience depends on many layers of necessarily tacit or 
inexplicit knowledge. 
A skilled driver, by retaining from his experience, knows how his automobile will respond to 
certain throttle manipulation: he awaits or expects the same kind of response as he now 
manipulates the throttle. These are not elements of the future and past: rather, they make up the 
actual activity of the present. The driver, in pushing the throttle, does not say to himself: "I will 
speed up": rather, as he pushes the throttle, he feels: "I am speeding up. " The present, after all, is 
significant existentially only in terms of action and situations. It is only because there is such a 
thing as a meaningful existential present that such a thing as "involvement" in equipment is 
possible. 279 
Such indefinable knowledge is an essential part of all human life and work. Checking a 
dial, using a tool, getting the color right, for all of these the "eye" or the "hand" has been 
trained to recognize instinctively what is correct and what is incorrect. All craftsmanship 
has an ineradicable tinge of art, because it "so regularly calls for aesthetic, quasi-intuitive 
judgments. "280 
This art of the trained intuition is both essential to good work (as when a carpenter 
picks the right piece of wood for a task) and imparts meaning to the work via a sense of 
278 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 90. 
279 Gelven, A Commentary, 197. 
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aesthetic satisfaction. 281 The intuitional nature of traditional craft work and artisanship is 
apparent, but even modern information technology depends on this same intuitive feel, 
Pacey points out. He traces the modernization of the processes of steel-making, which 
was traditionally a very tactile task involving a multitude of methods for judging when 
the steel is ready for cooling. 
In this instance, managers expected modernization to yield improvement in reliability, economic 
performance, and quality control. They also expected to employ fewer skilled people. But the 
problem now was that plant operators sat in a control room remote from the material being 
processed. They were surrounded by data in the form of digital printouts and displays on glowing 
screens. There was just as much skill and insight needed as in using twenty-six visual-cum-tactile 
methods for judging the state of the steel. But it was a different kind of skill, and until it had been 
learned, plant breakdowns were more frequent and costs were adverse. 282 
The irony of the computer age, remarks Pacey, is that, "people thought they had made 
knowledge entirely objective and believed that they had disposed of the need for intuitive 
judgment based on participatory experience-yet in both instances, some of these skills 
still proved to be necessary. "283 
It is patent that good human making requires ingenuity and skill. Likewise, as we 
will discover Augustine to have known long before, ingenuity and skill are goods in 
themselves and to be enjoyed. Human making, if it is to be good, depends on this 
existential engagement with one's work. Traditionally, limits on this form of enjoyment 
were tied to its integration with local patterns of life and material availabilities, local uses, 
etc. 284 Thus this tacit "feel" for good work was deeply imbedded, in technical skills, local 
political structures, and the availability of materials. 
But problems arise when the technical abstractions which describe technically 
good work become the sole focus of the existential pleasure of work. This abstraction 
281 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 67-68. 
282 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 73. 
283 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 74. 
284 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 114-115. 
123 
makes possible the severing of technical tasks from their social and political context. 
Pacey points out that the technical task itself may become the focus of existential 
meaning for a variety of reasons. The puzzle-solving aspect of work may engage the 
inventor, whether the challenge is intellectual or manual. "Indeed, one psychologist has 
suggested that `the ability to channel one's interests, even obsessively, may be a condition 
for producing original work. 159285 From another angle, there is an arousal associated with 
power and control. 286 
The problem of narrowly focusing one's sense of meaning on the technical task is 
that it becomes object-centered to the detriment of the other aspects of the impact of 
work. In short, the intrinsic enjoyment of the work itself overrides empathetic attention to 
the larger context, the existential spatiality, within which the work exists. 287 This 
narrowing of focus on the existential pleasure of good work is exacerbated by the 
abstracted nature of modern manufacture and can be exploited by political technique 
which revises the visibility structures of work for dubious political ends. For example, 
When napalm was first used, it was not always effective because, if the victim was quick enough, 
he or she could scrape it off. During the Vietnam War, industrial chemists were asked how to 
make it stick, a request that could be dressed up in scientific abstractions and that was dealt with 
by adding polystyrene. For the chemists, this was a narrowly technical question, and they did not 
have to dwell on the way napalm would now `keep on burning right down to the bone. ' Nor did 
the aircrew who dropped it on Vietnamese villagers have to think about this as they had fleeting 
glimpses of their targets. Nobody came face to face with the reality of what they were doing. 288 
Such management techniques are most clearly obvious in modern weapons design 
in which "... progress has `consisted mostly in eliminating... the chance of face-to-face 
combat. "' High altitude bombing, long range artillery, automated weapons, land mines, 
each makes violence more palpable by making the enemy less human, and information 
285 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 182, quoting Liam Hudson. 
286 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 180-185. 
287 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 176. 
288 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 176-177. 
124 
technology "... more than any technology that preceded it has succeeded in obliterating 
the humanity of its human objects. "289 
Psychologist Stanley Milgram's experiments of the 1960 sand 1970 s'showed 
that even when face to face with distressing outcomes of our work, a common response to 
the moral conflict produced is to dull it by sublimation of the moral identity into one 
judged in terms of exemplary completion of technical task. 290 The skilled manipulation of 
this division of labor to minimize psychological or moral scruples, or maximize the 
controllability of the workforce in time begins to "feel" right to the skilled manager. At 
the same time, for the worker, the radical redirection (not loss) of moral concern, from 
concern with the subjects of his action to how well he has satisfied the authority over him 
or the demands of the technical task, also comes to "feel" right-the laying aside of our 
own moral deliberation about the ends of our work by passing it off on the authorities we 
obey becomes a viable option, even in post-Holocaust democracies. 291 
Social Experience and the Perception of Meaning 
Existing in parallel with the personal existential meanings of the technical task is 
the experience Pacey calls social meaning, continuing, 
... the social meanings of technology coexist and interact with the personal responses and 
"existential" experience of individuals. A cook who does not enjoy the colors, textures, and 
scents of food in different stages of preparation never becomes skilled at the job. But the cook is 
also motivated by awareness of the social purpose and context of the meals he or she prepares. 
Similarly, inventors, engineers, and artisans may have intense personal experience of materials, 
or of sweetly running machines, but at the same time, they are also members of society, 
responding to public enthusiasms, political influences, economic conditions, and other aspects of 
their social environment. The inventors of television, for example, were well aware of the social 
289 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 178, quoting Zygmunt Bauman. 
290 Stanley Milgram, Obedience To Authority: An Experimental View (London: Pinter & Martin, 1974), 25. 
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meanings of the theater, music hall, and cinema, and were aware also of the potential of 
combining the visual, dramatic appeal of these media with the immediacy of radio. 292 
This sense of the social environment may be instinctively perceived, but is often 
systematically sought through the studies of economists or market researchers. 293 
We will see in chapter six that Augustine applauds the sense of communal spirit 
and desire to satisfy the needs of others which has been the hallmark of the rhetoric of the 
scientific age, and which has intimate connections with the Christian humanism of the 
west. But this positive aspect is paralleled by the negative possibility that this social 
community whose interests are sought easily shrinks into a self-referential community. 
For instance, medical or agricultural researchers and technologists may pursue projects 
which within the terms of the scientific community are an unambiguous success yet find 
their "success" met by an apparently inexplicable public outcry. Researchers who tout 
miracle cures for disease or hunger are, Pacey says, "often found to be cut off from the 
people they seek to help by their laboratory environment, and are sometimes unaware of 
the way agroindustrial businesses exploit science and innovation to control markets, often 
in remote countries. "294 Such abstraction from the wider implications of their work is 
exacerbated by those in "frontier science", Pacey notes. If the public does not understand 
what the brilliant alchemist is engaged in, then the scientist can at least rely on his 
community to understand that his work is good and good for all. Together and with a 
sense of communal excitement the research team ford the river into the new land of 
power and danger. 295 
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Political Experience and the Perception of Meaning 
Turning finally to the last corner of Pacey's pyramid, the political experience of 
technology creation, we find another facet of the technological "alchemist" role coming to 
the fore. Political power has long recognized the political capital to be gained by 
supporting the efforts of the civilizing explorer. Pacey speculates that the colonial 
projects of the modern west entrenched the expectation that the civilized world would 
bring order into whatever disordered arena it entered. Between 1870-1970 the frontier 
mentality and enthusiasm (and especially the American frontier mentality) shifted from a 
focus on the conquest of space to the technical frontier. "Today, funding and political 
support are still attracted to projects that seem to have frontier characteristics: space 
exploration, the human genome project, and even, for a while in the 1980's, the `high 
frontier' of the Strategic Defense Initiative (the Star Wars project). "296 
That scientists continue to forge ahead in this ever-expanding frontier indicates 
massive political support (recalling our observation that science and technology are an 
arm of production): "the characteristic pattern of research in the twentieth century has 
been that a connection with industrial or military power allows engineers and scientists 
`to dream in an expansive fashion, ' and the huge resources commanded by that power 
`brings their dreams to life. "9297 If technologists are allowed to "dream in expansive 
fashion", what is the benefit accruing to political power? 
David Nye's American Technological Sublime explores the way the emotional 
and psychological force unleashed by the special effect and showpiece technologies, or 
concretized in events such as setting foot on the moon or objects such as the skyscraper, 
can be converted into political capital. As a lens for this discussion Nye contrasts the 
modem experience of the sublime with the Kantian notion of the sublime utilized by the 
eighteenth century Romantic movement, which was defined as an experience setting off a 
296 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 181. Sadly, this sentence can no longer be uttered in the past tense. 
297 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 89, quoting Tom Athanasiou. 
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permissible eruption of emotion that overwhelmed the reason for a short time, only to be 
recontained by the reason. 298 
In the Critique of Judgment Kant defined two types of sublime, the mathematical 
and dynamic sublimes. Mathematical sublime is the encounter with extreme magnitude, or 
vastness, such as that provided by a far-reaching view. The dynamic sublime is the scene 
which arouses terror, the great storm, or a volcanic eruption, which the subject views from 
a safe distance. Nye correctly points out that Kant's definitions of the sublime as either 
vastness, dynamism, or both is easily and correctly applied to many technologies, 
including, we might add, the "invisible" ones such as the genome project, or the 
fascinating world of the miniature machine. 
Sublime experience is not merely a matter of vision; all the senses are engaged. Burke noted that, 
although the eye was often dominant, movement, noise, smell, and touch were also important. A 
city sounds much different at the top of a skyscraper than on the street below. The wind makes 
one feel more vulnerable out on the open span of a long bridge. The steam locomotive shook the 
ground and filled the air with an alien smell of steam, smoke and sparks; the Saturn rocket did 
much the same thing on a larger scale. The strong contrast between the silence of a rocket's liftoff 
and the sudden roar that follows a few seconds later is also a vital element in making that 
spectacle sublime. The sheer size of the crowd attracted to a technological display further arouses 
the emotions. In each event, the human subject feels that the familiar envelope of sensory 
experience has been rent asunder. 299 
Despite Kant's contention that the notion of sublimity could only be used to 
describe nature, what he described came to be increasingly associated with technological 
feats which lead to a reversal of its effect on the viewer. Kant understood the supreme 
sublime to be the hurricane; the industrialist sees it in the steel mill's flame and fury. 
Kant's sublime contextualizes humanity through a sense of insignificance, but the 
industrialist's induces wonder at the human mastery and ingenuity applied to containing 
298 David E. Nye, American Technological Sublime (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996), 5. 
299 Nye, Technological Sublime, 284-285. 
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such a maelstrom. 300 Nye argues that in the present era this sensitivity to the sublime in 
human creation has come to be a regular part of social life, an internalized taste for 
spectacle. 
Whereas Americans had once made pilgrimages to natural wonders in order to sense their place in 
the natural order, in 1986 they treated technological achievements as signs of political stability 
and dominance over nature. That attitude had already begun to emerge in the public response to 
the railroad and the telegraph, but by the late twentieth century the omnipotence of engineering 
had been internalized. It was no longer necessary to declare that machines were sublime. Indeed, it 
was hardly necessary to say anything at all, as President Reagan's short speech [rededicating the 
Statue of Liberty] suggests. He could simply turn on the lasers and watch the fireworks. 30' 
Lost is Kant's desire for moral growth, replaced by an insatiable taste for the novel 
products of the genius engineer's work directly tappable as political capital. 302 
Thus is the human impulse to wonder politicized, Nye contends. Technological 
sublime creates awe not for the laws of nature but for the engineers and businessmen who 
have created the machinery which tames the uncontrolled or taps vast powers. This radical 
shift in the focus of awe has become a seminal phenomenon of industrialized society. Kant 
believed that the natural sublime was a natural good, the experience of which lead to an 
enlightened awareness of transcendental reason. The corporate and manipulative 
technological spectacle which is so prevalent in the modern west moves in the opposite 
direction, seeking to impress and pacify while building support for the technician and 
financier who produced the spectacle. 303 
Invisible technologies, i. e., technologies which do not become well known to the 
public, would not serve to develop the public momentum desired by policy makers. "Big 
projects, " conversely, raise the profile of certain types of questions and solutions, 
depressing awareness of less flashy and human problems. Big projects remind the 
300 Nye, Technological Sublime, 131. 
301 Nye, Technological Sublime, 277. 
302 Nye, Technological Sublime, 153. 
303 Nye, Technological Sublime, 197,222. 
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populace that with the current regime all is possible. Thus the technological sublime is 
always the promise which the power/technical elite offer to the public. When it is 
promised it is couched in terms of the eradication of disease, or the development of an 
unprecedented and safe power over nature, or a natural evil, an unprecedented boon for 
humanity. 304 Foucault is not alone in his Nietzschean sensitivity to the tactical use of the 
language of morality in defense of spectacles using the language of established values. 
"We have all seen how government... invariably portrays its goals in morally favorable 
terms, " Milgram says, "how, in our own country [USA] the destruction of men, women, 
and children in Vietnam was justified by reference to saving the Free World, etc. We see, 
also, how easily the pronouncements are accepted as legitimizing goals .,, 
305 The point is 
that these spectacles appeal to technological humanity because they have been thoroughly 
penetrated with the priorities which these spectacles seek to satisfy. Create a society of 
technicians and the only thing that can convince them they are ruled well is a technical 
feat. When a railroad, skyscraper, or mapped genome is offered to the public, the power of 
the technician to disrupt a human perception about the barriers of the natural world is 
reinforced, demonstrating the potential omnipotence of technical expertise as supported by 
the present social system, whether this new feat is an actual boon or not. Each promised 
new feat reinforces the sense of technological progress, even as the technological success 
306 
quickly becomes part of the "given" and expected. 
In addition to its political usefulness in solidifying the present regime, Nye 
continues, the technological spectacle attempts to gain support for the regime's particular 
vision of the future. 307 Lewis Mumford spoke for a generation of capitalists when he 
304 The importance of the surplus of political effects over actual effects of spectacular technologies can 
hardly be over estimated. One of many illustrations of this gap is the unlimited investment post-WWII 
Russia devoted to the construction of the atomic bomb in an attempt to prove is "modernity" to the west and 
to itself, despite these weapons having seveely limited military value. See David Holloway, Stalin and the 
Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 
chapter seven. 
305 Milgram, Obedience to Authority, 233. Cf. George Orwell's Animal Farm. 
306 Nye, Technological Sublime, 285. 
307 Nye, Technological Sublime, 200. 
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explained what he desired from the 1939 New York World's Fair: "The fair, he argued, 
should tell a story through architectural form, showing the public an orchestrated future... 
`If we can point toward the future, toward something that is progressing and growing in 
every department of life and throughout civilization, if we can allow ourselves... as 
members of a great metropolis, to think for the world at large, we may lay the foundation 
for a pattern of life which would have an enormous impact in times to come. ", 308 Given 
the proper spectacle the "inevitability of the future", with its concomitant political 
backing, will be secured. Elaine Graham sharpens this point by noting that the scientific 
prediction of future "advances" are as much exercises in story telling and future-making as 
science fiction. Indeed, science fiction as a genre legitimates and sustains the discourse of 
scientific "prediction. " Her point, and the point of this section, is that asking about the 
representation of technology opens up consideration of power and authority: who will 
define present practice? 309 
Nye recounts some of the social costs of this mode of securing political unity. A 
primary effect is the shift in public attention toward the prospective users of grand 
technologies, and away from the human costs which may have accompanied their 
construction. Historically, producers and middle class consumers were awed by the vast 
symmetry and productivity of industry, and blinded to the reality that these complexes of 
machines were less than desirable when judged in terms of the lives of the workers who 
tended and constructed them and the citizens who were excluded from using them. 310 
Nye points out that another side effect of the technological spectacle is to augment 
the perception of technology being the fixed point in a sea of ephemeral and transient 
humanity. 311 The spatial and present foreshortening of the human landscape in favor of the 
mechanical is exacerbated in the temporal and historical frame of the memory. The whole 
308 In Nye, Technological Sublime, 207. 
309 Elaine L. Graham, Representations of the Post/Human: Monsters, Aliens and Others in Popular Culture 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 20,27-28,226. 
310 Nye, Technological Sublime, 118. 
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world watched, for example, the first steps on the moon, but how many knew the social 
context or the costs of that effort? With the passage of time the number attuned to human 
effects, inevitably small, receded as the technical event itself and its main players, the 
rockets, took on iconographic status. This focus on material rather than human reality is an 
inevitable collateral cost of directing public awareness through the technical feat. 
Nye indicates another social effect of the new sublime: it is attached to 
consumption. Having been sold a certain exhilarating future, the consumer's eye for the 
value of their purchases is transformed. The purchase inaugurates a future in which human 
frustrations are resolved by new material arrangements, as glossy stage-managed 
promotions illustrate what the world will look like when we all have electric cars and 
silent helicopters, not to mention fail-safe protection for sex. Once the viewer accepts the 
spectacle, the product is both the proof and beginning of a future already under way (a 
secular eschatology). But once again, the distorting effects of such vision redirection are 
hidden from view by the presentation of this single-faceted utopian future which hides the 
tradeoffs which might be inherent in a world where all accept the promised future. A new 
material relation is envisioned which solidifies a conservative view of political and 
personal social relations. In such a world no space is given to human weakness, only glory 
in human power. Tellingly, this is the template for the theme park, the magical kingdom, 
the true school of the imaginations of contemporary youth. 312 
Another effect of the social phenomenon of the technological spectacle worries 
Nye: it erodes democracy by intending our acquiescence in political control by an educated 
elite who propose to uplift all humanity by their expertise. The spectacle first enhances the 
belief that democracy and state or private control of technological progress are obviously 
compatible notions. Second, it creates citizens who experience a visceral and internal link 
between technological control and patriotism, an identity which takes pride both in the 
technological artifacts produced by their nation and in their identity as part of that 
311 Nye, Technological Sublime, 105. This focusing of perspective reverses the Biblical relation of earthly 
transience and stasis: "A generation goes, and a generation comes, but the earth remains forever. " 
(Ecclesiastes 1: 4) Emphasis mine. 
312 Nye, Technological Sublime, 220-224. 
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powerful entity. 313 Such beliefs can paradoxically exist even as other public sensibilities 
such as a desire for free speech, legal protest, labor practice, and job security are eroded. 314 
The very fabric of democratic habit is displaced. How? Gone from the modern 
technological spectacle, 
... was the power of the word that Jefferson had known to rouse the national spirit. Gone was the 
citizen who, in Baltimore or New York in the 1820's, actively helped to form the parade or 
watched friends and neighbors display the cohesion of the community. Gone were the visible links 
between work and product, between commerce and politics, between technology and human 
agency. To the public, the technologies that Ronald Reagan put into play by pushing a button at 
the 1986 event were anonymously spectacular. The rededication of the Statue of Liberty, like the 
launch of Apollo XI, was nearly empty of the contents of political life required by republicanism. 
Neither made any reference to a virtuous citizenry, and neither made the once-common claim that 
a new technology was a moral machine that would elevate the people. Instead, each was a massive 
display of organizational and technical power. Each encouraged the belief that democracy and 
state control of advanced technology were compatible. Each event presented a technical 
achievement as a sign of national greatness, encouraging the citizen to introject this vision of 
power and make it a fundamental part of personal identity. In this way, each enhanced the 
technological sublime as a category of American political experience. 315 
These observations force on us the realization that if freedom-loving people eagerly 
embrace repressive models of social interaction, the power of technological imagery in the 
contemporary context has been shown to be awesome indeed. 316 
By utilizing the insights of Foucault's method, the accuracy of Pacey and Nye's 
perceptions of the power of political experience may be tested by comparison with 
premodern political power. Premodern citizens felt impressed by pageantry, and political 
rulers augmented their power by satisfying this desire. Moderns, by contrast, most often 
313 Nye, Technological Sublime, 234-235,279-280. 
314 Klein, No Logo, 96-100. 
315 Nye, Technological Sublime, 279-280. 
316 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 89. 
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think royal pomp a quaint, historically interesting exercise. We simply have different 
matrices of awe. We are impressed by technological power, and thus modem political 
power displays its mastery through technology. But neither in ancient nor modem 
spectacles were the reasons why such spectacles were experienced as impressive made 
explicit: the reasons remain implicit to its participants. 
As we have seen, in relation to technical and social aspects of experience there is 
no theological reason to deny that facets of the technological world evoke sublime 
reactions. We cannot remove the size from an ocean liner, nor the speed from a jet, nor the 
elemental danger from heavy industry. But we can become aware of the ways in which 
sublimity itself has been deeply integrated into modern political economics. A preliminary 
theological assessment of the spectacle is possible by allusion: it might be impossible to 
take the awe-inducing nature out of Jesus' miracles, but the sublime is not the meaning of 
the miracles. The constant tension of the Incarnation will always be that its miraculous 
nature rightly evokes this emotional reaction, a reaction which easily leads us onto sinful 
and self-destructive worship of secondary facets of God's self-revelation. 317 
Most importantly, in talking about technology it is critical that the place of the 
technological spectacle in political technique be kept clearly in view, as well as the ways 
in which certain projects become more attractive to the scientific establishment because of 
their consensus building value. We must not let Foucault's insight about the hiddenness of 
power distract attention from the visible face of power, which Pacey and Nye have 
established as integral to political technique in modem society. That these spectacles aim 
to motivate through attraction is an obvious indicator of the perspicuity of Foucault's 
vision of the modem state's orientation toward an ever-growing possibility to use 
technological power to augment power itself. 
317 See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV, The Doctrine of Reconciliation: Part 2, trans. G. W. Bromiley, 
ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1958), 21 1ff. 
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Meaning, Experience and Foucault's Promise 
Foucault's Disinterest in Setting Will Under External Responsibility 
I have argued that Grant establishes the perspicuity of Heidegger's claim that the 
question of technology revolves around establishing the proper authority which displaces 
the desire for human freedom to remake all things. But Foucault denies this claim, 
inverting the Kantian project of discerning the limit of that which we can know by saying, 
"I shall thus characterize the philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical ontology of 
ourselves as a historico-practical test of the limits we may go beyond, and thus as work 
carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings. "318 With this espousal of "a new 
age of curiosity"319 comes the embracing of the will to power: he rejects, "everything in 
Western civilization that restricts the desire for power. "320 With direct references to 
Nietzsche, Foucault falls into the paradoxical ethic parading as description which has no 
other goal than ceaseless remaking of ourselves. We must applaud Foucault for following 
Nietzsche's frank coherence in admitting that this definition of freedom risks on one hand 
real, physical self-destruction, and on the other simply embraces the erasure of past 
culturally-defined definitions of the human. Both are the inevitable "injustice proper to 
the will to knowledge. , 321 
Having already agreed with Grant that the use of the term `should' implies some 
sort of transcendent referent against which human action may be measured, 322 it appears 
that Foucault has deeply problematized any use of the word "ethics. " Since Foucault 
318 Foucault, "What is Enlightenment? " in Ethics, 316. 
319 Foucault, "The Masked Philosopher, " in Ethics, 325-326. 
320 Foucault, "Revolutionary Action: `Until Now', " in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected 
Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 221. 
321 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, " in Aesthetics, 389. 
322 Grant, "The Computer Does Not Impose on Us the Ways It Should Be Used, " in The Georeg Grant 
Reader, 429; O'Donovan, Twilight of Justice, 134. 
135 
denies such a transcendent standard, ethical vocabulary is narrowed to aesthetic 
observations and rhetorical enticements. 
Foucault's Promise 
Foucault's work contributes two main insights to this study. The first he has 
established by fleshing out the relevance of Heidegger's concept of world: survival in 
modern society is based on a wealth of inexplicit knowledges including a hidden 
knowledge of political economy. This new and radically intimate political power, 
Foucault argues, "is tolerable only on the condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. 
Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms. "323 Foucault has 
established that we moderns internalize the social order, or rather grant our social 
structure strong though tacit normative value. 324 We have seen how this was 
accomplished in modem political life through the application of a vast and yet minute 
political technology which assumes the signal importance of the internalization of 
responses to certain stimuli/commands. 
This trait is not unique to our age. Even in the torture or ritual-based political 
economy legal prohibitions had to be memorized, to be on the lips of the populace, in 
order to act as a deterrent. If these laws were unknown, the motivational force of the 
execution on public behavior would have been lost. 325 We should not be surprised then 
that in order for our contemporary political economy to function, we too must be 
imprinted with the "rules" of modern society. The self-evidence of our beliefs makes us 
governable; we are governed precisely by those beliefs not open to conscious scrutiny. By 
uncovering the technological sinews of modern methods of political power, we begin to 
see how seriously ingrained we may now have become with a technological view of all 
things which, to function, must be evidently and transparently true. 
323 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 86. 
324 Milgram, Obedience to Authority, 133,156. 
325 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 96,101. 
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Critique of explicit knowledge is a rather straightforward project, hence the 
briefer time spent with Grant, and the more extended exploration of the implications of 
Foucault's work. By taking tacit knowledge seriously, Foucault's thought represents a 
subtle but profound advance on most thinking about technology. He refuses to look at 
technological being as somehow imposed on the "natural" or non-technological. Instead 
he looks at the ways we take up views of freedom by which we are formed, and by which 
we constrain and discipline ourselves. 326 This approach improves on Grant's more 
idealist responses which tend to speak as if technological logic is a discreet idea 
possessed by our conscious minds. Foucault radically questions the assumptions of TA, 
making it clear that the method of TA will be deployed in practice according to a range of 
tacit assumptions which its theoretical structure does not acknowledge. In other words, to 
make decisions about new technology using TA is, in Heidegger's terms, to be enframed 
by technological being. 
Rather than leaving us fettered by our tacit knowledge, Foucault's development of 
the concept of problematization is rich with promise. He has both established that we are 
constructed beings and indicated ways this construction might be questioned from within 
the context of dilemmas created by practical questions. 
Finally, Foucault has established that for a political power to see a population as 
standing reserve means in our age that it seeks to treat it as biopower. He has confirmed 
that Heidegger's concepts of `world' and `technology' do indeed illuminate the 
contemporary `equipment' of the `work' of political governance. The next chapter, 
beginning Part II of this study, will argue that being unmade as technological beings is 
possible in the transformation of grace. After arguing for this possibility I will return to 
evaluate in terms of human action, or ethics, what it might mean for us as political beings 
to be transformed into the likeness of Christ in a technological society. But before doing 
so, I summarize Part I with a case study. 
326 Foucault, "The Ethics of Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom, " in Ethics, 221. 
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Summarizing Part I with a Case: Tabulating Fertility 
A brief examination of a case will serve as a conclusion to and summary of Part I. 
Let us suppose that our ten men were considering whether to fund research on and 
construction of a machine which would mechanically test extracted human ova as part of 
the in vitro fertilization (IVF) process. The new machine will generate digitized 
information about the ova, allowing comparison with computerized databanks containing 
information about chromosomal defects. This will allow ova to be sorted and suitable 
specimens fertilized prior to implantation in a woman's womb. 
Part I has been seeking to widen the ways we deliberate about the development of 
technology, the necessity of which becomes more apparent with a technology that appears 
to have no precedent. We have seen that TA asks such questions as: What changes in the 
business and social climate have made this innovation attractive or indispensable? Are we 
leading our competitors in offering a path-breaking product or following them to avoid 
being displaced from the market? How will this innovation impact practice in the fields 
of medicine and research in which it is used? How will these changes shift relations with 
labor and the environment? Each of these questions will be framed to answer one 
underlying question: How will taking or refusing this decision advance the position of the 
company (or nation)? 
The analysis of Part I has suggested that such deliberation is insufficiently 
inclusive for making a well-informed decision about investment in a new technology. 
Heidegger and his interpreters have insisted on the importance of two distinct regions of 
questions for moral deliberation which seeks to escape a simple replication of the 
technological imperative. 327 The first queries the social context in which decisions are 
made, and the second the forces bearing on decision makers. The important point is that 
these two regions of inquiry must be part of a proper deliberation about new technology, 
and must remain open even if the way we frame responses to them undergoes revision. In 
seeking to give some content to these two regions of questions by deliberating about an 
327 Having come this far in the analysis it is important to admit what will have already become apparent: the 
modern technological imperative functions in tandem with the capitalist imperative. 
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ovum testing machine, the way feminist interpreters have answered the questions in these 
two regions will serve as one attempt to indicate the proper depth and breadth of answers 
which are necessary for pursuing a well-rounded deliberation about new technology 
within the two regions of questioning urged upon us by Heidegger and his interpretors. 
A. Locating IVF in its Social Context 
This first domain of questions attempts to lay bare the way the technology grows 
from and augments or dismantles the social context within which action takes place. 
What part does the proposed technology play in the contemporary `world' as Heidegger 
has defined it? This question is clarified by asking, How will it change our social 
practices and with what practices does it cohere? What kind of thinking does it betray? 
And how will it change humanity? 
Situated Within a Context of Theory 
Judy Wajcman's overview of feminist thinking about reproductive technologies 
observes that throughout patriarchal societies male control of and access to female 
sexuality was a central focus. In the contemporary context male control over female 
bodies is expanding via medical technologies to take a more pervasive control of events 
beyond sexual contact, i. e. reproduction and childcare, in short, motherhood. This vein of 
feminist analysis understands in vitro fertilization, egg donation, sex predetermination 
and embryo evaluation as powerful new ways for men to control women, especially when 
they become widespread social practice. If this occurs, social pressures will be arrayed 
against women simply hosting a child, because they will be expected to submit them to 
medical expropriation and "improvement" which leads to the deployment of such 
technologies as genetic engineering for eugenic purposes. 328 It seems inevitable, Charlotte 
Bretherton and Karen Stevenson comment, that "increasing numbers of women will face 
328 Judy Wajcman, Feminism Confronts Technology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 58-59. 
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decisions-having evident eugenicist connotations-concerning whether or not to 
terminate their pregnancies. "329 The negative eugenics of aborting the substandard might 
not become the positive eugenics of creating the `above-average', yet it is clear that the 
use of new technologies already serves a eugenic role by encouraging expression of 
heretofore inexpressible parental desires. For instance, 
[C]urrent utilisation of prenatal diagnostic procedures shows distinct patterns of North/South 
difference. In the North they are `primarily associated with middle-class demographic needs and 
desires-smaller families, better babies, etc. '... In the South they are used as an instrument of 
population control through selective breeding of male children. In both cases important 
judgments are evident concerning those members of society who are valued and those who are 
not. 
330 
Grant's analysis has given us reason to take seriously this line of questioning of 
the emplacement of these technologies within a social context. He asks us to include in 
our deliberation questions about whether reproductive medicine plays a part in a trend 
which respects the given, material reality of the woman, egg and child, perceived as 
having interesting and unique characteristics of its own. Or is it rather part of a thought 
world in which mathematecized method is applied to raw material in order to "improve" 
it? Grant has indicated that there are good reasons to wonder if the testing of ova.. 1 might 
indeed be playing a role in the proliferation of what he calls "technologies of the 
helmsman", which preclude social unconformity and wonder at unmanipulated material 
order. 
329 Charlotte Bretherton and Karen Stevenson, "Ambivalence and anxiety: women and the techno-scientific 
revolution, " in Alan Russell and John Vogler, eds., The International politics of biotechnology: 
Investi jz Global Futures (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). 
330 Bretherton and Stevenson, "Ambivalence and anxiety, " 57. 
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Situated Within a Context of Social Practice 
Some feminist commentators, Wajcman says, emphasize the ambivalence of 
contemporary uses of fetal and maternal medicine on actual women's lives. While in 
theory offering the possibility of greater choice for women, in practice the ways these 
technologies are deployed often submerges women's maternal desires within masculine 
power structures which determine their use. Within the wider realm of "fetal care 
medicine, " Wendy Farrant argues, at least one technology which can be understood to 
have been developed as part of the range of medical resources for improving the health of 
babies, has in effect narrowed mothers' possibilities for improving the lives of their 
nascent children. Prenatal screening in Britain, rather than empowering women by 
providing new possibilities for treating the sick neonate, has in fact taken the form of a 
demand for termination as a condition for providing amniocentesis. The technique has 
been alienated from the purpose of enabling women to make choices about their 
reproduction and the good of their child and become linked instead to population 
control. 331 In addition, feminists say, the ways such screenings are carried out not-very- 
subtly affects definitions of "disability" in ways which disempower both women and 
"handicapped". As a result, gendered power relations determine what and how these 
technologies are utilized. 332 At the same time, the high cost and poor public funding of 
fertility techniques produces a race and class bias which is exacerbated by the operating 
procedures for selecting recipients of treatment. 333 
Foucault has asked us to consider the form and effects of the biopower and 
surveillance society, and has given us good reason to wonder if the proposed egg-testing 
machine our ten men are considering will accelerate or thwart its current trends. His 
thought suggests that the widespread testing of embryos would be attractive to a society 
devoted to the augmentation of biopower, and has indicated how the insertion of a 
technique for gathering information, in this case the examination of ova might redirect 
331 Wendy Farrant, "Who's For Amniocentesis? The Politics of Prenatal Screening, " in Hilary Homans, ed., 
The Sexual Politics of Reproduction (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company, 1985). 
332 Wajcman, Feminism Confronts Technology, 60-63. 
333 Bretherton and Stevenson, "Ambivalence and anxiety, " 56. 
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and imbalance power relations, for the purposes of benefit to social planners rather than 
patients, mothers and children. In a society in which testing and examination are so 
susceptible to being integrated with centralized social decision-making, we are given 
reason to carefully consider the fears of feminist commentators that ovum testing may 
quickly become just another, and more intimate, form of invasive biopolitics. 
Situated Within the Recreation of Humanity 
We have already seen that feminists are worried that widespread testing of eggs 
and embryos will have the effect of redefining the "defective" human. They are also 
worried that IVF is a Trojan-horse-not curing or attempting to cure infertility (which 
would mean couples could bear children when desired and conceived through penetrative 
sex) but through a massive technical intervention for each, or any, conception, simulating 
normal processes. Such a simulated fertility, while not truly returning the full abilities of 
fertility, encourages the entrenchment and internalization of traditional social roles of the 
woman as mother. Claims made by medicine for the technologies strengthen the ideology 
of women's "natural" need to mother while not actually providing it, leaving women with 
a new "need" and a new worry which can only be remedied by intervention. 334 Whether 
or not such worries are "naturally" occurring, there are good reasons for medicine to 
encourage them. "The construction of infertility as a medical problem suffered by 
individual couples, and requiring costly interventions, is big business. In consequence, 
commodification is expressed through marketing reproductive services in a manner which 
misrepresents success rates (there are a number of methods of calculating `success; of 
which producing `take-home babies' is only one); through recommending assisted 
procedures at an earlier stage than necessary, or when the prospects for success are poor; 
and through generally glossing over the discomfort and stress associated with the 
334 Hilary Rose, "Victorian Values in a Test Tube: The Politics of Reproductive Science and Technology, " 
chap. in Michelle Stanworth, ed., Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 171. 
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procedures, whether they succeed or not. , 335 As this scientific and social apparatus is 
devoted to convincing people that childlessness is a "reversible disease", medicine 
maintains a consistent bias: the woman is under the most sustained physiological scrutiny, 
being considered defective in a way that a man is not. 336 The result of this complex of 
trends is that infertility can no longer be understood by a woman as a "given" to be lived 
within, but has become a "disease", meaning that the "decision" not to undergo technical 
intervention comes to be seen as a decision against women's "natural" capacity for 
mothering. 337 
Heidegger has asked us to consider our social environment in its pervasive effects 
on our thinking and practice, and has warned us that contemporary practice may be 
understood as technological, i. e. reducing all things to standing reserve. He has also 
argued that we don't just see things this way, we are this way-we are this kind of being, 
who acts and reacts "naturally" in this way because we are products of our social context. 
Our feminist interlocutors have indicated one point at which the techniques of maternal 
medicine ask humans to think of themselves in new ways, to act "naturally" in new ways. 
Women are no longer (as in past eras) mothers by choice and infertile by fate. A technical 
innovation and a concomitant set of social innovations have reversed and so redefined 
what is "natural" for humanity. For instance, it might once have been considered heroic, 
natural and loving to raise a handicapped child, but now medicine has helped to establish 
the social pressure which frowns upon a mother for not having "filtered out" this 
particular embryo. 
Brent Waters helpfully schematizes the divisions which this new humanity 
"naturally" thinks as it instrumentalizes the intermediate stages of procreation. First, 
childlessness is turned into infertility, a medical condition that can be treated. Where once 
caring for disabled children might have been considered part of charity, now the focus 
shifts to preventing illness and suffering. Second, sexual intercourse is separated from 
335 Bretherton and Stevenson, "Ambivalence and anxiety, " 54. 
336 Naomi Pfeffer, "The Hidden Pathology of the Male Reproductive System, " chap. in Homans, ed., The 
Sexual Politics of Reproduction. 
337 Wajcman, Feminism Confronts Technology, 57,62,67. 
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marriage. This is not unique to fertility treatments, but is endemic in a medical project 
and social context in which biological processes are compartmentalized and in which the 
ability to turn fertility off to "free" sex from it is an important aim. Third, procreation is 
shorn from sexual intercourse, becoming available to many combinations of `parents' or 
individuals. Fourth, parenthood is separated from procreation, requiring a new set of 
designations such as "genetic mother" which are part of the shift in procreation away 
from a natural unfolding of a single marital relationship to perceiving it as a collection of 
tasks. Finally, child rearing is severed from parenthood. Parenthood, once an essentially 
passive cooperation with biological processes, now becomes a series of interventions 
aimed at quality control, lending pregnancy and parenthood a new provisional 
character. 338 Here, Heidegger and Foucault claim, is not just new practice, or new 
thought, but the initiation of a new form of humanity. 
B. Felt Meaning and Decision-making 
Not only is it important for our ten men to have a clear view of where their 
proposed technological artifact will fit into the wider contexts of social practices and 
trends, but it is also important to delve into the more personal aspects of the forces 
bearing upon those who deliberate about proposed technologies. We might speak here of 
why people might desire to use the new technology, or why its producers might want to 
develop and sell it, or the government promote it. This analysis will leave aside an 
explicit discussion of these other users in favor of a focus on forces acting upon the 
deliberation of the medical profession. 
338 Brent Waters, Reproductive Technology: Towards a Theology of Procreative Stewardship 
(London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 2001), 14-18. 
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Meaning and Technical Experience 
Feminist interpreters of reproductive technologies are especially concerned to 
open up one important region of moral investigation: "Given their low success rate, and 
the level of physical danger and psychological distress that accompany these new 
reproductive technologies, why the current concentration on in-vitro fertilization among 
infertility specialists? How does it happen that resources are allocated to this 
`unsuccessful' technology? "339 In her study of the rise of in vitro and embryo transfer 
techniques, Naomi Pfeffer argues that these techniques became highly attractive to 
physicians because they raised the treatment of infertility from its low status in the 
medical hierarchy to an exciting position in "frontier science. 99340 Such techniques 
brought gynecology and infertility medicine into the "scientific age", which progressed in 
three stages from "direct communication with the patients' bodies through techniques of 
physical examination, to indirect connection with both the experience and bodies of their 
patients through machines and technical experts. "341 This technical change had the added 
benefit of validating the doctor's claims to know more about women than women do 
about themselves, while reducing the embarrassing discomfort of the physical 
examination of the female's body by the (almost exclusively) male physician. The power 
asymmetry between doctor and patient is thus maintained more effectively and on two 
levels, the level of knowledge and of practice, making daily practice easier and less prone 
to requiring negotiation. 342 
Pacey's analysis has again given us reason to expect that users of fertility 
technologies will like any technology that makes day-to-day tasks more interesting, more 
comfortable and less prone to produce conflict with others (in this case, patients). In 
addition, whereas once gynecology lacked much technical excitement, the introduction of 
new technologies generated a sense of technical rigor as well as a sense of the importance 
339 Wajcman, Feminism Confronts Technology, 72. 
340 Pfeffer, "Artificial Insemination, In-vitro Fertilization and the Stigma of Infertility, " in Stanworth, 
Reproductive Technolo iges, 88. 
341 Wajcman, Feminism Confronts Technology, 70. 
342 Wajcman, Feminism Confronts Technology, 69,70-71. 
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of the work, again making the technologies attractive for reasons not necessarily 
connected with the welfare of patients. 
Meaning and Social Experience 
Within western medicine, Wajcman points out, high technology procedures not 
only enliven and ease the doctor-patient relationship, but are also key to the advancement 
of a sub-discipline within the profession. The development of new technologies signals 
success in the competition for scarce medical resources. Technological sophistication can 
mean everything for the status, money and professional acclaim of a sub-discipline 
because, says Fagerhaugh et al., "Medical specialization leads to technological 
innovation; then, as a given technology is used, physicians and industrial designers 
collaborate to improve it. As it is defined, that process leads to ever more specialization 
and associated work and procedures. "343 Naomi Pfeffer's study of British physicians 
argues that the introduction of IVF and embryo transfer brought substantial financial 
reward and job satisfaction by elevating gynecologists' status within the medical 
profession. This in turn led to pressure to subspecialization, calling for new technologies 
to be generated which could attract financial support for training and research. 344 
Again Pacey has outlined how new technologies can be attractive for reasons 
relating to the internal dynamics of social groups. He has suggested that technology can 
play a central role in the formation and rearrangement of the hierarchies of sub-groups, 
causing the work of technologists to become detached from a focus on the good of 
recipients and reattached to a self-referential system of social hierarchy within a 
discipline. 
343 Wajcman, Feminism Confronts Technology, 71. 
344 Pfeffer, "Artificial Insemination, " 88. 
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Meaning and Political Experience 
Commentators have likened the biotechnology and fertility treatment boom to 
earlier technological booms such as computers and steam power. Feminist commentators 
point out the high risk of the commodification of human tissues and wombs that boom- 
time thinking and practice entails. They argue that such a technological boom can shift 
the focus of medicine from the care of patients to the maximization of new technology 
use and of profits. 
[T]he centrality of the profit motive involves the exploitation of women/couples who are 
desperate to conceive and who will be prepared to incur major debts in the process. A further 
impact of the profitability of assisted reproductive technologies is the diversion of research, and 
practitioners' efforts, in this field. As in the case of other expensive medical procedures, the 
emphasis on treatment serves to divert attention, and resources, from investigation of the broader 
social and environmental causes of infertility; and hence from prevention. 345 
What is clear, Wajcman comments, "is that the needs of infertile women play only a 
small part in the research agenda envisaged. Embryos are a unique source of information 
about human genetics, embryonic development and foetal growth. "346 
Pacey and Nye have suggested ways in which feminists' queries of fertility 
medicine fit well with technology's role in a society in which startling and obvious 
"advances" and promises of such advances are used to build support for political power 
blocks, often to the detriment of other classes of individuals involved. In addition, they 
lead us to ask whether the new technologies associated with IVF and embryo transfer are 
not seen as "frontier science" by government elites who have been led to expect a 
windfall of financial and political gain on investment. At the same time, both they and 
scientific researchers benefit from the sense of being national heroes on the forefront of 
dizzying breakthroughs in human health. In such a context, it pays for both politicians and 
345 Bretherton and Stevenson, "Ambivalence and anxiety, " 54. 
346 Wajcman, Feminism Confronts Technology, 73. 
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scientists to promise much, invest much, focus on technical innovation and capitalize on 
public wonder at new possibilities which may or may not be realizable. 
Conclusion: To Make a Decision 
It has been the contention of Part I that the technological habit can only be broken 
when our deliberation about specific technologies begins with the attempt to see 
technology as it really is. The discussion of a new ovum testing technology has allowed 
us to make clear that it is important to deploy at least three lines of questioning in order to 
expose the actual implications of our decisions about new technology. We must think 
about tactical relationships between competing entities and the welfare of the social 
grouping for whom we are responsible, as TA indicates. We must consider our social 
context as a whole, and whether our proposed action produces justice or injustice amidst 
a contemporary social climate. And we must ask if we and other users will be inordinately 
attracted to the technology on self-interested grounds. Each line of questioning develops 
the observant eye upon which well-developed moral sensitivity depends. It is important to 
recognize that Heidegger's attempt to bring different types of inexplicit knowledge to light 
destabilizes in salutary ways the mechanical moral method of TA which so easily 
promotes injustice in the guise of "rationality. " 
In the case of our ovum-testing machine, it has become troublingly apparent that 
any properly nuanced moral theory, whether philosophical or theological, must be able to 
respond to the realization that the needs of women and children constitutes only a small 
portion of the medical agenda within which the technology would find its place. As we 
will see, the importance of these three lines of questioning can only be established on 
other grounds, in this case, theological. Furthermore, by establishing the importance of 
these questions on theological grounds, the way we go about deliberation is decisively 
reshaped. Yet these three regions of questions raised by Heidegger, his interpreters, and 
the thinkers of TA, are important, and will remain at the focus of our inquiry. The 
difference this shift makes will become apparent when we return to discuss fertility and 
maternal medicine at the end of chapter five. 
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PART II: POSITIVE THEOLOGY 
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Chapter Four: Bernd Wannenwetsch on Being Remade in the 
Community of Worship 
... the center of theological ethics is the affirmation that the word of God 
is going to make something of man. 
Stanley Hauerwas347 
Part I has argued that an important part of resisting the technological ethic will be 
the making explicit and subjecting to judgment both our conscious and unconscious 
knowledge. Part II will develop a proposal about how humans caught up in unconscious 
desires and urges which lead to technological determinism can be empowered to 
deliberate as responsible actors. We have also seen throughout Part I that we must avoid 
replacing a technological decision-making method with a similar but "theological" one. 
We have seen that the problem is method and thus Part II, in order to meet the challenge 
of Part I, will not set up moral rules and announce eternal prescriptions: it aims only to 
ask "How can we more faithfully and insightfully deliberate about the choices we make, 
given our misdirected desires and misinformed reason? " 
The burden of this chapter is to establish how God might break into this confusion 
of motives and forces which determine the course of our existence and resurrect us as 
new, free, creations. Its first section will expound Dietrich Bonhoeffer's thought in order 
to outline the theological premises upon which Part II is based. A second section begins 
the body of the chapter in which an exposition of the thought of Bernd Wannenwetsch 
indicates how the practices of worship are essential to a Christian understanding of God's 
transformation of humanity. Wannenwetsch argues that because God has reconciled 
humans to Himself, He has also committed Himself to their renewal through the life of 
347 Stanley Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 139. 
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the Christian community. The form of life in which the church exists in salvation history, 
reconciliation, is also the medium through which it is transformed and generates new 
knowledge, i. e., by practicing and developing in the logic of reconciliation. Chapter six 
will return to the theme of the relation between divine and human reconciliation, which 
will also be central to the argument of this chapter with its focus on the transformative 
potential of human reconciliation. 
This chapter concludes with a third section in which Wannenwetsch's 
understanding of the transformative potential of the church's practices of worship are 
linked with practical issues of political governance which, unlike the manipulative 
political technologies outlined by Foucault, encourage responsive, reciprocal and morally 
engaged political action. I understand Wannenwetsch to establish that the relations of the 
worshipping community are an essential part of the divine transformation of human 
living, which, in the first instance, issue in clear priorities for understanding and 
deliberating about our lives as political agents. 
Bonhoeffer's discussion of the foundations of Christian moral theory, which 
grounds the thought of Part II, explains that Jesus Christ claims his people through the 
orders of 1) social and 2) material life. 348 The next two chapters circle around and are 
united by this claim, and inquire about these forms and how they might guide Christian 
living. In this chapter, Wannenwetsch wrestles with Bonhoeffer's understanding of the 1) 
social forms of life which guide Christian living. In the following chapter I will examine 
Barth's wrestling with the way the order of 2) material life guides Christian living. 
Chapter six completes the analysis of Part II by trying to sketch at a more general 
level the continuities which bind chapters four and five together. In doing so, via the 
thought of Augustine and Barth about the two cities, a more general theoretical 
background will be developed in order to give a sense of how our technological action 
takes place within God's larger struggle to reclaim humanity from the power of sin. The 
three chapters of Part II work together to develop a single analysis, and their order here 
ought not be interpreted as one of logical priority. 
151 
What is Moral Theology? Christ at the Center 
This study assumes, and will shortly argue, that Christian reflection about human 
action aims at the development of human freedom. If humans are to be truly free then we 
cannot expect human reflection about good action to have any independent authority over 
other humans: it can only point to true divine authority, with whom to walk in free 
companionship is the fulfillment of human life. This statement is at once a claim about 
both the proper form of moral theology and about free human action. Christian moral 
theology, as reflection on free human action, consists in a form of deliberation about God 
and His ways which aims at delivering over to humans a new attentiveness to God and 
His creation. 
Preceding the material content of Part II, this first section of the chapter provides a 
preliminary outline of its theological groundwork. This section attempts to indicate what 
moral theology is and what authority a Christian moral theologian might claim. The larger 
theological cosmology to which this discussion is related will continue in chapter six. 
Following the thought of Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, I contend that the 
only way Christian moral theology can respond to the full range of issues raised in Part I 
is to begin from the simple poverty of a declaration of our reliance, not on a set of formal 
principles or general observations, but on the living lordship of Jesus Christ. 349 Only by 
beginning from such an affirmation are we freed from the idealist temptation to construe 
moral theology as the working out of an idea which contains all truth, so Barth explains. 
That the nature of the command of God is spiritual means that it does not confront us as an 
ideal.. 
. but as the reality fulfilled in the person of Jesus Christ. This person as such is not only the 
ground and content but also the form of the divine claim. And it is in this person and only in Him 
that the identity of authority and freedom is accomplished. Deriving from this person, in His 
348 Bonhoeffer, "The Concrete Demand and the Divine Mandates, " chapter seven in Ethics. 
349 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II, The Doctrine of God: Part 2, trans. G. W. Bromiley, J. C. Campbell, 
lain Wilson, J. Strathearn McNab, Harold Knight, and R. A. Stewart, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. 
Torrance (Edinburgh: T& T Clark, 1957), 665-667. 
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relationship to us and in our relationship to Him, this identity becomes normative for what is 
demanded of us, 
350 
Understood this way, faithful, free human action is marked by the presence of moral 
thought which chooses its paths based not only on what is already assumed to be known, 
but leaves an important place open for learning through "hearing and obeying. "35' 
In what amounts to a commentary on this section of the Church Dogmatics, 352 
Bonhoeffer conceives Christian moral theology as the search for transformation by 
humans caught up in the rich and ambiguous mix of human motives and desires. Most 
moral theory, Bonhoeffer says, tries to construct a moral system on the basis of an idea (a 
project which he calls `ethics'), and 
... 
is repelled and horrified by the obscurity of the motives for action, by the way in which every 
deed is compounded of conscious and unconscious elements, natural and supernatural elements, 
inclination and duty, egotism and altruism, volition and compulsion, activity and passivity, so 
that all active doing is at the same time passive undergoing and vice versa. In all circumstances 
the `ethical' demands clarity, directness, purity and consciousness in human motives and deeds. 
It cuts any knotty growth in life. The commandment of God permits man to be man before God. 
It allows the flood of life to flow freely. 353 
350 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 11.2,606. Barth can later restate the claim that Jesus Christ is the one word of 
God claiming and judging all other words and realities, saying, "we have here the irresistible and relentless 
outworking of the `thou shalt have no other gods but me' of Exodus 20: 3. " See Barth, Church Dogmatics 
IV, The Doctrine of Reconciliation: Part 3.1, trans. G. W. Bromiley, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clard, 1961), 101, cf. discussion 86ff. 
351 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 11.2,673. 
352 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, A Testament to Freedom: The Essential Writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed. 
Geffrey B. Kelly and F. Burton Nelson (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), 358: "In Barth's 
Church Do mg atics, 11.2, Bonhoeffer seems to have found not only the missing link to his previous 
arguments on behalf of individual and corporate responsibility in the age of Nazi immorality and chaos but 
also a better expression of the underlying foundation of ethics. " 
353 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. Eberhard Bethge, trans. [from German] Neville Horton Smith (London: 
SCM Press, Ltd., 1955), 249-250. 
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Clearly Bonhoeffer, like this thesis, is concerned to develop a Christian ethic 
which takes seriously all the ambiguities of concrete, everyday life. In order to do so, 
Bonhoeffer argues, it is essential that our conception of moral deliberation not be focused 
on "decisions" in which we must choose between good and evil. Certainly we must make 
such decisions, but proper Christian moral deliberation has a much wider field of inquiry 
in which explicit decisions are addressed, but which Bonhoeffer can boldly call 
"peripheral events. "354 
The implication, Bonhoeffer continues, is that Christian moral theology foregoes 
the project of developing rational schemas from which "shall's" and "should's" can be 
pronounced on any conceivable situation in an attempt at systematic completeness. More 
properly, Christian moral deliberation must aim to develop a responsiveness to the 
disruptions of life in which our frailty, limitations and brokenness open up and become 
visible to us. As we wrestle with such brokenness, we must of course deliberate about 
shall and should, and insights which are gleaned from such wrestling persists to shape us 
long after discussion of the specific disruption has faded from our explicit awareness. As 
each of the writers of Part I have made clear, the technological life of contemporary 
humanity brings before us just such a disruption and is thus a particularly salient forum in 
which to wrestle with the implications of our belief in the living Jesus Christ. 
On Bonhoeffer's understanding, the task of moral theologians is to provide tools 
for people facing these moments of wrestling with human brokenness. This bars 
theologians from disrupting the flow of life by constantly acting as spectators, critics or 
judges of life in the attempt to make the shall and should which impinge on life at its 
periphery a constant theme for all moral deliberation. Instead of fostering the self- 
suspicion such interventions breed, they are in the business of being aware of the shall 
and should, but only in the service of urging the free acceptance of the fullness of life to 
which these negative limits point. 355 Christian moral imagination finds its true modus 
354 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 232-233. 
355 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 237. 
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vivendi in asking about good, rather than constantly ruminating on the limits of the good. 
We will return to this important theme in the opening pages of chapter six. 
To use the term "Christian moral theologian" is not an attempt to establish the 
authority of the "expert" which has been critiqued in Part I. Such a foundation for 
authority would imply the mastery of "systematic construction and metaphysical 
deduction, " both of which, says Bonhoeffer, "lead to inertness in real life. , 356 Expert- 
layperson relationships atomize society by making it nothing more than an aggregation of 
individuals living out their duties to one another, Bonhoeffer says, and thus the moral 
theologian is not to be understood as a possessor of esoteric knowledge which laypeople 
need to live obedient lives. In Christian thought all authority over human action is held by 
the giver of commands, who is in concrete day-to-day relation with the receivers of those 
commands. The ethical sphere, and those who try to think at more length about it, 
represent therefore only one part of God's leading and claiming of His children. 357 
This claim of God on the action of believers, Bonhoeffer emphasizes, is always 
concrete in time and place. God speaks today as He spoke to Abraham, Jacob, the 
apostles and disciples, which means He speaks in diverse ways. What God said 
completely and sufficiently in Jesus Christ He continues to make relevant in our present 
through historical, created mouthpieces. The essential supremacy of God's speaking 
becomes evident in His leading His people by juxtaposing and coordinating the many 
created forms and human words through which He speaks, a theme to which chapter six 
will return. 358 
Life within the claim of the commanding God, Bonhoeffer argues, entails an 
acceptance of certain institutions and orders as holy which confront and claim me in a not 
entirely quantifiable manner amidst the fullness and messiness of my daily life. In this 
way the claim of God through these orders, which at first we can only recognize in a 
rather broad and general sense, is understood not as a list of rules but as an atmosphere in 
which one moves without needing to be constantly conscious of it, even as it stands ready 
356 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 243. 
357 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 240-244. 
358 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 245-246. 
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to provide guidance in times of perplexity. This understanding of God's claim as all- 
encompassing releases Christians from fixation on rules and "implies certainty, quietude, 
confidence, balance and peace. "359 Such a command is a permission to live as a true 
human being before God. "It differs from all human laws in that it commands freedom. It 
is by overcoming this contradiction that it shows itself to be God's commandment; the 
impossible becomes possible, and that which lies beyond the range of what can be 
commanded, liberty, is the true object of this commandment. 360 This chapter will examine 
what can be gleaned from this "atmosphere" at the level of its social aspects, while the 
next will ask what can be learned from its material aspects. 
As Bonhoeffer and this thesis define it, moral theology, as an explicit discourse, is 
only faithful as it keeps two priorities firmly in view. It must be devoted to indicating the 
positive content of the life made possible through Jesus Christ, and committed to serving 
the embodiment of this liberty of each person before God. 361 The achievement of 
communion with God is upheld as the center of the fullness of human life: Christian 
moral theology can only teach us the act of hearing His voice. 362 This means that the 
discussion of practical questions in Part II will not issue in pronouncements about "the" 
Christian course of action, but will attempt to argue that the work of Christ means that 
truly free deliberation about particular topics will attempt to do justice to the orders of 
grace provided to guide human life into wholeness. 
This definition of the task of moral theology will ground the remainder of the 
discussion in Part II, and has a range of implications for the topic of technology, of which 
two are immediately relevant. First, because Christian life is constituted by loyalty to a 
person rather than a principle, principles from both "secular" and "Christian" thought can 
be weighed for their congruence with the Christ event. Thus Part II will evaluate and 
359 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 247. 
360 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 248. 
361 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 251. 
362 Karl Barth, The Christian Life: Church Dogmatics IV. 4 Lecture Fragments, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981), 33-34. 
156 
employ the arguments derived from an exegesis of Heidegger and his interpreters in Part 
I. 
Second, because Christian moral deliberation is not tied to any formal principle, 
human action and thought remain open to experimentation and revision, bound only by 
fidelity to the Redeemer. What we ask about at root is how God reconciles man to 
Himself and how we may participate willingly in that reconciliation, about which Barth 
can say, "Here in the doctrine of reconciliation, as in general also ethically, we stand 
before the center, the source of all the reality and revelation of God and man-Jesus 
Christ, who is not only the ontic but also the noetic basis of the whole of the Christian 
truth and the Christian message. "363 The question is, what are the orders in which 
Bonhoeffer says we hear God's speaking in order to learn the freedom of action promised 
to humanity in Christ? 
Beyond Reactionism 
It is Sunday morning and bells are ringing in a prominent building with a skyward 
pointing spire. This ringing marks an interruption of the habits of the working week as 
people leave their daily routine to gather in this building also marked out by its open 
doors closed to none and a large central room in which all sit together. A ritual begins in 
which God is spoken to as Thou, a speaking punctuated by singing and kneeling. The 
great deeds of God are proclaimed and requests are made of Him. The group undertakes 
the collective action of a ritualized eating and drinking ceremony which contains within it 
moments of individual initiative. As it concludes, the gathering disperses, returning its 
participants to the time and space of daily life. This is the physical, embodied, practical 
form of the body of Christ. 
The boardroom, shop floor, and worship service are each contexts in which our 
being is questioned and to which our actions give answers, yet in the actions of the 
worship service worshippers learn that they are questioned in a special way by God. 
363 Barth, The Christian Life, 9. 
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Because God is generating a distinctive people, in the distinctive practices of worship we 
first glimpse the possibility that in the life of the church secular patterns of life are being 
critiqued, reformed, and often completely displaced. 
This second section of the chapter follows the thought of Bernd Wannenwetsch, 
who develops a nuanced definition of how the social life of the church is an order of 
grace in which sinful humans are given the resources to understand their own brokenness 
and come to inhabit their own redemption. In this chapter's last section I will attempt to 
show how this view of the transformative potential of worship might displace habits of 
political relations learned in technological society, but any such displacement depends on 
there being a real transformation taking place in Christian life. This second section of the 
chapter will be devoted to explicating how this transformation of social life is related to 
worship. 
It is just this attempt to study the generative power of worship that most Christian 
political ethics ignore. Responding to a theological climate prone to reactionism about the 
pernicious and pervasive effects of the Constantinian settlement, 364 Wannenwetsch points 
out that many contemporary attempts to speak about renewal of Christian political life 
breed political pessimism by assuming Christians can be nothing more than protesters 
against their society. Wannenwetsch will argue that the church's worship only interrupts 
the course of the world as its participants learn and relearn to renounce destructive and 
selfish violence under the claim and tutelage of the Spirit. 
365 
Such an understanding of the source of the church's political power is based on a 
twofold contention, says Wannenwetsch. First, the church has power not because it 
interprets the Gospel for society, but because it is itself a hermeneutic of the Gospel. This 
means that its political engagement with society does not properly begin with the 
announcement of a political ideal, but springs from its distinctive political participation 
364 The claim that the church must always be the church of the protester and outsider finds a clear and recent 
articulation in a volume of responses to Oliver O'Donovan's Desire of the Nations in Studies in Christian 
Ethics 11: 2 (1998). 
365 Bernd Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst als Lebensform, trans. [from German] Margaret Kohl (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhamer, 1997), 188,205. 
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and confrontation of the political habits of society. Wannenwetsch even goes so far as to 
say that a church which knows that its own political life speaks volumes will not try to 
assuage a sense of political unimportance by pronouncing ideal blueprints for society. 366 
This is not to imply that Christians worship in order to be good citizens, 
Wannenwetsch hastens to add. For the Christian, formal practices of worship are ends in 
themselves, not means to other ends. Yet such practices do not repudiate the sphere of 
necessity and the bodily but incorporates and situates it as dependent on a living heart of 
intercession and worship. On this view the political power of worship is located in its 
possibility for overcoming the antinomy between freedom and necessity. The illusion is 
widespread that worship is an optional addition to the more basic forms of secular 
political and economic life. But, Wannenwetsch says, worship is the central human act 
because making explicit the core of the life in faith, and thus its practice represents an 
alternative to the partitioning and polarization of freedom and necessity, even while 
taking up the truth of each concept. 367 
Wannenwetsch's foundational assertion is that the worship of the Christian church 
is a happening which is an elemental presupposition of a Christian understanding of 
freedom in political life. All of the necessary activities of life, our feeding and sheltering 
activities are here set into explicit and visible relation with the kingdom of God, even as 
that kingdom is remade in invisible and inexplicit ways which they cannot grasp. The 
public and private realms of political life are in this transaction each given back their 
proper dignity which is destroyed when their center in worship is lost by allowing one 
sphere or the other to be totalized. In worship the good things of political and economic 
366 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 166-67,187. Wannenwetsch's discussion of the practice of stational 
liturgies by the early Constantinian church which took possession of the city's spaces because acting on the 
belief that the presence of the church sanctified the city is an illuminating critique of modern forms of 
church political engagement. Neither the stabilizing nor destabilizing effects of this early church behavior 
went unnoticed by the Roman rulers (428-43 1). 
367 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 302. 
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life also find their place, their proper relation. 368 How then does Wannenwetsch 
understand this transformation to take place? 
The New Community's Transformation as Politically Generative 
Part I brought into focus the central role of several destructive antinomies of 
thought, the most important having been indicated by Heidegger; the vacillation of 
attempts to "get technology under control" between two equally inadequate 
conceptualizations. Heidegger was able to expose the vacuity of this polarity by critiquing 
it, but ultimately was only able to hold this critique open by divinizing the earth. His 
critique reveals, however, that to sustain critiques of such polarities demands they be 
confronted by another absolute priority. Heidegger does so by making reference to holy 
earth, but Wannenwetsch contends that the properly Christian priority is discipleship of 
Jesus Christ for the sake of the kingdom of God. In the face of the practices of such 
discipleship, the obligations imposed by life in the worldly political economy may be 
relativised without disparaging these spheres of life in principle. The new citizenship of 
the kingdom brings in its train not an erasure of, or extraction from, the daily patterns and 
practices of life, but an awareness of a new possibility regarding their relations. 369 
The radical newness of this possibility is marked, Wannenwetsch argues, by the 
New Testament writers' struggles to name the Christian community's distinctive way of 
being. The term ecclesia, taken from contemporary Roman political life, was used by the 
New Testament writers to designate the political side of the life of the worshipping 
community, while also gesturing toward that inner form of their existence which made 
them different as those "called out" from other representatives of the same concept. The 
search to characterize this perceived difference of the Christian community's self- 
awareness is further indicated by the rich overlapping tapestry of other self-descriptive 
terms. They saw themselves as a city set on a hill, within which they were citizens, even 
368 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 303. 
369 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 217,224. 
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as they called themselves resident aliens. By examining the overlap of the different terms, 
we see that the uniqueness of the church's form of life emerging precisely in their 
notation of similarities with other disparate social groupings bearing the same individual 
names. The peculiarity of this self-designation was such that to be granted full citizenship 
in this ecclesia could not but relativise the believer's ties with all political, economic, and 
ethnic systems which claimed to be the basic social grouping. 370 
Wannenwetsch continues that any religious group understanding itself as such a 
self-contained political community was bound to be subversive of other schemas of 
political division, as Augustine so clearly saw and elucidated in his City of God. Because 
the political existence of Rome was fundamentally flawed by its reliance on pride and 
rapacious desire, Augustine said, the rise of the church was dangerous precisely by calling 
into question the Roman empire's explicit reliance on practices of violence and political 
disenfranchisement. Wannenwetsch fleshes out Augustine's insight by saying that within 
such a political background the church's practices of baptism and eucharistic celebration 
provided the experience of reconciliation of the hitherto unreconcilable which 
undermined the social divisions of Rome. This experience of reconciliation distinguished 
the structure of Christian worship from the beginning, and gave it its unique shape as the 
community marked by God's reconciliation of the world. 371 
In the example of the New Testament church, Wannenwetsch sees a growing 
recognition of the logic of God's reconciliation. Because this disparate aggregation of 
formerly separated brethren is gathered into the one body, they began to see that to be 
reconciled in Christ is to be equally opposed to the resolution of conflict by violence and 
to the resolution of the Christian community's internal conflicts by recourse to secular 
law courts. Instead, the reconciliation of Christian worship came to be understood as a 
unique form of life whose inner logic cohered with God's work. The church's special 
"political character means that the form of life in which it exists in salvation history-i. e. 
reconciliation-is also the medium through which it solves conflicts. "372 The New 
370 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 226-232. 
371 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 237-38. 
372 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 252. 
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Testament church came to see that God's reconciliation and the reconciliation of the 
church are not two processes. To receive God's reconciliation in communion is truly 
accomplished only as those reconciled to one another. 
The transformation worship brings begins with the Spirit's creation of a will to 
worship, says Wannenwetsch. The renewal of human judgment within worship is 
irreducibly linked to the Spirit's prior work of making possible the self-identification of 
the individual with the community of worship. The way this identification then functions 
to bring illumination is not through "direct inspiration, or analytical, through the 
application of a theory, but indirect: through the experience of what is good, well pleasing 
and perfect as this is promised and present in worship. " The practice of baptism makes 
explicit the passage from the sway of the powers of the world into the worshipping 
community. Yet inside this community all is radically new and unfamiliar. Learning the 
life form of worship is like learning a foreign language, which entails partially unlearning 
the familiar ways of our native tongue. Because such transformation is the basis of the 
church's existence, we must also understand that the ethos of the life of the worshipping 
community cannot be translated back across into the logic of the "old man. "373 
Comparing the transformation begun at baptism to a change in language is not to 
imply that we simply take up a new language game with baptism as we might the lingo of 
a new hobby, continues Wannenwetsch. The change in language is part of the 
identification with a community and the concomitant transformation of practice which 
underlies it. The practice of worship is thus irreducible as the language school of faith. 
The identifying marks that the Spirit imparts (the gifts of the Spirit) are learned not from 
texts but from participation in the Christian community as it is shaped by the law of the 
Spirit. This law finds its heart in worship, where the Spirit is promised to be experienced, 
where we "taste and see" God's works. This experience of God's reconciling work 
373 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 54-55. We must emphasize that Wannenwetsch is not saying that the Spirit 
works only in the context of the communal relations of the church, but is indicating that the community is 
where the Spirit draws people so that they may be remade in the course of their all too human relations with 
this community to which they have been so led. 
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provides the raw material for the intellectual work (theological and ethical) of the 
body. 374 
Here Wannenwetsch is in implicit dialogue with a rich tradition of reflection 
about how worship shapes Christian action. Bonhoeffer, for instance, argues that 
Christians are transformed within the life of the church by preaching and church 
discipline. 375 Barth is dissatisfied with this focus and adds explicit discussions of the 
importance of prayer and the Lord's supper for ethical life. 376 Stanley Hauerwas has 
systematically elaborated this way of understanding the transformative aspect of 
worship, 377 but Wannenwetsch is contending that the life of the worshipping community 
is transformative of Christians not only in these moments but in the whole range of the 
reconciling and worshipping of the Christian community. 
While the experience of the reconciling and transforming work of the Spirit is the 
generative source of Christian transformation, Wannenwetsch warns that we must be 
careful not to take an instrumental view of the Spirit. Neither the worship service nor 
preaching can force the Spirit's appearance. It is the Spirit that makes the word and 
service alive, applying them to the congregation as He will. Thus, all human possibility is 
concentrated on waiting for the Spirit. The free work of the Spirit is the primal source, the 
lifeblood of the community whose power is found in participating in its own 
transformation. We thus explore worship not as a "foundation" for Christian moral 
theory, but as a heuristic taken to be the beginning of moral deliberation because it is the 
beginning of God's work in the world. 378 This formulation can be understood as a further 
specification of Barth's contention that even if we speak formally in the order of salvation 
374 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 57,96,112,148-49. 
375 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 258ff. 
376 Barth, The Christian Life, paragraph 74. 
377 Stanley Hauerwas, "The Liturgical Shape of the Christian Life: Teaching Ethics as Worship, " chapter ten 
in In Good Company: The Church as Polis (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995). 
378 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 97. 
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history, materially there is an order of rank within doctrine based on reconciliation being 
the first moment of Christian existence. 379 
According to Wannenwetsch, Christian moral theology can only begin from 
within the practical life of the reconciled community, within which reflection about its 
proper shape is a proper, but less basic component. This demands that all Christian moral 
deliberation begin from the realization it has been taught that "to listen afresh is 
something for which there is no substitute. , 380 Having given this priority to listening, 
Christian moral theory is firmly situated as a reflection on this practice of submitting to 
the ongoing judgment of God, a submission which in turn forms our own judging 
processes. 
On Wannenwetsch's argument, then, the Christian response to technological life 
should not begin from an ideal picture of what worship and thus political life should be, 
but from participation in the actual practices of the church. By being included in this 
practice we discover the form of the body which is ruled by its Head through the law of 
the Spirit. Traditional theological terminology can help to light up facets of the social 
experience of the body and does play an appropriate role insofar as it makes explicit to its 
participants the living processes of God's transformation of His people through worship, 
enabling them to be more faithful participants in this empowerment. Beginning moral 
deliberation from a priority on listening and communal reconciliation retains for ethical 
deliberation the pluriform interrelatedness of worship and politics by refusing to 
encapsulate them in another foreign and reductive concept or metaphor. This is not to 
leave the relation completely without any guiding landmarks, but to insist that all political 
life is under only one illuminative rule: human political life finds its fulfillment in "the 
law of the Spirit of life in Jesus Christ" which has "set you free from the law of death" 
(Rom. 8: 2). 381 
This rooting of the political power of the church in the transformative power of 
the Spirit's rule, Wannenwetsch says, does not discard other authorities in the Christian 
379 Barth, The Christian Life, 9-11. 
380 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 8. 
381 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 12-17. 
164 
community. Though the life form of worship is regulated by the Spirit, this regulation is 
through, and in coherence with, the canon of scripture because the rule of the Spirit is 
enfleshed and understood in the body's interaction with scripture. Having outlined 
Wittgenstein's argument that agreements in judgments about practices are implicit in 
agreements about language, Wannenwetsch clarifies the regulative role of scripture 
within the community of faith: 
[T]he canon is to worship as a grammar is to a form of life. In both cases the telos of the first is 
at home in the second. Strictly speaking, grammar exists only in and for forms of life. But at the 
same time the grammar ensures not only that the life has form, but that the form has life. That is 
to say, just because of its regulating character it also makes something new possible, by making 
the new recognizable in a given context of linguistic communication-born out of the continuity 
which it both transcends and extends in substantially expanded form. The same can be said about 
the canon. On the one hand, as canon it is formed in worship and formed for use in worship. . . 
But 
at the same time worship is regulated by the canon: what is to be celebrated in worship is given 
us in the canon. 382 
If the social life of the worshipping community is going to find its peculiar form, it does 
so as it is in dialogue with the rule of scripture. This means that, 
Worship is not in itself and directly the rule for the community's moral life; it governs the moral 
life as the first instance, so to speak, of the rule's application. If the social life of believers is to 
find its form in relation to this rule, it does so first of all in worship. For it is there that the 
primary modes of the common life can be found-as fellowship at the Lord's table, in shared 
listening and speaking in assent to the Word; it is also the place where the canonical texts find 
their direct expression; and it is these which mediate the rule to us. So in what sense is worship 
382 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 49. 
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itself regulative? Here the answer has to be: simply as the rule's first application-its first, 
continually necessary first application-its beginning. 383 
By understanding the forces shaping the community in this way, Wannenwetsch 
contends that moral theology is founded neither in worship alone, nor in the canon alone, 
but is a disciplined reflection taking place in the interaction between the two under the 
guidance of the Spirit. This is to insist on keeping the pluriform relations of the 
worshipping community open as an ethical source by holding ecclesiology and 
pneumatology together to note the richness available in their mutual interpretation. 
"Worship", then, is defined as this formed activity of the Spirit in the church. 384 
Such a definition of the foundations of Christian ethical knowledge refuses to 
adopt either alternative in the idealist-empiricist squabble illustrated by the different 
approaches to technology depicted in Part I, and is therefore critical in situating the 
foundations of the theology of Part II. What Christian worship values is what God is 
doing with His church. This means that for the purposes of this study I must affirm the 
ethical relevance of worship not as it conforms to one or another ideal, but as it is 
currently taking place. Wannenwetsch says that to do so is to perceive the actual 
occurrence of worship through God's promise rather than through our human perception 
of its current state. There is a hidden reality in the life of the church which restrains our 
thirst to define and possess it through precise and completely inclusive definitions. 385 
If Christian moral deliberation is oriented through the exploration of the dynamic 
and pluriform life of the community which God is reconciling to Himself and to one 
another, Wannenwetsch continues, then the task of moral theology is the dynamic 
intellectual reconstruction of the change which every encounter between the congregation 
and God brings. Theology must not itself be conceived as the basis of Christian life and 
383 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 50. Again, Wannenwetsch is not ruling out the Spirit's work outside this 
framework, but is pointing to the heart or central node anchoring human knowledge of who this Spirit is: the 
church which is baptized in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. 
384 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 51,94. 
385 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 104. 
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behavior, because when it does, prayer, belief and life itself are replaced as the font of the 
community's transformation by the reductive category "correct belief '(or, in 
Bonhoeffer's terms, "ethics" as idea). This is not, however, to take up the empiricist 
position and understand theology as somehow second-order: it is simply an integral part 
of the life of worship which must retain space for serious academic study. 386 
In the same way that the scripture/Spirit, pneumatology/ecclesiology, and 
experience/reflection categories must be understood in their unity, so too must the unity 
of politics and worship be appreciated, continues Wannenwetsch. When theology and 
worship are perceived as different spheres, they are inevitably conceived in the typical 
pattern which considers the effect of one sphere on the other. The upshot is that political 
freedom can only be perceived as an effect of worship. Drawing on the thought of Luther, 
Wannenwetsch points out that integral to the transformation of the community of 
reconciliation is the drawing together of political and economic life as the field in which 
the church's love proves itself. This reconciliation of the political and economic is not an 
"application" of the insights of worship: worship is political and non-political in specific 
ways. It is non-political in detotalizing politics by saying that all humanity exists under 
one ruler, and all human authority is therefore a representative of this authority. In this 
sense worship is pre-political because it is the condition for politics. But it is political in 
creating something outside, distinguished from itself-secular economics and politics in 
which Christians enact their Christianity but which they insist is other than the church. 387 
The question which must now be addressed is, in what ways are the way of life 
known in worship at odds with those political practices which are coherent with the 
technological metaphysic? Having argued that the church's moral reflection is grounded 
in its life with God and the church, this second section moves now to outline how the 
ordered social life of the church might be understood as containing insights about the 
proper functioning of wider political society. 
386 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 118-120. 
387 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 122,92-93. 
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Political Life: Members of One Another, Romans 12: 1-8 
Wannenwetsch has prepared the ground to argue that the church's reflections on 
the proper shape of secular political power grow from its reflections on its own way of 
being, a sentiment with which Oliver O'Donovan concurs. "A theological account of how 
this world is ruled, then, must proceed from and through an account of the 
church... Decisions made about the nature of church authority have shaped and still shape 
what is said about secular government. , 388 In his " `Members of one another': Charis, 
Ministry and Representation, A Political Reading of Romans 12, " Wannenwetsch takes 
the church seriously as a governed society which is at the same time eschatologically 
open, and still exploring its own being. It is a society formed according to the "law of the 
spirit of Christ" (Romans 8: 2) and keeping the bond of peace (Ephesians 4). "As the 
church learns to understand and describe its own life politically, it offers the world an 
opportunity to rethink its dominant conceptualizations of the political life, and the hope 
that it may readjust its practices in a way which is less caught up in narrow frameworks 
and unfruitful alternatives. "389 The church's glory, contends Wannenwetsch is not the 
possession of a superior "image" toward which it strives, nor an "ontology" out of which 
it expresses itself, 390 but is found in practical exploration of the political 
conceptualizations to which it has been directed by revelation. This exploration assumes a 
willingness to admit the existence of the powers of this age. "In order to be able to 
witness to the worldly city with transforming power, the church must acknowledge the 
formative power of the dominant patterns of reaction within the worldly city. Though 
Christ has deprived this power of rule, the schemata are nevertheless still powerful, and 
388 Oliver O'Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 159. 
389 Bernd Wannenwetsch, "Members of One Another": Charis, Ministry and Representation. A politico- 
ecclesial reading of Romans 12, unpublished author's manuscript (Oxford University, 2001), 1. 
390 A counter to Milbank's ontological "harmonic peace. " See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), chapter 12. 
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the new understanding and practice of political authority within the Church must be 
formulated over against these conceptualizations... "391 
In the description of the church Wannenwetsch developed in the first part of this 
section, part of its social organization included the address of the whole community by a 
single individual. Wannenwetsch contends that the form of this address exposes the order 
of grace which gives shape to redeemed human social existence. Drawing on the famous 
"body life" passage of Romans 12, Wannenwetsch notes that in speaking to the church 
Paul addresses himself to a corporate "we", not a collection of individuals. This is 
characteristic Pauline speech, implying that in the church the authority of speech is not 
based on any appeal to supposed superiority possessed by the speaker which claims the 
attention of monadic individuals, but draws its authority from the status that the speaker 
and addressees share as "brothers. " This implies that the Christian understanding of 
political authority is not derived from an ideal yet to be realized; authoritative speech is a 
summons to the whole community to explore the communal reality which they already 
participate in and which itself is authoritative, as the embodiment of God's reconciling 
action with which they have been identified by the Spirit. 
The kind of exhortation that "parakalein" denotes, mirrors the particular address ("brothers"), 
which is in itself an appeal to a reality (the brotherhood of the children of God) that embodies an 
inherent moral imperative. And it seems that the detailed exhortation that follows is merely 
specifying the imperative inherent in the invoked reality. Thus, the appeal is not directed to 
"moral subjects" as a summons to realize what is not yet real or not yet fully there; rather the 
appeal is to a given reality. 392 
The political life of the church as portrayed in this passage begins in its members' trusting 
that they are indeed participants in this body, created as a body by God's dissolution of 
the power of the former antagonisms of public and private, slave and free, by which they 
391 Wannenwetsch, "Members, " 2. 
392 Wannenwetsch, "Members, " 4. 
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once were separated, and which we saw in their entry through the church's open doors 
and their sitting together. 
According to Wannenwetsch, political authority understood in this way is 
"leveled" precisely because its claim to authority is made from within a society of 
fellows. Such a construal of authority forbids any actor to claim to be more valuable than 
others, as all stand equally under the authority of the gospel. Given this radical equality 
(which is to be strictly distinguished from egalitarianism because it admits many 
differences but refuses political hierarchy), how can Paul repeatedly write as if he expects 
obedience to his exhortations? On what basis does he expect obedience if not he, but the 
community itself, is the authority over each actor? These questions bring us to the crucial 
theological question: If the sole authority of the church is the household of God itself and 
the authority of Christ in whom the body has life, how is this authority properly 
represented in the church? By analyzing the structure of Paul's exhortations we see that it 
is his appeal to the mercies of God, which constitute the church, that gives his 
exhortations the force of authority. 
Paul's form of authority claim contains two important political implications) 
Wannenwetsch indicates. First, as part of its claim to authority Paul's speech is submitted 
to be judged by the moral claim of divine mercy. Second, within the church, authority 
figures need not themselves be concerned about establishing the divine legitimization of 
their own temporal authority. "The nature of this political language is intelligible only in 
a community for which "authority" is never a monolithic concept-a community, which 
is less concerned with divine legitimization of temporal authority but with human 
mediation of divine authority. , 393 Churchly authority does not therefore deliver from on 
high abstractly referenced inner promptings, but continually takes its reference from the 
public and historical work of God. Such authority listens for God's prompting while it 
attends to the state of God's people. 
Such a conception of authority assumes that the political society of the church is 
sustained by its members' participating in the living sacrifice which is corporate life in 
the body of Christ, Wannenwetsch continues. This is the very bodily "spiritual worship" 
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to which Paul exhorts the Romans. Such worship is not a mystical union, but a concrete, 
practical, communal affair. Because our bodies are the medium of our communion and 
communication, to sustain this one social body demands the continual giving over of 
many believers' bodies. In handing the medium of human communion, the individual 
body, over to the corporate body, the believer actively participates in the sacrificing of 
their natural beliefs and ways of relating to authority and community. Insofar as the 
community of worship exists, this "renewal of your mind" is already a living reality 
displacing the world's schematizations. Yet this renewal depends on continual vigilance 
in exposing the ways the powers of this (and every) age have schematized our being, and, 
"What the transformation is meant to overcome is precisely "disordered" thinking about 
the way in which the individual members relate to the whole body by way of relating 
themselves to the other members. "394 This redeemed political reality exists to the extent 
that a new schema of political logic has penetrated its relations of bodies and minds. "The 
schema of rule in the secular world ("the rulers of the nations lord it over them, and those 
in authority are called benefactors") in which "natural authority", the authority of means 
dictates status, is confronted ("but not so with you") with a new way of understanding and 
exercising authority: `The greatest among you must become like the youngest and the 
leader like one who serves. "'395 
This transformed understanding of authority, remarks Wannenwetsch, reconceives 
authority and greatness from success over others to a "notion of service or ministry which 
marks out a greatness that makes others grow rather than diminish in its presence. ', 396 
Furthermore, not only the church's leaders, but all its members hold such authority. 
The modern hierarchical or division of labor definitions of authority which are 
popular today make such a claim appear to collapse the concept of authority entirely. The 
393 Wannenwetsch "Members, " 6. 
394 Wannenwetsch, "Members, " 9. 
395 Wannenwetsch, "Members, " 9. This runs precisely counter to the argument for natural authority in 
Oliver O'Donovan's Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics, 2 nd ed. (Leicester: 
Apollos, 1994), chapter six. 
396 Wannenwetsch, "Members, " 9. 
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division of labor conceptualization of the society of the church assumes individuals are 
organized so that they can productively live out the fully formed gifts (skills) they bring 
when joining the social group. But Paul with his "members of one another" gestures 
toward a much more counter-intuitive formulation says Wannenwetsch. The paradoxical 
formula "members of one another" is used to break down the possible division of labor 
interpretation of "members of one body", by indicating that not only must I accept my 
charismata and that of others, but I am whole as I delight and take part in the expression 
of their gifts. Thus Paul's exhortation to Christians calls them to realize that they are 
members of one another not only in accepting others' gifts, but in delighting in their own 
weakness precisely as it is the occasion to be served. But even this formulation has not 
yet made clear the true challenge of Paul's mixed image, which is against the believer's 
self-perceived strengths. 
What if, for instance, I am asked to sit under a preacher who is a lesser theologian 
than myself? Paul's claim is that even this, or especially this, is the forum for true growth 
of the body. Such a construal of political society runs directly counter to the "expertise" 
model of political organization based on the compartmentalization and fragmentation of 
knowledge, in which I must protect my expertise from the encroachment of non- 
professionals, while the body is conceived to be functioning "inefficiently" if its 
"organizer" is "deficient". Instead, Paul insists, if the unity of the body is the foundation 
of the body, then the gifts of the body are one, because the body is one if I do not 
amputate myself from it by my prideful refusal to delight in being served or uphold those 
who serve incompletely. The community's task of discernment is precisely not the 
validation of well-understood natural skills which people bring when they join the body, 
but prayerful seeking after the work of the Spirit who raises up those who will learn to 
properly render the service of authority. Each member has authority within a particular 
sphere, and thus serves the building up of the body into wholeness. By accepting this 
corporate task the church glimpses the possibility of living out its true being, which is to 
be a community of discernment, exploring God's will as revealed precisely in taking itself 
seriously as a particular, concrete community established and completed by God. "It is 
exactly this acceptance of mutual representation that allows the Church to become a 
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community of discernment that probes and explores God's will (Romans 12: 2), " 
Wannenwetsch says. "For to know God's will is to do it, and it is only in doing God's 
will that it will be known. The political existence of the Church is itself the practice of 
exploring God's will. "397 
When the church asks itself who will represent the body as its leader, it is really 
asking who will re-present to the body that which already exists within it. In this way the 
body of Christ actively asks how it may ever more be transformed into its full being. Who 
has God established in the practice of making the rationality of faith apparent and 
awakening in the body its gifts? They are our teachers; and so on. Such an approach 
enacts in faith the claim that the charismata are not the private property of their bearers, 
but belong to the whole body, through which the community is maintained as a society, 
not as an organization ruled by experts. 398 
We must be clear in articulating the difference between this vision of political life 
and the view of TA in which the task of organizing the life of the social unit serves the 
basic goal of self-preservation. In stark contrast, Wannenwetsch indicates, the body of 
Christ submits itself to organization by the Spirit as a society which offers itself to be 
consumed by God's will. Its maintenance of social organization is not focused on the 
establishment and recharging of ecclesial authority, because it lives in faith that such 
authority arises as the community prayerfully discerns who the Spirit is raising up to fan 
to life the praxis of the body through the gifts of teaching, hospitality, preaching, etc. The 
spiritual reality of this distinctive praxis may not be apparent to the outside observer 
analyzing the church through natural conceptions of authority, yet this spiritual reality has 
a real if hidden presence. Preaching, for instance, may within natural categories appear as 
an active speaker instructing a passive audience. Yet when the church gives its attention 
to a preacher as "one's own member" it invests itself in the success of the act of 
397 Wannenwetsch, "Members, " 12. 
398 Wannenwetsch, "Members, " 13. "Technology is always focused on property (the objectifying mode of 
getting hold of something as control) and is therefore a structurally private/individualized affair (even in its 
societal form), "possession" is a corporate phenomenon from the outset as it denotes what people have in 
common, share in. " Bernd Wannenwetsch, private communication. 
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proclamation. In so doing it inspires the preacher's attentiveness to God as the 
congregation avows the importance of their own attentiveness to God in the preached 
word, so reaffirming the centrality of the whole body's attentive listening to God. 
Here we have a nascent explanation of the place of technological expertise within 
the ethos of reconciliation. A preacher must undertake the technical preparation necessary 
to deliver a good sermon, but this preparation is worse than useless if not prepared in 
attentiveness to the claim of this particular congregation. At the same time, a preacher's 
deep love for a congregation is contentless in the absence of serious sermon preparation. 
The sermon, as a carefully constructed communicated word, becomes the instrument of 
an act of love between preacher and congregation. In this way technique finds its proper 
place, being neither an end nor a means but integral to the act. Understanding these 
connections we see that though proclamation may externally resemble a political speech, 
for instance, the lines of force in the body of Christ have their own distinctive being 
which throw a new light on technical practice. 399 
In concluding his outline of the social order of redeemed human life, 
Wannenwetsch summarizes the life form which is Christian worship thus: 
Every charisma represents the one charis just as every ministry (for example teaching) 
represents the one ministry (of witnessing God's charis) of the church by representing one 
charisma (for example understanding doctrine) in particular. 
Every office (for example teacher) represents the ministry (of teaching) in a (publicly 
ordered) way which differs from the way in which the ministry is represented by every other 
member.... 
This is why there has to be a paraklesis such as Paul's which summons the body to a 
sound form of recognition of its peculiar political nature as it is highlighted in the said account of 
differentiated representation... 
The recognition of office is a way of recognizing ministry, which is a way of recognizing 
charismata, which is a way of recognizing charis. 
Charis as the fundamental level of representation is, of course, a highly critical principle 
which does allow every single charisma and its exercise in office and spontaneous service to be 
399 Wannenwetsch, "Members, " 14. 
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tested against its very own nature: Does the concrete way in which the office/service is exercised 
betray the gift character of grace? Or does it instead subvert grace in making its exercise look 
like an achievement, expecting praise, gratitude, etc.? Does it live up to the communal character 
(panti), or does it reclaim the charisma for the officeholder, denying the participation of others in 
it? 
400 
Redeemed Social Order and Secular Social Order 
This second section concludes by indicating how Wannenwetsch understands the 
social order of the redeemed community to interact with and influence the organization of 
secular society. We will then turn to a concluding section in which a range of practical 
moral claims about the proper shape of secular political life will be outlined. 
The New Testament practice of intercession for temporal authority indicates that 
the body of Christ also accepts secular political authority, even when those authorities are 
hostile to the church. At the same time, Wannenwetsch continues, such prayer sets 
secular authorities under the same God who holds the church's authority in His hands. 
However secular authorities may conceive themselves, they are in fact within God's good 
grace, and their authority, like authority within the church, is ordained to re-present the 
common good of the governed. Because they bear this responsibility, the church's 
imperative is to call them to what their re-presentation entails, and to do so by indicating 
the possibilities embodied in its own practice. 401 
Here Wannenwetsch intends to sharpen Karl Barth's mature understanding of the 
linkage between churchly and secular authority, which also takes seriously the church's 
ordering by the Spirit as politically generative. Because the church and state are both 
ordered, and because "the civil community shares both a common origin and a common 
center with the Christian community, "402 the insights of the church's experience of order 
400 Wannenwetsch, "Members, " 14-15. 
401 Wannenwetsch, "Members, " 7. 
402 Karl Barth, Community, State and Church: Three Essays, with an introduction by Will Herberg (New 
York: Anchor Books, 1960), section VI. 
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may find their way into the secular order of authority. Yet, Wannenwetsch says, Barth's 
formulation is deficient in focusing solely on the witness of the church as speech, and his 
image of church and state as concentric circles is too unifaceted to sustain 
Wannenwetsch's more nuanced set of observations in which the whole field of political 
transformation within the church is kept open as generative for secular political life. 403 
Barth and Wannenwetsch agree, however, that political ministers, authorities, and 
managers are, like authorities within the church, God's servants, called to obedience and 
service to the common good in their exercise of authority. 404 Secular society cannot of 
itself know that its authorities stand under this claim and therefore cannot call human 
hubris into question: it depends on the church to know this. 405 
Wannenwetsch clarifies his understanding of the political dimension of the 
worshipping church by comparing it with three other forms of political theology. The first 
understands the church as a political anti-type to society, within which the theologies of 
Augustine and Milbank might be placed. These anti-type political theologies correctly 
insist that there are true and false kinds of political activity in all spheres of political life, 
but are not as focused on how "counter politics" can become the "encounter politics" 
which allow the church's way of being to rub off on secular society (we will return to this 
questioning of Augustine's formulation in chapter six). A second form of political 
theology understands the church as an ideal type which provides the state with social 
principles, and is embodied in the political theology of William Temple and the 
mainstream liberal Protestant tradition. Such theologies are interested in elucidating the 
positive influence of the church on wider society, but tend to ignore the church's practice 
of worship, preferring to offer political principles derived from abstract concepts like 
sacramentality. A final form is the paradigm (Karl Barth, Stanley Hauerwas) or model 
mode of theologizing (John H. Yoder), which recognizes that political worship neither 
403 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 507, n. 228. 
404 Barth, Church and State, trans. G. Ronald Howe, intro. David L. Mueller (Greenville, S. C.: Smyth & 
Helwys Publishing, Inc., 1991), 57-58. 
405 Karl Barth, "Christian Community and Civil Community, " in Barth, Community, State and Church, 
section seven. 
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mirrors existing political structures nor provides them with religious rationales, but is a 
unique instantiation of the politics of God. As a proponent of this type of approach, 
Wannenwetsch is keen to emphasize that the church as political body is unique, and as 
such provides the secular polity with a way of conceiving "power, " "citizenship, " 
"decision-making, " "difference, " etc. which it does not possess. It does not tell the secular 
community how to enact these insights, but makes possible both a positive call to society 
and a clear set of alarms when policy has run afoul. 
Though its reality is often hidden to natural perception, the work of the body of 
Christ is to bring before political authority the transformation of social life as God's work 
of reconciliation. The body of Christ calls political authority to its Lord by living out this 
reconciled and reconciling transformation, and in doing so opens the possibility of a 
correspondence with its own life in the wider society which that wider society cannot 
itself initiate. 406 "The deconstructive potential of the politics of God as enacted in the life 
of the church always begets... constructive hope. Though renewal of secular rule will 
hardly start from the peace that Christ has wrought, it may begin with the penetration of 
important realizations into the political consciousness. "407 If the church's life as a 
political hermeneutic of the Gospel is to make any claims on society, they will spring 
from the concrete moral distinctiveness of the life of the church. 
Clashing Forms of Life? The Politics of Management and Discernment 
This chapter's final section will draw from Wannenwetsch's understanding of the 
unique political life of the church some ways in which secular society may be called to a 
more robust and healthy form. Its subsections will take up many of the problems of 
technological political technique raised in chapter three. 
406 Barth, "Christian Community, " section 14. Wannenwetsch thus corrects a significant omission by Barth 
who tends to speak as if the church must choose to be political by "taking up its share of political 
responsibility. " 
407 Wannenwetsch, "Members, " 1. 
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In order to elucidate the ethical implications of Wannenwetsch's argument, it is 
important to have grasped the polarity that has been established. On one side is a society 
described in Part I (especially chapter three) which is based on a vision of an ideal state of 
social efficiency, and which seeks powerful political control by minimizing open means 
of persuasion. On the other, Wannenwetsch has described a society based on a vision of 
action which conceives the present, confusing yet diverse community within which we 
currently exist as a divine gift to be explored. This section and its parallel at the 
conclusion of the next chapter are devoted to grasping in practical terms how and where 
these two very different ways of life may be seen to conflict. 
We may be tempted to believe it is impossible for the church to be organized in 
reliance on the Spirit's bringing together the fruits of individual's faith to form a 
community. We may also believe that the search for such an organization would be hard 
or meaningless. Yet Wannenwetsch has insisted that the church both relies upon and must 
take active part in the building up of precisely such diversity of the body. Because God 
cares for secular society as well, the church may likewise hope that having revealed His 
own politics to the church, He may open the eyes of its rulers and citizens to the 
implications of the church's life of reconciliation. 
As the body of Christ explores its life in secular society it will ever again come to 
the practice of worship with questions about how it should reconcile antinomies placed 
upon it. Again, as Bonhoeffer has warned us, it must not attempt to deal with the 
technological society by constructing a systemic and ideal Christian ethic which would 
only offer a new political technology to replace current constellations. This means that 
Wannenwetsch's (and Bonhoeffer's) formulation specifically disavows offering global 
solutions to the technological dilemma but clarifies the conditions which must be held 
open and the priorities of action which make the faithful attempt to explore rifts which 
arise in the course of life in technological society. The church's worship is generative as it 
explores the reconciling of rifts it experiences and learns in wider society. The upshot is 
that no form of government or division of political power is finally and undebatably 
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"Christian": there is only a Christian claim on the action of governing and the forms taken 
by political life . 
408 
Foucault's observations about the interpenetration of government and business 
interests and Grant's protests against the co-opting of the university by business have 
proved to be highly relevant in relation to Wannenwetsch's claim that worship both 
creates and situates the economic and governmental spheres. This is especially true when 
the logic of biopower works to link politics and the managerial culture because both 
understand the telos of the exercise of authority to be maximum growth. Wannenwetsch's 
formulation is not against the "building up of the least of these", which is implied in the 
technological project, but is against biopower, which uses its own methods to do so as it 
seeks very different goals. Here we will look at the practical difference the 
implementation of the two logics makes, and in chapter six we will look at their 
differences at a more schematic level. 
I will attempt to discern the practical import of Wannenwetsch's position along 
two central lines of inquiry. First, how does the church's way of life confront or confirm 
the processes of contemporary political technique? Second, how does the church's way of 
life confront or confirm the ways individual citizens take up the schemes of political 
authority so that these schemes are applied throughout their lives, becoming the guiding 
logic of their life? 409 
The remainder of the chapter will take up in turn a series of assertions about 
contemporary political life made by Foucault, and show how the life of the church might 
be understood to claim 1) the action of political authority, 2) the action of citizens, both 
as good citizens and in calling those authorities to their proper role, and 3) the inner life 
of the believer. Though Wannenwetsch disavows the project of deriving ethical norms 
from the church's practice, by pointing to several specific practices of the church's life of 
408 Barth, "The Christian Community, " section 21. 
409 Foucault has exposed the intertwining of "private" life and "public" technique. Charles Taylor's Sources 
of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989) is the 
classic contemporary examination of the relation between one's self-identification and one's activities of 
moral self-discipline. 
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discernment I hope to hold together the importance of lived worship and the development 
of the skills of the good inner life called for by Grant. By noting the relevance of a few of 
the church's practices for the understanding of the good inner disposition required to live 
in such a society, I am not suggesting a mechanical linkage between the inner disposition 
and practices, and freely admit that the linkages I make between aspects of the Christian 
ethos and its practices might very well be replaced or supplemented in the development 
of the good inner life by the lessons provided by engagement in other church practices . 
410 
The point is that deficits of our everyday habits may be challenged by carefully attending 
to the development of the ability to live out peacefully and naturally the life of the 
Christian community. By indicating specific churchly practices in which this challenging 
might take place, I hope to indicate points at which the life of the church illumines 
aspects of our social character. 
Implications for Authority and the Examination 
The previous chapter indicated how, under threat of war and epidemic, political 
techniques such as the examination have developed which govern modern life based on 
the formal commitment to seek continually to maximize the growth of society and the 
output of labor. These techniques are held together by the power of commonly accepted 
polarities and antinomies which we now compare with the life of the worshipping 
community. We do not take up all of Foucault's examples, but examine the trends he has 
indicated to show how the transformation of the worshipping community might flow out 
into the exploration of secular political life. The material discussion which follows will 
trace the organizing scheme of the last chapter and the implications of the life of worship 
on the political practices of the examination, the spectacle and work. 
410 Our attempt at such a project has some sympathy with McClendon's thesis that the church's resources 
for its political life spring from the shaping of the conscience and judgment in the practices of the church's 
communal life. See James W. McClendon, Jr., Systematic Theology: Ethics (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1986), chapters 6-8. 
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The last chapter suggested that the fearful urgency of political action in war and 
epidemic now characterize the whole self-identity of government and business, which 
understand their behavior as part of a tactical struggle that equates a lack of growth with 
the beginning of corporate extinction. 411 The introduction also claimed this assumption 
grounds the moral deliberation of TA. But Wannenwetsch has argued that the growth of 
the Christian body is built on the precise opposite of the fear of extinction, aiming at the 
growth of unity which invites the whole world to join the Christian community. Because 
God is understood to be responsible for this growth in unity and numbers, fear and human 
responsibility for ultimate success is relinquished. The worshipping community knows 
that corporate survival is not the ultimate good and refuses to be pushed into denuding 
political arrangements to serve survival or efficiency. The tactics of the worshipping 
community grow from a refusal to capitulate to the spirit of self-preservation, seeking 
instead just or Spirit-ordered corporate organization in the trust that its transformative and 
generative habitus will be sustained by the God who sustains His kingdom. This means 
its desire for growth in righteousness assumes a readiness for God to disband or 
extinguish any particular worshipping community. 
In this way, the logic of worship challenges political authority and the 
assumptions of TA by throwing its grounding assumptions of scarcity and the normative 
demand for physical growth into doubt. One implication of such a claim would be the 
generation of a call for political authority to query the inner links between the massive 
investment in genetic technologies and the biopower imperative. 
412 The logic of worship 
calls citizens to live as reminders to secular authority that cost-benefit politics and 
political appeals to fear which press action over careful deliberation are unacceptable. 
They will act as a social force calling political authority to defend its policies by reference 
to the care of the existing social body rather than self-protective or consumer demand- 
oriented rationales. Relativization of the believer's sense of responsibility for individual 
survival might come through engagement in the church's practices of tithing or through 
411 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 162-166,168-169. 
412 Cf. Russell and Vogler, The International Politics of Biotechnology. 
181 
its prayer "Give us our daily bread, " indicating the freedom of the good inner life which 
grounds the possibility of such political transformation. 
The formal commitment embodied in the biopower imperative, it has been 
suggested, is materially filled out in the techniques of manipulating visibility and 
invisibility. In terms of invisibility, Barth expresses the thrust of this chapter by 
categorically stating: "The statecraft that wraps itself up in darkness is the craft of a state 
which, because it is anarchic or tyrannical, is forced to hide the bad conscience of its 
citizens or official S.,, 413 Barth's comment predates but addresses Foucault's claim that 
modern political power in actual fact works by not talking, by withdrawing itself, and 
acting in small but invisibly coercive ways. 414 By contrast, Wannenwetsch has argued, 
Christian authority, as a conduit of the word, exposes itself, states its case, convinces and 
draws along, and does only this, rejecting the undoubted but destructive efficacy of 
coercion. Its acts of authority seek to draw the community in small steps by public 
persuasion through the word. It repudiates the manipulative masking of its power, either 
through the flamboyance of spectacle or less visible micro-disciplinary sanctions. It 
therefore rejects government which treats citizens as "cases" to be continuously examined 
so that a web of information can be constructed for potential use in coercion. Conversely, 
it supports government which values the personal contact of discipleship, conversation 
and persuasion. 
The logic of worship places a claim on political authorities who govern by covert 
operations, intelligence services, and multiplying the means of surveillance and 
examination. A reconciliation-marked political power refuses to demote the citizens in its 
care from explicit participants in political engagement to participants in social decision- 
making only through their sociological or consumer profile. It is therefore skeptical of the 
proliferation of information gathered by CCTV, consumer loyalty cards and electronic 
devices, and of the physical and electronic monitoring of the workplace. And again, it is 
skeptical of the power offered to government by the newest and most penetrating exam: 
413 Barth, "The Christian Community, " section 22. 
414 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 200-202. 
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the genomic exam. 415 The logic of grace asks the citizen to consider resisting such moves 
by authority, at times explicitly calling authority to articulate its hidden machinations, at 
other times by non-cooperation with government by examination, for instance, by 
mechanical means of examining and directing consumer preference (such as the 
consumer card). Wannenwetsch has touched upon the practices which may indicate the 
good inner life needed to sustain such a political movement: exposure of our need and the 
gifts of presence and of self-involvement. 416 
Another material technique of the biopower project is the minimization of 
individuals' difference in the quest for increased social utility. Force is deployed by such 
techniques in the myriad of ways observed in chapter three to break the individual down 
so that they may be reformulated under the control of political power. This, Foucault 
incisively observes, is the monastery made secular by the replacement of its rationale of 
reconciliation for that of coercion. 417 Such a procedure can only be understood as a 
macabre mimicry of the Christian conversion experience, now based on the logic of force, 
in which the useless old creation must be given up and the new re-formed. 418 In contrast, 
the conversion of baptism, while asking the same total renunciation of old ways of being, 
415 The attachment of knowledge is the first move of biopower of which the Human Genome Project 
represents a fulfillment and infinite extension. Its promise is to ameliorate disease, but it also offers 
immense power to enhance and augment the very forces of life itself. Such observations make 
comprehensible how the medical establishment, represented by one Christian geneticist, could mix the 
promise of benefit with the implied threat of legal enforcement. Cf. James C. Peterson, Genetic Turning 
Points: The Ethics of Human Genetic Intervention (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2001), 339. Here the ethos of the hospice movement provides salutory contrast in 
indicating the limits of cure and the centrality of care in medicine, even as it utilizes technology to do so. 
See Michael Banner, "Christian Anthropology at the Beginning and End of Life, " in Christian Ethics and 
Contemporary Moral Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 75-83. 
416 See also McClendon's portrayal of the centrality of the practices of presence and listening for body 
life, 
in McClendon, Systematic Theology, 82-83. 
417 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 136-37,164-66,177-181,306. 
418 Thus splitting the work of Creator and Redeemer. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III, 
The Doctrine of 
Creation: Part 1, trans. J. W. Edwards, 0. Bussey and H. Knight, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1958), 43: 3. 
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reformulates by reconciling and rebuilding the individual into a new and unique 
wholeness as an indispensable, not interchangeable part of the community of faith. 
Secular docility programs are justifiable at best for simple physical processes, while the 
claim to remake man in order to control him is an unwarranted deification of political 
authority, an abuse of its true role. In worship, God's Spirit is the reforming and 
transforming agent, reforming bodies into His likeness in which each is unique, striving 
for greater communal unity by bringing about the wholeness of the uniquely personal. 
God's mode of political organization is not confined to the church, and He likewise cares 
for the secular polis, against its desire for dissolution, through true authority whose proper 
task is to convince those under its care that it is acting in their best interests by being 
attentive and responsive to their stated concerns. 
The logic of worship calls political authority to reject indoctrination methods of 
personnel management and the striving for a totally mobile workforce. It bars political 
authority from making the dream of the Enlightenment the rule of the workforce: that 
freedom is found in complete renunciation of all contextualizing attachments, and the 
continual revolution of labor's activity and knowledge in the pursuit of maximum 
unfettered possibility. Negatively, the logic of worship marks the citizen with the desire 
to refuse authority this unlimited claim to remake. Positively, it urges the challenging of 
political authority to make the effort to seek equitable labor arrangements while 
undertaking to practice the rooting in place and involvement with local life which resists 
the ideal of the continual mobile workforce. The good inner life which makes such 
embodied locatedness both attractive and possible begins with the exposure of the 
vacuous inner life urged upon us by the technological way of being. 419 We glimpse the 
419 The Enlightenment's ideal for personal discipline urges a vigorous remaking of the self (again built on 
the body as tool) to bring it into line with this monadic and materialist ideal. Concrete technologies can 
augment the logic of technological self-discipline. "You record the food you eat... and Diet Log calculates 
the calories you take in for the day. ExerLog software... provides the same services for exercise and regular 
activities of daily life, and calculates the number of calories burned... WeightLog software tracks and graphs 
weight ... BodyGEM, a 
hand-held device... measures a person's metabolic rate and calories burned. . . This 
information can [be] ... 
integrated with diet and exercise data. . . the 
information can be sent to the company's 
interactive Web sites, where virtual dietitians and personal trainers analyze it and give users feedback and a 
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possibility of new life being poured into this void in the attempts of the worshipping 
community to find its true form in which personal and collective giftings mesh into a 
whole greater than its parts. This search is a practice entailing committed participation in 
a local worshipping community. 
Modern political technique forms individuals whose skills make him or her more 
controllable at more levels by political power but which are of little value to the 
individual. 420 Conversely, the life of worship is founded on the Spirit's fanning to life the 
particular gifts of individuals. Thus good authority within the worshipping community 
aims to train the members of the body in righteousness, the ultimate private/public skill. 
Likewise, it expects that each embodiment of righteousness will be unique, and from this 
uniqueness the corporate entity thrives as authority guides the body in bringing to life 
individuals' self-discipline. 421 
The logic of worship claims political authority for the spoken word and 
commitment to the long-term development of labor and against automatic control and 
obedience to the whistle. This amounts to a refusal of a basic principle of Taylorism, that 
skilled labor is more costly and less reliable than "skilled" machines. 422 Critiques of 
Taylorism (traditional assembly-line manufacture) and the search for good postindustrial 
manufacture need not take the route of assuming the economic benefit of high turnover or 
personalized plan. " Cristina Lourosa-Ricardo, Wall Street Journal Technology supplement, Nov. 13,2000, 
R25. 
420 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 138. 
421 1 Corinthians 1: 1-8. 
422 Elsewhere Rawlins makes a comparison between political technique and computer programming which 
is illuminating for our discussion. Napoleon's army was first taught simple actions, which were then tied 
together in another layer of more complex actions, which were further bundled by commands, all of which 
the commander actualized by delivering simple instructions into these complex layers of pre-instruction. 
Political technique thus directly parallels computer programming. The practical problem is that the soldier 
(or computer) is not allowed under that model to take any initiative, even if she thinks that an opportunity 
might be opening up which the commander does not see. The point that this illustrates on one hand is the 
lack of initiative which this political technique allows those under its command, and on the other it points to 
the motives behind mutations toward more "free" models of the Napoleonic discipline technique. Rawlins, 
Slaves to the Machine, 45-46. 
185 
of a skilled but highly mobile work force. There are good reasons to embrace their 
opposites: skilled teams of workers having fluid duties and a high valuation of the tacit 
knowledge of long-term employees. 423 The Christian as citizen and worker resists 
capitulation to regimes of segmentation and indoctrination, by preferring to call authority 
to the costly but necessary effort of building trust and skills in a political body or labor 
force. The inner life necessary to sustain attempts to live out such commitment is 
generated in the worshipping community's involvement in discipling and teaching, the 
passing on of the many levels of knowledge which sustain the unique form of the 
Christian life. 
Implications for Authority and the Spectacle 
If the examination is deeply entwined with the punitive or repressive function of 
political technique, the spectacle is its mode of active persuasion in which explicit 
conversation is replaced by the manipulation of opinion. 424 In a society whose authority is 
committed to silent coercion, an essential political task is the building of consensus and 
recharging the authority to govern through the technological spectacle. 425 We have seen, 
however, that persuasion by spectacle has several collateral effects. These include the 
inflammation of human wonder at humanity's own power, the heightening of political 
pacification, the emphasizing of materialist visions of human affairs which augment 
social conservatism, the encouragement and manipulation of consumerism, the erasure 
from view of the human costs and long-term impacts of a given technological change, 
and, most importantly, the displacement of political conversation in favor of government 
by examination and spectacular persuasion. 
423 See Larry Hirschhorn, Beyond Mechanization: Work and Technology in a Postindustrial Age 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1984). 
424 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 200-202. 
425 It is worth keeping in mind that the technical problem of how authority communicates its legitimacy is 
central to its ability to function. Cf. Milgram, Obedience To Authority, 230. 
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The worshipping community that knows it is constituted by the Spirit and word 
eschews unidirectional manipulation of the community by authority. It is aware that the 
visual is the form on which overview and strategy rely, while speech and hearing 
privilege presence in time and space, creating opportunities for trust. 426 At the same time, 
because it seeks to re-present the good of the community, Christian political authority is 
committed to awareness of the wider human effects of its operation, and will always 
define political action in these terms rather than in those of ideology and party. The 
contrast here is between the sub-society which contributes to the wider society's search 
for practices of wholeness, and that sub-society which exists solely in the exertion and 
expansion of its influence on the political matrix. One society demonstrates its identity by 
sharing its resources with wider society, the other seeks to establish itself by developing 
its power of influence. 427 
Modern authority's practices of "public relations, " which we saw so clearly in the 
understanding of TA that public image is the main limit on the free action of political 
power, are questioned by this Christian understanding of authority. Such priorities 
underlie a whole complex of explicitly or implicitly manipulative political strategies 
centered domestically on government by public relations and pronouncements of public 
intellectuals, and both domestically and internationally in the use of propaganda, or 
entertainment as propaganda, and advertisement. 428 The logic of worship restrains 
political authority from attempting to augment its power by manipulation via the 
spectacle, in recognition of the wide range of destructive effects on those so governed. 
For the Christian citizen who has become aware of the place of the technological 
spectacle or manufactured sublime in contemporary life, such events represent an 
important possibility for the confession which reverses the intended manipulation of the 
manufactured event. At a more mundane level, the Christian citizen may live out in daily 
426 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 511-513. 
427 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 443-445. 
428 For an excellent comparative historical study of these processes see Mikael Hard and Andrew Jamison, 
The Intellectual Appropriation of Technology: Discourses on Modernity, 1900-1939 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
The MIT Press, 1998). 
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life the potent political statement of continual critical engagement with the utopian 
promises of the imagemakers whose goal is to secure, for instance, the brand loyalty of 
consumers. Remembering Burke's observation that the sublime engages all the senses but 
especially the eye429 the good inner life indicated by worship is the nurture of a healthy 
sensitivity to and skepticism of the political implications and promises of the spectacle. 
Such skepticism can only be healthy if built on a positive experience and appreciation of 
the word and the listening presence which grounds a functional political life in which 
consensus-building is practiced. 430 
Foucault's work has suggested that the disciplines seek to instill the belief that 
political hierarchies in which authority stands at the top, the unskilled and unlettered at 
the bottom are all-important and should motivate our work. 431 But Wannenwetsch draws 
out the great Pauline theme that human community has everything to gain from the 
contribution of the weaker members who have "greater honor. "432 In worship we are first 
reconciled and equalized, and thus such hierarchies are not only stripped of their 
motivating power but, in addition, those who seek glory by social climbing are exposed as 
anti-Christ. Only the "measure of faith" properly establishes difference within the body of 
Christ, differences which are individual because linked to charisma. Authority is thus the 
service of elevating the least of these, and is properly held only by one who serves the 
community rather than using the community as a forum to achieve social recognition. 
A political authority which is impacted by the logic of the body of Christ finds its 
meaning in developing individual aptitudes which are useful to the worker and thus 
gladly used, repudiating techniques and machinery which are built on the premise that 
workers become most productive when arranged in a series which assumes them to be 
433 equivalent biological machines. It will also not rely on setting up a social hierarchy as a 
429 Nye, Technological Sublime, 284-85. 
430 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 539-540. 
431 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 227. 
432 Cf. 1 Corinthians 12: 22-26. 
433 Such thinking is the hallmark of modern industrial processes, and was fine-tuned by Fredrick Taylor's 
system of using time and motion studies to maximize worker productivity by conceiving them as 
biological 
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basic tool motivating those in its care. That such methods are nonetheless in widespread 
use places important demands on the Christian citizen in many different walks of life. 
While recognizing the legitimate pedagogic value of the competition of "iron sharpening 
iron", the Christian citizen will understand and refuse caste as motivator because seeking 
to nurture all those given to the community, including those who are given non-standard 
skills. The discerning authority is the glue of church politics. Such esteem for the non- 
standard and eschewal of social pressure as motivation is possible in a community whose 
inner life is marked by the development of skills of attentiveness to, and love for, "the 
least of these. " 
Implications for Authority's Conception of Work 
Foucault contends that one of the fundamental tenets of our age is that time 
measured and paid is the property of the employer, to be used diligently and precisely. 434 
But the worshipping community as described by Wannenwetsch experiences a decisive 
relativization of human authority which rules out any claim to have authority over time. 
Such claims by authority function to loosen subordinates' sense of moral responsibility 
for their action. Yet Wannenwetsch has indicated how Christians do not believe any time 
or space exists in which God's claim on humanity is abdicated, meaning that authority is 
always limited to being simply a necessary moment in God's leading and remaking of 
humanity. Because, as Bonhoeffer has argued, humans are meant for freedom, no human 
action can be good which surrenders its moral accountability to God to any other 
authority. And, as Wannenwetsch has argued from the life of the New Testament church, 
no authority can be good which seeks to dissipate the moral accountability of those under 
its care. 
machines. See Hirchhorn, Beyond Mechanization, 13-15, passim. While Taylorism is being modified and 
supplanted in many ways, its continuing power is nowhere more evident than in the rapidly expanding fast- 
food industry. See Schlosser, Fast Food Nation, chapter three, passim. 
434 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 149-155. 
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The life form of worship challenges secular political authority to do away with 
any claims of inviolable sovereignty. It cannot ask the renunciation of moral 
responsibility by citizen or employee, nor begrudge those under its care the necessary 
space to maintain the processes of sustaining their family lives, because this too stands 
under the protection of God's authority (as we will discuss more in the next chapter). This 
maintenance of the space for life might entail programs like generous maternity leave and 
scheduling flexibility, or a limit to the work week. The citizen's refusal to validate the 
public/private split of technological being issues in a refusal of the demands that "public" 
existence illegitimately places on "private" existence. The citizen does this not by calling 
for a renewal of authority's respect for the "private", but by implicitly urging a practical 
commitment to developing and maintaining a balance between work and the rest of life. 
The good inner life which can sustain such a balance is brought to consciousness in the 
idea and practice of Sabbath, which is the topic of the next chapter. 
Arnold Pacey's observations about the many levels at which work may feel 
meaningful to us indicates how technical meaning and the desire to please authority may 
subvert the individual's moral sensitivity by tying it to the technical task or wishes of 
authority rather than the human ends of work. 435 Here the practice of authority in the 
worshipping community has a great advantage over modern authority: churchly authority 
always asks to have its commands judged before God's mercies, meaning that it 
systematically trains its agents into identification with the human ends of its work, not 
distracting attention from these ends by focusing on the perfection of technical processes, 
nor on the satisfaction of authority. 436 Christian action is barred from seeking validation 
from a narrow community which shears technical work from its responsibility to consider 
the wider community. To assert this is to reclaim the idea of the profession, in which a 
aas Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 176-177. 
436 Understanding oneself as acting before God does not trivialize human authority, but relativises the 
claims of authority by reference to empathy with effects of our action on other humans. Cf. Milgram, 
Obedience To Authority, 66. 
190 
guild "professed" that they would uphold the provision of a specific good to society, 
refusing its exploitation for gain. 
437 
Reconciliation-impacted political authority thus finds itself renouncing the 
exploitation of a technical community by a management community by relying on or 
promoting the technical community's ignorance of future applications of their work. Such 
authority seeks rather to inform all its constituents of the ultimate and tactical aims which 
their work serves while inviting moral participation of technical and manufacturing 
communities within the framework of the search for the benefit of product recipients. 
Good citizenship will likewise entail an inquiring desire to understand how one's work 
impacts the wider world. The most important act of reconciliation-marked citizenship is 
to call authority to its proper limits by categorically refusing to become self-identified 
with any narrow working community to the exclusion of wider communities also 
impacted by that work. The practice serving the good inner life which sustains this 
widening of empathy is the practice of evangelism, the empathetic work of inviting the 
human community to its proper home. 
Questioning Further with Wannenwetsch 
In summary, this chapter responds to Grant's call to mitigate the destructive 
features of technological life by developing a robust vision of social justice and the good 
inner life. It has endeavored to do so by explicating the form of life of the community 
God is redeeming and sketching some practical implications of this way of life in order to 
situate and stimulate more detailed discussions of a range of concrete technologies and 
management techniques. 
Part I argued both that the practices of technological society form thought in 
subconscious ways and that any response to technological society must assume an 
important role for the displacement of this knowledge through other practices. I take it 
that Wannenwetsch's theology attempts such a task, and at least opens the possibilities 
437 See Bonhoeffer's discussion of the medical profession in "Vocation, " chapter six in Ethics, part I. 
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for further thought along this dual trajectory. This does, however, suggest a criticism of 
Wannenwetsch's formulation. On one side he is not aware enough of his own conceptual 
claims. He never undertakes a phenomenology of the practices of worship and the ways 
they might form us, despite affirming that they are indeed essential in shaping the thought 
and practice of believers. Instead he begins and ends with conceptual discussion, not 
taking full advantage of the basic observation that religion is action: it is formed action 
which teaches in more ways than we can explicitly know, and is therefore worth 
examining in more detail. Yet Wannenwetsch is among the precious few theologians who 
are fully aware of the shaping power of practices and thus opens a way to respond to 
Foucault's observations about technological practices forming us below our threshold of 
knowledge. 
A final criticism of Wannenwetsch is that, from the other side, he is too aware of 
the wide range of connections between the practices of worship and their wider ethical 
implications. He tries too hard to avoid giving shape to the complete openness of 
analogical logic. Having criticized Barth for illegitimately narrowing ethical thought by 
too rigidly attaching ethical deliberation to specific doctrinal loci, he also criticizes 
Hauerwas for the same narrowing in tying the field of ethical thought to specific liturgical 
moments. 
Wannenwetsch concludes, "Even if the writers concerned stress that the 
allocations are merely exemplary, the outcome tends to be a shortening of the 
perspective ... Hauerwas of course 
knows that, just as Barth was aware of the difficulty; 
but that does not do away with the problem involved in such a procedure. "438 It is my 
contention that such a claim unnecessarily jettisons the critical boundaries made possible 
at well-defined moments in the life of the worshipping community. It will be the burden 
of the next chapter to substantiate this criticism, by showing the theological fecundity of a 
sharply defined doctrine through which we can respond to the calls of Grant and 
Heidegger for material order to shape technological practice. 
438 Wannenwetsch, Gottesdienst, 100. 
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Chapter Five: Karl Barth on Sabbath and Creation 
[T]he Lord through the seventh day has sketched for His people the coming 
perfection of His Sabbath in the Last Day, to make them aspire to this perfection 
by unceasing meditation upon the Sabbath throughout life. 
a39 John Calvin 
The last chapter drew its moral insights about political ethics from an examination 
of the practices of the church's life together. This chapter, by contrast, directs attention to 
one doctrine, creation, and one ethos, the love of creation, to draw out another set of 
moral claims on human action. Bonhoeffer's argument, given at the beginning of chapter 
four, indicated the importance of Christian ethics finding its orientation as it asks about 
"permission" rather than "What is permitted? " By beginning from questions about 
permission, moral questioning takes place within an assertion of the moral unity of all 
things under Christ, a claim which links the thought of chapters four and six and frames 
this chapter's consideration of the doctrine of creation. Yet this chapter will not "derive" 
moral axioms from the doctrine of creation in a top-down fashion any more than the last 
chapter "extracted" moral truths from experience with a bottom-up method. Rather, this 
chapter's contention is that we correctly explore the moral import of material order only 
by inquiry into revelation which serves to guide our search to comprehend human action 
which conforms to the action of the Creator. 
Heidegger's analysis has given us reason not to come to creation with overly 
defined ideal categories, which cause us not to pay attention to the contours of creation's 
own order. Grant further clarified this problem by indicating the tendency of 
technological being to find what it seeks in materiality. In order to avoid this trap some 
broad categories of being are needed which still give us space to explore the claim of 
439 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), chapter VIII. 30. 
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natural order upon us, yet which admit a teleological framework which can guide our 
understanding of the meaning of that form. This is of course precisely what we are 
offered in the Genesis account-a loose idealism if you will, but one which tells us what 
all being is for, how it is related, and where to begin to look to rightly understand the 
claim of the material order. "What seems to be needed, " Christoph Schwöbel suggests, 
"is not an ethics of creation, but an ethic of createdness which is informed by a theology 
of creation. "440 In other words, in what way does the shape of God's creative act 
determine the act of the creatures so created? 
Drawing on the meditations of Karl Barth from volume III of the Church 
Dogmatics, this chapter will begin by indicating the integral connection between the 
doctrine of creation and the practices of worship. In particular, Barth uses the concept of 
Sabbath to draw out the importance of the concept of creation which emerges from and 
clarifies our practice of worship, facilitating in turn the development of useful categories 
for our understanding of creation and thus our knowing and making. Next this chapter 
will examine how Barth utilizes the notion of Sabbath to link worship with a Christian 
ethic of work which takes seriously the created order as divine gift. This linkage of 
worship, work and creation will be elucidated by contrasting it with the technological way 
of life as displayed in contemporary farming and human reproduction. This chapter is 
intended to indicate how Christian moral theory might espouse a view of creation in 
which created order is not worshipped nor dismissed but is treated as a gift claiming our 
love. Only when freed by this love, first of God and then of materiality's order, can we be 
playfully responsive gift-returners, not overawed or dismissive of the gift of creation. 
440 Christoph Schwobel, "God, Creation and the Christian Community: The Dogmatic Basis of a Christian 
Ethic of Createdness, " chapter eight in Colin Gunton, ed., The Doctrine of Creation: Essays in Dogmatics, 
History and Philosophy (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 150. 
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Linking Worship and Creation in Moral Theology: Sabbath as Ethical Master-concept 
The crowning vision of Christian theology is the triumph of all creation praising 
its Redeemer. 441 Here Christ is fully expressed as the end of all creation in the action and 
therefore being of that new creation. That creation is new indicates that the 
transformation of the worshipping community goes beyond its political existence, also 
transforming its material being. Worship is one way of describing the first moment in 
God's renewal of creation, new life coming as a word spoken to humanity, breaking in to 
renew its being both by separating it from creation and exposing its proper union. We 
move now to further explore the unity of worship, living in grace, and the love of creation 
in our look at the implications of the church's affirmation of God as Creator. 
The issues raised by the chapters in Part I cannot be fully addressed by focusing 
only on the life of worship, and we must seek concepts which recapitulate all that is 
learned in worship while opening it up in a formed way to the examination of human life 
as creaturely. I will contend that the most appropriate linking concept is that of Sabbath, 
which comprehends the transforming listening to the Spirit which is worship within the 
material frame for human action, the creation. On one side Sabbath names God's 
interruption of our illegitimate identity with creation, our work, our technologies-our 
whole way of life. On the other it indicates how life is re-formed by this interruption into 
a receptive mode of working, thinking and living. This is not to imply that our discussion 
of worship was dismissive of the import of materiality on social life, but here we 
explicitly refocus our analysis on the specific ethical import of the church's confession of 
the Trinitarian God as Creator. The focus of this chapter shifts from the largely political 
questioning of our action to the more material and embodied questioning of our being 
which Karl Barth understands as an integral part of the action of God as Creator. 
In paragraph 41 of the Church Dogmatics, Barth expounds the biblical account to 
explore how God's Sabbath rest (Genesis 2: 1-3) claims human worship, setting it into its 
proper orientation toward creation. He concludes that the love of creation is the central 
441 Revelation, chapter four. 
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orienting consideration for human work. Barth already understands the second creation 
saga to be specifically concerned with defining good human action, and thus considers it 
apposite that here God's Sabbath rest is established as its prerequisite. In the second saga 
creation is portrayed as being brought to its completion with the union of man and wife. 
God was content: "He was satisfied to enter into this relationship with this reality distinct 
from Himself, to be the Creator of this creature, to find in these works of his Word the 
external sphere of His power and grace and the place of His revealed glory. A limit was 
revealed. "442 
Having found the object of His love, God is depicted turning from a focus on the 
work of ordering His creation to the work of upholding and loving the finite creatures as 
they are. By both concluding His creative activity with humanity and proceeding to 
celebrate His creative work with them, God immediately declares His allegiance to 
humanity, sealing His intent to make His love a temporal event on which He stakes His 
honor. For the creature this rest with God was all important, because "creation, and 
supremely man, rested with God on the seventh day and shared His freedom, rest and joy, 
even though it had not as yet any work behind it from which to cease, and its Sabbath 
freedom, rest and joy could be grounded only in those of God and consist only in its 
response to the invitation to participate in them. "443 
Barth contends that this first observance of Sabbath by God and man together is 
the culmination of both creation sagas, an intimation of the Incarnation, and the 
establishment of the practice of worship. It thus grounds the covenant promise of 
redeemed human action. Here God rests with humanity not because creation is complete 
and now to be left on its own devices, but because He sees at that moment its 
eschatological completion as it rests in Christ. God rests in Himself always ("I will be 
who I will be"), but He rests in time to bestow His rest on His creatures to give them time 
(to share participation in His life). Thus this first rest is the coronation of His creative 
work, not, as has often been supposed, the creation of humanity. "When God celebrates 
442 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.1,214-215. 
443 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.1,217. 
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the completion of His work, this totality becomes the festive hall and man His festive 
partner. "444 
The history of the doctrine reveals that Barth's use of Sabbath as an ethical master 
concept is indebted to Calvin, who sought to develop Augustine's and Luther's 
positions. 445 Barth follows Calvin (and Luther) in moving the fourth commandment to the 
head of the decalogue, saying, 
The Sabbath commandment explains all the other commandments, or all the other forms of the 
one commandment. By demanding man's abstention and resting from his own works, it explains 
that the commanding God who has created man and enabled and commissioned him to do his 
own work, is the God who is gracious to man in Jesus Christ. Thus it points him away from 
everything that he himself can will and achieve and back to what God is for him and will do for 
him. 446 
This bold statement of Sabbath as a global description of redeemed human action seems 
at first glance to be a counter-intuitive reading of the fourth commandment, but Barth is 
grounding this reading in a well-established theological line of thought drawn from a 
decisively Christological interpretation of scripture. He is not asserting that the act of 
resting from our works supersedes all the other commandments, but that the ethical 
substrate of all the commandments is a demand that humans rest from action and belief 
444 Barth, Church Dogmatics, Ill. 1,223. 
aas St. Augustine, "Against the Manichees, Book 1, " chapter 22.33-34 in Saint Augustine on Genesis: Two 
Books on Genesis Against the Manichees and on the Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book, 
vol. 84, The Fathers of the Church (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991). Cf. 
also St. Augustine, City of God (REF), bk. 11.9, bk. 22, chapter 30; Martin Luther, "Treatise on Good 
Works, 1520, " in Luther's Works: The Christian in Society, vol. 44, ed. James Atkinson, trans. W. A. 
Lambert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966); Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, vol. 21, chapter 
VIII. 1,28,31-33; John Calvin, A Commentary of John Calvin, Upon the First Books of Moses Called 
Genesis, trans. [from Latin] Thomas Tymme (London: Henry Middleton, 1578), 52. 
446 Barth, Church Dogmatics III, The Doctrine of Creation: Part 4, trans. A. T. Mackay, T. H. L. Parker, H. 
Knight, H. A. Kennedy and J. Marks, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1961), 53. 
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which attempt self-salvation. In the divine address to humanity which is Jesus Christ we 
know the divine desire that humans partake of this festive rest in His work. Without the 
affirmation that creation is a work of grace it can appear that grace is an imposition 
within a broken creation, not the integral fulfillment of creation. The first Sabbath reveals 
this possibility for fulfillment as available to humans through human resting in God's 
action. 
Barth further integrates his use of Sabbath as an ethical master-concept by 
following its threads into the rest of the Old Testament narrative. In CD III. 1 he examines 
God's rest after creation and sees in it "no more and no less than the meaning and 
intention of the covenant between God and man. "447 Here Sabbath is seen to constitute 
the keel on which Israelite worship was constructed, because God's rest directly follows 
and is explicitly linked to the Sabbath that Israel was commanded to perpetually observe. 
Thus God's Sabbath rest clearly indicates the all-important day of religious observance 
for the people of Israel. Barth applauds Calvin's observation that Hebrews chapter four 
makes explicit the Christian knowledge that this keel is Christ. In the Old Testament, God 
never wearies of recalling his children to Sabbath observance, and at the "climax of that 
intercourse, He has definitely recalled them in His Son (Hebrews 4: 9). "448 The New 
Testament church understood that Jesus truly is the one in whom the believer rests, thus 
fulfilling the Sabbath. It rightly perceived that to convene Christian worship on Sunday 
was not an innovation but a true memorial of the covenant of grace revealed in God's 
resting with his human creation in Genesis 2: 3, simultaneously a promise and a summons 
to a great and final Lord's Day. 449 The Sabbath spoken to humanity not only frames the 
deliberation of Christian moral theology but is the eschatological fore-presence of the 
kingdom of God. As John the Evangelist makes clear, the effect of this fore-presence is to 
reveal that Sabbath is not a rest from human action, but is a character of human action in 
450 harmony with the divine life. 
447 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.1,218. 
448 Barth, Church Do mg atics, 111.1,227. 
449 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.1,228. 
450 John 5: 16-17. 
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Barth uses the notion of Sabbath as a structure within his theological procedure to 
hold in tension the content derived from the creation, Christ-event and eschatological 
moments of salvation history. Having thus linked the meaning of the Sabbath command 
to the beginning, middle, and end of salvation history, Sabbath is shown as the heart of 
the covenant which claims believers' whole existence. The radical implications of Barth's 
theological connections are apparent in his affirmation that, 
If we link the significance of the holy day in salvation history and its eschatological significance, 
and if we remember that in most instances we are concerned with its relationship to the 
particularity of God's omnipotent grace, we shall understand at once, and not without a certain 
awe, the radical importance, the almost monstrous range of the Sabbath commandment. By the 
distinction of this day, by the summons to celebrate it according to its meaning, this command 
sets man and the human race in terribly concrete confrontation with their Creator and 
Lord... which means also the inexorable end of the form of their present existence. This 
commandment is total.... The command to celebrate the Sabbath, and therefore to cease and 
abstain from all our own knowledge, work and volition, even from all our arbitrary surrenders 
and inactivity, from all arbitrary quiescence and resting-this command claims from man that 
which on the basis of his self-understanding he can understand only as a sacrifice of his human 
nature and existence, and against which he can really only rebel as life rebels against death... It 
thus demands of him that he believe in God as his Ruler and Judge, and that he let his self- 
understanding in every conceivable form be radically transcended, limited and relativised by this 
faith, or rather by the God in whom he believes. It demands that he know himself only in his faith 
in God, that he will and work and express himself only in this imposed and not selected 
renunciation, and that on the basis of this renunciation he actually dare in it all to be a new 
creature, a new man. 451 
451 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.4,57-58. 
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Clashing Forms of Life? Weekly Worship and the Work Week 
What is the practical import of this "monstrous" Sabbath claim? Barth was later to 
write "[W]hen the man who labors and is heavy-laden is summoned to obedience, it 
creates for him... Sabbath refreshment, rest. He is to honor God and serve him by letting 
himself be given this rest. , 452 This rest, Barth says, is characterized by human action in 
which the activities of worship and work are firmly integrated with one another. 
Participation in the worship of the body is the first moment of the Christian life, because 
in worship the church participates in God's work by making the work of God present in 
the world. Four clusters of more concrete implications follow, Barth notes. First, such rest 
claims Christians for the church's communal worship service, for listening to God in 
thanksgiving. Positively this means that we are commanded to participate in the church's 
communal worship service; negatively that we are not to approach Sunday as a day free 
for our disposal, nor a day which we rigidly plan to the exclusion of the breathing room 
necessary to sustain communal relations. This leads to Barth's second point, that Sunday 
is a joyous celebration, a fact which should be remembered by the preacher and the 
congregation alike. We do not "go to church" but we "come together to celebrate and 
therefore participate in the coming of the kingdom. "453 
Thirdly, continues Barth, Sabbath "is a communal benefit and a communal duty, " 
and cannot be celebrated alone. If we refuse to invest ourselves in the community, it is 
concomitantly weakened in its task of witness both by our refusal to join in its witness 
and by our refusal of personal renewal. Finally, Barth concludes, our holy day practice 
reciprocally indicates our Sabbath life on all days. If we truly rest on Sunday we will rest 
and be at peace in our work. Conversely, if we are at rest and peace in daily life, our 
Sabbath rest will be joyful. When Sunday is understood as a duty, a resting from the 
"important" things of life, we learn that Monday through Friday have not proceeded on 
the basis of a renouncing faith, and likewise, if we dread Monday, our Sunday has not 
been spent in freedom. The reward for humans who obey the Sabbath command is that 
452 Barth, The Christian Life, 31. 
453 Barth, Church Do mýatics, III. 4,69. 
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they become free from themselves, free from "making themselves" by their work. Having 
been set free from themselves they are free to be for God-to hear God in the divine 
service. The whole of Christian life is a traveling down hill from that day of resting with 
God prefigured from the first day of humanity's living in creation. Thus worship is not 
simply a rest from work but the source of all right action. 
Barth, in understanding worship to be the first ethical implication of Sabbath I 
rather than as a resting from the "real life" of work, correctly emphasizes its role as the 
celebratory center of the Christian life. 454 The last chapter will have made it clear that I 
accept his claim that it is fatal for the church to neglect its communal life and that the 
existence of the worshipping church presents a challenge to a world trusting in its own 
work. Yet we must add a specific criticism of Barth's formulation at this point. His 
salutary emphasis on Sabbath as command fails to note that it is at the same time the 
basic experience of God's reconciling and transforming action which Wannenwetsch has 
so clearly drawn out. Barth at times formulates discussion in ways which make it appear 
as if Sabbath is an attitude of awareness of what is behind us at creation, or before us as 
an eschatological ideal to be celebrated and remembered, when both concepts find their 
true depth when grasped as part of a corporate experience of place before God and in the 
life of the body of Christ. 455 In this Sabbath the believer experiences the dangerous 
redundancy of fashioning idols in order to be at peace and in right relation with all things. 
If communal life plays a central role in mediating our knowledge of God, then 
worship is not an ideal to be achieved, nor simply a mode of witness, but a reality which 
already exists by God's grace, in which we are already involved and which it is our duty 
to nurture and groom. We must be sure that our talk of worship as celebration, or as the 
focus of Christian learning about God, does not imply that God's real work goes on 
elsewhere and is simply memorialized in worship, nor fall prey to the reduction of 
worship to only one day of the week. Having examined how human life is oriented by 
454 Revelation chapter four makes the eschatological centrality of worshipful praise explicit. 
455 Formally, however, he is strictly opposed to this abstraction of concept and practice. Cf. Barth, 
Church 
Do matics, IV. 2,35. 
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Sabbath toward worship, Barth moves on to expound how this orientation of renewed life 
impacts the daily, mundane habits of the life of work. 
Clashing Forms of Life? Work and Service 
Having begun with Sabbath as an ethical master-concept, we can approach still 
closer the question of human remaking of the material world by asking, "What is work? " 
It has been argued that technology gives us an answer: it is the project of endowing 
ourselves and our future with meaning. But because through the Sabbath humanity is told 
that human work is not salvific, we can see why Barth moves from his discussion of 
Sabbath to indicate the proper aim of human work. That aim, Barth says, is service. 456 
Barth begins by defining work as human action directed at shaping and reshaping 
the spiritual and material fabric of the universe. Because the praises of worship issue from 
embodied beings, praise itself contains within it an implicit demand for human work 
which sustains human life. God in His grace was not indifferent to the creation in Christ 
but recalled it to wholeness, and our response of gratitude can only be to second God's 
grace by seconding its redemption with our work. Thus this seconding of God's work by 
ours is best summed up, Barth says, with the biblical concept of service. Because God 
Himself was a servant we learn that the renewal of creation is service to others, and thus 
the activity of our lives which is work rests in God's work by joining in this service. 
Spiritual service and work are in fact commingled. 457 Work makes worship possible, and 
worship makes work meaningful, Barth contends. "To live as a man is to fashion nature 
through the spirit, but also to fulfill the spirit through nature. "458 Barth is not positing a 
duality here between spirit and nature, because his understanding of action as the primal 
category of being assumes that `spirit' and `nature' are aspects of a unitary but never 
static being. 
456 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.4,523. 
457 Barth, Church Do mý atics, 111.4,471-477,502,517-518. 
458 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.4,519. 
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According to Barth, all humans exist within the struggles and toil of a broken 
materiality, but having been made part of the church (redemption), the believer is shown 
the purpose of life (eschatology), and commanded to be oriented accordingly. This 
personal orientation takes place in reference to the integrated order of all beings (creation) 
in which the believer participates in her place by looking and striving beyond herself. 459 
This striving seeks to participate in God's work, which can only be accomplished by 
respecting the difference between human and divine work. This means, Barth continues, 
that "the basic form of the active life of obedience... is man's direct or indirect co- 
operation in the fulfillment of the task of Christian community. "460 The truest and most 
secular human activity is membership in the Christian community, because it is through 
the "invasion" of the church into time and space that God binds creation together into a 
reconciled whole. 461 
By saying that the first action demanded of the Christian is participation in the 
church Barth assumes a four-fold definition of the church. First, the Christian community 
is not all of humanity, nor a national church. Second, the church is a people awakened, 
not an institution. This means, third, it is not a community gathered to receive but is 
gathered precisely in order to pass on what it receives. And finally, all of its members are 
called to serve in this giving, not just the clergy. This community's role in the world is 
first to be those who step out declaring the kingdom, not as spectators but as participants, 
a declaration only truly made in faith. In this way, the activity of the individual believer is 
oriented by both the outward action of the church in witness and its processes of inward 
upbuilding. This work of upbuilding the church establishes the first claim on human 
work: that a believer maintain his or her own inner spiritual life. 
462 
The claim of the kingdom upon human action does not end with this work on 
one's spiritual state, Barth contends, because the Christian is simultaneously a Christian 
and a physical being. The first end of humanity is the kingdom, but this end is part of the 
459 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.4,477-478. 
460 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.4,483. 
461 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.4,482-486. 
462 Barth, Church Dogmatics, matics, 111.4,488-493. 
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whole of his creaturely being and thus entails physical work. This allows Barth to develop 
formal definitions of work before moving on to material description. Whether explicitly 
or not, all humans who work recognize the gift of embodiment and affirm it by working 
to sustain its existence. Yet this recognition of the importance of human work for 
maintaining the good which is our embodiedness easily divinizes work or the bodiliness it 
supports, making them demonic taskmasters. True work takes place only in orientation to 
God's work, meaning that "man's work cannot be done for its own sake but only in the 
teleological connection which it is given by God. "463 
On these grounds, Barth says, culture can be understood as a residue of 
humanity's collective working, a residue which itself shapes the way humanity works. 
This is not to say that culture itself has a "spirit", but to note that culture is the product of 
human action which reproduces in turn the patterns of life and death which are taken up 
by future work. Barth's definition of `culture' might be understood as a theological 
analogue to Heidegger's `world'. Good work, Barth says, affirms the creation, or 
conversely, all work which elaborates the creation toward the coming of the kingdom is 
good work (a theme which will be elaborated in the next chapter). In this sense we are 
free to work at many tasks, free to follow our talents and aptitudes to earn our daily 
bread. 464 
The reality of our need for daily sustenance brings the political aspect of work (the 
subject of the last chapter) as close as our dinner table, Barth contends: we may preserve 
our lives in ways which take no account of others, or in ways which are truly human in 
their respect for the needs of others. Right work, he says, demands that our effort be both 
a striving for excellence in our particular work, and also be characterized by ongoing 
attempts to be sure that this work serves proper ends. If our work is good it claims our 
diligence, if not, our abandonment or reformation of its end. Having said that culture is 
the sum of the work of the community, Barth indicates that the work of all, from 
politicians to business people to manual laborers, is grounded and flourishes as the 
people's work is good, and is degraded as work serves poor ends, even if serving the 
463 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III. 4,521. 
464 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.4,522-526. 
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immediate needs of the worker by providing a paycheck. Each individual has the 
responsibility to consider the final product of their labor, understanding that no work is 
inherently good, as context may decide the actual end that labor serves. Some forms of 
work are more probably meaningful in all epochs (say, farming, because it is basic to the 
sustenance of human life), but continual vigilance is needed in the actual context of work, 
465 for all work can become bad work. 
Having set up the formal framework for making theological judgments about the 
quality of our work, this chapter will give flesh to this framework in three sections. In the 
next section Barth further specifies what it means for work to be good, arguing that good 
work is communal, reflective and playful. Yet these are still formal characteristics, and so 
in the following section we turn to explicate how good work must be attentive to material 
order, taking that order as a gift to be explored in wonder and reverence. This chapter's 
final section will draw all these threads together by looking at two cases in which the 
formal and material criteria of good work are shown to call forth an ethos which is 
diametrically opposed to the technological way of being. 
As we turn to examine Barth's further specification of the characteristics of good 
work, we pause to take on board an interlocutor. In affirming that the biblical God created 
the world because He loved it, and has not revoked that love, essayist Wendell Berry 
shows himself to be an ally in the search to understand what it means for human action to 
be attentive to God, neighbor and creation. 466 He is interested in the question of work and 
the claim of creation on it, and conceives these questions as inescapably social and thus 
cultural. While we would undoubtedly wish to criticize his formulations at various points, 
because his work focuses on the specific issues Barth has raised in relation to work, he 
will help add some detail to the well-developed theological skeleton provided by Barth. 
467 
465 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III. 4,521-533. 
466 Wendell Berry, What are People For? (London: Rider Books, 1990), 98. 
467 Berry's salutary but often uni-faceted emphasis of the gift nature of creation means that his theological 
arguments are often built on single-faceted appeals to the holiness of creation. This leads him to speak as if 
Christianity is important as a religion because it upholds community which affirms the importance of 
creation, the danger of which is nowhere more apparent than in his claim that belief in Christ is dependent 
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Communal Work 
How then do we judge the value of our work? The first and most basic measure of 
the goodness of work, Barth says, is that it coexists in harmony with the satisfaction of 
others' needs. We glimpse in the koinonia of the church the promise of human work, that 
it may take place in cooperation. But most often in our age work is conceived as a 
struggle for victory over the competitor. The real abuses of competition (not, of course, 
the only way for work to become destructive) have arisen since the industrial age, Barth 
claims, and thus Christian praise of contemporary work stands under a definite cloud. 
Why can the praise of work in a Christian ethics be only a muffled praise...? A priori and 
positively, as we have seen, it is because the true and primary form of the active life demanded 
by the divine command is participation in the service of the Christian community. But a 
posteriori and negatively, as we must now add, it is because work as it now presents itself in the 
history and present state of the process of human labour, and as with a few limited exceptions it 
is the work of us all, conforms so little to the criterion of humanity that we are well advised to be 
as modest as possible in this matter. 468 
on a prior belief in the goodness of creation. See Wendell Berry, Sex, Economy, Freedom and Community: 
Eight Essays (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 95-97. Also, in his salutary insistence on the importance 
of being temporally present he can disparage all eschatology as inherently destructive. 
468 Barth, Church Do mg atics, 111.4,535. This sorry state of western work is arguably the result of the 
withering during the late middle ages of theological thinking about the life of work and the management of 
labor. Disinterest in such questions was related to an abandonment of the practice of monastic labor with the 
result that the ideal of "morally ordered, non-exploitative, cooperative labor was abandoned by the men 
who defined the theology of the Christian church. In its place, theoreticians of medieval culture turned to 
matters of personal transcendence and left the work of the world to social managers, merchants and 
capitalists. As it turns out, world making is still the business of these men, and the perplexing technological 
choices [modern society is making] have originated in their view of the way the world should be used. " 
George Ovitt, Jr., The Restoration of Perfection: Labor and Technology in Medieval Culture (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 17. 
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Here Berry's thought helps to fill in Barth's call for harmony to exist in our life of 
work. Modern industrial life, with its speed and danger, rigidly controls the use of space 
and therefore excludes the young. At the same time the ideal of labor mobility 
problematizes long-lasting relationships. This is one mark of the rooting of work's telos 
in an idea of competition. But, Berry points out, good work may also be conceived as 
communal for a community and by a community. Children might, as they once did, be 
found playing on the margins of adult work, and adult work might strive to take place in 
shared cooperation. To work in such company can itself be enjoyable; though labor, not 
laborious. The danger here, often realized in the modern telecommuting home-office- 
work style, is that this insight will again be turned against workers who, rather than 
receiving the benefit of work at home, instead lose the once protective barrier concept of 
the private realm. 469 Yet when work is truly communal we are engaged in creation and 
social life in a way which makes the present truly habitable. 470 In sum, Berry says, 
developing what might be a helpful paraphrase of Barth, "Good work is not just the 
maintenance of connections-as one is now said to work "for a living" or "to support a 
family"-but the enactment of connections. It is living, and a way of living; it is not 
support for a family in the sense of an exterior brace or prop, but is one of the forms and 
acts of love. 471 
469 This danger is especially acute for women in lower socioeconomic strata, where work at home is driven 
by employers' desire to cut overhead costs rather than the welfare of workers. See Sheila Allen and Carol 
Wolkowitz, Homeworking_Myths and Realities (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1987). On the other 
end of the discussion, when trying to formulate a better view of good work in the present context, we must 
be attentive to the way space is used, and how it interacts with our building a sense of place, or rootedness. 
See Alan Felstead and Nick Jewson, In Work, At Home (London: Routledge, 2000), especially chapter ten. 
470 Berry, What are People For?, 142-43. 




Barth's second criterion of good work is that it allows reflectivity. The awareness 
of the relationship between work and service demands ongoing reflection about how the 
activity of work contributes to the good of those around us. True and good work 
facilitates this awareness by encouraging the striking of a balance of inner and outer work 
which allows the worker room for creativity and initiative and thus responsibility and is 
not simply the physical extension of reflective work done elsewhere. Part of the work of 
those who manage others' work is to protect the possibility of others' work having this 
inner side by maintaining its possibility for free initiative. Likewise, Barth argues, 
workers must take up this possibility by using it to consider their work's meaning and 
quality. 
472 
But for some, Barth continues, work is not mainly physical but predominantly 
reflective, and these too must consider whether their work is good-creating or not, and if 
good, whether they devote themselves to it studiously. This reflectivity is the hardest and 
most essential component of all good work. 
Not for nothing are so many afraid of falling sick or growing old. Not for nothing is the relatively 
ample time left to most men by the claims of their external work normally used otherwise than 
for the exercise of reflection and mostly for an escape from it in the various forms of 
"amusement. " If reflection is to be carried through, it demands an effort which can be much 
greater than that of a woodcutter, factory director or university professor. For the reflection 
demands honesty, courage and consistency at a point where we would rather be dishonest, 
cowardly and inconsistent, namely, in solitude. It demands rest where we would rather rush into 
cheerful or tragic unrest because in rest we might have to face the truth. It demands a step or 
steps into freedom which we seek to avoid because we know that they will also entail 
responsibility. In the inner realm we realize that we should be on the high seas instead of a 
sheltered harbor. 473 
472 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.4,456-457. 
473 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III. 4,550. 
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If good work is not only the physical activity of work but also the reflective consideration 
of its place before God and in the human community, Barth contends, then we can say 
that the outer work week demands a concomitant "inner work week" consisting in 
reflectivity about the outcome of our work which takes responsibility for it. 
But this inner work week, Berry elaborates, is precisely what the modern project 
of total control repudiates. The idea of the expert and the project of total control exist in a 
symbiotic relationship which places strict limits on consideration of the impact of our 
work. 
The specialist puts himself in charge of one possibility. By leaving out all other possibilities, he 
enfranchises his little fiction of total control. Leaving out all the "non-functional" or otherwise 
undesirable possibilities, he makes a rigid, exclusive boundary within which absolute control 
becomes, if not possible, at least conceivable. 474 
The stricter such control, Berry observes, the greater the disorder produced on its 
margins, "outside its remit. " The only antidote to this technological way of being is no 
longer to ask, as the specialist does, "What can I do with what I know? " without at the 
same time asking, "How can I be responsible for what I know? "475 In the new age of the 
service industry the colonization of the inner work week has become almost complete, 
and yet the question remains pertinent because, as chapter three suggested, the modem 
political expert is also trying to sever the worker from explicit reflection about, or even 
awareness of, their work's end. 
Here again the practice of the church reveals a startlingly counter-cultural claim to 
modern practice. Those who are least capable of sustained "production", the sick and the 
aged, are either discarded or subjected by technological society to regimes to return them 
to work. Barth points out that, in contrast, in the church the sick and aged are able to 
pursue the inner work of reflectivity all the more directly. In this we can see work as 
474 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 70-71. 
475 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 48. 
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service in its most obviously Christian shape as it may be that the "least of these" may 
greatly affect the shape of the church's participation in society through its work by 
sharing their wisdom and counsel with the body. This service is vital for the community 
of faith, and thus the end of a "career" is not an invitation to become idle. "Aging among 
Christians, " comments Hauerwas, "is not and cannot be a lost opportunity, but rather is a 
transformation of what the world understands to be a loss of power into service for the 
good of the Christian community. "476 
Playful Work 
Finally, good work, Barth says, is playful. Fulfilled work, while it frees humanity, 
does so only because it knows its proper context and thus its proper limit. If humanity is 
only truly free in service, then the service of work has its limit in the service of the 
church's corporate worship, the "impractical" joyful praise of the body of Christ. Without 
the joyfulness of worship and the playfulness of rest outside of work, we cannot but fall 
prey to the belief that our work sustains the good, drawing us into the empty and 
inordinate desires of competition, the affliction of pride. Good work is the child of the de- 
totalization of work and is thus freed for the risky creative service of joyful delight. 
Play, Barth says, is the inhabitation of God's desire to create beings who are not 
locked into work and competition but are free in the service of the community. When we 
have developed the skill of playing and worshipping and wondering outside of work, we 
can see that right work too is service only as play, "i. e., a childlike imitation and 
reflection of the fatherly action of God which as such is true and proper action. " We are 
freed from the compulsion to "make the future" by inhabiting Christ's command not to be 
anxious about life, sustenance, or the morrow. Such playful work requires periods of 
idleness which rejuvenates our service. Of course this idleness must also conform to the 
law of Sabbath, and thus is more akin to wonder than decreased reflectivity. If our work is 
476 Stanley Hauerwas, A Better Hope: Resources for a Church Confronting Capitalism Democracy, and 
Postmodernity (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos Press, 2000), 185. 
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too frantic, leaving no energy for a hobby or side interest, this too calls for our reflection, 
raising the possibility of casting off on the high seas rather than remaining in the calm but 
deadening harbor in which we by our work have anchored ourselves. 477 
What might playful work look like? "[W]e must learn to think of human energy, 
our energy, not as something to be saved, but as something to be used and to be enjoyed 
in use, " Berry contends. If we know how to enjoy play as Barth advocates, we will learn 
to enjoy work, says Berry. "There is no such thing as a reservoir of bodily energy. By 
saving it-as our ideals of labor saving and luxury bid us to do-we simply waste it, and 
waste much else along with it. "478 Only as play can our work become rejuvenated. "The 
nearly intolerable irony in our dissatisfaction is that we have removed pleasure from our 
work in order to remove "drudgery" from our lives . 
9,479 
Work undertaken in rest, Barth explains, will have a composure about it, not 
engaging in superfluous activity for activity's sake, nor simply with one eye on the 
competitor, but having a well-discerned understanding of its meaning as part of the good 
of society. The power of Christian work is that it is given a telos and can therefore 
prioritize its aims in a way which yields resources for resisting their ordering by the 
capitalist imperative of survival. Barth singles out for criticism the frenzied irrelevance of 
modern diplomatic practice and the tendency of Christian publishing to allow quality to 
be undermined by the newfound capabilities to produce quantity. Both, he perceptively 
notes, have lost their orientation in relation to a purpose and have become self-referential 
industriousness which is not only ineffective but counter-productive in the terms of the 
work itself. This ineffectiveness is the result of ignoring the inner work which is the 
essential component of any right outer work. 
The rest from physical work which is necessary to engage in this all-important 
inner work relies on the acknowledgment that only God can transform our work, Barth 
contends. Such reflection begins with the effort to lay aside the frantic, focused activity 
which accompanies work, and thus becomes the quietness and stillness into which God 
477 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.4,550-553. 
478 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 219. 
479 Berry, What are People For?, 141. 
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can speak. "The achievement of true rest is really a matter of pure receiving. "480 This 
reflective and attentive receiving makes it possible to hear the speaking of God through 
the challenges of work, and through the suffering of love and trials which are part of life 
in the worshipping community. Without this resting, this listening in supplication, our 
work will become futile, Barth notes. In becoming detached from its real end, God's 
4a praise, it becomes attached to the cares and competitions of this world. ' 
If good work is characterized by this attentiveness to God's claims on our action, 
it will, Berry adds, go forth to enact affection and give honor, calling forth the same from 
others' work. Yet precious little work is of this type, he observes. "All of us are 
responsible for bad work, not so much because we do it ourselves (though we all do it) as 
because we have it done for us by other people. "482 Conversely, our striving to define and 
enact good work calls forth other good work because it takes place in a social matrix. 
Christian work, then, gives honor to God because the skill or craft of work is good in both 
being attentive to its created material and in its desire to serve God by serving fellow 
creatures. Berry adds: "Any life, by working or not working, by working well or poorly, 
inescapably changes other lives and so changes the world. This is why our division of the 
"fine arts" from "craftsmanship, " and "craftsmanship" from "labor, " is so arbitrary, 
meaningless, and destructive. "483 If work is not art, meaningful because good service, 
then "we are wasting our lives, and our work too. "484 
On one side, and in relation to Part I, Barth can be interpreted as indicating that 
because our salvation is in Christ, the Christian has reason to repudiate business or 
national claims that work demands a permanent or regular footing on an emergency or 
crisis basis. Refusal of the messiah complex of work is critical, and often technical 
requirements call forth the greatest compromises of this priority. Whether or not we are 
sure about the positive meaningfulness of our work, we know the consequences of the 
480 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III. 4,564. 
481 Barth, Church Dogmatics, atics, 111.4,554-564. 
482 Berry, Freedom and Community, 36. 
483 Berry, Freedom and Community, 110,112. 
484 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 78. 
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missed deadline, letting the assembly line stop, or the deal fall through. In these moments 
we relinquish the proper limit to work because we have internalized an employer's 
definition of performance. 
On the other side, Barth argues, because work's limits frame human recreation, 
the mechanization and mindlessness that produce bad work also produce meaningless or 
joyless play. "Our workplaces are more and more exclusively given over to production, 
and our dwelling places to consumption, " Berry concurs. 485 The antinomy of modern life 
strips both play and work of meaning, and Barth has indicated that good work which rests 
in Christ reasserts their proper relation and integration, but the rise of the "pleasure 
industry" indicates the rejection of this integration, Berry points out: "That there can be 
pleasure industries at all, exploiting our apparently limitless ability to be pleased, can 
only mean that our economy is divorced from pleasure and that pleasure is gone from our 
workplaces and our dwelling places. "486 
As chapter three noted, the spectacular plays a central role in contemporary modes 
of entertainment, and it is important to observe the growth and shape of the cultural 
constellation known as entertainment, locate its essentially technological substrate, and its 
tendency to promote decreased moral reflectivity as indicated by the widespread use of 
the term "mindless entertainment. " The physical expansion of the "entertainment center" 
in the modern living room is paralleled by the global expansion of the industry devoted to 
satisfying (or creating) modern claims for ever more consumable entertainment. By 
focusing on the technologies of the entertainment center, and the yearning for more 
complete escapes into virtual reality, we can grasp the life it embodies and claims, 
unmasking the reality that "mindless entertainment" is in fact an active habituation to a 
state of decreased moral reflectivity. 487 Knowing the cultural artifact of the entertainment 
center frees us to respond to it in our own lives, to get a handle on how to name the social 
485 Berry, What are People For?, 134. 
486 Berry, What are People For?, 134. 
487 Despite a tacit acquiescence ! the mandates of the technological imperative (172), and 
his espousal of 
an instrumental view of technology (180-81), this point is touched on by Graham 
Houston in Virtual 
Morality: Christian Ethics in the Computer Age (Leicester: Apollos, 1998), 177. 
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presence of certain industries, and to imagine a very different interaction with these 
objects, if they can be understood to serve true, rejuvenating, communicative, reflective 
and connective play. 488 
In summary, good work as Barth has developed its definition, is communal, 
reflective and playful because it does not conceive itself as enacting self-salvation but as 
glorifying God. It is grounded in God's love for us and the creation, and is thus attentive 
to all of creation and to the speaking God. In this way work becomes joyful because not 
gripped by over-earnestness, yet is characterized by the application of attention, time, and 
thought. Only two tasks remain: to explicate what is implied in the claim that good work 
is attentive to the order of creation, and to summarize the chapter's arguments by 
reference to two cases. 
The Love of Natural Order as Gift 
Heidegger argued and Grant repeated in ringing tones that the problem of 
technology could only be met by a theory which allows the beauty of natural order to call 
forth human love. This section will indicate both why Christian moral reflection must 
begin from just such an awareness and what the practical implications might be on human 
work. This penultimate subsection begins from consideration of the import of the 
Christian affirmation of God as Creator, and will home-in on some of the implications of 
this claim by drawing out its impact on the way we eat and procreate, and the work that 
sustains good eating and procreation. This will lead directly on to the two cases which 
summarize the chapter. 
488 Bernd Wannenwetsch has developed a theologically astute schema for dealing with such questions which 
builds on the critique given here by noting that communication which has ceased to be transformative of 
both parties tends to be oriented by its lowest common denominator, the optimization of technical means. 
Bernd Wannenwetsch, "Communication as Transformation: Worship and the Media, " in Studies in 
Christian Ethics, vol. 13: 1 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 105. 
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The Doctrine of Creation and its Rejection 
Barth's discussion of the meaning of Sabbath has indicated the perspicuity of 
Hauerwas' claim that "we do not believe that `creation' is something that all people can 
affirm. Rather, the confession of `creation' is something made by a group of people who 
are called to be the church in a world of people who do not in fact know that they are 
`creatures. "' The faithfulness of the church consists in living in such a way that the 
bondage of creation is revealed and mitigated in favor of its sacred capacity for peace. 489 
The basic question pressed on us by the Christian doctrine of creation is, "How are our 
bodies to relate to other bodies and all materiality? " Because creation is a doctrine, this 
question becomes a religious question, implying that there are deep inner connections 
between the way we treat our bodies and the way we treat the earth. What are the outlines 
of this doctrine and how does it indicate a divine claim on human action? 
The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo has three basic specifications, argues Christoph 
Schwöbel. First, we can speak of God without creation, meaning that God has a free 
existence which contrasts with creation's dependence. Second, God is involved with His 
creation which is derived from the overflow of His Trinitarian love. On one side God did 
not wind up a clockwork world to leave it alone, and on the other He has granted it a form 
of stability. Creation, because it derives from the Trinitarian love, is part of God's story, 
yet God does not need another partner to be fulfilled. Finally, creation is an integral part 
of divine action, meaning that it is a complex act. Supremely, "The recognition of the 
eschatological ultimacy of salvation leads to an understanding of creation as mediated by, 
integrated in and ordered toward Christ. " At the same time creation is the work of the 
Father and a participant in the ongoing work of the Son. 490 
These affirmations lead Schwöbel to assert a distinction between creatio as God's 
act of creating, and creatura as the result of that act, a distinction which establishes that; 
"Seeing the world and ourselves as agents, as created, as the result of God's absolute 
giving, restricts our objective and subjective possibilities of action in such a way that it 
489 Hauerwas, In Good Company, 191-195. 
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enables their success. The restriction that is demanded is precisely that we refrain from 
interpreting our relationship to the world in terms of absolute creativity. 
"49' 
Michael Banner has argued that Augustine's account of sexual ethics indicates two 
important ways that the creature's work can ignore this productive distinguishing between 
human and divine work. In addition, Banner contends that Augustine's account is 
methodologically paradigmatic because it attempts to situate human procreation within 
the framework of salvation history. In doing so, Banner says, Augustine saw clearly the 
rejection of the claim of creation on human action by the Manicheans. They denied that 
the natural is possessed of any moral significance, so denying the goodness of the work of 
the Creator. They and their contemporary representatives "presuppose that our bodily life 
is not possessed of a form or character which comes from the hand of a good God. "492 
Creation was also improperly loved, Augustine argues, by the Pelagians, who 
believed humanity's drives to be basically good, so denying the work of the Redeemer. 
This led, Banner notes, to a superficial view of the brokenness of creation giving 
Pelagians an over-optimism about the possibility of eradicating all sin and evil by 
remaking social habits and materiality. a93 Because the Manicheans and Pelagians wrongly 
related the creator and creation (as Heidegger also did in loving creation as itself the 
creator), each is unable to correctly conceive the proper, creaturely form of human action. 
Understanding this properly formed human action, we now turn to imagine a proper, 
formed and informed love of creation. 
Sex and Food 
In the course of these observations it becomes theologically interesting that the 
worship of the Israelites was linked by the Torah to a fine-grained set of ethical claims 
490 Schwobel, "God, Creation and the Christian Community, " 159. 
491 Schwöbel, "God, Creation and the Christian Community, " 173 
492 Banner, Contemporary Moral Problems, 281. 
493 Banner, Contemporary Moral Problems, 21,287. 
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relating this worship to their eating habits and their sexual practices. The New Testament 
is no less concerned than the Old Testament to understand sexual practices and eating as 
powerful sites of social contest within which Christians either accept or challenge wider 
social patterns. 494 Though the religious meaning of the Israelites' and the New Testament 
Christians' sexual and culinary practices appear to vary in scripture, it is remarkable that 
eating itself remains a constant source of attention for the writers of scripture as they 
attempt to elucidate the ethical implications of being God's chosen people. This dual 
emphasis will similarly focus discussion here. Like the chosen people of scripture, we 
need not be too surprised to see that the way we eat and the way we have sex may be 
intimately connected with our worship. The main text in this section, the creation story, 
frames this dual focus in portraying humanity's relation to creation in terms of the 
creation as a dinner table, and humanity's blessing in terms of reproductive success. 
Wendell Berry is also interested in the connection between eating, or agriculture, 
and sexual practices. He claims that study of these connections is fruitful because they 
"are our basic connections to each other and the earth, and they tend to relate analogically 
and to be reciprocally defining: our demands upon the earth are determined by our ways 
of living with one another; our regard for one another is brought to light in our ways of 
using the earth. "495 
We saw in chapter one Heidegger's interest in work being guided by the order of 
the earth. His reflections on the claim of created order on human making spring from his 
early interaction with the Christian tradition's attempts to specify that order. 496 He was 
reacting to the high medieval canon lawyers' attempts to develop a fine-grained and 
timeless schema of these natural divisions for use in moral theology. Heidegger so fully 
rejects the timelessness of natural order in the interest of the multiplicity of the earth's 
orders that his ethic becomes uselessly vague, whereas Oliver O'Donovan has much more 
fruitfully engaged with this same Christian tradition. 
aua 1 Corinthians 5-8, for instance, is clearly concerned with both questions. 
495 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 131. 
496 John D. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on OvercomingLMetaphysics (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1982), especially chapters 1-3. 
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As we look at the issues of sex and eating, let us briefly examine O'Donovan's 
use of natural order to ascertain whether it is appropriate for technological science to turn 
a woman into a man (or vice versa) by surgical technique. Christians, O'Donovan begins, 
because they acknowledge that creation is good, celebrate the fact that humans come into 
existence dimorphically differentiated. Marriage as an institution recognizes this 
difference and fits it into the broad sweep of human life. In Genesis this biological 
differentiation is interpreted as a created order, ratified by Christ in the gospels and 
consummated in the institution of marriage which "disclose[s] the goodness of biological 
nature by elevating it to its teleological fulfillment in personal relationship. "497 
But, O'Donovan notes, modern Manicheans don't consider this differentiation a 
gift, but a problem to be overcome. They often point to the spectrum of social gender to 
problematize the clarity of biological sex, but O'Donovan replies that masculinity and 
femininity exist as a spectrum in a way biological sex does not. Rather, he says, fixed 
biological sex makes possible the rich social differentiation of gender because of the 
tensions set up between the fixed poles of biological dimorphism. And at the center of 
498 this interplay the structure of marriage elucidates its full created wholeness. 
In affirming that sexual difference is a created good, Christians are not at the same 
time saying that sexual difference may not also take on the aspect of a problem (as in 
hermaphroditism). They are saying, however, that this problem is qualitatively different 
from the modern technological problem which asks how human work can overcome any 
material obstacles in its quest to make meaning out of meaningless materiality. Here, 
O'Donovan concludes, the self is destroying itself in "sinning against one's own body" (1 
Corinthians 6: 18). 
Self-transcendence, in which the spirit may view the body as an object for thought, has not led, 
as it ought, to the recognition of the body as self and the acknowledgment of self as obligated to 
the body's form; it has led to the reduction of the body to undifferentiated matter, on which the 
497 O'Donovan, "Transsexualism and Christian Marriage" in Journal of Religious Ethics, ls` ed., vol. 
11 
(1983), 141. 
498 O'Donovan, "Transsexualism, " 142-43. 
218 
spirit proposes to exercise unlimited freedom. In this way we confront the possibility of self- 
manipulation which is self-falsification; and we discover it to be based on precisely that abolition 
of complementarity between the body and the soul which was being recommended to us in the 
499 interests of a unified conceptual field. 
O'Donovan is prescient in delivering this clear and important No to those who 
refuse creation as a gift, and to a church under the technological imperative hankering to 
validate it. At one level the church must be prepared to let the world go its own way, in 
the knowledge that the sin against the Creator of Romans chapter one is to claim that 
creation is "merely there", without any divine interpretation. Paul asserts that the 
punishment for this sin for those who take this route is to be handed over to the 
consequences of their refusal of God. 50° 
But at another level, the focus of this study is to pinpoint the divine Yes of created 
order (linked here as it is with the revealed form of Christian marriage), toward which 
O'Donovan has so clearly gestured. God is gathering up his community and transforming 
it, not only by naysaying, but in imparting true, positive Christian knowledge of the 
world. 50' We will come to see that a socially creative response to the creation as gift 
speaks from the conviction that creation was meant to be admired as God's handiwork 
before it was understood as something to be used. 502 Fear, awe, reverence, humility, 
delight and joy-the mathematical or technological way of being ties these to wonder at 
human power, or the work of its hands, but not to the cosmos as creation. But if creation 
is a gift, holding complete within it the possibilities of true human flourishing even in its 
brokenness, then our delight and joy in it reinvigorates our work with living, creative 
possibility. 
We turn now to a last look at Barth's exposition of Genesis which develops how a 
species of "loose idealism", or moral idealism, might allow a fruitful listening to, and 
499 O'Donovan, "Transsexualism, " 151. 
500 Bernd Wannenwetsch, "Old Docetism-New Moralism? Questioning a New Direction in the 
Homosexuality Debate, " in Modern Theology, 16: 3 (July 2000), 357-58. 
sot Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV. 3.1,214. 
502 Berry, What Are People For?, 138. 
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working with, the gift of created order which does not impose its knowledge but has 
sufficient formal knowledge to orient its material exploration. Barth's linkage of our 
work, eating, and procreation via the creation story will complete this subsection, as we 
turn in a concluding subsection to consider Christian forms of agriculture and sexual life. 
Karl Barth and the Creation Narrative: Genesis 1: 24-31 
Having looked at the importance of the seventh day of the creation account, let us 
return with Barth to hear God's word on the sixth day, the oft-discussed command to "be 
fruitful and multiply and subdue the earth" (Genesis 1: 28). The command follows the 
description of God's creative work on the sixth day (Genesis 1: 24-31), which began with 
God creating all the land animals. 
By setting the creation of humanity in the context of the creation of the other land 
animals, Barth points out, humanity is not pictured in isolation from, or as superior to, but 
in the company of the other animals with whom he was created. The land animals and 
human beings are so intertwined in creation that they share the reproductive blessing with 
humanity. 503 Yet God immediately distinguishes humans from animals by establishing 
human dominion over all other animals (v. 26). The source of human glory is not this 
dominion, but the direct correspondence of humanity to God as God's image-bearers. The 
Trinity in unity ("let us", v. 26) wills to create a new being corresponding to that unity 
and separation, and thus capable of conforming to the divine life. 504 
In this way the divine "us" creates a human "us"-"male and female He created 
them" (v. 27). The God who speaks of Himself as plural speaks into existence creatures 
who can enter into free covenant relationship with Himself and with each other because 
they have been created in this plural image. In this way man "repeats in his confrontation 
503 Barth, Church Do mgatics, Ill. 1,177. 
504 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.1,183. This is a contested, but not an obscure reading of the much 
disputed Genesis 1: 26. For a good survey of rival readings dealing explicitly with Barth's position, see 
Gordon J. Wenham, Word Biblical Commentary: Genesis 1-15 (Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1987), 27-34. 
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of God and Himself the confrontation in God. "505 By juxtaposing "let us create" with 
"male and female He created them" the relationship of the sexes is revealed as a critical 
social locus at which a single order of physical difference is shown to be morally and 
theologically crucial. 506 
The command to rule over the animals fits within the establishment of humanity 
as being in God's image which marks humanity as designated to live God's presence 
among the creatures, Barth continues. "Man is not their creator; hence he cannot be their 
absolute lord, a second god. In his dignity and position he can only be God's creaturely 
witness and representative to them ... man's 
lordship over the animals is a lordship with 
internal and external limitations. "507 The internal limit of human lordship is the good of 
other creatures, its external limit God's sovereignty over both. 
It is interesting to note, Barth continues, that God's spoken command is directed 
only to humans. This is because "man needs God's blessing when (animal-like in this 
respect) he moves forward as male and female to the procreation of new individuals, to 
the multiplication and expansion of his kind; and when (God-like in this respect) he again 
moves forward as male and female to the exercise of this lordship. "508 This command is 
the beginning of God's history with man in which God accompanies and guides man by 
both His presence and His word of blessing, permission and promise. 509 
According to Barth, the goodwill God shows to humanity in this blessing is 
reconfirmed in His provision for humanity after the Fall, through punishments designed 
to draw humans back into the form of the blessing. But the firmest proof that their 
lordship as God's image is blessed is that their marital union becomes the image of Christ 
and His church. Even here at creation, before the man and woman are aware of it, their 
505 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.1,186. 
506 Barth, Church Dogmatics, Ill. 1,196. 
507 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.1,187. 
508 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.1,188. 
509 Barth is again not alone in this reading. Contemporary Jewish and Christian biblical scholarship confirms 
Barth's reading of the import of the blessing as speech, both unifying humans with the animals and setting 
up fertility as a task. Cf. Jeremy Cohen, "Be Fertile and Increase, Fill the Earth and Master 
It": The Ancient 
and Medieval Career of a Biblical Text (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), chapter one. 
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activity as man and woman points beyond them toward the Son of Man and His 
community. 510 
The central point of the language of "God's image", Barth says, is that God willed 
to create a being who, while unlike God, mirrored God's own knowledge of Himself. It is 
Paul, Barth contends, who draws out the importance of this connection, understanding 
man and wife together as God's image (1 Corinthians 11: 7) and therefore understands 
Christ not as the isolated culmination of the image of God but always as Israel's Christ, 
husbanding the community of faith. For human beings to fully inhabit the image for 
which they were created they must be participating in Christ's body by the quickening of 
the Spirit who fulfills the Creator's wish to create men in His own image. 511 
In understanding the imago dei in this way, Barth points out that humans' image- 
bearer status is fulfilled by hope in God alone. The answer to this hope is the divinely 
provided cosmos which supports human life. "I shall give you every plant... you shall 
have them for food" (v. 29). "[I]t is an incontestable and unshakable sign of the real grace 
of God addressed to him, " Barth says, "that the cosmos is a home prepared to satisfy his 
own and his fellow-creatures' needs, to nourish him and them, and in this way, when 
existence has been given to them, to assure their continuation as the presupposition of the 
activity assigned to them. 612 
The framing of this gift of sustenance to humanity makes it clear that they do not 
possess the power of dominion over the vegetable kingdom by right but are given it as 
food, Barth continues. God has spread a table for humanity, and human life must be 
marked by an acknowledgment of that gift. "Give us our daily bread" is a petition which 
recognizes the relation of humanity to their food and to God, and is an acknowledgment 
that God will not fail humanity in this provision. Man is invited first to this table to make 
510 Barth, Church Dogmatics, Ill. 1,189-19 1. 
511 Barth, Church Do mgL atics, Ill. 1,197,203-204. 
512 Barth, Church Do mgatics, 111.1,207. 
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it clear that creation is the home of humanity, the covenant holder with God, Barth notes, 
yet man is not at this table alone because all creatures are invited to share it. 513 
We need not be surprised, Barth points out, that the original order of creation was 
strictly vegetarian, living off only the fruit and seeds of plants. Humans were sustained by 
the superfluity of the plant kingdom, eating without killing. Despite the intervention of 
the Fall, this peaceable early state was remembered in the Old Testament's prohibition of 
the eating of blood and of homicide. The divine command to kill animals in sacrifice 
established the violence of killing as part of the post-Fall condition, yet Barth understands 
verse 29 to convey that the nourishment of one creature at the expense of the other "does 
not correspond to an original order and will not therefore correspond to a final. "514 This 
does not mean that the final new creation will be a return to the first, but establishes meat 
eating as an allowable concession. The primary thrust then of vv. 29-30 is not to establish 
vegetarianism but to mediate man's dominance over earth by showing the interreliance of 
man and animals on the vegetative, all of whom have the same necessity, means of 
support, and command515 
"God saw everything He had made" the passage concludes, "and indeed, it was 
very good" (v. 31). All creation, Barth states, was adapted to the purpose which God had 
in view for it. It was well-stocked to support humanity in obedience to the covenant of 
grace. 516 The food was prepared, the table was set, humanity was given to eat. Stephen 
Webb well summarizes the biblical tradition, saying that it "balances two potentially 
opposed viewpoints; it allows for the use of animals even as it insists that they are worthy 
of God's justice and mercy. , 517 Humans are asked to subdue the earth, to fill it with their 
513 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.1,207-208. As we will see, this attitude of receipt is the missing 
component of modern agriculture, which is conceived as extraction, with humanity alone at the table. 
514 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.1,209. "It is exceptional that a pastoral people who lived on meat, dressed 
in animal skins, and wrote on parchment... should bequeath to the world a vision of an original and an 
ultimate vegetarianism. " Stephen H. Webb, On God and Dogs: A Christian Theology of Compassion for 
Animals, forward by Andrew Linzey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 135. 
515 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.1,211-212. 
516 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.1,212-213. 
517 Webb, On God and Dogs, 23. 
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offspring, and to do so in thankfulness. The promise of God "setting the table" for human 
sustenance is a permission for and shaping of human gardening, just as God's blessing 
humanity with fecundity frames their perception of the meaning and ordering of sexual 
life. This chapter concludes by making explicit how these theological insights about 
human eating, dominion and procreation might be understood in a contemporary, 
technological social context. 
Clashing Forms of Life? The Eating Complex 
Environmentalism 
What does it mean to say that good work has love for the goodness of creation? 
We might respond by pointing to environmentalism, yet this term's weakness is its 
conception of the earth as "life support" for humans. This weakness betrays the 
estrangement from, or over-identification with, our own creatureliness which also 
underlies terms like "biocentric" or "anthropocentric" or "deep ecology. " Each term 
either perpetuates a false polarity which sustains our destructiveness and estranges us 
from the materiality of our own particular and intimate dwelling place, or so identifies 
human action with the processes of nature that it cannot develop normative claims. 518 
The concept of conservationism is likewise fatally flawed. The conservation of 
"scenic resources, " for instance, places the sphere of our sympathy with creation outside 
the reach of our daily lives. In addition, conceiving ourselves as conserving "natural 
resources" exacerbates the technological habit of treating both renewable and non- 
renewable resources in the identical fashion: as reservoirs to be conserved for strip- 
mining at a later date. There is also a "realistic" conservationism which aims at stopping 
the worst abuses of capitalism, yet it also fails to see that the larger abuses of capitalism 
are the result of a pattern of smaller abuses which a focus on "ecological disasters" 
518 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 22; Berry, Freedom and Community, 34-35. 
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hides. 519 The conclusion of Michael Banner is that the debate about whether ecological 
reform is for the sake of humans or the sake of the "environment" which supports them 
can only be resolved by a "proper account of human well-being [which] would allow us 
to understand something of the unreality of the contrast which the debate in 
environmental ethics has tended to assume. "520 We need then to bring love of creation 
closer to the everyday events of our lives than the concept of environmentalism allows. 
Husbandry vs. Agribusiness 
Christian Presuppositions of Agriculture 
In the preceding discussion of Sabbath, we traced Barth's argument that our work 
is good when it does not attempt self-salvation but relies on God's work of creation as 
sufficient for meeting human needs. But the rhetoric of technological medicine and 
agribusiness, Berry points out, begins its discussion of potential new technologies with 
the opposite logic-emphasizing threats facing humanity which only humanity can 
remedy: "people are starving" or "people are dying of disease" are assumed to provide the 
mandate for immediate investment in the development of investment-intensive medicine 
and agriculture. 521 Such threats on one hand call forth a Promethean and totalitarian 
council of perfection, embodied in the destructive absurdity implicit in Hans Jonas' 
admission that his ethic demands a totalitarian world government in order to stop the 
destruction of the planet. 522 As chapter three has also argued, they may, on the other hand, 
end in a paralysis of moral sense, a ceding of control by the masses to the promisers of 
fantastic technologically-enhanced benefit. 
Christian theology, based on the sensitivities developed out of its primal story, has 
reasons to sense the totalitarian drift of such claims. In the creation narrative, God curses 
the ground (Genesis 3: 17) as punishment, but in the punishment is promise: "[F]or the 
519 Berry, Freedom and Community, 27-30. 
520 Michael Banner, "Why and How Not to Value the Environment" in Contemporary Moral Problems, 
184. 
521 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 65. 
522 Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, 151. 
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creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the will of Him who subjected 
it in hope... " (Romans 8: 20). God cursed the ground because He wants us not to be at 
rest, to feel we have overcome a creation which is still racked by evil. The desire of the 
technologist is to overcome, to settle and conclude this struggle prematurely in rejection 
of the claim that this conclusion can only be brought about by God. But by beginning our 
thinking with acknowledgment of creation as a good gift to be enjoyed and respected, 
ethical deliberation can wait in active hope for God's redemptive work rather than being 
driven to paralysis or hubris out of horror at the effects of the Fall. That horror makes 
wonder impossible, and without wonder work cannot be good. And by beginning 
deliberation with creation as a gift we are certainly allowed to take seriously its 
dissolution, its suffering, its deprecation. 
A Christian agriculture which refuses this Promethean project, Berry suggests, is 
based on the premise that "creation is a unique, irreplaceable gift, and therefore to be used 
with humility, respect and skill. "523 Rather than beginning with the theoretical and 
abstract long term worries of the environmentalist, such work seeks a right relation of 
people to the earth, in which all humanity's neighbors become part of the discussion. 524 if 
the human relation to material order is understood in this way, it understands that there is 
no such thing as autonomy, only responsible and irresponsible dependence, both on one 
another and on our materiality. Such work opens up connectivity between these spheres, 
as attention and care is paid to the physical medium of our communion. 525 
Human neighbors, animals, plants and the land each impose their own rules for 
care on us, and will be degraded if cared for in any other way, Berry, an experienced 
farmer, notes. To properly care for them requires strong motivation and close attention. 
To care well for something it must be loved in the concrete. 526 In relation to agriculture, 
this implies the corollaries that people must have a reasonably secure tenure on their land 
523 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 213. 
524 Berry, Freedom and Community, 15. 
525 Knight, Douglas. "From Metaphor to Mediation: Colin Gunton and the Concept of Mediation. " In Neue 
Zeitschrift Für Systematische Theologie und Religion Philosophie 43 (2001) 127. 
526 Berry, What Are People For?, 6,9. 
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so that they can see the fruit of their labor, and because a minimum amount of attention is 
required to care well for a given piece of creation, there are boundaries to the amount 
which people can own and properly care for. 527 
This latter observation links us again with the criterion of good work which Barth 
has already established: that it demands love and attention. Husbandry is inescapably 
particular, Berry says, and to seek to treat every animal or every field or every part of a 
field equally is the mode of technology. The task creation claims us for is to live well in 
my place in the world, which demands an attentiveness which, when applied to the 
farmer, is called husbandry, which rules out his understanding himself as a banker, 
production expert, etc. 528 
Technological Presuppositions 
In examining Berry's understanding of the priorities which Christian agriculture 
will uphold, we begin to see a contrast between what may be labeled a gift ethos with an 
analogue of Heidegger's technological ethos of the standing reserve. Nowhere is this more 
clear than in Berry's contrast between the technological and husbanding mindset. 
I conceive a strip-miner to be a model exploiter, and as a model nurturer I take the old-fashioned 
idea or ideal of a farmer. The exploiter is a specialist, an expert; the nurturer is not. The standard 
of the exploiter is efficiency; the standard of the nurturer is care. The exploiter's goal is money, 
profit; the nurturer's goal is health-his land's health, his own, his family's, his community's, 
his country's. Whereas the exploiter asks of a piece of land only how much and how quickly it 
can be made to produce, the nurturer asks a question that is much more complex and difficult: 
What is its carrying capacity? (That is: How much can be taken from it without diminishing it? 
What can it produce dependably for an indefinite time? ) The exploiter wishes to earn as much as 
possible by as little work as possible; the nurturer expects, certainly, to have a decent living from 
527 Berry, Freedom and Community, 3-4. This insight has a long history and a Christian tradition, seen 
clearly, for instance in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 38, Iniustice (Questions 63-78) 
(Oxford: Blackfriars, 1975), IIa Ilae Q. 66 A. 3. 
528 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 31,34-35. 
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his work, but his characteristic wish is to work as well as possible. The competence of the 
exploiter is in organization; that of the nurturer is in order-a human order, that is, that 
accommodates itself both to other order and to mystery. The exploiter typically serves an 
institution or organization; the nurturer serves land, household, community, place. The exploiter 
thinks in terms of numbers, quantities, "hard facts"; the nurturer in terms of character, condition, 
quality, kind. 529 
If we conceive human work as the rearrangement of the energy flows of creation, 
Berry continues, technology is the presupposition that this energy is best understood as 
something produced and used and thus speaks in terms of conservation of the 
consumable. But, he contends, the order of biological energy from which our own lives 
are sustained requires a third term: return. Return links consumption with production in a 
much more complex and less individualistic way. Agriculture as a cultural discipline 
attuned to this aspect of reusability of biological energy has in practice been marginalized 
by agribusiness whose first move was to conceive biological energy as a store of energy 
extractable by machinery. 530 
Such a system of agriculture, Berry points out, is modeled on economics, thinking 
and acting in terms of consumption/waste patterns rather than in terms of a cycle of 
renewal. Such industrial agriculture does not listen to the land, nor does it wish to until its 
project of return maximization exhausts the land. The two approaches to the health of 
creation are husbandry, as a particular conversation with a particular piece of creation, 
and production, which uses chemicals and machines to make all soil and terrain equally 
hostile to anything but monoculture. Industrial agriculture is inextricably tied to the 
measure of production, husbandry to the desire to use land well . 
531 Again, we hear a 
resonance with Foucault's exposition of modern political technique, which functions by 
denying the importance of particularity, as it seeks control by the disassociation of parts 
so that they may be treated in standardized ways. 
529 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 7-8. 
530 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 81-89. 
531 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 137; Berry, What Are People For?, 206-209. 
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Good Care of the Earth 
If honoring creation entails repudiation of important presuppositions of modem 
agricultural practice, what type of practice is called forth? Modern agriculture (like 
modem political technique) aims at homogeneity to produce material efficiency, Berry 
argues. It repudiates the wild, substituting the principle of uniformity for the principle of 
diversity. Ancient or "primitive" agriculture uses the diversity of the crop gene pool to 
circumvent undue losses due to insects and disease. Its methods are based upon the 
principle of diversity, and thus it is more sophisticated, soil conserving, and resistant to 
crisis than technological agriculture. This variety depends on appreciation of and reliance 
on the diversity of "wild" versions. In short, it attends to and values the survivors. 532 
This emphasis on the importance of the principle of diversity, contends Berry, is 
not meant to imply that the mechanization of farms is the enemy, but that the industrial 
method which produced the tractor cannot be applied wholesale to organizing all the 
processes of the farm without significant degradation of its health. The main issue is to 
apply the right standard in attempts to gauge agricultural performance: health vs. 
productivity. Production and its goals will always be inimical to reproduction. Again the 
terminological contrast is important; agriculture intimates the essential components of 
ritual and attentiveness in the way agribusiness, agriscience, and agridollars do not. 533 
Industrial Agriculture 
It should come as little surprise by now that the type of contemporary agriculture 
that draws Berry's protest fits very closely the profile of technological practice developed 
532 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 177-180. An excellent example of the difference such thinking makes 
is embodied in the attempt of the Floral and Nursery Plants Research Unit of the U. S. National Arboretum 
to respond to the North American Dutch Elm epidemic. Rather than investing in engineering disease 
resistant strains, the unit is combing the United States to find trees which survived the epidemic, 
from which 
seedlings are being grown. Phil McCombs, "Making a Stand, " The Washington Post, 
July 30,2001, Cl. 
533 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 87,194,204,217. 
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in Part I. He recounts in great detail how "modernized" farming focuses on material, 
mechanical possibilities for the "farm of the future", forgetting the social offshoots of 
proposed changes to farming. He traces how this takes place under the same desire to 
make the future that Grant articulates. Such a logic defines itself by being against the 
promotion of diversity and is thus inherently totalitarian, reasoned with only by force. 534 
Like all totalitarianisms it lacks imagination. What is the solution to drought? To have 
agribusiness engineer more drought resistant plants. Such inflexibility illustrates that 
modern agribusiness is firmly in the grip of the technological way of being in that its 
ambition is to gain control of all factors rather than working with the complex layers of 
lives and earth on which it depends. 535 
According to Berry, such aspiration to total control creates more risk than it 
solves: the control which can grow tomatoes in January is much more precarious and 
problematic than the biological flexibility which gets the wild oak and mouse through the 
winter, though such wildness, to the technological mind, appears "uncontrolled. " Such 
agriculture and the centralized food systems that go with it cannot have a "small" 
disaster-only the diversity of smaller scale agriculture sustains the margins which 
provide essential buffers against such perturbations. Because of the way it degrades the 
land, mechanized monoculture agriculture is only productive in terms of man-years, not 
per unit of land. From a biological and geological perspective it appears that the problem 
of soil degradation created by such agriculture is increasingly impervious to simple 
technical fixes. 536 
Any solution to the problems created by the principle of homogeneity begins with 
the realization that food is a cultural product, Berry says. "The agriculturists who think of 
the problems of food production in terms of technical innovation are oversimplifying both 
the practicalities of production and the network of meanings and values necessary to 
define, nurture, and preserve the practical motivations. "537 Furthermore, such a widened 
534 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 169, chapter 5. 
535 Berry, What Are People For?, 166; Berry, The Unsettling of America, 70. 
536 Berry, Freedom and Community, 13; Berry, The Unsettling of America, 71,223,166. 
537 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 43. 
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scope of interest would have to deal with the political reality that the industrialization of 
food production is intimately connected with the political project of increasing biopower. 
Food surplus is a political tool, yet as a political tool it is a double-edged sword because 
industrialized food production demands petrol and producing petrol requires food with 
the result that food and fuel become equally politicized. The use of food for political 
purposes in the international food trade creates need for the continuous deployment of 
military force, because if we are inextricably dependent on foreign supplies we are 
hopelessly dependent on military force when that commerce is interrupted. 538 
Breeding Poultry for Disease Resistance 
Does such a general outline of Christian agriculture have any explanatory value? 
Part I, using Heidegger's thought, developed a range of regions of questioning which was 
essential to laying bare the drive toward technological development. I applied those 
regions of questions at the end of Part I to the development of a machine to test human 
ovct . 
Suppose then, in looking at a similar question in agriculture, we ask not about 
whether we should develop machines which indirectly modify humans, but if we might be 
allowed to modify animals to fit machines. This question can easily be couched in terms 
of a question familiar in modern industrialized chicken farming: Should we breed poultry 
for increased disease resistance? 
This question is usually the cue for philosophers and theologians to begin to talk 
about metaphysical distinctions and the "form" of eternal chickenness, which is not to be 
violated, but I have argued that this route is of severely limited value. Part I indicated that 
proper deliberation about such a question requires unpacking who is deliberating about 
the question and why they deliberate, in what context they do so, and what the theory and 
practice are within which the asking is being generated. 
538 Berry, Freedom and Community, 79,80,88; Berry, The Unsettling of America, 36-37. 
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The people currently most concerned with this question are the decision makers in 
the egg and chicken meat industries. The authors of the revealingly named Chicken Meat 
and Egg Production539 describe the U. S. egg production industry thus: 
During the last one hundred years, the number of US farms producing eggs dropped from 5 
million in 1900 to under 1000 in 1999. In 1978, Watt Publishing Co. began a survey of major egg 
producing companies in the United States. They reported that 34 companies owned 1 million or 
more laying hens, representing 27% of the nation's laying hens. The most recent survey (2000) 
listed 63 companies with 1 million or more hens, representing 78% of the nation's total flock. In 
addition, 5 companies with 10+ million hens each controlled 27% of the nation's flock and 11 
companies with 5+ million hens controlled 41% of the nation's flock. This leaves about 59 
million of the nation's 275 million hens in the hands of owners of less than 1 million hens 
540 each. 
This rapidly-commercializing egg industry is paralleled by the even more rapidly growing 
US chicken meat industry established after World War H. This industry has become 
"vertically integrated, " with the top five firms producing half of the country's meat, and 
with the largest producing 25% of US output. "[T]his industry has been one of the fastest 
growing of all agribusiness industries in the United States .,, 
541 
Such increases in the size of "farms" and their profitability has been built on the 
application of the scientific methods of segregation, testing, maximizing growth to feed 
ratios and minimizing cost to production ratios. Maximization of the number of chickens 
in relation to space has been an important part of this scientization, meaning that for 
539 "The information and research needs of this dynamic industry grow at an ever increasing rate as 
individual companies strive to improve performance and efficiencies and to reduce costs. Issues associated 
with the environment, animal welfare, food safety, business management, and labor have become critical 
areas for problem-solving efforts. This edition of Commercial Chicken Meat and Egg Production has 
changed from emphasizing the chicken to emphasizing the business of raising chickens. " Donald D. Bell 
and William D. Weaver, Jr., eds., Commercial Chicken Meat and Egg Production, 5`h ed. (Norwell, Mass.: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), xi. 
540 Donald D. Bell, "Introduction to the U. S. Table Egg Industry, " in Commercial Chicken, 949. 
541 Paul W. Aho, "Introduction to the U. S. Chicken Meat Industry, " in Commercial Chicken, 806. 
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laying hens, "the use of cages for commercial egg production has become increasingly 
popular to the point that today, it is estimated that over 75% of the world's commercial 
table-egg-producing flock are kept in cages (Bell, 1995). In the United States, over 95% 
of the layers are in cages (Bell 1993), "542 making caging a central part of individual 
companies' attempts to "improve performance and efficiencies and to reduce costs. g1543 
Such high caging rates mean costs are also directly related to control of disease, because 
many poultry diseases are untreatable and treating with medicines can be costly. 544 
Two main problems of these systems press the question of disease resistance. The 
first is that as farm size increases, even if there is no decline in per-animal space or 
rations, a decline in performance results which is "almost certainly due to the increased 
incidence of disease. "545 At the same time, broilers and egg laying chickens have been 
homogenized and pushed to the edge of their genetic envelope in the interests of either 
maximal meat or egg production, meaning they are much more sensitive to their 
environment than "wild" or genetically diverse populations. 546 The same issue is raised 
for laying hens because one of the main cost ratios of egg production is inversely related 
to animal or cage density. 547 
Because improvements in breeding and nutrition have been the central factors in 
raising yields, it is natural that breeders focus on reducing disease. 
548 "The improvement 
in the genetic potential of chickens over the last 50 years has been the cornerstone of 
542 Donald D. Bell, "Cage Management for Layers, " in Commercial Chicken, 1007. 
543 Bell and Weaver, Commercial Chicken, xi. 
544 Carol J. Cardona and Gregg J. Cutler, "Medication for the Prevention and Treatment of Diseases, " in 
Commercial Chicken. 
545 David Sainsbury, Poultry Health and Management: Chickens, Ducks, Turkeys, Geese, Quail, 4`h ed. 
(Oxford: Blackwell Science, 2000), 9. 
546 Michael P. Lacy, "Broiler Management, " in Commercial Chicken, 829. 
547 H. A. Elson, "The Economics of Modified Enriched Cages (MEC) Compared to Other Systems of Egg 
Production, " in C. M. Sherwin, Modified Cages for Laying Hens: Proceedings of a Symposium Held at 
Nobel House London on 18th January, 1993 (Potter's Bar: Universities Federation for Animal 
Welfare, 
1994), 94. 
548 Lacy, "Broiler Management, " 829. 
233 
industry progress. " Today producers can expect to get twice the weight in half the time 
with feed conversion twice as good as compared with traditional breeds. 549 These 
increases in productivity have led to further systematic attempts to lower human labor 
costs and production costs. On these large egg farms, for instance, 25-30 people care for a 
complex of one million hens. 550 The result is that, "lower costs have not only fueled 
higher consumption, but have also given the chicken industry the inexpensive raw 
material necessary to produce a variety of further processed and value added products. , 551 
The final result of cost reductions is an increase of the power of the major producers over 
their own production and a gain in freedom within the marketplace, power which is based 
on cost control. 
Costs of production are influenced by stocking density (area per bird), housing system, food 
intake, labour requirements, hygiene, mortality and bird performance. It is well established that 
they are lowest in conventional cages at high stocking densities and highest in the free range 
system. They are more variable in alternative systems than in cages. 552 
Holing in on lowering these costs, the major commercial breeding companies 
(about twenty companies worldwide) aim to develop strains with lower mortality and 
higher producing potential. 553 "The aim of breeders of commercial poultry stocks is to 
permanently change the phenotypic characteristics of the birds that improve their 
productive performance. Growth rate, egg production and egg quality, feed conversion 
efficiency, carcass conformation and disease resistance are examples of characteristics 
that poultry breeders aim to improve in their stocks . 
"ss4 Genetic transfer techniques and 
sag Aho, "Chicken Meat Industry, " 804. 
550 Donald D. Bell, "A Model One Million Hen In-Line Egg Production Complex, " in Commercial Chicken, 
977. 
551 Elson, "Modified Enriched Cages, " 91. 
552 Aho, "Chicken Meat Industry, " 804. 
553 S. P. Rose, Principles of Poultry Science (Wallingford, Oxon: CAB International, 1997), 
91. 
554 Rose, Poultry Science, 91. 
234 
artificial insemination programs are often used to expand the limits of the gene pool and 
more effectively control reproduction. 555 
It is clear from the language used and the context of the question about breeding 
chickens for disease resistance that questions about the permissibility of breeding for 
disease resistance are part and parcel of breeding programs designed to maximize 
"product. " Breeding within an industrial system aims at fitting the animal to the 
environment, and if environment includes higher risk of disease (which intensification 
entails) then breeding for resistance is implied in the commitment to increase yields 
within the project of breeding for maximum efficiency of byproduct production (meat or 
eggs). Disease happens to be an important uncontrolled variable within such production 
systems. 
Animal welfare in such systems is taken into account mainly on the 
presupposition that a minimum concern with animal welfare promotes efficiency. Within 
the context of this industrial agriculture, it is accepted that there are basic freedoms which 
should be accorded to all farm animals, such as freedom from hunger and thirst, freedom 
to express normal behavior, etc. 556 But as Part I has indicated, if the animals are 
considered raw material then their welfare will be respected only in relation to public 
opinion and production costs, not in relation to the animals themselves. 
How might Christian belief about the goodness of creation bear on the question of 
breeding for disease resistance? As indicated above, the question cannot be reduced to 
asking "What is a chicken? " but must be "What is the permission embodied in the 
relationship of human and chicken? " What exactly a chicken is will always retain its 
ambiguities (as will the defining of humans). Barth has argued that the chicken is a fellow 
creature, sharing with humans at the table spread for all creation. This suggests that we do 
not really ask about chickens at all if we view them as raw material, but only begin to ask 
about them out of a recognition of their otherness and a sympathetic attempt to grapple 
with and respect it. Barth has indicated that permission has been granted for humans to 
eat flesh, but it has not been given to renounce fellowship with the animals by 
555 Rose, Poultry Science, 96. 
556 Rose, Poultry Science, 126ff. 
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instrumentalizing the living animal. We might even strengthen Barth's formulation by 
saying that in living with animals, and in attentive partnership with animals (most clearly 
seen in the long term partnership of domestication), we might have something to learn 
about God's grace. 557 Thus the Christian question is "How can we take the chicken 
seriously, valuing both the individual's flourishing and the givenness of the species with 
all its essential and wonderful material and social variability? " Clearly, the animals with 
whom humans have lived most intensively, the domesticated animals, most directly (but 
by no means alone) bear the brunt of our decisions to forego such sympathy. 
In this case the practical implication of the doctrine of creation is to critique the 
project of fitting the animal into an intensive environment, and call for an increasing 
attentiveness to the welfare of animals. Use of the term `sympathy' is not meant to 
emphasize our psychological rapport with animals and theirs with us, 
558 not least because 
this is rather thin (but not absent) in the case of chickens. I am indicating that the 
otherness of poultry is complex, social, material, and in the absence of human breeding 
efforts, self-sustaining, and as gifts of creation their very givenness at these levels ought 
to claim our attention as we include them as partners in the project of human sustenance. 
This observation urges the thoughtful oversight of farm animals with an eye to the 
sustainability of their health and the land which they (and we) depend on. Such attentive 
husbandry relies on the ordered materiality and action of the chicken itself as the set of 
cues through which its flourishing is discerned. In relation to chickens this impulse is 
expressed by attempts to devise cages in which hens can express natural behaviors 
through the provision of perches, nesting boxes, dust baths, etc. Such attempts to promote 
557 Webb, On God and Dogs, chapter five. Webb criticises Barth for so focusing on divine benevolence and 
human reception that he leaves no room for the gift relationship between humans and animals. 
There is 
certainly more to be said than Barth does about what humans might receive from and give to animals. 
However, Webb, in interpreting Barth exclusively from CD 111.4, reveals an incomplete acquaintance with 
Barth's understanding of creation in claiming that Barth thereby warrants a relationship of 
human use of 
animals. 
558 This is in distinctionPiTany salutary animal liberation arguments which rightly try to circumvent use of 
the concept of animal rights. See Webb, On God and Dogs, chapters three and 
five. 
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chicken welfare are a small step beyond simple modification of barren battery cages. 559 
Yet without a major restructuring of the market even these minor changes in care are only 
marginally economically feasible, unless premium prices are generally embraced. 560 
Any more radical search for a way of life which receives creation as a gift will call 
forth wider systemic changes in the way we eat, think about, and practice food buying. In 
the process of deliberating about whether to breed chickens for disease resistance we 
again stumble across the "monstrous range" of the Sabbath claim, glimpsing beyond 
ameliorative action more radical possibilities for response. Breeding for disease resistance 
has been and will always play some role, however minor, in the discipline of attentive 
husbandry: but we have been enabled to see that what is at stake in asking the question 
within the context of widespread industrial farming framework is no more or less than the 
validation or incremental repudiation of the presuppositions of technological agriculture; 
the technological way of being. 
Eating and the Earth 
Our discussion of poultry breeding has clarified the point with which we began, 
well restated by Stephen Webb. "Eating and animals are thus more than symbols; food 
becomes part of the daily struggle of obeying God. "561 The rise of industrial agriculture, 
Berry continues, implies not only an impoverished view of the work of agriculture, but 
also of eating. By making a social ideal of minimal effort spent in preparing and growing 
food, and a goal of minimum cost, a wide range of effects has resulted, most importantly 
in turning eating and growing over to industry or "the expert. " The acceptance of this 
separation is the final self-estrangement of the gardener planted by God in the garden: the 
559 B. O. Hughes, "Origins and Development of Modified Cages for Laying Hens, " in Sherwin, Modified 
Cages, 1. 
560 Elson, "Modified Enriched Cages, " 93-94. 
561 Webb, On God and Dogs, 22. Webb ties this comment to the test of wills played out in the arena of 
eating which culminates in Daniel 1: 15. 
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consumer repudiates any link to production, and the farmer forgets she is the consumer's 
representative on the land. As a result both eat worse and farm worse. 562 
What we must ask is, Can we envision the richness of restraint? Can we delve into 
the richness of creation if that means forbearing to do something we can do? To argue for 
a new balance between people and tools, biological and machine energy, is to argue for 
restraint in the use of machines and a ban on the blanket application of technological 
logic to all spheres of life. All machine metaphors point to infinite growth, but we have 
no evidence that these lie within our sphere of responsibility, says Berry. 563 
The envisioning of restraint might begin with the experience of health, Berry 
notes, and such an experience might easily begin with the enrichment of our eating. 
Enrichment, however, we must remind Berry, when understood Christianly, entails a 
renunciatory moment. We cannot eat well if we do not understand the relativization of 
desire and need embodied in fasting, and the contextualization of the Christian freedom 
of diet implied in the eschatological witness of vegetarianism. Contra Barth, who 
insinuates that vegetarianism rings of Pelagian perfectionism, 564 I want to stress that we 
cannot properly talk about the tragic fallen aspect of meat eating (of which Barth is well 
aware) without taking seriously the eschatological witness of vegetarianism, which may 
be more attractive than ever in an age of factory farming. But contra Webb and others, 
565 
vegetarian Sm cannot be established as a universal Christian mandate without 
undermining Christian freedom and the divine Noahaic concession. 566 
In practice, eating in gratitude is connected with an awareness of food production, 
not only its mechanical producers, but its life cycle which passes through our own bodies. 
562 Berry, What Are People For?, 128; Berry, The Unsettling of America, 37-38. 
563 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 94. 
564 Barth, CD III. 4,356-357. 
565 Webb, On God and Dogs, chapter seven. 
566 Genesis 9: 3. 
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Berry contends that such an awareness is easily cultivated, for instance, through attempts 
to grow a small portion of one's own food. 567 
We lose our health-and create profitable diseases and dependencies-by failing to see the 
direct connections between living and eating, eating and working, working and loving. In 
gardening, for instance, one works with the body to feed the body. The work, if it is 
knowledgeable, makes for excellent food. And it makes one hungry. The work thus makes eating 
both nourishing and joyful, not consumptive, and keeps the eater from getting fat and weak. This 
is health, wholeness, a source of delight. And such a solution, unlike the typical industrial 
solution, does not cause new problems. 568 
Here we begin to see the force of Berry's claim that bad work and bad eating reciprocally 
feed one another to the detriment of the health of many systems. 
An awareness of the links between eating and producing leads naturally, Berry 
says, into the quest for responsible consumption. Indeed, the "responsible consumer" 
escapes the consumer category altogether because consumers are by definition estranged 
from production. The practice of responsibility in buying is categorically different from 
organized consumption because it marks a participation in production, bringing together 
what the consumption mentality separates. Responsible consuming cannot be a stand 
alone project, but is incidental to a responsible life. 
569 
Good political authority, recognizing these trends, would encourage the greatest 
possible technological and genetic diversity against the present promotion of dangerous 
uniformity, Berry contends. It would care for farmers, land and community by promoting 
farming at a smaller and more stable scale. In doing so it would promote local self- 
sufficiency in food production because the cheapest and freshest food is produced closest 
567 Berry, Freedom and Community, 41. For a list of practical suggestions on how an urbanite might 
begin 
to develop gratitude and understanding for the life cycle of food, cf. Berry, What Are People 
For?, 149-150. 
568 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 138. 
569 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 25. 
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to home. Good consuming would support such governance by seeking to keep its money 
near home in the local economy. 570 
It is perhaps an encouraging indication of the inner coherence of this chapter's 
argument with that of chapter four that here too the remedying of the fragmentation of the 
modern age entails learning a new logic in one's personal experience. Berry indicates this 
by claiming that his aim in discussing agriculture is to indicate how we may increase our 
capacities as individuals by learning to inhabit a redefined sense of what it means to be 
effective. Again, such a call for a renewal of personal practices must also be viable as a 
true political alternative. Here communities which are renewed in their understanding and 
love of creation can be generative of political solutions, and for this reason communities 
who have explored the inner connections of Christianity and husbandry on the margins of 
s7 industrialized agriculture (such as the Amish) remain instructive. l 
Clashing Forms of Life? The Sexual Complex 
By now the framework within which I will explore the moral import of the gift of 
human sexual difference will be becoming familiar. Thus only a sketch of those 
possibilities will be indicated here, understanding that contemporary sexual practice and 
thought about sexuality faces the same social forces as industrialized agriculture. But 
having unpacked those forces as they bear on a decision about developing a new ovum 
testing machine, what can our theological discussion add to the analysis of Part I? 
Paralleling the problems of the nomenclature of environmentalism, the 
contemporary usage of the word "sex" betrays a division of knowledge which separates 
being from action, and this act from its social and created matrices. 
572 This disassociation 
assumes that we know things better by isolating them, again presaging the familiar 
570 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 220-221; Berry, Freedom and Community, 40. 
571 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 23-24,210ff, 218. 
572 Bernd Wannenwetsch, Text of Sexual Ethics Lectures (Oxford University, Winter 
Term 2000), Lecture 
one. 
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application of industrial method. Thus human fertility is conceived as thriving when 
"freed" (like food production) from the cultural ties which once linked it to thinking 
about responsibility and sustainability. Richer and more diverse (because more particular) 
farming and sexual practices are simply replaced without the cultural forms, disciplines, 
and restraints and ecological insights that once kept them sustainable. 573 
Having understood sex as a resource for the production of pleasure, Berry argues, 
marriage is put under an unfulfillable demand. Rather than enjoying the many-layered 
richness of marriage, such as in its dimension as a communion of workmates who 
procreate and have pleasure in it, it becomes instead susceptible to succumbing to the 
grim competition of sexual capitalism. Having discarded any interest in exploring the joy 
of marriage as working together in harmony, but having promised to "forsake all others", 
marital partners are left to explore with one another only the unifaceted aspect allowed by 
conceiving each other as one another's exclusive sexual property. But, Berry argues, it is 
possible to imagine marriage as more open than this, more communal and inviting. 574 As 
O'Donovan earlier indicated, the framework of Christian marriage centers and orients 
human sexuality by giving it a cultural form which reveals the meaning of biological 
dimorphism. In doing so, it makes possible the vast range of human sexual difference 
which gives marriage its great richness. As an account of vegetarianism was a necessary 
part of talking about good meat eating, so also is it necessary to give close attention to the 
eschatological witness of celibacy in a full account of the reproductive aspect of Christian 
marriage. 575 Yet our concern here is a narrower one of outlining what might be entailed in 
the married witnessing through marriage to the goodness of creation. 
Berry points out that the concept of marriage both protects human society and 
fulfills individuals in their particularity. The disorderly discharge of sexual energy is 
destructive and fidelity is the necessary discipline of sexual energy. In marriage, a man 
and woman are not united against a community (forsaking all others) but are united with 
the community in a vow of sexual responsibility toward all others. Thus a generalized 
573 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 132-135. 
574 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 118-120. 
575 Banner, Christian Ethics, 301-307. 
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created impulse is made meaningful and responsible by being tied to the acceptance with 
joy of one's own particularity and the particularity of another. Only in this particular way 
of faithfulness does one take seriously the sexual aspect of communal life. 576 
In contemporary society the social aspect of sexual fidelity is marginalized by a 
view of sexual energy as a force to be extracted or "utilized. " But, says Berry, "Sexual 
energy cannot be made publicly available for commercial use. . . without destroying all of 
its communal or cultural forms: forms of courtship, marriage, family life, household 
economy, and so on. The devaluation of sexuality, like the devaluation of a monetary 
currency, destroys its correspondence to other values. "577 It destroys by, for instance, 
moving the attention of potential lovers from the eyes and speech of the other to the 
sexual anatomy. It is a fearful thing to reduce the complexity of fidelity and love to sex, 
Berry continues. In love we find ourselves by losing ourselves; in sex we seek salvation 
through acquisition and use. In forsaking the upholding of sexuality based on fidelity for 
sex as a social tool, a society severs itself from trust within sexual life, and in so doing 
politicizes sexual energy. Once politicized, one no longer asks how created goods may be 
properly expressed but how instincts may be indulged with the least risk to personal 
safety. Whether through disorderly use or systematic exploitation sex is dangerous 
because it is powerful, whereas as part of the invitation to give one's self away in 
marriage it plays a part in the ongoing transformation of one's own priorities. 
578 
According to Berry, like our estranged eating practices, the death of vibrant sexual 
life occurs in the failure to imagine its place within its wider range of implications and the 
refusal to commit and explore the particular. 579 As we saw in the example of gardening, 
work and eating, marriage and fertility exist in a single rich matrix within which sexual 
energy (and indeed pleasure) has its appropriate and therefore richly embodied place. 
These insights can be schematized in the terms of this chapter's earlier discussion. 
The proper, formed love of createdness in the context of marriage entails an appreciation 
576 Berry, The Unsettling of America, 122-123. 
577 Berry, Freedom and Community, 134. 
578 Berry, Freedom and Community, 134-139,142-144. 
579 Berry, Freedom and Community, 166. 
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of sexuality as part of the fabric of social and family life, to be tended and cared for in 
attentiveness to this important role. Berry has indicated a complex of Manichean trends in 
contemporary sexual practice-where creation is seen not as good but as neutral, to be 
used or exploited, controlled or overcome. Because Christians are prepared to consider 
the sexual rhythm as part of the gift of fertility, they might also see the relevance of these 
observations on the social construction of the use of the contraceptive pill, which is 
touted as bringing freedom by overcoming rather than working with human fertility 
cycles. This is not to set up an absolute prohibition of its use (as if this was the task of 
moral theology). It is, however, to suggest that the weight of evidence indicates that 
modern practices of contraception fit within a constellation of thought and practice which 
render problematic the embrace of bodiliness and the situation of sexuality firmly within 
a context which respects the embodied features which make for a rich, diverse marital 
union. 
Stated more positively, an appreciation of creation sees in the female fertility 
cycle not a messy inconvenience to be escaped or minimized by chemical means but one 
facet of the gift of human fertility from which we may learn the shape of God's grace as 
Creator. Because Christians have reason to closely question the quest for complete 
chemical and mechanical control of fertility, they will also be enabled to sense 
estrangement from the idea of "multiply and fill the earth" as a formula of blessing. 
Because they recognize fertility as a blessing they are prepared to consider that much is to 
be learned about sexual intimacy by recovering the shared disciplines of attentiveness to 
the limits and rhythms within which the union of man and wife can become more 
sso nuanced, more particular, and more embodied. 
580 Feminist Germaine Greer agrees that the technological paradigm applied to female sexuality has, like its 
application to agriculture, fundamentally undermined the femaleness of human fertility. More interestingly, 
she laments the inability of thirty years of feminist theory to come up with an effective way to convey the 
positive significance of fertility and menstruation. Our discussion suggests that attempts to portray fertility 
and menstruation in abstraction from their place in the marital embrace will fail to reverse the pervasive 
feeling that menstruation is the "liquification of abjection" and therefore to be treated with pills, surgery and 
"protection. " Germaine Greer, The Whole Woman (London: Transworld Publishers, 1999), chapters 
"Manmade Mothers" and "Womb". 
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Our case study of IVF at the conclusion of Part I drew out its emplacement within 
a social constellation resembling the Pelagian error in which the barriers of evil material 
can be overcome to achieve human perfection. A certain Promethean hubris was indicated 
which is mixed up with medical desires for career advancement, technical excitement and 
political power. Christian thought, negatively, is prepared to closely consider and reject 
any such use of others' sexuality as a means to another end, such as personal social 
prestige. Such a questioning of the status quo is made possible because Christians 
understand children as a gift, which also prepares them to consider the indeterminacy of 
childbirth as part of that gift. The Christian practice of celibacy has always indicated the 
eschatological truth that children are not essential to human fulfillment. Similarly, 
because Christians find their identity in Christ, they are freed from placing their children 
in the position of having to validate the parental desires which led to the undertaking of 
technical struggles before and during pregnancy to bear a "normal" child. 58' 
A repudiation of the idea of humanity as standing reserve based on respect for the 
human body as God's gift also implies staunch opposition to any technique which 
depends on the exclusion of human offspring from the human community for the 
purposes of any supposed "greater future good". The presence of the other, however 
nascent, is a place marker of the limit of human naming power established in God's 
claiming of that role. 582 Thus Christians cannot but agree with the prophetic note 
Nietzsche strikes: "Mankind unsparingly uses every individual as material.. . 
is that the 
umana comedia? "583 Such tragicomic suggestions have throughout the Christian tradition 
been countered by an inclusion of and care for the disabled by the Christian community of 
worship. To do so is to be reminded of the goodness of all creation, even when broken, 
and reveals the cruelty of "perfectionism" and the degrading implications and the non- 
581 Robert Song, Human Genetics: Fabricating the Future (London: Darton, Longman ' and Todd, 2002), 
124. 
582 Isaiah 43: 1. 
583 Human comedy. Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. 
Marion Faber and Stephen 
Lehmann, intro. Marion Faber (London: Penguin Books, 1984), 9: 585. 
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necessity of having "perfect" children. 584 Only as humanity ceases to try to name and 
remake itself in the project of giving itself dignity will its ingenious medical efforts 
thrive. 
Positively, Christians are nurturers because they appreciate the givenness of 
creation and their own adoption into God's family. Adoption cannot then be a "last stop" 
when techniques have failed, but can only be understood as a positive lived reflection of 
the experience of being adopted as God's children. 585 The orphan claims the attention of 
Christian marriage precisely because like a genetic child the orphan is already embodied 
and present. The practice of adoption, rather than participating in the modern medicalized 
fertility project, may be instead an attempt to reinforce the unity of the marital union by 
disclosing the breadth and depth of parental and familial forms of love. 586 Christians will 
have a concomitant skepticism about the defensibility of the application of vast sums of 
power and energy to the human body which characterizes the "fertility" industry, an 
industry which closely conforms to the technological project of gaining control of 
biological processes at any cost. 
Conclusion: Sociality and Materiality as a Site of Conflict 
With these two examples we conclude the discussion of concrete and practical 
moral questions which characterized this chapter and chapter four. This chapter 
responded to Grant and Heidegger, who drew our attention to the objectification of 
human and material givenness which results from the technological rejection of the 
importance of the formed nature of materiality. But what they have not provided is a 
reason why we should not, as Foucault says, simply embrace our remaking. This chapter, 
and the last, argued that Christians, who are told that all humans are children of the 
Creator, do have a reason to respect but not worship creation. As the thinkers of 
Part I 
584 Song, Human Genetics, 125. 
585 Song, Human Genetics, 125. 
586 Waters, Reproductive Technology, 75. 
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have indicated, our technological social context shapes us in subtle, complex and often 
ungraspable ways. In our reproductive lives, as in our eating and our political existence, 
we are given a chance to resist the powers of dissolution which set upon humanity to 
devour it. Given this insight, we can see that to ask whether or not we should use a given 
technology is a facile question unless tied to questions about the form of our being: What 
kind of being are we expressing and becoming through our activity at this locus? 
This chapter has suggested ways in which the Christian affirmation of God as 
Creator can be understood to claim human working, eating and sexual life. In doing so it 
has developed a Christian commentary on the search of Part I for the givenness of 
materiality to guide human making. Within the context of Part II, it, with chapter four, 
represents an attempt to indicate some of the concrete ways faith in the Trinitarian God 
might challenge or encourage trends within contemporary technological society. A final 
chapter will draw out some of the inner contours linking chapters four and five. 
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Chapter Six: Augustine and Barth on Technology for Good and Evil 
What manner of time, that is the heart of the matter. 
Thomas Mann587 
This study began with an examination of Heidegger's understanding of 
technology, ontology and human action, and so ends by returning to examine the 
intertwining of these themes. An examination of the inextricable relationship of these 
fundamental questions to the Christian gospel will be the task of this chapter, which aims 
to develop a more generalized account of the conflict between the two ways of life 
sketched in chapters four and five. 
Augustine's understanding of the two cities, and Barth's doctrine of the redeeming 
work of the Trinity from Church Dogmatics volume IV anchor this chapter's discussion, 
which has a dual purpose. On one hand it develops a theological narrative of the genesis 
of the conflict between the technological and Christian forms of life. On the other, this 
narration functions as a deep account of the moral back cloth of all human action in a 
technological age, of which any contemporary deliberation about new technology must be 
constantly aware. The chapter's two aims are introduced by contrasting the modes of 
moral deliberation which characterize the two ways of being. The chapter's dual purpose 
is necessitated by the understanding of the task of moral theology as defined by Barth and 
Bonhoeffer: Christian moral theology is most properly the attempt to offer a description 
of moral space and obedient human action which prepares Christians for humble 
attentiveness and free action within the ongoing leading of God's own work. John 
Webster has perhaps best encapsulated this understanding of of moral theology in his 
description of Barth's Church Dogmatics: 
587 Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus, trans. H. T. Lowe-Porter (London: David Campbell Publishers, 1992), 
chapter 25,234. 
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Barth's Dogmatics is, amongst other things, a moral ontology-an extensive account of the 
situation in which human agents act. Barth's ethics has, therefore, a very particular character, 
both materially and formally. It is primarily devoted to the task of describing the `space' which 
agents occupy, and gives only low priority to the description of their character and to the analysis 
of quandary situations in which they find themselves... such an ontology is not centred on the 
human agent, and especially not on moral reflectivity. Yet Barth pushes this kind of focus on 
moral selfhood out of the way in order to introduce in its place what is to him a more 
theologically-and humanly-satisfying account of the moral life as genuine action in analogy to 
prior divine action. 588 
A theological description of moral space which hopes to provide a re-narration of 
contemporary technological practice must establish that technological practice which is a 
force for evil stems from a spiritual malaise and, insofar as technology is good, it is a 
participation in God's ongoing salvation of the world from its pride. The chapter's main 
argument begins on the negative side, tracing Augustine's concern "with the basic flaws 
that must be discerned in each and every form of political society. , 589 Augustine develops 
a critique of human action which reveals the social aspect of human sin by arguing that 
pride is the hoarding of what is properly communal for one's own good. I apply this 
thought to name the demonic form of technology as the pride of our age. Meilaender and 
O'Donovan substantiate Augustine's claims by arguing that modern society is wrapped in 
the chains of pride as expressed in the habits of contemporary technological practice. The 
chapter's main argument concludes on the positive side, as Barth argues that the 
ontological bedrock of reality is established in God's work on the cross to overcome 
death and pride. This implies that God's present working in the world is the continual 
expression of this cruciform overcoming of evil, to which redeemed human action must 
conform. Thus human action and human work are good when participating in the 
historical outworking of this redemption. 
588 John Webster, Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 1-2. 
589 John M. Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
217. 
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This chapter argues that the technological form of life must be theologically 
named in order to facilitate our ability to perceive specific contemporary technologies as 
manifestations of human sin, pride, and curiositas, and thus self-delusion. Conversely, 
while "good" technology cannot be described on the basis of a principle, it is important to 
describe the shape of redeemed human action (and thus the making of technological 
artifacts) which is guided by a formed vigilance in reverence for God's ongoing work. 
This project assumes that technology is not a thing, but a mode of action, a type of event. 
In faith Christians believe that in the best case, human participation in technological 
activity can be understood as the contemporary work of humans who hand over their 
divinely given skills as humble gifts offered in train to the contemporary, historical 
working of the Redeemer. 
How Far is Too Far? The Question of New Technology as a Diagnosis of Our Mode of 
Moral Deliberation 
We return to Bonhoeffer's definition of moral theology, which began chapter four, 
to unpack the concrete implications of his claim that Christian moral deliberation focuses 
on embodying the good rather than the untransgressable limit. "God's commandment, 
revealed in Jesus Christ, embraces the whole of life, " says Bonhoeffer. "It does not only, 
like the ethical, keep watch on the untransgressible frontier of life, but it is at the same 
time the centre and the fullness of life. "590 Despite God being the center of the moral 
life, 
our common sense and all too often moral theology return nonetheless to the prototypical 
moral question of the juvenile: "How far can I go? " This question 
hides a fatal narrowing 
of moral vision. Rather than harnessing thought to overcoming 
barriers to the 
embodiment of the good, it is oriented to the attractions of the privation of the good, 
tending to link moral inquiry with the pursuit of an indeterminate and 
decontextualized 
freedom and the avoidance of moral consequences. Thus the 
heart of right moral action, 
delight in the good pleasure of God, is eclipsed by the desire 
for self-determination and 
590 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 247. 
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self-protection. This chapter will contend that the question "How far can we go? " betrays 
a fatal shift of moral perspective; God's delight has become a peripheral concern, 
displaced by preoccupation with power or fear or profit, in Augustine's terms, by pride. 
The previous two chapters explored several practical issues, in order to ask how 
human action marked by a sincere desire to echo God's action might take its cues from 
mediating forms. By developing an understanding of how such forms might mark 
Christian action it becomes possible to see that the "How far can we go? " question 
assumes the very boundaries it wishes to relativise, hence Foucault's internal consistency 
in not asking it. 591 
Christian thinking, Bonhoeffer says, because it knows the center of the good, can 
distinguish between the `permitted' and `permission'. "The `ethical' defines only the 
boundary, the formal and the negative, and is therefore possible as a theme only on the 
periphery, formally and negatively. The commandment of God, on the other hand, is 
concerned with the positive contents and with man's freedom to accept these positive 
contents. "592 Moral deliberation within such presuppositions takes on an entirely different 
cast. For example, continues Bonhoeffer, if I love my wife as part of the acceptance that 
marriage is an institution of God, then, 
There comes an inner freedom and certainty of life and action in marriage; I no longer watch 
with suspicion every step that I take... the divine prohibition of adultery is then no longer the 
centre around which all my thought and action in marriage revolves (as though the meaning and 
purpose consisted of nothing except the avoidance of adultery! )... the divine commandment has 
here become the permission to live in marriage in freedom and certainty. 
593 
The church can only appear hypocritical if it does not frankly admit that it has 
often and miserably failed to think about its action in such positive terms. As a result it 
591 This insight parallels MIntyre's claim about the fading moral momentum of western society 
in After 
Virtue, and is sympathetic with Oliver O'Donovan's attempt to show how contemporary political 
liberalism 
is a post Christian phenomenon. See O'Donovan, Desire of the Nations, chapter seven. 
592 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 251. 
593 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 248. 
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has consistently failed to challenge the story of "technological progress", not because it 
does not have the resources to do so, but because it has lapsed into `ethics' rather than 
seeking to be transformed. How can we take seriously this consistent failure of the church 
while asserting its real redemptive possibility? The focus of this chapter is to explore the 
basic mistakes of such a failure so that the church may confront the story of progress 
without simply capitulating or proffering a facile Luddite refusal. Augustine, and later 
Barth, wrestle with precisely these questions by admitting the weakness and insufficiency 
of the church, even while claiming that it is God's chosen mode of being in the world. 
Indeed, they argue that the church's lifeblood is precisely its realization of its weakness. 
Its life is found in the question of the rich young ruler whom Jesus loves (Mk 10), "What 
can I do to inherit eternal life? ", the open question marking the humble desire to "learn 
and test and discover and know what is the will of God, the commanded action that is 
good and acceptable and perfect to Him (Rom. 12: 2; cf., Phil. 1: 10; Eph. 5: 10,17). "594 
Augustine contends that human evil flows out of the refusal of such humility. 
Augustine's Two Cities 
Love and Ethics 
"[I]n Augustine love of God must be tied (socially) to love of neighbour, [and] 
hatred of God must be tied to hatred of neighbour and the desire to dominate. "595 This 
great Christian polarity grounds Augustine's City of God, which analyzes the history of 
the Roman empire through its lens. Augustine understood pride and humility to be the 
basic states of human action, with humility consisting in the recognition that humanity 
depends on God for its existence, and that in its fallen state humans can only find 
wholeness with the active help of God's own humility and servanthood, Christ. 
594 Barth, The Christian Life, 31. 
595 Rist, Au ug stine, 189. 
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This Augustinian emphasis on humility transforms the concept of love which was 
the heart of ancient ethical theory. Augustine combined the Platonic insight that it is not 
possible for humans to love the unlovely with the Christian teaching that the ability to 
love is the gift of a loving God, concluding that love cannot be understood if the gulf 
between the beauties of this earth and the beauty of God, the basis of all beauty is not 
grasped. 596 Because there is this gulf, Augustine says, the beautiful is not to be loved for 
its own sake but only as an ordered and beautiful divine gift. Thus, a just and holy life is 
judged by its love of the proper order of created things, a love oriented by its knowledge 
that God's love for His creation warrants our also loving its order. By framing love of 
created things in this way Augustine establishes that creation can only be said to be good 
because its Creator loves it, just as it is intact only because His love holds it together. 
Thus the basic form of human evil is to love creation for its own sake rather than because 
it is created, ordered and upheld by God . 
597 
As was common to the ethical theory of his day, Augustine understood love (or 
desire) to be the basic impulse of human action, perfected by the guiding of the reason so 
that right action might issue. But Augustine differed from his neo-Platonic 
contemporaries by insisting that the problem of human sin is marked by a deficiency of 
both knowledge and desire. 598 Whereas the Platonist focus on right knowledge led to a 
high esteem for contemplation, Rist notes that for Augustine "contemplation and action 
seemed increasingly subordinate to the overriding desire for a Christian life which 
transcends them both. What matters is less whether one acts or contemplates, but whether 
one's loves are ordered by God so that genuine virtue, of whatever sort, is possible 
in the 
circumstances. , 599 
In this way Augustine's thought comes to solidify around a distinction quite 
foreign to his Platonic roots: that depraved love appropriates what is properly social to the 
s96 Rist, Augustine, 157-159. 
597 Rist, Augustine, 162-165. Cf. also St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry 
Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 10.29. 
598 Rist, Augustine, 152-153,156-157. 
599 Rist, Augustine, 201. 
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private sphere, while holy love is to have a right love toward earthly things, 
understanding what is properly one's own and what is properly common to all. 600 
Augustine's programmatic statement in The Trinity clarifies the complex of ideas which 
will constitute the focus of this chapter's analysis: 
[T]he soul, loving its own power, slides away from the whole which is common to all into the 
part which is its own private property. By following God's directions and being perfectly 
governed by His laws it could enjoy the whole universe of creation; but by the apostasy of pride 
which is called the beginning of sin it strives to grab something more than the whole and to 
govern it by its own laws; and because there is nothing more than the whole it is thrust back into 
anxiety over a part, and so by being greedy for more it gets less. That is why greed is called the 
root of all evils. 60' 
With the crystallization of this understanding of pride as the basic human weakness, the 
role of pride in forming human institutions became Augustine's constant and central 
concern. This pair of axes, pride-humility and personal-social, formed the basis of his 
understanding of the two cities. The earthly city is that society whose unity is the love of 
power which displaces the love of the properly communal. Augustine stops well short of 
implying that power over others is itself evil, making himself clear that to love power as 
an end in itself is the perversion and negation of power. Power too is divinely created and 
should be loved only insofar as it is applied as a means to a proper end. 602 Remove the 
love of the good and justice, Augustine famously commented, "and what are kingdoms 
but gangs of criminals on a large scale? "603 
600 Rist, Au ustine, 155. 
601 St. Augustine, The Trinity, intro. and trans. Edmund Hill, ed. John E. Rotelle (Brooklyn, New York: 
New City Press, 1991), 12.14. 
602 Rist, Augustine, 205,217-219. 
603 St. Augustine, City of God, IV. 4. 
253 
The Peace of the Two Cities 
In contrast to modern ethical theory, Augustine does not hold the concept of 
justice to be the key measure against which the action of the two cities is judged, but 
claims they are set apart by the shape of their collective loves. By calling the two 
communities of loves cities Augustine intends to draw out a social unity: societas is unity 
of love. 604 The city of God is united in hope because it loves the true good which is God, 
and hopes in the coming of true peace which is eternal blessedness. But the city of man 
rejects this eternal good and thus raises earthly goods to the ultimate position, making the 
goal of its supreme happiness the possession of temporal goods. 605 Augustine warns 
readers that this worship of earthly goods is a dangerous affair because an association of 
love is also an association of sacrifice. If social unity is not found in the love of Christ's 
sacrifice, society becomes vicious, finding its unity in loving sacrifices to one of the gods 
who is "devoid of true justice" and thus cannot bring peace. 606 
The locus classicus description of the two cities is found in the City of God 
XIV. 28. "[T]he two cities were created by two kinds of love: the earthly city was created 
by self-love reaching the point of contempt for God, the Heavenly City by the love of 
God carried as far as contempt for self. " Augustine explains that by "love of self reaching 
contempt of God" he means a love that glories in itself while looking to be glorified by 
men. It indulges its lust for dominion over others, reveling in its own strength and 
powerful leaders. Its wise men give their lives to the self-aggrandizement of the pursuit of 
bodily or intellectual goods, the reward of which is an impoverished mastery without true 
satisfaction. But the inhabitants of the Heavenly City find their highest glory in God and 
the witness of a clear conscience. 
In sketching this portrait of the two cities Augustine is trying to distinguish behind 
the variety of all human behavior two basic forms of human action. Pride, in attempting 
to create meaning and garner human glory, exacerbates the discordance of its tumultuous 
604 Rist, Au ugstine, 219-220. 
605 St. Augustine, City of God, XIX. 4 
606 St. Augustine, City of God, XIX. 23 
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society. Conversely, the Heavenly City expresses in action a love of contentment with 
limit, of order and discipline both personally and socially. The strength of Augustine's 
description of the city of man is his firm linkage of the private action of pride and 
selfishness and the public actions of lust for glory, dominion and sensual pleasure. 607 By 
grasping this thought we can begin to see that Augustine would have perfectly 
comprehended the influence of desire and belief on the shape of practices as schematized 
in Pacey's diagram of technological practice. It becomes apparent why it was necessary, 
in looking at technological making, to look at each corner of Pacey's pyramid to map out 
how lustful desires or the love of God's works might shape our technological practice. 
Uniting these thinkers' insights reveals that what Augustine calls the city of man is in the 
technological realm a love of power which shapes technological practice by the 
indulgence of personal desires for power through action in social, political and 
technological spheres. But in the Heavenly City, Augustine argues, love of God inflames 
men to seek with their intellect to discern from revelation the proper orderings of life in 
these spheres, working back to critique and reform the desires. 
Augustine refers to these conflicting logics under the Pauline terms spirit and 
flesh. One city chooses to live by the standard of the flesh, the other by the standard of the 
spirit, and "each desire their own kind of peace, and when they achieve their aim, that is 
the kind of peace in which they live. 9608 The peace of the flesh is the continual expansion 
of war and conquest, growing from intolerance of any other rule than self-rule. 
Augustine saw this prideful peace as grounding the Roman empire, whose apparent 
stability was actually "achieved through the imposition of one's own will by the exercise 
of force, and is at once costly in its creation, unjust in its character, and unstable in its 
existence. " Michael Banner continues his summary of Augustine's understanding of the 
peace of the earthly city by explaining, 
Costly in its creation: of the imperial peace, Augustine exclaims (City of God, xix, 7): `think of 
the cost of this achievement! Consider the scale of those wars with all that slaughter of human 
607 Rist, Augustine, 221; St. Augustine, City of God, IV. 3, V. 19,20. 
608 St. Augustine, City of God, XIV. 1. 
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beings, all the human blood that was shed! ' Unjust in its character: the prime mark of this 
injustice is, for Augustine, the existence of slavery. And unstable in its existence: In the midst of 
a melancholy review of the woes of life produced by division and conflict within house, city, 
world and even within that `angelic fellowship' posited by `those philosophers' who insist that 
`the gods are our friends', Augustine notes (City of God, xix, 5) that the peace of the earthly city 
is `a doubtful good, since we do not know the hearts of those with whom we wish to maintain 
peace, and even if we could know them today, we should not know what they might be like 
tomorrow. ' 609 
While we moderns easily identify with this description of the antagonisms, 
trustless associations and tragic conflicts of social life, Augustine points out that God's 
work is to overturn the lustful human desire for power and selfish love of earthly goods 
which leads to such suffering. 610 The fruit of this work of grace is the establishment of the 
true peace of the heavenly city which is harmonious agreement of fellowship, repose of 
the appetites, and coordination of desire and action, in short, "a perfectly ordered and 
perfectly harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God and a mutual fellowship in 
God. "611 
Behind the action of both cities is the search for peace, which all men desire. Yet 
[P]ride is a perverted imitation of God. For pride hates a fellowship of equality under God, and 
seeks to impose its own dominion on fellow men, in place of God's rule. This means that it hates 
the just peace of God, and loves its own peace of injustice. And yet it cannot help loving peace of 
some kind or other... It comes to this then; a man who has learnt to prefer right to wrong and the 
rightly ordered to the perverted, sees that the peace of the unjust, compared with the peace of the 
just, is not worthy even of the name of peace. 612 
609 Michael Banner, "The City, the City and the City: a Lecture for St. Paul's Cathedral, " in Scene, 
Newsletter of the King's College London Theology & Religious Studies Society, 2001,15-6. 
610 St. Augustine, City of God, XIV. 11 See also St. Augustine, Confessions, x. 27. 
611 St. Augustine, City of God, XIX. 13 
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Part I suggested ways in which the technological imperative can be viewed as a claim that 
peace is found in increasing technical control and material prosperity. The Heavenly City 
knows that precisely such claims mask the power-lust which leads to personal and social 
degradation. 613 Peace, as Augustine so clearly relates, is found in loving the proper 
ordering of all things, a nascent form of which we saw displayed in non-Christian protest 
against the wanton destruction of important created goods. 614 On these grounds we were 
able to listen attentively to the observations of Heidegger and his interpreters who 
described the sense that something good was being consumed in the name of lesser 
goods, stimulating a desire to discern an order which can protect and perceive the order of 
these goods. 
If the philosophers have learned to love aspects of true beauty, can they also 
perform the good without any knowledge of Christ? While applauding non-believers' 
recognition of the denuding of the good and affirming that they may act in congruence 
with the good, Augustine denies that their acts are truly good if not directed to the honor 
of God. There is no true virtue without true piety, he insists. However, their action is 
appreciatively received by the city of God because those motivated by glory to be virtuous 
are of more service to the earthly city than those who are avowedly rapacious. Yet the 
slope is slippery from this appreciated virtuous action which is based on a love of praise 
to a lust for power which ceases to care for anyone's opinion. 615 Augustine hopes that 
those with true piety and who are skilled in the art of government will participate in the 
wielding of public power. Their ruling is properly circumscribed because they humbly 
attribute their virtue to the God to whom they have prayed for it, even as they perpetually 
ask forgiveness for their shortcomings. 616 The implication of Augustine's argument is that 
the city of God can applaud and participate with those who through technological efforts 
613 "Societies constituted on acquisitiveness cannot help but be imprisoned within perpetual conflict and 
violence. " Hauerwas, In Good Company, 213-214. 
614 St. Augustine, City of God, XIX. 13. 
615 This is why it is so dangerous for technology assessment procedures to encourage corporate moral 
deliberation about the state of labor and the environment framed only by the limits provided by the 
necessity of maintaining public relations. 
257 
seek to heal the sick, care for the poor, and alleviate injustice, however shadowy their 
knowledge of the Christ event. Yet Augustine warns that such secular efforts inevitably 
decay into something less salutary because, if not flowing from the love of God, they 
cannot but rest on the love of earthly goods or self-glorification. 
Having outlined the hidden wellsprings of good and evil loves, Augustine goes on 
to indicate how these evil loves mature into the deprivation of the good, by embodying 
the basic falsehood that humans may construct their own welfare using human standards, 
in short, self-divinization. 617 `By aiming at more is a man diminished, when he elects to 
be self-sufficient and defects from the one who is really sufficient for him. , 618 Out of this 
basic orientation of the heart, concupiscence, which infects both body and spirit or reason 
and will, comes all the open evils of action. 619 While not every act of sin is a direct and 
knowing act of rebellion against God-much sin is the result of ignorance or weakness- 
all sins are actions whose orientation and standard is self-referential. 620 Augustine thus 
provides an account which satisfies the demands of Part I: he understands the defects of 
the self-referential will and misinformed intellect in a way which demands that rigorous 
moral deliberation question and attempt to reform both the subjective and objective 
sources of human action. It is this Augustinian insight which justifies Part I's dual focus 
on subjective and objective technological knowledge which was most evident in the 
contrast between the work of Grant and Foucault. 
The punishment for evil, Augustine continues, is simply the unruliness and 
ugliness of disobedience itself, which results from the refusal of the promises of God's 
616 St. Augustine, City of God, V. 19. 
617 St. Augustine, City of God, XIV. 4. 
618 St. Augustine, City of God, XIV. 13. Cf. also St. Augustine, Confessions V. 3, where Augustine argues 
that though science serves as a false god, it may still grasp truth-it is a god precisely because it 
does have 
some grasp of truth. But only as God and not this god is worshipped can the truth about created things 
be 
known. 
619 Allan D. Fitzgerald, John C. Cavadini and Marianne Djuth, eds., Augustine Through the Ages, foreward 
Jaroslav Pelikan (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999), 226. 
620 Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1967), 350. 
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grace. 621 The story of the Fall reveals that disobedience abandons God to exist in itself, 
which is "not immediately to lose all being; but it is to come nearer to nothingness. "622 
Yet God cares too much for creation to let its self-destruction be triumphant and so enacts 
the work of healing which is Christ. Since evil is a deprivation of the good, and not a 
free-standing entity, "an evil is eradicated not by the removal of some natural substance 
which had accrued to the original, or by the removal of any part of it, but by the healing 
and restoration of the original which had been corrupted and debased. , 623 The result of 
God's work of redemption is defined as living out the "somewhat paradoxical [truth] that 
exaltation abases and humility exalts. "624 What is the content of this healing humility? 
And how might it engage with our previous thoughts on technology? 
Gift as Moral Hermeneutic 
For Augustine obedience in humility is sustained by faith in God's word that He is 
generous, lavishing gifts on creation. God has "given to mankind certain good things 
suitable to this life, " including peace, health, light, speech, air, in short; "whatever is 
suitable for the feeding and clothing of the body... and the adornment of the person. , 625 
These gifts are granted under the equitable condition that they be used to serve the peace 
of human society and their bounty elicits wonder and praise. In a striking passage, 
Augustine utters just such praises of God's provision of the human ingenuity which is the 
possibility of human artifice: 
Who can adequately describe, or even imagine the work of the Almighty? ... Man shows 
remarkable powers of mind and reason in the satisfaction of his aims, even though they may be 
unnecessary, or even dangerous and harmful; and those powers are evidence of the blessings he 
621 St. Augustine, City of God, XIV- 15. 
622 St. Augustine, City of God, XIV. 13. 
623 St. Augustine, City of God, XIV. 11. 
624 St. Augustine, City of God, XIV. 13. 
625 St. Augustine, City of God, XIX. 13. Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 323. 
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enjoys in his natural powers which enable him to discover, to learn, and to practice those arts. 
Think of the wonderful inventions of clothing and building, and the astounding achievements of 
human industry! Think of man's progress in agriculture and navigation, of the variety, in 
conception and accomplishment, man has shown in pottery, sculpture and painting; the marvels 
in theatrical spectacles, in which man's contrivances in design and production have excited 
wonder in the spectators and incredulity in the minds of those who heard of them; all his 
ingenious devices for capturing, killing, or taming of wild animals. Then there are all the 
weapons against his fellow-man in the shape of prisons, arms, and engines of war, all the medical 
resources... Man's skill in geometry and arithmetic, his intelligence shown in plotting the 
positions and courses of the stars. How abundant is man's stock of knowledge of natural 
phenomena! 626 
Augustine's overflowing delight in human ingenuity is followed by further wonder at the 
ability of the abundant and beautiful creation to meet all the physical needs of humanity. 
The Heavenly City knows these gifts as pleasant consolations amidst the painful shadows 
of life in the present, tokens of the eternal rest and blessing in which it hopes. It rejoices 
that God scatters the blessings of ingenuity and created abundance on good and bad, 
knowing that these blessings are only a taste of the goodness of the Heavenly City which 
is Christ. 627 Augustine compares the inordinate love of the city of man for these created 
goods to the love of a fiance who loves the engagement ring her betrothed has given her 
more than the betrothed himself. 628 Only the Heavenly City can recognize the 
concreteness and orderedness of the good things of creation while understanding that 
these gifts can easily become the focus of worship themselves if not continually 
relativised by the knowledge of the superior goodness of their Creator. 
Gilbert Meilaender argues that by framing the discussion this way Augustine 
allows the divine gifts both to empower and free while making a claim on our gratitude. 
Augustine understands a gift to elicit gratitude to the giver and a respectful use of the gift, 
Meilaender continues. Such an understanding of the proper form of human gratitude does 
626 St. Augustine, City of God, XXII. 24. Cf. also St. Augustine, Confessions, XI. 5. 
627 St. Augustine, City of God, XXII. 21. 
628 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 326. 
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not create rigid boundaries of use around a gift, but rules out uses of a gift which are 
clearly disdainful of it or counter to its purpose. Thus the obligation created by a gift is 
not a self-contained set of rules about its use but a freedom to explore its goodness within 
the broad limits of fidelity to the giver. 629 
Contemporary understandings of gift giving obscure Augustine's thought at this 
point. John Milbank clarifies Augustine's meaning in noting that gifts are in important 
senses inalienable from givers, and that in receiving a gift one is inescapably asked to 
receive the giver. God's gift to creatures is of themselves, and can therefore only be 
refused by suicide. A minimal return of the gift of creation is to refuse suicide, but a truly 
thankful receipt seeks to recognize the relationship that the gift has established. Thankful 
receipt of a gift, Milbank argues, seeks to strengthen and integrate the relationship with 
the giver by returning it, in time, in a different form. This indicates that the formation of 
serial relations is in fact the point of gift exchange, rather than the construction of a debt, 
which rather than building up a relationship, intrudes on it. Only as we enter into a 
relationship of free receipt and return do we experience the plenitude of God's gifts 
which makes generosity to others possible; and the church is the supreme engagement in 
gift exchange with the Creator because here humans repeat back God's life in Christ, 
returning it to Him with praise added. 630 Such an understanding of gratitude shatters the 
boundaries of duty language, and helps us to flesh out Augustine's focus on love by 
saying that gratitude is a specification of the love for God which claims, pervades, and 
shapes the Heavenly City. 631 
But a gift is only an offer until God overcomes the resistance of our sin, enabling 
us to take it up. As Rist puts Augustine's view, "God's love both commands man's 
obedience and gives him the strength to obey. Without God's help we are `under the law' 
and will either fail to act rightly or pretend (through various rationalizations) that 
(in this 
629 Meilaender, Practice of Virtue, 161-163. 
630 John Milbank, "Can a Gift be Given? Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian 
Metaphysic" (Modern 
Theology, 11: 1 January 1995) 132-137,145-154. 
631 Meilaender, Practice of Virtue, 167. 
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case) the Law does not apply. "632 We began this chapter by discussing the relation of the 
center of the good to its outer boundary in Christian moral inquiry. That image helps us 
begin to grasp Augustine's understanding of the role of divine love in orienting and 
motivating human love. Free human love does not grudgingly respect the outer 
boundaries set up in God's good gifts while longing to forsake them. Instead, it yearns 
toward the center of the good, examining its boundaries only in order to learn how best to 
love, as it calls for the empowerment of God to do so. 
The content of these boundaries is simply the order of God's gift of creation and 
redemption. Against this order, Augustine says, selfish desire throws up a self-serving 
counter-order, and our physical need projects yet another order, but reason tells us the 
true ordering against which these false orderings must be critiqued. 633 Augustine is not 
implying here, Rist explains, that natural reason is able to rightly order all things itself. 
Augustine understands the "rational" order of things to be established by the revealed 
truth that proper love for God includes proper love for our fellows. 634 To know the peace 
of this harmonious order humanity "needs divine direction, which he may obey with 
resolution, and divine assistance that he may obey it freely to prevent him from falling, in 
his enthusiasm for knowledge, a victim to some fatal error... so long as he is in this mortal 
body he walks by faith, not by sight. That is why he views all peace.. . 
in relation to that 
peace which exists between mortal man and immortal God, so that he may exhibit an 
ordered obedience... to the everlasting Law. "635 In this formulation the ordering of 
theological loci is assumed which I have insisted on throughout Part II: because humans 
are called by the Spirit and redeemed, they are given an eschatological vision of Christ 
through which to understand God's work of creation. 
632 Rist, Au uff, 191. 
633 St. Augustine, City of God, XI. 16. 
634 Rist, Augustine, 166-167. 
635 St. Augustine, City of God, XIX. 14. 
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Technology as Pride: A Society of Curiosity 
Augustine's clear view of the connection of love and limit, Meilaender explains, 
frames his definition of the sin of curiositas. Curiosity is not just an innocent itch to 
explore but is the Faustian lust for knowledge and power which overreaches any claims 
of limitation. Such curiositas is embodied in Foucault's neo-Nietzschean "rejection of 
everything in Western civilization that restricts the `desire for power. "1636 An Augustinian 
definition of curiositas, however, defines such sentiments as the prototypical sin. In 
modern usage curiosity denotes a positive character trait, an openness and freedom. 
Augustine too celebrates this openness to God's rich gifts, but would probably call 
wonder a more accurate descriptor of the positive content of the modem concept of 
curiosity. Far from rejecting the explorative pursuit of "useless" knowledge (which is part 
of delight and wonder), Augustine's concept of curiositas highlights the temptation to 
conflate the exploration of creation and human ingenuity in delight and wonder with a 
refusal to recognize that there are things that I cannot know because I will not do the evil 
required to know them. 637 For example, in the case of David and Bathsheba, David's sin 
was not the insignificant (from the neighbor's perspective) glance from the roof but the 
curiositas which led him to the intimate knowledge and finally the possession of his 
neighbor's wife. 
Augustine insists on retaining curiosity as sin because he wishes to affirm that 
beyond certain absolute limits no good may come of human exploration. David, for 
instance, might have avoided the full playing out of his sinful desire to sexually posses 
his neighbor's wife by exposing and refusing to indulge that disordered desire. Yet David 
came to murder as part of the desire to experience the ownership and consolidation of 
regal power that the co-option of Bathsheba as a wife ensured. Similarly, modern 
technological practice may find itself bounded, for instance, by a refusal to explore the 
cloning of humans because the attempt to do so, under current scientific procedures, 
636 Foucault, "Revolutionary Action, " 221. 
637 Meilaender, Practice of Virtue, 133-136. For an early view of curiositas which focuses on sight see St. 
Augustine, Confessions, x. 35. 
263 
involves extermination of embryos. Such a principle demands the true limitation of 
resources be squarely faced: moral limits reveal material limits. 638 Meilaender 
encapsulates Augustine's claim: "Our appetite for knowledge must always remain 
appropriate to those who are creatures. It must be set within limits and governed by the 
understanding that we seek not simply the enjoyment of seeing, but the truth of 
reality. "639 Augustine has already claimed that intellectual and practical exploration of 
creation are gifts of the Creator, only becoming vice when having no reason or limit, 
bounded neither by respect for others nor reverence for God. 640 Meilaender explains that 
for Augustine there are two vices of human exploration. The first treats the good of 
human ingenuity as an end in itself without limit. The second ties human ingenuity to a 
disordered end, a disordered love. It is this latter disease (which is not entirely separable 
from the former) which Oliver O'Donovan sees evidently embodied in a contemporary 
society which watches the appearance of new technology as a form of entertainment. 
When exploration of the technological frontier is the existential excitement of choice, 
curiositas, the love of ingenuity for its own sake, has become the sin of a whole 
civilization. 641 And as the Foucault chapter suggested, because this sin both enhances and 
is inflamed by the power of political authority, this unfettered desire for the extension of 
technological power and political power can be understood as the unified love which 
createemodern societas. 
With Augustine's help we come to the point of defining technology as the pride of 
our age. Technology is sin when it becomes a way of life characterizable as the search for 
power and self-aggrandizement. It is sin when it is a way of life without limit, without 
wonder at the goodness of existing creation, without concern for the neighbor. Here 
desire (concupiscence) reigns, greedily making an empire of our wills. 
642 The rapacious 
expansion of such concupiscence illumines the rapacious practices of empire building, 
638 Meilaender, Practice of Virtue, 140. Or, the covenant reveals the basis of creation. 
639 Meilaender, Practice of Virtue, 144. 
640 Meilaender, Practice of Virtue, 150. 
641 O'Donovan, Begotten or Made, 9. 
642 St. Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, chapter 30. 
264 
and vice versa. For both the constant temptation to evil lurks in the limitless and 
undisciplined desire. Augustine has brought into the light the dark and slippery slope of 
lust, at the bottom of which lies both the false corporate peace of the violent empire and 
the false individual peace of chasing insatiable desires. Furthermore, he contends that no 
one admits to such a lust because it is never possessed abstractly, but is always embodied 
in practical, mundane activities. We come one way or another to find "meaning" (as 
Pacey describes it) in technological behavior which, truth be told, we continue because it 
brings us a modicum of power, notoriety or selfish pleasure. 
These patterns always come to us through inherited social forms which draw us 
into self-destructive habits. These may be wrong desires which shape our knowledge or 
wrong knowledge shaping our desires. 643 Augustine is quick to warn, however, that the 
corruption of materiality by the embodied rebellion against God which forms "carnal 
custom" is not the cause of our sin, but is the punishment for our making others' sins our 
own 644 At this juncture Heidegger's and Augustine's points mutually illumine one 
another. Individuals are corrupted as they are born into the sinful practices of their 
progenitors, and individuals sustain and augment social patterns which likewise sully 
future generations by transmitting or transmuting the habits of pride into new forms. This 
is the theological implication of Heidegger's `world': we come into existence as part of 
the social matrix of embodied dead ends, wrong desires, and punishments of the actions 
of our forebears. In saying this Augustine is not implying that materiality and enfleshment 
are themselves evil, but that when the good gifts of creation are misshapen to serve 
ourselves rather than God and one another, creation's blessing is masked by human sin. 
When technology becomes the mode of the sin of pride we become comfortable 
with the denuding of the good perpetrated in the name of technological method, and 
uncomfortable with placing limits on technological remaking. Such sensations are 
powerful diagnostic indicators of our loves and the lords who claim them. This is 
additionally revealed in the tenor of our love as the city of God acts in well-reasoned love 
and gladness, not from the fear of loss or pain. In chasing its desires and running from its 
643 St. Augustine, City of God, XIV. 2. 
644 St. Augustine, City of God, XIV. 3. 
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fears, the city of man is kept either frantically active and in emotional upheaval or under 
the control of a steely pride, bent on reaching the peace of the flesh by living out its self- 
referential assessment of the proper ordering of the good. 645 
Here it becomes clear what was intended by delineating between moral 
deliberation about the "permitted" from deliberation about "permission. " The Heavenly 
City understands the "problem" of technology to be the discernment of the proper human 
place within an ordered love of earthly goods and the flourishing of all creation. 
Conversely, the city of man considers the "problem" of technology to be how best to gain 
tactical advantages by its application. It resolves its conflicts of desire not by restraint but 
by the expansive acquisition of additional power. Augustine does not repudiate the 
expansion of power but limits its selfish acquisition by enjoining the selflessness of 
service, the confession of sin, and gratitude to God. Conversely, the city of man asks 
"How far? " only in order to discern and remain within the minimum proprieties of justice 
while still loving the self-aggrandizing power which is a constant threat to the proper 
relation of created goods. 646 
How amidst this widespread unfreedom does Augustine think we may find the 
freedom of grateful gift receipt and return? Despite the fact that materiality and sociality 
are the vectors through which our wayward wills are formed in sin, Augustine's basic 
defensive move is not to eradicate temptation by changing the social and material setting 
of human action but to reiterate the importance of the discipline of the soul. The decay of 
materiality springs from the waywardness of human will, and thus "The soul is conquered 
by itself. "647 Such a change in our desire for God may become an internal discipline 
issuing in external discipline which over time acts to reverse the ravages of sin on 
materiality and sociality. 
To summarize the lessons learned by a study of Augustine's understanding of the 
two cities, we may turn to his own summary of the categories of human action provided 
near the end of the City of God. "[A]11 man's use of temporal things is related to the 
645 St. Augustine, City of God, XIV. 9. 
6aß St. Augustine, City of God, XIX. 13. 
647 St. Augustine, City of God, XIV. 20-24. 
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enjoyment of earthly peace in the earthly city; whereas in the Heavenly City it is related to 
the enjoyment of eternal peace. , 648 More concretely, "both kinds of men and both kinds 
of households alike make use of the things essential for this mortal life; but each has its 
own very different end in making use of them. "649 By exposing the form of life and the 
differing types of peace of the two cities, Augustine theologically illumines the role of our 
social embedding and provides a powerful theological framework to guide our perception 
of it and response to it. He suggests how the city of God can applaud the city of man in 
the upholding of created goods, and gives a basis upon which to recognize when that 
agreement subverts the ordering indicated by the eschatological end of peace. He has also 
illumined the critical theological insight that the short-sighted and greedy devotion to 
penultimate goods or social power as ends in themselves is the central fallacy of the city 
of man, leading to a false peace rife with injustice. 
The institutions of society, like their members, are inevitably mixed entities, yet 
Augustine makes it clear that this does not warrant escapist politics, for social life is a 
created good of high importance. The city of God is bound to participate in human 
community though it is unavoidably fraught with evil. As it does so it suffers "heartfelt 
grief' for the torn nature of social life, in the knowledge of how life can and will be in the 
Heavenly City. Christians thus live as resident strangers, experiencing the tension, both 
social and moral, between the description of life as it is, broken and rent by selfishness 
(as Part I attempted to describe it), and as it may be in eschatological hope (as the 
previous two chapters have attempted to describe it). This tension will inevitably mean 
that moral ambiguity is a constant feature of obedient public action, especially as 
Christians forego the lesser good of homogenous though forced assent to the truth for the 
greater good of uncoerced but partially destructive social harmony. 
650 The wandering 
citizen of the heavenly city, the peregrinus, is homesick for another world but in 
temporary dependence on the life around him. Thus, the Christian must be genuinely 
grateful for both the goods and task of life in society. As Peter Brown puts it, "the 
City of 
648 St. Augustine, City of God, XIX. 14. 
649 St. Augustine, City of God, XIX. 17. 
650 St. Augustine, City of God, XVIII. 1, XIX. 4-6; Rist, Au ugý, stine, 252. 
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God, far from being a book about flight from the world, is a book whose recurrent theme 
is `our business within this common moral life': it is a hook about heims ntherwnrlrlly in 
the world. 51,651 
Theological Ontology and Moral Deliberation 
But is Augustine otherworldly enough? Certainly Augustine's formulation of the 
questions which must be put to technological being makes clear the important roles 
played by desire and the love of the good in shaping human action. He is likewise helpful 
in portraying the destruction and disintegration wrought when desire turns self-referential. 
Despite having an insufficiently Trinitarian ontology, I will argue, he was nevertheless 
able to come up with a powerful set of insights into the dynamics of fallen social 
behavior. The preceding section drew out this strength by portraying the self destructive 
pride of the city of man as it applies to our topic. And while Augustine's solution, 
humility before God and His gift of created order, is correct, its formulation in terms of 
static relations of ordered hierarchies has a conservative ring about it which is rooted in 
his use of a pre-Christian ontology. That this conservative resonance is not endemic to the 
gospel will emerge in examination of Karl Barth's Trinitarian ontology. 
At a surface level the theologies of Augustine and Barth mesh extremely well. 
Like Augustine, Barth understands the root of sin to be pride, or self-reliance and self- 
justification, Bar and as Michael Banner has persuasively argued, both theologians consider 
human humility before God to be the solution to the strife of the two cities. 
653 At a deeper 
level, Barth, while interested in similar ethical questions, remedies two lacunae in 
651 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 324. 
652 This emphasis is as foundational to Barth's theological project as it is for Augustine, 
despite, or possibly 
because of, Barth's modern concerns with epistemology. Barth's extended study of 
human pride and God's 
redemptive response is tied to Christ's offices of king, priest and prophet. 
See Karl Barth, Church 
Dogmatics IV, The Doctrine of Reconciliation: Part 1, trans. G. W. Bromiley, ed. 
G. W. Bromiley and T. F. 
Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956), para. 60; IV. 2, para. 65; IV. 3.1, para. 70. 
653 Banner, Christian Ethics, 241-242. 
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Augustine's formulation. Though commendable in desiring to explain how Christians are 
to be "otherworldly in the world, " Augustine is hampered at critical points by an overly 
static ontology. By grounding his discussion within a framework of desire for the 
beautiful, Augustine's moral theology begs for the beautiful to be defined in God's action 
in the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. Without having established this, Augustine's 
definition of God's beauty is built on strong conceptions of God's transcendence or on 
conceptions of God's creative work insufficiently integrated with God's redemptive 
work. 
The implication of this oversight is twofold. First, when moral action is framed in 
terms of loving the eternal God, or as striving after the Christian's reward of presence 
with God in eternity, deliberation about human action is forced to cope with an 
insuperable gap between the eternal and the temporal. Second, because Augustine has not 
theologically explicated the work of God in overcoming this gap, it becomes apparent 
that he has not indicated in any detail how the Spirit might conform human action in the 
concrete present to the form of eternal life. 
The upshot is that while Augustine is excellent at defining the state of sin in 
general, atemporal terms, he has little or no discussion of how good action must also be 
appropriate to particular time and place. This means that on the basis provided by 
Augustine's thought, whose chief lack is a developed pneumatology and a Trinitarian 
ontology, it is difficult to formulate a complete account of the activity of technological 
obedience. 
Karl Barth's groundbreaking formulations in Trinitarian theology promise to 
remedy these intertwined deficits, yielding a substantive gain for our theological 
framework and our practical deliberation. Barth's founding assumption is that in 
revealing Himself in Christ, God reveals Himself as a reconciling God. God is this act, 
and thus what is eternally real is first and basically action having a certain Christ-shaped 
quality. In Christ, God's word and action are one proclamation of good news: Christ is 
God's definitive word in the form of a definitive action, which had reality before the 
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world and yet was for the world. 654 Christian life is that life which lives in humility from 
and toward this reality. 
Two implications follow. Because God's reconciliation of humanity in Christ is 
the more basic event upon which created reality is founded, we are given a sharper view 
than that provided by Augustine of the insight that "eternal life" is both an end and a 
character of action in the present consisting in the human mirroring and participating in 
this event. Also, in order for human action to accomplish this, Barth contends, a more 
developed pneumatology is necessary because the Spirit is the possibility and the content 
of eternal life, the presence of the redemption of Christ in humans. Invocation of the 
Spirit must therefore be understood to be an essential determinant if particular, 
contemporary moral decision-making is to be shaped by grace. 
Such a pneumatological definition of the ethical life provides a resource for 
defining technology as having a place within the life-form of obedience. Using the 
conceptual insights of Barth I will suggest the possibility that technology holds the 
promise of playing a role in our finding ourselves in the love of the other, rather than 
being only a temptation to denude the other in the extension of my own power. Going 
beyond, but taking up Augustine's definition of ordered loves as determinants of right 
action, Barth's work implies technology may be perceived as instrumental in a new 
way-as an opportunity or arena in which to find ourselves in service in particular and 
mundane ways. 
Trinity, Theology, Ontology and Ethics 
While Augustine, as a pre-modern, does not make his methodological 
assumptions explicit, his discussion of the two cities assumes the essential unity of the 
discourses of theology, ontology and ethics. Having maintained the interpenetration of 
these fields throughout this study, this assumption is welcome even having indicated 
deficits in his account. Because Augustine's account functions as a unity, to address the 
654 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV. 2,209ff. 
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deficit of his ethic requires an engagement with and revision of his ontology which 
replaces his essentialist ontology with a more fully theological one. 
In modem usage the doctrine of the Trinity has been used to make explicit what 
Augustine assumed by allowing ethics, ontology and theology to be seen in their essential 
and immediately apparent unity, claims Samuel Powell. "The doctrine of the trinity is not 
a theory about the eternal being of God but is instead first and foremost an account of 
God's being for us and among us... it is about the way in which the Christian God comes 
to us. It is about the way in which the Christian life is lived out by participation in the 
being of God. 11655 Having attempted to glean the best insights of the patristic era through 
Augustine, I will now endeavor to draw out the best insight of modern theology, turning 
again to one of its most important voices, Karl Barth. Eberhard Jüngel's examination of 
Barth's ontology will provide a way into Barth's Trinitarian ontology, which will be 
followed by an examination of its ethical implications as portrayed in Church Dogmatics 
volume IV. 
Barth defends an account of God's being which refuses to begin theology by 
assuming the commonsense perception of substance and working back to a first substance 
or prime mover theory in order to establish the nature of God's being. He decided instead 
(following Hegel) that God was most accurately known through His self-revelatory 
presence in Jesus Christ. John Webster summarizes this insight: "The crucial principle for 
an ontology of the divine is that God's being in and for Himself be conceived on the basis 
of God's revelatory action, which means on the basis of God's triune relatedness. God is 
the event of his self-gift as Father, Son and Spirit. , 656 This affirmation emphasizes the 
essential unity between God's being and His historical acts which is more revelatory than 
the unity between the substances He has created and the substance of His being. 
655 Samuel M. Powell, The Trinity in German Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
261-262 
656 John Webster in the introduction to Eberhard Ringel, God's Being is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being 
of God in the Theology of Karl Barth. A Paraphrase, intro. and trans. John Webster (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 2001), xviii. 
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This is not to deny that God can be known through His creative work, but affirms 
that this creative work is of subsidiary epistemic importance in relation to His work of 
making Himself known through the Word. Ringel observes that Barth indicates this 
difference with the terms primary objectivity and secondary objectivity. In Christ God 
reveals His primary objectivity to be one which claims humanity as Lord, while in His 
creative work, His secondary objectivity, this claim is not so immediately and strikingly 
apparent. 657 In chapters four and five the claim of God's secondary objectivity (the church 
and created order) on human action was discussed in a form which affirms that God's 
secondary objectivity in its moral relevance can only be truly understood in the light of 
the claim of lordship inherent in God's primary objectivity. God's primary objectivity 
must be understood to orient our perception of God's secondary objectivity, making clear 
the way the doctrine of the Trinity functions in a hermeneutic role. 
This claim can be restated by saying that God's self-revelation is the criterion of 
all ontological affirmations in theology, Ringel concludes. Such affirmations, Augustine 
has rightly assumed, are not only allowed but necessary. The concept of revelation is in 
this way understood to control the concept of being. This is to affirm that God has 
retained the ability to interpret and communicate Himself through the Word to the 
creature, rather than emptying Himself into His creation in order to be accessible to the 
creature on its own resources. This implies further that because God is known in His 
redemptive action in Christ, this history is the criterion of all other histories in the same 
way the being of God is not in sequence with other beings but is an event against which 
all other events are measured. 658 
657 Jüngel, God's Being, 62. In The Trinity, Augustine relies much more heavily on God's secondary 
objectivity to define God's being, though not entirely without attempts to transcend it. 
658 Jüngel, God's Being, 77-79. 
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Jesus Christ the Lord 
At the heart of God's self-interpretation is Jesus Christ, the Redeemer, in whom 
God and humanity are seen together alongside the overcoming of sin and death in the 
resurrection. Jüngel interprets Barth to be saying that the Christ event exposes the content 
of God's primal decision. Before humanity was created, God determined Himself to be 
Father and Son, and the Son was God's eternal decision to turn his face toward humanity, 
thus relating Himself to human history. Barth articulates this by saying that the covenant 
is the ground of creation. Because God has set up this covenant with humanity, He takes 
seriously the threat of the negation of humanity by sin, committing Himself in His Yes to 
humanity in Christ. This amounts to a commitment to divine becoming as part of 
engaging in the overcoming of the dissolution of being. God does not will this dissolution 
but upholds it, even as He abandons Himself to it in order to reclaim it. In Jesus Christ, 
hell, death and the Devil are defeated because God's being precedes and redeems non- 
being, a redemption definitively revealed and accomplished in the resurrection. Here the 
Father confirms the overcoming of death by the Son, and in this new divine 
correspondence humanity is included in a new correspondence with God. "In the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ humanity is given a share in the being of God which asserts 
itself against death, " summarizes Jüngel. 659 
So for Barth God's being is what God does in Christ's life, death and resurrection. 
The yearning to define God's being more "concretely" is an artifact of western substance 
ontology. This means that the reality of human time is established in the accomplishment 
of this reclamation of evil, just as the redemption accomplished there constantly bears 
fruit as God elaborates this act in overcoming the sin of His people. It is the human place 
in this active reconciliation with which we are concerned in moral theology, making the 
question of this thesis: How do we participate in God's working to reconcile humanity to 
Himself in the light of the evil and redemption possible at the locus of technological 
activity? We have defined the darkness possible here in some detail, and yet we still ask: 
659 Jüngel, God's Being, 103, also 90-93. 
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How do we, in this time and place, participate in its reclamation, judgment and 
redemption by God? 
If we are to frame the question of good human action in a way that takes seriously 
the problems of discerning my particular obedience, Barth says, we cannot consider the 
atonement a hypothesis to be tested, but must admit that it is the basis of Christian 
reason. Theology, Christian theology, begins when Jesus is first seen not as a man but as 
the redemptive event of "God with us", ordaining in Himself the world to redemption, 
and my self with that world. In other words, redemption is known because it is 
experienced, and thus true thinking about perceptions of creation and the end of all things 
can be undertaken. 660 Clearly, naming God's being in a Trinitarian way has concrete 
anthropological significance because it makes part of God's nature this bringing of 
human existence into a definitive relation to His existence. 661 
Affirming that God exists as one who brings humans into His existence means 
two things immediately, says Ringel. First, we do not know God as other objects, but He 
must let himself be known. Second, because of sin, God must make us fit subjects for this 
knowledge. Any knowledge gained of God can only be known because a human knower 
has been granted a share of God's own self-knowledge. At each moment the character of 
these transactions is event, God's bringing humans into communion with Him. This 
human communion, because it is not discovered by humans on their terms, is known only 
in faith, which assumes the awareness that humanity is different in kind from God. 
662 
Because God brings humanity into peace with Himself, Barth believes we can say 
two further things about the human who knows God in faith. First, to know God is to 
know Him as Lord, and this knowledge immediately implies a concrete demand on 
human action. When a person in faith acknowledges his or her justification they 
acknowledge God's designs on their sanctification, which takes place not generally but in 
their life, as vocation. To know Jesus Christ as God, Barth says, "means that the 
being of 
660 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV. 1,3-2 1, especially 19,90. 
661 Jüngel, God's Being, 69. 
662 Jüngel, God's Being, 58. 
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man acquires a direction, because it acquires a destiny and a perspective. , 663 The great 
hope revealed in Christ's work is thus the font of the little, mundane hopes for 
redemption of daily life which founds ethical transformation. 
Second, Barth is careful to say that this taking up of humanity into God's self- 
knowledge and work of loving in history does not imply the deification of the creature but 
is the fulfillment of human being which participates in the eternity for which it was 
made. 664 When humans do so, Barth says, they enter the kingdom of freedom. 
The kingdom of freedom is not one in which [man] can act as lord. It is not for him to act in it 
according to his own judgment. If he did, he would certainly not be free, he would secretly have 
left that place. It is the house of his Father, and he needs the Father's guidance to act in it and 
therefore to be free. But he receives and has this ... It is a matter of learning to breathe and live in 
that freedom, of taking it with all seriousness. 665 
What is the work of that kingdom of freedom? It is the honor of representing the 
presence of God Himself. To participate with God's action as one under a Lord is to learn 
that God permits created reality to speak for Him, that He brings Himself to speech in 
humanity. In Jesus Christ God promises that other creatures too may attest God's 
reconciliation as His instruments and signs. We are partakers of God's history because in 
our temporality His once for all temporality is repeated in historical particularity. Ringel 
encapsulates how God's being establishes this relation: 
As the mutual self-giving of the three modes of God's being, God's being is event. Because 
God's being as threehood is self-giving (love), this being may not be conceived as something 
abstract. When this happens it is not conceived as God's being. For `being is actually something 
abstract only where it is abstracted from love. '666 
663 Emphasis mine. Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV. 1,111; Cf. also 108ff. 
664 Jüngel, God's Being, 75. 
665 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV. 1,100-102. 
666 Junge!, God's Being, 41-42. 
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The content of this divine love that humans express is the same as its form: Jesus Christ. 
Their existence is no longer an end in itself and they have no option but to rise and follow 
Christ, being called and commissioned to "attest Jesus Christ in the world and among 
their Christian and non-Christian fellows. "667 They exist as a pilgrim people whose 
existence is not an end in itself but a public affair of mediating a Christ who is for all 
creation. 
We are prepared now to make a summary statement of Barth's Trinitarian 
ontology as the unifying center of Christian ontology, epistemology and ethics. The 
resurrection of Christ is a noetic declaration and the ontic establishment of the truth of 
God's being and the reconciliation of humanity to Himself. To receive this declaration in 
faith is to be as altered as one raised from the dead. In such an alteration humanity is truly 
transformed in "thought and speech and action. "668 This transformation of human being 
through the processes of reconciliation which grounded the argument of the 
Wannenwetsch chapter is now revealed as the fundamental ontological truth. 
Prior to being conceived as the correspondence of mind and reality, truth would be understood 
Christologically as the event of a saving interruption of the actual connectedness of life, in virtue 
of which we are first able to grasp that the world holds together at the deepest level, though not 
through itself... God is at one and the same time the interruption of the coherence of being and its 
intensification; and, therefore, the correspondence between person (mind) and reality, which 
occurs in all true knowledge, means, in the case of knowledge of God, a gain to being which at 
the level of practice makes more possible in the actuality of the world than that actuality is 
capable of granting to itself. 669 
This shock and remaking of God's reclamation of humanity is the reverberation 
and recapitulation of the resurrection. Heidegger exposed the modern tendency to 
understand our true and enduring being as material conceived with the help of the thought 
picture of an object moving with inertia through space (with perhaps ordered energies 
667 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV. 3.1,344. 
668 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV. 3.1,298-299. 
669 Junge!, God's Being, 138-139. 
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being its more basic substrate670). But Christian faith claims that behind and sustaining 
any such claims about matter is a deeper truth: the resurrection of Christ. This truth was 
with God before the creation of matter, and Christ's resurrection shapes our perception of 
this reality not as an ideal object of thought but as a real, particular, historical occurrence. 
Here God makes definitive His hand in and over the most definitive event of world 
occurrence-death. 
Whereas the mathematical image of a generically measured mass is too small to 
situate our perception of the multiplicity of world occurrence (the deficiencies of which 
Grant has pointed out), the resurrection is too big. It, Barth argues, "transcends its spatial 
and temporal limits. It must work itself out in another event, filling and controlling all 
other times and places. "671 To see the resurrection is to proclaim Easter as the day of all 
days, to expect the final day and the recapitulation and judgment of all things in this 
moment. The Easter moment, because it appears to us as a contradiction, is unsettling in a 
productive way, inviting us to expect and look for the presence of this new event which 
God wills in the contradiction and disorder around us. This crossing the border of death 
by God cannot but fly in the face of all other realities we experience. Creaturely life after 
death can only exist in the hand of the One who both created creaturely being and loved it 
enough to enter it, a singular truth, unmixable with any others, into which the community 
of faith is gathered and upbuilt. 672 
Again, it is important to emphasize that in order to do Christian moral theology, 
Barth says, the historicity of the resurrection must be understood as basic. First, at the 
theoretical level, this historicity establishes humanity as concrete, embodied being. We do 
not understand ourselves abstractly on the basis of principles because "Redeemed 
humanity has no history except that which is with Jesus Christ, and this means that man is 
interesting, or more accurately, real, in his concrete and historical confrontation with the 
670 Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science, intro. Paul 
Davies 
(London: Penguin Books, 1989). 
671 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV. 3.1,324. 
672 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV. 3.1,310-313,324-326. 
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living God. "673 Not only is humanity real only in his historical confrontation with a 
historical God, but the historicity of this confrontation impacts the shape of God's work 
in claiming His people for particular historical action. "He is special and different in each 
time and situation for each man, but he is never other than himself for any man or in any 
time or situation of any man. The multiplicity of his ways is endless, but his will and 
resolve in all his ways is one and the same. "674 
The Promise of the Spirit 
Having claimed that Augustine needed a stronger pneumatology, we can now 
indicate the pneumatological implications of Barth's Trinitarian ontology. Barth's 
pneumatology is irreducibly Christological. More specifically, Jesus Christ resurrected is 
the promise of the Spirit, who continues and assists to perfection that which is established 
and foreseen in the resurrection. By bringing the present Christ to life in individuals, the 
Spirit is the promise of the end which gives the Christian community its freedom. Thus 
the Spirit is the basis of any knowledge of God and provides the content of our particular 
knowledge of our being in Christ, our eternal life. 675 
Christians are free only where the Spirit of the Lord is, Barth continues, and that 
Spirit, again paralleling the argument of chapter four, is reconciliation. The children of 
God have peace because they live before God according to the "order of divine grace of 
reconciliation. " This grace is brought to them and actualized in them by the Spirit as they 
put their bodies at God's disposal as a "living sacrifice. , 
676 Christian moral theology will 
always fare poorly in relation to all other moral theories without making explicit that God 
teaches and transforms His people through the guiding work of His Spirit, drawing them 
673 Barth, The Christian Life, 19-2 1. 
674 Barth, The Christian Life, 18, cf. 13. 
675 Barth, Church Do mmatics, IV. 3.1,295-296,351. 
676 Barth, The Christian Life, 23. 
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into knowledge and insight not humanly possible. 677 Methodologically, the implication is 
that Christian moral deliberation is not first about delimiting duties or rules, limits or 
even eternal commands, but is the act of listening, a negotiation. Here a demand is placed 
upon human action that it become mature in judging, acting and reconciling as it learns 
from its Father, who is teaching women and men to be Christ-like through the Spirit. 
Pneumatological Ethics 
How does Barth understand moral deliberation to take place in this distinctive 
mode? Having spent two chapters talking about how God's secondary objectivity might 
situate and inform our moral deliberation, we can affirm with Barth the general claim that 
humanity's calling on God is an event corresponding to the event of God's making His 
grace to humanity known. Each individual case of this calling on God is a special case 
played out in the "light and power of the basic event between God and man in Jesus 
Christ, and totally determined by this event. , 678 From the human side such an event not 
only assumes the sinful brokenness of human reason and desire but lives in their humble 
confession. 679 
This dialogical event between humanity and God is always and irretrievably 
dynamic. God's speaking and claiming hearers, Barth says, 
... 
is not the timeless truth of a general principle, or a collection of such truths, but the specific 
content of what is always a special event between God and man in its historical reality. Where 
and when it goes forth and finds an answer in man's obedience or disobedience, it is a precise 
and filled-out direction and not, therefore, an empty form that still needs filling out and 
preciseness. Special ethics, then, must resist the temptation to become legalistic and casuistic 
ethics. Its task is to point to that event between God and man, to its uncontrollable content. 
680 
677 Barth, The Christian Life, 35-36. 
678 Barth, The Christian Life, 45. 
679 Barth, The Christian Life, 24. 
680 Barth, The Christian Life, 4-5. 
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The dynamism of this relationship implies a restoration of individual and 
collective vocation to a place of prominence in moral deliberation. It also means that for 
the believer seeking to act in faith, moral deliberation is fundamentally grounded in an 
asking which seeks transformation of the supplicant into something not yet graspable. 
Prayer in faith can only issue in transformation if it is asked without a specific answer 
being assumed beforehand. 68' 
Thus the question, `What shall I do? ' asks about God's choice of the good today, the direction in 
which God makes this known so that it may be kept. It asks about the very concrete and specific 
form and manner of the action that God wants from man. . . Ethics, then, cannot itself give 
direction... Ethics, however, can point to the event of the encounter between God and man, to the 
mystery of the specific divine ordering, directing, and commanding and of the specific human 
obeying or disobeying. It can give instruction in the art of correct asking about God's will and 
open hearing of God's command. 682 
This, Barth says, is pilgrim theology, and despite the often-leveled accusations that it 
makes humanity a pawn in God's action683 Barth contends that such waiting on God frees 
humans to take seriously the reality that our action must always proceed in the humility of 
not having all the answers. Barth, sharpening Augustine, argues that God's self-humility 
in Christ establishes our mandate to live this life of humbly calling upon God. 
684 Because 
God is the commanding God, humanity is freed into creative and responsive obedience to 
the goodness of creaturely and redeemed existence rather than locked into the rigidities of 
rule-based conceptions of right action. 
681 Barth, Church Do mmatics, 11.2,645. 
682 Barth, The Christian Life, 33-34. 
683 For this claim and its rebuttal see John Webster, Barth's Moral Theology: Human Action 
in Barth's 
Thought (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), and John Macken S. J., The Autonomy Theme in the Church 
Dogmatics: Karl Barth and His Critics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
684 Barth, The Christian Life, 8; Church Dogmatics, IV. 1,188-192. 
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To obey God according to static rules would represent a return to a 
"technological" mechanism which mounts attempts to manipulate God in order to achieve 
our own desired ends. Conversely, Barth says, the freedom of grace is not a static not 
sinning but a striving to live into a promise. The logic of pride is self-protective, but the 
logic of grace claims that only by living generously will we find a way forward out of 
death-the divine command is thus taken seriously as our life and freedom, a law of 
liberty. Barth encapsulates this insight by saying that there are no abstract good acts, only 
divinely given priorities for human action. 685 Because the task of moral theology is to try 
to understand the continuities of creation and human relations which God has upheld in 
His word and which thus claim human action, it must proclaim that all human action 
stands in relation not only to such truths, but is ultimately claimed only by God Himself. 
This claim stands or falls as He is faithful to be present with His church until the end of 
the age. Good action can only be that which coheres with its authority, meaning that its 
historical moment must be considered integral to any action's goodness. 
On Barth's view special ethics (chapters four and five) is the human attempt to 
outline how God's action claims human action in particular spheres, and should be 
attempted only as a preparation for the project of asking about God's present work and 
His will for the community of worship and us as individuals. 
686 Barth considers 
invocation to be the most incisive characterization of obedient human action because, 
"What God permits man, what he expects, wills and requires of him, is a life of calling on 
him. -)1687 Thus, Barth says, the command of Psalm 50: 15, "call upon me", is the meaning 
of every command and the basic form of all human obedience. 
688 
Christian moral deliberation, because it assumes a central role for the work of the 
Spirit, Barth concludes, is a living life form sustained in the act of comporting ourselves 
toward God with the question, "Lord, what shall I do? " To properly ask such a question is 
to consider what God has required of others in other times and places. In addition, 
I can 
685 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 11.2,585,703. 
686 Barth, The Christian Life, 7. 
687 Barth, The Christian Life, 44; cf. 37-43. 
688 Barth, The Christian Life, 44. 
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only ask "What should I do? " as part of the prior question "What should we do? ", which 
acknowledges that we utter the question from within that circle of people also taken up 
into God's grace. Thus, "What should I do? " is the question of that community which 
does not expect the echo of the answer they have always given themselves. 689 "Man asks 
because he is asked, " Barth says. I have argued that humanity is questioned by God in 
many ways, and have focused on God's querying of humanity in worship and in the 
boardroom. In each setting we are asked what our being will conform to, and the answer 
we give there flows out into our action and the actions of others in a myriad of ways. 
Technology and the Trinitarian Life: The Promise of Technology 
To summarize what this chapter has gleaned from Augustine and Barth in tandem 
with Part I: 1) Every age has its own pride and lust as well as its overactivity and laziness 
which push it into destructive imbalances. 2) Every age has its own methods of gaining 
and exercising power, the shape of which helps us to define the directions in which it may 
be led by pride and lust, overactivity and laziness. 3) I have emphasized that modem 
technological practices represent a successful attempt to gain power over the material and 
social universes. 4) This method originated before the modem age, but became 
hegemonic in the modem age. 5) Thus our task is not to renounce the technological 
method but to look at the ways it tempts us to refuse to participate in or recognize God's 
reconciling work so that we may find its proper place within this work rather than 
indiscriminately applying it as overarching method. 6) We should expect that 
technological practices, because experienced as a route to power and meaning, will tend 
to take on an aura of divinity, tempting us to reach for its help rather than God's help, 
tempting us even to apply it to manipulate God. 
What can be said on this basis about the promise of technology as part of the life 
of humanity which knows that its only history and reality is in Christ? First, we should 
not expect that any answer we give here will be as immediately graspable to natural 
689 Barth, The Christian Life, 32. 
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reason as the definition we gave of technology as pride. Natural man is capable of 
grasping the presence of horror and degradation with a clarity it cannot achieve in trying 
to understand the life of faith from the outside. We should not expect a Christian 
approach to be translatable into the terms of other moral systems, though its practical 
recommendations may overlap with and inform these other systems. The Christian view 
of technology, because it is Christian, is simply itself, based on its own unique claims 
about the ground of all reality. 
Because Christians affirm the Christ event as the ground of all reality they also 
affirm that technology has no existence independent of this ground. Moral theology can 
therefore only discuss those facets of the obedient life of God's reconciling kingdom 
which touch on the realms claimed by the technological way of life. Christians cannot be 
"technological" as we have described it, as a way of life, but can only criticize its 
overreaching its proper place in an ad hoc fashion by living the imperative of peace in 
sensitivity to the encroachment of destructive nothingness which occurs through 
capitulation to the technological imperative. Only as the expansive temptations of 
technology as a form of life are grasped are Christians empowered to take up this or that 
technological framework or artifact, always in readiness to criticize, modify, discard or 
embrace it in the light of their subservience to a superior mode of being. 
What is the reconciliation of the technological? On a Trinitarian view, it is the re- 
establishment of communion, peace, and fellowship in God's love. As we have seen, a 
Trinitarian view of relations claims that I know myself as I am included in communion 
with God through His Spirit, which is to participate in His action of giving Himself to 
others. The I truly becomes a subject when the gift of God's inexhaustible grace is 
returned to God in trust that He will replenish the time, space, and skill which I have used 
to serve others. God is a God of communion, a mediated God, from whom we know that 
our true being is found in trusting, mediated, communion upheld in the promise "give and 
it will be given to you" (Luke 6: 38). Augustine has noted that pride seeks to exploit 
relations by breaking up their reciprocity to serve the self, cutting off the possibility of 
others making a claim on me. But Barth's Trinitarian view is able with greater clarity to 
make the positive statement that Christ-like humility sees in relationality a 
forum for 
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service in which I find myself, no longer simply pretending to engage the other without 
receiving myself from them. The promise of the gospel is that by risking myself into 
God's work of reconciliation in the world as Christ did, God will restore and resurrect 
human brokenness from the inexhaustible well of His grace. 
Here then we come to the root of the problem of technology, and thus the pinnacle 
of our analysis. This pinnacle is not separate from, but is the conceptual center of, the 
many particular examples given in the last two chapters. Both the way of being that is 
technology and the way of being of Christianity utilize conceptions of space, time and 
identity. The way of being in Christ conceives wholeness as the giving up of my search 
for distance in order to receive intimacy, and conceives the giving of time to be the 
consummation of the Christ-like self. The false promise of the technological way of 
being, and the root of its destructiveness, is its refusal of this faith in love for reliance on 
a mechanism which promises salvation by ridiculing the risking of self. It asks us to find 
salvation by controlling space to find intimacy, controlling time to find meaning, and 
seeking power over others to establish our subjectivity. Thus pride inverts the gospel, 
using a method to seize and control the communicative possibilities of our creaturely 
forms of material mediation in an attempt to extract that which can only be received as a 
divine gift. The freedom of the gospel is thus turned into law by pride, and the good 
becomes odious, to be escaped from into "how far" moral reasoning. 
Technological life is marked by a style of manipulating the mediums of our 
communion with one another that is based on a lie. It is the mode of human action in 
which a method takes on a life of its own, severing our ability to think of any of our 
practices in their correct framework as service. Technology names the way of being in 
which humanity finds the idea of human life as service problematized because set within 
an all-encompassing project of control of the social and material. Fear and lust frantically 
try to gain control over the medium of communion while denying that our actions have 
repercussions beyond ourselves, an idiom of forgetfulness taking hold. At one moment 
pride denies its actions affect and thus harm others, at the next it seeks frantically to 
accrue as much control over the material mediums of communion with others as possible 
in order to effectively and efficiently control others' actions. 
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Such lies frame the promises of technologists to guarantee ever more intimacy 
through increased communication, information, and cybernetic control. No mention is 
made of the source of true intimacy, service and self-knowledge, which is to be really 
present by losing myself as gift into the other in faith in God that I will be renewed. This 
true intimacy is pushed away by the pseudo-intimacy of technology, this true time by 
"time-saving. " It is thus a trick whose only means of defense is ridicule of the claim that 
true subjectivity is found in the sacrifice of self into the other. This sin, like every other, 
when confronted with difficulties of its own making, tempts us in time of trouble to reach 
ever again for the same lever of power, leading to a deepening spiral of sin, irrationality 
and absurdity, an ever more incisive self-isolation. 690 Conversely, creativity in the service 
of grace breaks this spiral by calling us out of ourselves into the interreliant and always 
risky communion for which we were created. 
To see this polarity is to be sensitized to particular technological objects and their 
role in interpersonal communion. When technology is revealed for what it really is, 
having been lit up by the Easter event, this is what we see: like a word of blessing or a 
cup of cold water it is only an extension of an act of love. When this word or object 
comes between me and the other as a thing in itself, claiming its own solidity, when we 
begin to love it, then we are in the grip of penultimate loves which deprive us of both 
God and neighbor. 
A focus on the circulation of objects as the medium of human relation helps us to 
see that our habitual textual or abstract mode of perception often misleads our analysis of 
technology. We assume, for instance, that `economic indicators' are more real than our 
more basic material communion upon which those indicators are based. Heidegger 
grasped this insight by insisting that the basic level of human knowledge is the practical 
level of making and sheltering. As he made clear, the modern way of abstracting some 
information from its context-rich environment and privileging it assumes 1) the material 
world is conceived as purely non-specific and alienable, a standing reserve, and 2) this 
690 Jacques Ellul, The Technological Bluff, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990), 215-228. 
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standing reserve is to be used in an efficient manner, setting up the conclusion that it is 
the efficient use of the medium which defines good. 
I contend that Augustine's and Barth's arguments dovetail in claiming that through 
grace and gospel we are freed from sacrificing others in our search for wholeness. 
Augustine has said that if society is not constituted in humble union under Christ's 
sacrifice it can only become vicious because an association of love is always an 
association of sacrifice. 691 With Barth's greater clarity about pneumatology and 
Trinitarian ontology we now see the full implications of the gospel's claim: we do not 
need to sacrifice others to maintain our foothold in this world. The church's true witness 
is to live within the breath of the Spirit, and thus without victims and sacrifices. As 
Augustine grasped, we can only live in our place in creation partaking in true (not 
destructive and obscuring) relations if we are freed from responsibility for making truth. 
Participation in Christ's sacrifice releases us from this cycle because we no longer need to 
force upon our fellow creatures the burden of becoming a substitute for God. 692 
Good human making is portrayed in the ark-building of Noah, who built the ark to 
continue his story with God and God's story of the redemption of creation from sin. God 
not only led Noah into this course of action but worked to inspire and direct Noah's all 
too human construction efforts as Noah "did all that God commanded him" (Gen. 6: 22). 
Noah's building of the ark which sustained him, his family, and the animals through the 
swirling chaos of the flood is paralleled by God's participation in the building of the 
temple, through which the people of Israel were plucked from the tumult of the nations 
(Psalms 2: 1). God inspired and upheld these human efforts as the form of His upholding 
His covenant with humanity. Here the making of artifacts does not drive homo faber 
against God, but is part of God's work of redeeming homo faber and all creation from the 
sin and chaos of pride. 
In stark contrast, Jeremiah 10 summarizes the true problem of modern technology. 
Though the nations "cut a tree out of the forest and artisans work it with an axe, decking 
691 St. Augustine, City of God, XIX. 23. 
692 Christof Gestrich, "God Takes Our Place: A Religious-Philosophical Approach to the Concept of 
Stellvertretung, " in Modern Theology, 17: 3 (July 2001), 65-74. 
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it out with silver and gold... their idols are like scarecrows in a cucumber field and they 
cannot speak" (Jeremiah 10: 3-5), they are in fact impotent, distracting us from the truth. 
"The gods who did not make the heavens and earth shall perish from the earth and from 
under the heavens" at the sound of the voice of "He who made the earth by His power, 
who established the world by His wisdom, and by His understanding stretched out the 
heavens" (Jeremiah 10: 11-12). Technology appears powerful (as idols of gold and wood 
once did), giving the illusion that it possesses its own vitality and power. The Trinitarian 
clarification of this Hebrew insight is that when God is displaced from the center of our 
moral vision that which we make with our hands ends up becoming the form of our own 
self-isolation. "Those who make them are like them; so are all who trust in them" (Psalms 
115: 8). No matter how hard we try to make this self-alienation complete by pretending 
our creation is alive (paradigmatically expressed in the dreams of the makers of artificial 
intelligence), we will always in our prideful search for self-sufficiency be worshipping the 
broken ends of our communion with others. To see the Lord seated on a throne, high and 
exalted, filling the temple (Isaiah 6: 1), is to know that God alone is worthy of awe, 
against which our ingenuity is relativised, put in place, made productive. Yet pride draws 
us magnetically to awe at the work of our hands. This is the true nothingness which is our 
sin, that the secondary, the subservient, has yet again claimed our awe. 
Barth, like Augustine, is deeply aware that such idolatry leads to the evils of work, 
forgetfulness of the other, and greed. The real social explosive of our time, he says, is 
forgetfulness of the social character of work. 
693 But under Christ's kingship a new order 
is revealed, in which God's leadership both gives and actualizes the freedom of the 
church and within it the believer. Christians use this freedom to revolt against the 
forces 
of disorder wherever they appear, wherever deviation from order threatens 
"human right, 
freedom and peace-of a life of people in fellowship of one another. 
, 694 In short, 
693 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111.4,537-545. 
694 Barth, The Christian Life, 211. Though brief, it is unsurprising to find Barth's discussion of the 
technological "progress" spoken of within the rubric of the principalities and powers which contradict 
Christ's power. 
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Christians participate in God's action by revolting against power exercised to augment 
power itself rather than in truly sacrificial re-presentative service. 
The three besetting sins of the technological way of being can be summarized by 
way of conclusion. The first we saw in Foucault, who rejected any good toward which 
human remaking of material and social order might be directed. The second is to believe 
in a shadowy commonsense notion of moral limits, but to have real faith in the law of fear 
and pride. Such faith, Augustine argued, is always trying to ameliorate its fears by 
pushing back limits in the search for self-protective tactical advantage. This sin is 
embodied in the "how far" question. A final sin is believing in God's action as the good 
to which human action must conform, but being too lazy or unimaginative to truly 
participate in this good. Our target is that slothful conservatism exemplified by Emil 
Brunner's comment that, "As soon as we begin to do anything we are bound to do it in 
the same way everyone else does it. Even if we are building a church our action does not 
really differ from that of those who build any other kind of building, both in the narrower 
technical sense as well as in socially technical relations (use of money, conditions of 
labor, etc. ). "695 Such sentiments repudiate the profoundly transformative possibility of the 
resurrection and its promise to generate ethical insights about avenues never before 
conceived. 
Such obedience is always experimental, not in the sense of making up the rules as 
one goes or in creatively evading them but in finding new ways to be obedient to the 
promises we know. 696 The goal of this obedience is the renewal and superabundance of 
the creation as it is known in Christ. This being the case, on a Christian view the problem 
of modern technology is not that we manipulate the world in increasingly intimate ways, 
because in doing so the brokenness of the creation is also healed. This growth in the 
power to heal and restore life can only be applauded wholeheartedly by Christians as an 
unvarnished good. But if the power to manipulate creation grows, so does the temptation 
of technology to become an end in itself, or to be harnessed to fear or lustful ends making 
695 Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative: A Study in Christian Ethics, trans. Olive Wyon (London: 
Lutterworth Press, 1937), 245. 
696 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 11.2,598-601. 
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it destructive. Understanding the problem in this way we can see that the answer to the 
properly theological question of technology is not to be against all technology but to be 
continuously wary of our own modes of power, which perpetually tempt us to apply them 
beyond their proper limits, in rejection or ignorance of God's revealed peace. 
It will have become clear that such an understanding of technology is not 
interested in a facile protest against the whole of modern society in favor of establishing a 
pre-industrial utopia. On the other hand, the worship of the Christian God places modern 
technological modes of being under legitimate and sustained attack at almost every turn. 
Because Christians follow a God who transforms humanity, they refuse the snobbishness 
which protests change simply as change. Such a position means that the church must 
avoid embroilment in the purely aesthetic derailment of political decision-making by 
vague perceptions such as "too big" or "too fast", which are marginal at best and 
unresolvable at worst. For the Christian, change itself will require neither protest nor 
comment. What does require comment is a change in the life of society coming under the 
sway of an impoverishing lord. This may mean praise for new capacities for justice and 
material bounty or protest of the denuding of the good by new practices. In short, this 
protest will always be that engagement in the routine questioning of the form of society 
which has long been central to Christian engagement with society. The church may 
function at times as a force promoting social cohesion or a critical force, but must always 
act in service of its Lord. This means it must not allow itself to serve the integrative or 
critical projects of other lords, while preserving the possibility of cheering or joining in 
non-Christian public movements which serve the public good as theologically defined. 
The implication of this analysis is to highlight the importance of Christian moral 
creativity. At minimum, the affirmation of the importance of moral creativity indicates 
that by working within social structures as they exist in their evil state they are subverted 
as ideology by our refusal to participate in them in a spirit of slavery. Emil Brunner draws 
our attention to the commonplace patristic claim that a Christian shoemaker might work 
within standard economic practices of his guild, but his doing so will always subvert 
these practices by breaking their rules in light of a desire to better serve the neighbor 
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before God. 697 O'Donovan points out that such a resistance was practiced by the earliest 
church, who by living joyfully into the created order recovered from oppressive and 
exploitative corruptions to which it was subject. Slavery, for instance, was undermined as 
the Christian conception that slaves and masters were on equal footing before God took 
hold. This historical moment began the slow collapse of such forms of exploitation, but 
this historical moment was an expression of its actual defeat in the death and resurrection 
of Christ in which exploitation was finally abolished. The New Testament community 
affirmed this change in status, thus participating in the tide of grace which eventually 
swept away the caste understanding of slavery. 698 
Such subversion can also be understood as an active moral creativity. Stanley 
Hauerwas commends a form of Foucauldian micro-resistance which explicitly recognizes 
the multiple levels at which Christians may resist the impoverishment of society. 699 
Micro-resistance depends on a model of human action we have utilized throughout our 
study in which private and public action are seen on a continuum and which allows 
creative resistance at many levels and in diverse ways, through speech, thought and action 
which seek to reverse destructive trends at any point in lived existence. 
We must also keep in mind with Barth, who uses the relationship of Saul and 
David as a paradigmatic case, that God's work is not confined to cooperation with His 
servants but may also include working through those who are in rebellion against Him. 70° 
Barth's point is that God is Lord over both cities, whether they knowingly rebel or 
unwittingly obey. God is the lover of both, loving even the lepers, and thus "He is 
favorably disposed to the pure only in order that they may be at His disposal for service to 
the lepers . 
"701 Barth's central points recapitulate those of Augustine. First, the elect and 
the rejected only differ in their reliance on grace. Second, the elect are only elect to take 
this message to those who reject it. Finally, to take the message of grace into the world is 
697 Brunner, The Divine Imperative, 259. 
698 O'Donovan, Desire of the Nations, 184-186. 
699 Hauerwas, In Good Company, 134-135. 
700 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 11.2,355ff. 
701 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 11.2,407 
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not to join with the unregenerate but, while maintaining a distinction, to cry out for a 
unity of the two cities under grace while being aware of the siren song of pride. 
Christians above all should be able to participate in society for society, renouncing 
the simple service of self-interest. They see that in asking "how far? " there is no safety, 
only unrest, disquiet, and dissolution. Because Christians have faith that creation has a 
meaning, they will always be the solution givers, understanding the world and its powers 
better than it understands itself. The church's task is not coterminous with this political 
task, but includes the political task. Because they have established their lives in the 
unshakable assurance of their Father, they are "surrounded on all sides by absolute and 
unshakable peace. And it is not to ask too much of them, nor is it asked in vain, that even 
outwardly they should be and become messengers of peace. "702 
Having argued with Augustine and Barth that technology can be understood as an 
important part of the form of life of the city of man, this chapter has called for a renewed 
appreciation of the relation between the lived life and God's work of redeeming a broken 
creation. Its basic claim is that in claiming our whole way of being, technology serves our 
prideful desire to make meaning and can only be met by a renewed appreciation of God's 
gifts and God's work in time. This claim drew out some of the relationship of chapters 
four and five as it completed the argument of Part H. 
702 Barth, Church Dogmatics,, 11.2,732. I have changed the singular pronouns to plural in this quotation. 
The fair trade charity represents one of many examples of the church serving as a catalyst 
for movement 
against the normal mode of economic imperialism, which it then sets afloat 
in secular society. 
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Conclusion: Dwelling and Ethos 
One thing have I asked of the LORD, 
that will I seek after; 
that I may dwell in the house of the LORD 
all the days of my life, 
to behold the beauty of the LORD, 
and to inquire in his temple. 
For he will hide me in his shelter 
in the day of trouble; 
he will conceal me under the cover of his tent, 
he will set me high upon a rock. 
Psalm 27: 4-5 
Artifacts as Embodied Ethos 
Demetrius' meeting with his fellow Ephesian silversmiths turned out to be an 
exciting event indeed! Continuing the biblical story of Acts 19 with which the 
introduction began, we find Demetrius' irritation grown to anger and his anger to 
murderous incitement against Paul. Paul's "crime" was proclaiming Jesus the Christ, so 
debunking the god Artemis. This amounted to an attack on the silversmiths' livelihoods 
and their international fame, and Demetrius' inflamed speech to his countrymen laid bare 
the implicit threat of Paul's claims about the Christ, to such effect that the city's whole 
population was stirred to riotous anger. 
By proclaiming the name of Christ Paul called their god to account, touching the 
sore truth that their god needed the protection of human effort, belief in whom was 
sustained by a familiar cocktail of religious, economic, and nationalist beliefs overlaying 
a deeper pride and a desire for collective security. Might we construe Paul's action as 
objecting to their work because he believed the Ephesian silversmiths actually were 
making little silver gods? Of course not, he writes: "Indeed there are many `gods' and 
many `lords'-yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for 
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whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ" (1 Corinthians 8: 5-6). Rather, his objection 
to their practices of manufacture was an implicit moral corollary of his attack on any 
manufacture of divinity, any human grasping for control of fate. He objected to the social 
significance of their making of silver figurines within the local context and in relation to 
social expectations of the cult of Artemis. He made this protest because he saw the city's 
peace as an unstable and chaotic peace at best, a peace augmenting and upholding a claim 
that Artemis was the proper route to secure human well-being, power, and security. The 
deficit in the silversmith's work was in particular the making of idols, but was at a 
general level that pride and self-interest which takes up the flags of religion, nationalism 
and livelihood. Thus the problem of the Ephesian "ten men" group is strikingly similar to 
the problem of our modern "ten men": both pursue their work at the center of a society's 
self-salvific quest for power and meaning, and thus both suffer the temptation to the 
delusion that they can deliver it. The main difference between the two groups is that the 
modern group reaches for a method as talisman, the technological imperative, which only 
later becomes the representative and objectified physical object, while the silversmiths 
were fabricating the talisman more directly. 
We return in conclusion to the ten men discussion, to summarize how the 
affirmation that God is reconciling the world to Himself completely shifts the parameters 
for moral deliberation which both the users of TA and the Ephesian silversmiths assume. 
In grasping the ethos of worship the problem of modem technological being is exposed, 
its inability to see the forest for the lumber is glimpsed as one manifestation of a spiritual 
syndrome affecting all humanity. 
This study's assessment of the practices of the ten men can be made more explicit 
by way of a brief summary. The introduction traced contemporary forms of action and 
thinking as revealed through the form of moral deliberation (TA) utilized by a ten man 
corporate board. Part I followed Heidegger and his interpreters' arguments that 
contemporary deliberation about new technology as indicated in the example of TA is 
bereft of the resources to escape an unwitting replication of the technological imperative 
and in doing so denudes legitimate goods. Part II developed the claim that the good news 
of Jesus Christ is that in Him humanity is offered another grammar, another logic, our 
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true teleology. This new grammar of living is not one which seeks a better route to more 
properly acquire "new" technology, but is a recontextualization of our moral deliberation 
by highlighting the question of what, theologically understood, it might legitimately be 
said to serve. The radical re-envisioning of the context of moral deliberation indicated by 
the gospel message suggests a new richness of possibility for moral deliberation about 
human making, oriented by a theological understanding of its proper shape and priorities. 
Augustine warns us against utopianism here: there will always be an eschatological 
tension in practice. Even if any given ten man group comes to inhabit an ethos of service, 
it must always be content to bring the possibilities of service to life amidst a 
contemporary society which is hostile to it. We might rather expect conflict to inevitably 
begin within such a ten man group long before it tries collectively to live the life of 
service amidst the wider society. 
This study has not offered a replacement of one logical method or practical 
program with another equally concrete proposal, but has analyzed standard ways of 
deliberating about new technology in the hope of exposing the contemporary form of our 
illegitimate and inevitable pretensions to self-love. Those pretensions, Kierkegaard 
rightly observed, are so hegemonic as to be invisible to us, and "When this is the case, the 
art of being able to communicate eventually becomes the art of being able to take away, 
or to trick something away from someone.. . 
When a man has his mouth so full of food 
that for this reason he cannot eat and it must end with his dying of hunger, does giving 
food to him consist in stuffing his mouth even more or, instead, in taking a little away, so 
that he can eat? "703 
Taught by Heidegger and his interpreters, this study has listened closely to the 
intimations of deprival in order to expose the pretensions of the technological imperative. 
From this cleared ground I attempted to point to a theological framework of terms which 
enabled faithful action to appear in its living vibrance. Whereas the contemporary context 
is prone to assume that Christian faithfulness is straightforwardly congruent with 
the 
salvation promised by the technological imperative, the thought of 
Part I, by undermining 
703 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, vol. 
1, ed. and 
trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992), 275. 
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this assumption, opened up the space to imagine how human action and speech might 
express a different sort of being. This study has proposed that this being is best 
understood as centered and established in the redeeming being of Jesus Christ. 
Restating the purpose of the study in theological terms, the meeting of the ten men 
and the gathering of the congregation in the house of God have been understood as 
important contexts in which human life is questioned, and must give answers which 
define us as beings. In worship we are questioned about the form of our life with God and 
creatures, while TA sets up a questioning which assumes that humans construct all 
houses, all relations, including the church. Yet in the house of worship we are told that 
proper housing can only be continually discovered amidst a bountiful and sufficient 
creation. That this is the case, that all our making, technological or otherwise, is about 
discovering the resources given by God to sustain our creaturely lives, can only be a 
confession. In confessing God as Creator we confess that we need neither search for, nor 
fight against, our compatibility with nature, but like Noah and the ark our work is part of 
our seeking to continue our material lives so that we can continue participating in the 
story of God. This is the ethos of worship in which human practices play a small but 
nevertheless glorious part in God's redemption of a broken creation. In the house of 
worship we hear, learn, enact and confess this word, which is the indispensable condition 
for escaping the ethos of technology. I have suggested in chapters four and five some 
practical implications of such claims. 
There is a clear sense in which the procedural logic of TA most clearly represents 
the formalist logic of decision-making of modern society, yet we might easily have 
chosen other levels of social organization than the boardroom from which to analyze our 
shared moral climate. This is true, I have argued, because the guiding logic of the 
discussion which takes place in the boardroom is both a product of and perpetuates 
patterns of life in wider society. The decisions at the center of political authority which is 
the boardroom is one important but by no means unique point at which humans decide to 
confirm and entrench the social and material fabric of society along the lines of the 
technological imperative. The decisions made here rest on a firm certainty about society's 
behavior which TA assumes as a basic variable in decisions about technological 
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development. Thus we can see that the decision of the institutional steering committee is 
just one of a myriad of points at which "logical action" retains its publicly familiar shape. 
We must not naively think that the "problem" of technology is solved in the corporate 
boardroom, because the subconscious desires and wrongly oriented knowledge which 
subvert the manager's action also subvert our own. 
Returning to our opening chapter, three main differences between TA and 
Christian love emerge. The first is that, in contrast to the goals of TA, institutional 
survival is not understood in Christian theology to be the telos of homo faber nor even a 
human responsibility. Second, institutional survival is not only an artifact of God's 
blessing rather than human action, but Christians (unlike the users of TA) have been told 
through revelation that there are moral commitments which cannot be violated even to 
save an institution. Christians confess that such boundaries sustain ever-new and 
transformative interpretative innovation. These absolute prohibitions, however, are not 
the heart of Christian theology. This means that, third, Christian theology (unlike good 
action as understood within the framework of TA) has a rich and multi-faceted vision of 
the ordering of ends which right human action serves, and is thus able to give a more 
fine-grained analysis of the negative and positive aspects of proposed action. The contrast 
between the two thought worlds can be crisply summarized. TA has only one inviolable 
prohibition: Thou shalt not undermine the survival of the institution, or stated positively: 
Thou shalt protect your own institution by ceaselessly expanding those "resources" under 
your control. The Christian community has one inviolable claim upon it: Thou shalt love 
the Lord thy God and your neighbor as yourself, or, stated negatively: Do nothing which 
harms your fellow man. The promise of Christ is that the embodying of His love makes 
possible a freedom and free innovation far beyond action springing from the compulsion 
to expansion driven by fear. 
In sum, the promise of the technological imperative in modern society fits the 
classic definition of that offered by a god, principality, or power. The response offered by 
this study has been to scrutinize its claims, to study this god's powerlessness to deliver on 
its promises as typified by the dilemmas at the locus we call "new technology". 
Foucault's discussion of problematization spurred the theological insight that our 
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disappointment with our false gods provides an opening for a new and purer devotion to 
the service of the true God's work in the world. Through the case study of the moral 
deliberation of the "ten men" we have exposed the relevant claims of the technological 
imperative, so that we may, in Augustine's words, demote the worship of the penultimate 
goods of human ingenuity and work to their proper place before the ultimate good, God. 
This is not to dismiss as useless empirical analyses like impact analysis, but to insist that 
their proper remit is to bring to explicit knowledge information which should be taken 
into account by a non-proceduralist, non-consequentialist, theologically-informed mode 
of moral deliberation. 
Obedience, Not Results 
If the technological hermeneutic is as hegemonic as has been suggested, then 
Kierkegaard is also right to warn, 
It is said that were Christ to come in to the world now he would be crucified again. That is not 
quite true. The world has changed, it is now situated in 'understanding'. So Christ would be 
laughed at, treated as mad, but as a madman one ridicules... 
704 
Augustine, Barth and Wannenwetsch have insisted that such ridicule and our own moral 
confusions are an ineradicable part of obedient human action in this time between the 
times. This ought not surprise Christians, says Richard Hays, as "Jesus' death on a cross 
is the paradigm for faithfulness to God in this world. " The essential point 
for Christian 
moral deliberation, he says, is that "our actions are therefore not judged 
by their 
calculable efficacy in producing desirable results but by their correspondence to 
Jesus' 
example. , 705 We are always being given up to death so that the 
life of Jesus may be made 
704 Soren Kierkegaard, Papers and Journals: A Selection, trans. with intro. 
Alastair Hannay (London: 
Penguin Books, 1996), 49 XIA 187,376. 
705 Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Community 
Cross, New Creation. A 
Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics (New York: Harper San 
Francisco, 1996), 197. 
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visible in our mortal flesh. 706 In this way the church embodies the power of the 
resurrection in a world still being redeemed. Against the animosity this arouses in the 
world, Paul says, "Our sole defense, our only weapon, is a life of integrity, whether we 
meet honor or dishonor, praise or blame" (2 Corinthians 6: 7). 
This study has attempted to draw out two implications of this theological 
affirmation for Christian moral deliberation. First, because human action takes place in a 
world whose redemption is still being actualized, human commitment to participate in 
God's reconciling action always stands amidst our own and others' mixed motives. The 
two kingdoms battle within and around each individual; because reconciliation is 
historical God's work will be met in each human by a dynamic struggle between a partial 
acceptance and a partial rejection, a tension sustained only by God's working in us. 707 
This means that the believer can only act rightly in the faith that he or she has made the 
attempt, however inadequate, to accompany God's working. The weight of our analysis 
has focused on setting out as clearly as possible the priorities to which obedience seeks to 
be faithful, rather than relying on consequentialist reasoning in the examination of 
outcomes, though we have seen that the effects of our action are not irrelevant to proper 
moral deliberation. 
Second, the ambiguity of such a life breeds not fear but humble faith that 
redemption is the outworking of Christ's power over all things. By taking on the role of 
follower the believer is delivered from the burden of ensuring God's triumph and the 
defeat of this age's powers. 708 This does not mean that life becomes suddenly frivolous or 
detached, but indicates how the Christ-sign set up over this time and our lives means 
something more and different to the eyes of faith than to the non-believer. To truly hear 
this word is not only to hear but to repeat and accompany it with our own all too human 
chorus. This makes Christians great, Barth points out, because in doing so they are made 
part of Jesus' fight against darkness and for humanity. But it makes them small because 
they are shown the domination of sin and the bondage of humanity which exposes the 
706 2 Corinthians 4: 11. 
707 Barth, Church Do matics, IV. 3.1,191-196. 
708 1 Corinthians 3: 21-23. 
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monstrous demand made on them should they side with Jesus in His fight. "Who has such 
deep and necessary cause for sighing as he who has received the promise of the Spirit, in 
whom it is already fulfilled, who knows what others do not yet know, namely, that Jesus 
Christ alone is the hope of the world and therefore his hope, to whom the positive sign 
under which we may exist here and now is known and not merely imposed, who is thus 
permitted but also required to live with this knowledge? "709 
Yet, Paul encourages the church in Romans 8: 3 1, "If God be for us, who can be 
against us? " This affirmation, Barth suggests, is precisely what makes the Christian life 
difficult and glorious, and therefore "possible, necessary and meaningful in this time. 
This is what makes him in all circumstances a positive man. 9,710 In relation to our topic, I 
have suggested that this positivity has the effect of releasing human action from the 
reckless or paralyzing fear of tragic outcomes which demand human work shoulder the 
burden of ensuring salvation. Truly obedient action becomes possible in the realization 
that human freedom is being released from solemn self-salvation into the joyful and 
playful yet bittersweet enjoyment of God's good creation. 
Only on these terms can Christians celebrate with Augustine the ingenuity of the 
human mind that issues in fantastically creative technologies. He sensitizes us to the 
goodness of human ingenuity and gifts of creation, insisting that the two can come 
together in the creation of good and beneficial technologies. From him we discern that 
our final position on technology must be that, like all human ingenuity, science as an 
abstracting logic has its proper, quite limited, place but must not become an all-inclusive 
metaphysic. Having had our certainties shattered by a vision of the reconciling God-man, 
we see that the methods of technology must be considered from within a love of the 
material creation, of our own bodies as gifts, and of the preciousness of social 
relationships which emerge from the command to the church to be reconciled with one 
another. The recognition of such divine gifts gives structure to joyful action, providing 
creativity with direction precisely by taking creation to be a good gift of 
God and 
709 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV. 3.1,366. 
710 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV. 3.1,367. 
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therefore gospel-the good news which permeates the things we touch and see, and the 
people with whom we converse. 
If human work understands its meaning as grounded in the unique truth of Christ, 
it will at times resonate with the goodness in the human work around it, but will 
invariably do so in a way that what it embraces and rejects will appear inexplicable from 
the perspective of the technological imperative. This is because, I have argued, the 
Christian way of life is sui generis. Therefore the Christian No is at times a Yes to 
something which reaches the same goal as the non-Christian, and other times it is a 
categorical repudiation of such goals. But primarily, Christian naysaying will be 
peripheral to the desire for and a practical vision of an embodied Yes to the good of 
society, a Yes embodying Christ's Yes to the human race. 
Kierkegaard, the master of God-fearing self-suspicion, sums up well the danger of 
conceiving Christian moral deliberation this way: "The wrong path lies all too close, 
wanting to reform the world instead of oneself, and just designed for uneasy minds with 
much imagination. "711 To forestall such hypocrisy, the only proper resolution of the 
problem of the technological imperative must lie in the desire to be involved in the 
experimentation which is attempting to learn the logic of grace in every facet of our lives. 
As the knowledge of grace spreads from one area of life to another, beginning with one 
insight grasped close to home, it will eventually become real in our work, at some point 
"walking to work" becoming "changing the kind of work you walk to. "712 Tackling 
larger, more social battles can only be a process which is attentive to particular 
circumstance and the leading of conscience and the Spirit. Such engagement in the 
workplace, for instance, may mean insisting on simple things such as institutional 
honesty, or might entail more active questioning of practices like budgeting the 
reformulation of "the skeleton of the [institution] stripped free of all ideology. 9713 In both 
personal and corporate realms the experimental quality of the life of grace might also 
71 1 Kierkegaard, Papers and Journals, 49 XIA 513,393. 
712 Pacey, Meaning in Technology, 216. 
713 Richard Swedenberg, Schumpeter: A Biography (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 95, 
quoting Rudolph Goldscheid. 
300 
cause us to reconsider practical modes of self-inquiry such as that proposed by Langdon 
Winner. 
One conceivable approach to tackling whatever flaws one sees in the various systems of 
technology might be to begin dismantling those systems. This I would propose not as a solution 
in itself, but as a method of inquiry. The forgotten essence of technical activity, regardless of the 
specific purpose at hand, will be revealed by this very basic yet, at the same time, most difficult 
of steps. 714 
We might also inquire into the systems designed to accelerate and protect the momentum 
of the technical imperative, such as trade and patent law. These are just a few of the 
possibilities open to creative faithfulness, by no means an exhaustive list, but offered as 
an indication of what practical possibilities opened up through the humble exploration of 
the logic of grace. 
Taking Hold of the Life That Really is Life: Dwelling in the House of the Lord 
The promise of the Christ event is that as humans act in faith they are freed from 
their own self-contradiction by ceasing to contradict God. By studying technology we 
have seen many indications that in Christ the "myth of labor-saving"715 may have its hold 
broken, liberating human action from consuming itself in the name of its own power. 
Such liberation, we are told in the resurrection of Christ, frees our work from fear and 
slavery to ourselves, handing it over to the life of service to do much greater things, 
in 
confidence that we will "see the goodness of the Lord in the land of the 
living" (Psalms 
27: 13). 
Augustine's narration of the church's struggle for faithfulness is also that of the 
aged Paul in the first book to Timothy. Our gain, our eternal inheritance, 
is "great gain in 
714 Winner, Autonomous Technology, 330. 
715 Winner, Autonomous Technology, 204. 
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godliness combined with contentment" (6: 6). This contentment, Paul reminds us again, 
transvalues our prideful ideas about power, exposing the pretensions of scarcity which 
pride perpetually holds up as the basic force of the universe. Yet, Paul says, in Christ 
creation is known as benefit, and power is revealed to be given for service to all. Thus 
Paul exhorts the powerful, "As for those who in the present age are rich, command them 
not to be haughty or to set their hopes on the uncertainty of riches, but rather on God who 
richly provides us with everything for our enjoyment. They are to do good, to be rich in 
good works, generous and ready to share" (6: 17-19). This, Paul informs us, is the "life 
that really is life" (6: 19), born in God's action and ratified by our baptism. He exhorts us 
in conclusion, "Fight the good fight of faith; take hold of the eternal life to which you 
were called and for which you make the good confession in the presence of many 
witnesses" (6: 12). 
Humans can achieve such confidence only by dwelling in the shelter of God's 
imperative word-Sabbath-which is the transformative reality of eschatological justice. 
To contemplate such a theme is to face a demand for response, either committing 
ourselves to it or standing back "objectively" without commitment. 716 We have not the 
faith to "produce" such an ethos on our own, Bonhoeffer points out, to which 
Jesus says: "First obey, perform the external work, renounce your attachments, give up the 
obstacles which separate you from the will of God. Do not say you have not got faith. You will 
not have it so long as you persist in disobedience and refuse to take the first step. ""' 
Because the Spirit is establishing such faith and such an ethos, Augustine knew 
that the heart of the biblical message is the promise that God is establishing the city of 
God and will protect it among the kingdoms. In faith that it is the recipient of this great 
gift of grace, it becomes possible for the church to dwell in stillness in the house of the 
Lord, even as its hands and feet explore the good creation to find suitable forms for its 
716 Barth Church Dogmatics, 11.2,659-660. 
717 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, trans. R. H. Fuller and Irmgard Booth (New York: 
Collier Books, MacMillan Publishing Company, 1949), 73. 
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material life. Such a community of worship finds its life in the prayer that God may in His 
mercy complete that good work which He has done, redeeming us from our evil desires as 
we seek in faith to become useful partners in His joyous work of reconciliation. 
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